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ABSTRACT
The thesis examines the relationship between the Norwegian state and the 
international oil companies from 1965 when the first oil concessions were 
granted on the Norwegian Continental Shelf to the beginning of 1975. It singles 
out three variables which were the objects of bargaining between the state and 
the companies during this period; oil-rent, volume control and Norwegian share 
of spinoffs from oil. To study in more detail the division of oil-rent over 
time we have constructed a cash-flow model which incorporates different parti- 
cipation schemes which were negotiated between the state and the companies and 
which also takes account of different exploration success rates. This framework 
of analysis makes use of a historical methodology. It attempts to recreate what 
the likely division of rent would have been at the time when new concessions 
were granted to the companies in 1965, 1969, 1973, 1974. It is only based on what 
the state and the companies expected the costs, revenues and tax conditions to 
be that it is possible to understand the historical development of Norway's oil 
policies. We have also carried out a number of sensitivity tests to see how 
changes in the variables which influence costs and revenues would have affected 
the division of rent and the Internal Rate of Return (IRR) of the companies. 
The most important of these factors was the shape of the production profile.
To understand the development of the three chosen bargaining variables over 
time, and in particular the constantly increasing role of the Norwegian state 
with respect to all three variables, we have relied on three explanatory factors. 
First exogenous changes in the expected Present Value from the oilfields in the 
North Sea; secondly the situation in the international oil industry; and thirdly 
the special characteristics of the Norwegian state. While development of the first 
two factors opened up the way for a strengthening of the role of the Norwegian 
state in the industry and made them easier to achieve, the particular form and 
manner in which these changes were grasped by Norwegian policy-makers can only 
be understood with reference to the historical and political peculiarities of 
the Norwegian state, in particular the weakness of the national Norwegian capital- 
ist class. Norwegian oil policies also operated within a set of ultimate policy 
constraints. This meant that the Norwegian policies tried to increase the state's 
share of the total rent by a process of participation and by the creation of a 
state oil corporation, Statoil, which did not imply any fundamental confrontation 
with the private companies and which left the IRR of these virtually intact. 
There are thus no 'unicausal' explanations of the increase in the role of the 
Norwegian state in the oil industry. Any satisfactory explanation must rely on an 
interdisciplinary perspective. No purely economic, sociological or political 
approach to state intervention in a modern society is possible.
(ii)
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INTRODUCTION
The period 1965 to 1974 saw a number of fundamental changes in 
Norwegian oil policies. From being exclusively a 'passive 1 tax collector 
when the search for oil first started, the Norwegian state was by 1975 
extensively involved as a potential producer of oil through its own state 
oil corporation and was also rapidly expanding its downstream activities.
This thesis will concentrate on the reasons, limitations, and 
perspectives for this increased importance of the Norwegian state in the 
oil industry and puts particular emphasis on what this has meant for the 
state's relationship to the international oil companies.
In order to analyse the changing role of the Norwegian state it is 
necessary to develop a general framework of analysis of the oil industry. 
Oil production is characterized by the existence of oil-rents. These 
rents are then divided between the landlord owning the oil-producing 
territory (the nation-state) and the capitalist extracting the oil 
(normally a private oil company). Therefore an important part of the 
analysis of the role of the state is (by necessity) made by examining 
the relationship between oil companies and producer-states, the two 
protagonists in the battle for the oil-rents.
The second antagonistic relationship between the companies and the 
state, the control over the volume of production, is related to the first 
area of conflict. A change in the optimum production schedule for a 
field will (in a number of well-defined circumstances) change the 
discounted value of the oil-rent accruing to each protagonist.
Finally, the producer-state will want to maximize the spinoff effects 
from oil. Because this aim may involve less of a direct conflict with 
the companies, it is of a somewhat different nature than the two others.
We will examine the 1965-74 period, analyzing the relationship 
between the Norwegian state and the companies, and the increasing import- 
ance of the Norwegian state in the light of the three variables listed 
above.
In doing so, the thesis breaks new ground in several ways. It 
develops, for the first time, a model to describe the division of oil- 
rents which incorporates the concept of 'participation 1 . In addition, 
the underlying cash flow model also incorporates a number of more 
specific novel features. It incorporates a notion of 'risk 1 . It also 
measures the rent in discounted terms; while a number of models have 
done the same, we try for the first time to trace the development of
discounted variables over time. Finally, our model uses an historical 
methodology. This means that the development of the relationship between 
the Norwegian state and the companies at any one time is seen in relation 
to what was known and believed to be the case at that time. I.e. the 
1969 round of negotiations between the Norwegian state and the oil 
companies can only be understood in relationship to the cost and revenue 
conditions and the situation in the international oil industry in 1969. 
We have thus tried to recreate a number of bargaining situations 
throughout the 1965 to 1974 period.
It should be noted that there is at the moment no satisfactory 
treatment of Norwegian oil policies which in a systematic manner analyses 
the state's overall relationship with the companies through time; or which 
tries to relate the outcome of the relationship between the Norwegian 
state and the companies to existing bargaining theories in the oil 
industry.
What exists is mostly partial accounts dealing with the impact of 
oil on the political system (Naustdalslid (1974) (1975a,b), Noreng 
(1974) (1978), Ausland (1978), Mathiesen (1976), Wyller (1973) (1975) 
and Owe (1974). Similarly, there exist a number of more narrowly 
defined economic studies: Eckbo (1976), Bjerkdal (1975), Dam (1976) 
(1965) (1975), of which Dam is the most illuminating. But because 
Dam's whole approach is methodologically completely different from ours 
(see Chapter 2, p.65), and the others are very narrowly 'economic 1 in 
their approach, none of these treatments are in our view comprehensive 
or satisfactory. Finally, there exist a number of Government white papers 
and studies which both deal with the structural consequences of oil and 
outline the relationship to the companies. While these white papers are 
excellent from a factual point of view, they tend, not surprisingly, to 
leave out the more contentious issues from their analysis. An overall 
feature of all these efforts is furthermore that none of them concentrates 
in a comprehensive way on the increased importance of the Norwegian state.
Based on this state of the literature, our efforts to provide an 
overall and systematic investigation into the relationship between the 
Norwegian state and the companies, and in particular to analyze the 
increased importance of the Norwegian state in this process, can be 
classified as a step forward,, Furthermore, most case studies of company/ 
state relationships have been related to third world countries, while 
Norway will be the first industrialized capitalist country where the oil 
export industry will become of primary importance. Thus our analysis
will help to broaden the scope of the study of the oil industry and make 
available material for possible future cross-country studies.
Orthodox economic theory in general, and oil-economics in particular, 
has been notoriously weak in analyzing the state and the basic motives 
for state intervention. This thesis attempts to integrate an analysis 
of the state into a basically economic framework, concentrating on the 
division of oil-rent, in the tradition of political economy. It is 
impossible to understand the origins of state action by the Norwegian 
state in a purely restricted 'economic 1 sense. Also oil is not like any 
other commodity due to its strategic characteristics (see Chapter 8), 
which tends to influence state action when dealing with the oil industry. 
In order to understand state involvement in the oil industry a thorough 
analysis of the relevant historical and political peculiarities of the 
Norwegian state is provided.
The basic conclusion of this thesis will be that no single existing 
theory is able to account for the increase in the Norwegian state's stake 
in the oil industry. Any understanding of what happened must rely on a 
complex set of economic and political factors where the nature of the 
Norwegian state becomes of paramount importance. The thesis must in 
short be 'interdisciplinary 1 , a methodological approach which has perhaps 
been most strongly advocated by Myrdal when he argues:
"The isolation of one part of social reality by demarcating it 
as 'economic' is logically not feasible. In reality, there are 
no 'economic 1 , 'sociological', or 'psychological* problems, but 
just problems, and they are all complex.... Logically, the only
distinction that is scientifically valid is the one between more
2 
relevant factors and less relevant ones."
This attitude led Myrdal to argue for a return to a historical and
10
4
3 institutional mode of analysis. A similar methodology has recently
been advocated in a Norwegian context by Hernes.
Such a methodological approach stands in contrast to the positivist 
approach of most studies in economics which present a 'hypothesis', and 
which then a number of observations are meant to falsify. We are more 
interested in establishing the dynamics of state action over time, a field 
of study which theoretically has largely been ignored by modern Western 
economists of the neo-classical school.
The thesis is organised in the following way: Chapter 1 describes 
the historical setting within which the bargaining between the Norwegian 
state and the companies first took place. Special attention is given to
the peculiar nature of the Norwegian state, and the situation of the oil 
industry in the mid 1960s. When read together with Appendix A the latter 
description also provides a historical overview of the state/company 
relationship in the industry this century. Chapter 2 discusses in depth 
the three main objectives of bargaining between the Norwegian state and 
the companies, the choice of which are intimately related to the analysis 
carried out in Chapter 1. The second part of this chapter examines the 
literature which deals with the relative bargaining strength of the state 
and the companies in a raw-material producing industry like oil. It is 
then supplemented by our own discussion of the factors which influence 
the relative bargaining strength between the Norwegian state and the 
companies over time. The final part of Chapter 2 outlines the different 
policy options open to the state.
Chapter 3 opens with an operationalisation of our bargaining 
variables. Then follows a detailed description of a computer cash flow 
model we have constructed to evaluate the division of rent between the 
companies and the Norwegian state over time. It also highlights the 
special features of our approach in analysing the problem at hand. 
Chapters 4 to 7 are a step-by-step analysis of what happened to 
Norwegian policies between 1965 and 1974. Each chapter deals with 
the granting of a new round of concessions on the Norwegian Continental 
Shelf (1965, 1969, 1973 and 1974), and we analyse what the new 
conditions of exploration (both with respect to taxes and participation 
agreements) would have meant for the division of rent; for control
over the volume of production; and for the spinoff effects of the oil 
production. Parallel to this we examine the form in which the steadily 
increasing importance of the Norwegian state made itself felt; and in 
particular how the creation of the Norwegian state oil corporation 
Statoil influenced the variables under scrutiny. Chapter 8 then carries 
out an overview of the period as a whole and relates the development of 
the sharing of rent, of volume control, and of spinoff effects, to the 
development of the factors that in Chapter 2 were postulated to influence 
this outcome. In explaining the nature of the Norwegian state's inter- 
vention in the oil industry we put particular emphasis on the constraints 
under which Norwegian policies were de facto forced to operate. Then in 
Chapter 9 follow the conclusions and some further perspectives that 
arise from the emergence of a strong and dominant state capitalist sector 
in the Norwegian economy in the wake of the oil activities.
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CHAPTER 1
THE HISTORICAL SETTING: The oil industry and the Norwegian
state
1.1 INTRODUCTION (1962-65)
It is commonly assumed that the interest in the North Sea as a 
possible oil-producing area started with the 1959 gas find in Groningen, 
Holland, of one of the biggest natural gas fields in the world. But 
interest had already been shown at an earlier date by the major oil 
companies. According to Shell: "Interest in the North Sea as a prospective 
zone of exploration became marked in the late 1950s after the first Suez 
crisis of 1956-57." The initial interest therefore stemmed from a 
political event (a threatened supply boycott), and the Groningen find
merely reinforced this existing interest. Shell made contact with the
2 UK government about exploration as early as 1959 and by 1962 three of
the majors (BP, Shell and Esso) were conducting seismic surveys off the 
UK East Coast. 3 Phillips was the first firm to approach the Norwegian 
government about oil exploration in the North Sea. The initial contacts 
were established by the somewhat unusual route of officials at the 
Norwegian Embassy in Bonn. In the words of one Phillips 1 executive: 
"At this time (1962 - PN) the primary interest.was centred in 
the southern part of the North Sea- However, it was in this 
initial period that Phillips exploration people, in evaluating 
the entire area, became curious as-to the possibilities of 
the northern portion of the North Sea.... It was thought 
that this Northern part could also be attractive and that 
the competition for acreage might be less than in the 
shallower southern part, where there was a more general 
knowledge of the geology and where operations would be 
closer to shore."
If Phillips was the first company to apply for acreage, others 
were not far behind. Between autumn 1962 and June 1963 at 
least six foreign oil companies made provisional enquiries 
about the possibility of obtaining search concessions in the North 
Sea.^ By July 1963 the Norwegian government had given permission to 
three groups to carry out surveys. The first consisted of Shell, Esso 
and BP, the second of two French state entities, BRP and RAP, and the 
third was Phillips on its own. At the same time ten companies decided
to jointly finance an airborne magnetometer study over 144,000 square
 7
miles of the North Sea.
Phillips 1 application for exploring and producing oil was rejected 
in 1962, according to one Norwegian civil servant, because "at that time 
there were no regulations, neither in Decree nor in Law form, concerning
o
how Norway should behave with regard to such applications". One reason 
for this lack of regulations was that there had never been any hope of 
finding oil on the Norwegian mainland 0 The first necessary step for 
Norway to produce oil was to declare its sovereignty over the North Sea 
Continental Shelf as regards exploration for and exploitation of natural 
resources. This was done in a Royal, Decree of 31 May 1963 0 The Decree 
was followed by an Act on 21 June 1963, which stated that the rights to
Q
submarine natural resources were vested in the State. Norway could 
then, if it wished, grant Norwegian or foreign corporations the right 
to explore such underwater resources. The Act finally empowered the 
State to issue rules and regulations concerning such exploration. A 
special Continental Shelf Commission was subsequently created to work 
out these regulations. While the more legal questions were being 
studied in detail, the companies were allowed to start seismic work 
on the Shelf.
Several factors should be noted about the way Norway solved 
the initial legal problems connected with oil exploration.
Norway could, first, have ratified the Geneva Continental Shelf 
Convention drawn up in 1958 to assert individual countries' sovereignty 
over the Continental Shelf. But Norway chose its own solution,because "on 
one interpretation (of the Geneva Convention - PN) Norway would not 
be entitled to any significant share of the open sea". Norway's 
refusal to accept the Geneva Convention, but its insistence on the 
median-line principle, was later confirmed in a legal agreement with 
the UK signed in April 1965  One of the reasons for this not obvious 
but extremely important outcome, was the UK interest in a speedy 
solution. Any attempt by the UK to challenge the Norwegian interpreta- 
tion in an international court would have taken many years to settle, 
if the normal speed of such cases is anything to go by. And the UK 
was in a greater hurry to extract oil from the North Sea than was 
Norway. All of Norway's present oil and gas-fields are today situated 
in what would have been disputed waters had Britain persevered against 
the Norwegian interpretation.
8Secondly, the clarification of formal ownership of the Continental 
Shelf was thought by the Norwegian government to be a prerequisite 
for an all-out involvement by the companies in the North Sea. 
It is however doubtful whether such a clarification was an absolute 
requirement for the entry of the companies (even though it 
undoubtedly helped). And even in the Norwegian case a number of oil 
companies were prepared to spend a considerable amount of money on 
seismic surveys even before the legal questions had been definitely 
settled. It can, however, be argued that these companies may simply 
have wanted to establish their presence on the Shelf as a fait accompli 
before Norway had time to impose any strict regulations. On the other 
hand the major companies did not like the prospect of a 'free for all 1 . 
According to one executive this would lead to 'anarchy 1 as well as 
encourage 'parasites' - i.e. competitors that would idly stand by 
while one company drilled, merely to start exploring once a find had 
been made.
By claiming sovereignty over the Continental Shelf, a number of 
questions were however left unanswered. Some of these may have meant 
relatively little in 1963, but they could in the long run have a 
profound influence on future developments. The most important was the 
ambiguity of the definition of the Continental Shelf and whether this 
should be interpreted according to a fixed depth criterion (200 m) or
whether the criterion should be one of technological possibility of
13 
exploration. This had an important bearing on the question of
exploration north of the 62nd parallel. No acreage was initially offered 
in this territory, because the median line criterion of division could
not be applied, and because there was no unambiguous definition of the
14 Continental Shelf.
The general situation in the North Sea in 1963 was summed up in 
these words:
"Nearly 20 companies are competing for a glittering prize -
the chance of an oil and gas bonanza right on the doorstep
of the world's second biggest consuming area." 
The companies' access to the Norwegian Continental Shelf was 
formalized in a Decree form on 15 May 1964, and 8 groups could formally 
apply for permission to explore for oil (but not to drill or produce). 
BP split off from Shell and applied as a single group, while Gulf for 
the first time became interested. Norwegian interests were represented 
by one fully owned Norwegian consortium and through Hydro at that
time, the second largest industrial firm in Norway, and with a minority 
government share. Hydro had in February formed PetroNord together with 
the two French state oil companies. This was hardly surprising seeing 
that 30% of Hydro's shares were French-owned.
The detailed regulations for drilling and production on the 
Norwegian Continental Shelf were published in a Royal Decree of 9 April 
1965 - regulations which were to be the basis of Norwegian oil policies 
until 1972. Applications for the production licences were closed on 
15 June. The results were announced in September 1965. Norway had 
truly entered the oil age.
It is our aim to understand the relationship between the Norwegian 
state and the international companies which was formally initiated at the 
same time. As a first step towards such a task, we must analyse the 
historical situation of the two protagonists in the battle for oil-rent 
from the Norwegian Continental Shelf, the international oil companies and 
the Norwegian state.
1.2 THE HISTORICAL SETTINn
1.2.1 The international oil industry
There were several reasons why the companies should have been 
extremely interested in the North Sea. Even if there was an excess supply 
of oil in the mid 1960s, the demand for oil on a world-wide scale was 
expected to increase, and it was clear that an increasing proportion of 
this demand would have to be satisfied from offshore areas. The five years 
up to 1964 had seen an increase in world oil consumption of no less than 
64.5% - and there was no indication that the rate of growth in demand 
for oil would abate.
According to one optimistic oil executive:
"Energy demand is expected to double by 1985, and the petroleum 
industry is intensifying its search for oil and gas in underwater 
areas... (therefore) ... there appear to be very few coastal areas
any place in the world which will not be explored in some manner
18 
or other within the next 10 years."
The prediction that an increasing amount of this oil would come from
off-shore areas was based on the worldwide distribution of sedimentary
19 
rocks, a great proportion of which are situated offshore. The oil
10
industry was in 1964 already involved offshore in 19 different countries, 
while actual production was taking place in five. But these were 
scattered in such different areas as -the Persian Gulf and the Cook 
Inlet, Alaska. In the latter area the general weather conditions were 
just as bad as in the North Sea even if the depth of water was shallower.
This general interest in finding oil must also be seen in relation 
to the companies' world-wide strategies. It is here useful to distinguish 
between different kinds of firms.
The independents were at the time especially eager to gain access to 
new sources of oil outside the US. When seen against this background, 
the very aggressive and enterprising attitude of the 'independent 1 
Phillips in the North Sea from the early 1960s becomes much more 
understandable.
The majors were equally interested in the North Sea, but partly 
for other reasons. Their short-run requirements would be satisfied 
from their own deposits, especially in the Middle East, even if we 
should make a distinction between crude-long and crude-short majors. 
But they also knew that they needed access to new fields in the medium 
to long run, and that the North Sea was one of the more attractive 
future areas which they did not want other companies such as the 
independents and the state oil corporations to monopolize. Finally, 
as Gaskell observes, there almost seems to be a psychological law
among companies that nobody wants to be left out of a new productive
20 
area.
In addition to the more general factors explaining the companies 1 
need for oil, the North Sea as a producing area enjoyed a number of 
other advantages. Oil and Gas International listed in 1964 a number
of these. For our analysis two are especially relevant: first, a
71 stable political climate and second, closeness to markets.
At that time transport costs constituted around 30% of the
22 import cost of one barrel of oil to Europe. This would in the
case of finds in the North Sea be drastically reduced. The political 
stability of the countries around the North Sea was at that time also
unquestioned. 23 The oil companies were in principle willing to pay a sub- 
stantial premium for operating in such a political climate, where the 
danger of nationalization was minimal. The companies were therefore willing 
to pay what amounted to a 'political rent' for operating in the North Sea
11
compared with other parts of the world. But it was up to the Norwegian 
negotiators to try to find out how large this rent was. The companies 
were not likely to tell them.
The companies' interest in the North Sea and their initial strategy 
can only be understood on the background of the situation in the 
international oil industry in the mid 1960s. Norwegian policy-makers 
were in 1965 faced with an oil industry which for decades had exhibited 
a remarkable degree of stability. This chapter and Appendix A show 
how the world's oil industry came to be dominated by a small number of 
vertically integrated oil companies which operated internationally and 
which in an explicit or implicit manner were colluding with each other. 
Any threats to this structure, whether from the entry of new firms, or 
from producer-states trying to exert more control, had historically been 
incorporated or neutralised by existing firms without much difficulty. 
While we will later outline in more detail the reasons for this unusual 
industrial structure, our historical introduction shows that the corres- 
ponding traditional company/nation state relationship remained one of 
extreme 'inequality 1 for much of this century. This inequality of the 
traditional concession patterns were largely the result of the colonial 
circumstances .under which most of these agreements had been signed.
Towards the early 1960s this structure of the industry was coming 
under some pressure as 'independents' and state oil corporations for the 
first time appeared as producers. Both groups of companies were later to 
have an important influence in Norway.
The period 1959 to 1965 can be best understood in the light of the 
decision to impose quotas on import of oil to the US. This move upset 
the whole pricing and profitability structure of the industry and led 
to a much more unstable market situation, which again had an adverse 
influence on the 'majors' and their control. The chain of reactions was 
the following. A number of US firms wanted to produce from the low-cost 
Middle-East fields so that crude could be shipped back to the US, refined 
and sold at the generally higher prices that applied to petroleum products
in the US. This process started as early as the mid-1950s and by 1960 a
24 
number of these companies, normally called the 'independents', had found
oil outside the US. But because of the import-quota system the amount of 
oil which each of them could ship back to the US was restricted. Any 
additional output from their overseas fields therefore had to be disposed 
of elsewhere. In effect, this meant selling it to the small, but increasing
12
number of independent refiners that existed in Western Europe at the 
time. But there was only one way of ensuring access to this market, 
namely to undercut the price offered by the majors.
But this was still not a bad commercial proposition for the 
'independents 1 , because the majors had traditionally charged a 
relatively high price for the crude it sold to these refiners. 
This was to take advantage of the specific taxation rules in 
the West, which induced the majors to declare most of their profit 
in the upstream end of the production cycle. This strategy suffered 
no set-backs as long as the majors completely dominated the supply of 
crude. But when the independents offered the independent refiners 
cheaper crude, there was no lack of takers. Final product-prices 
fell as a consequence, and the majors had no choice but to follow suit. 
But with a price of crude to the subsidiaries of the majors which 
stayed constant at posted price levels, and falling product prices, 
profitability was squeezed. (The saying 'only fools and subsidiaries 
pay posted prices' originates from this period.)
The majors consequently wanted to bring down the posted price of 
crude closer to the real market level. This was for them in any case 
quite natural, as there had never been any thoughts that there should 
be a difference between posted and market prices when the system was 
first introduced. But in doing so they would hurt the 'fiscal take 1 
of the producer countries, as this 'take' was linked to posted prices. 
It was somewhat ironic that cutting the posted price of crude helped
f\
the creation of OPEC in 1960.
The first aim which OPEC pledged to carry through was to restore 
the cuts in the posted price. This they did not manage to do, but on 
the other hand OPEC successfully fought any further cuts in the posted 
price all through the 1960s even if the difference between 'posted 
price 1 and the 'spot price' continuously widened until discounts up 
to 40<f/bbl were to be found in the late 1960s. The weakening of the 
price of crude was further brought about by the increase of Soviet
exports to Western Europe, which by 1961 provided 7.5% of all oil
25 consumed by the Western European NATO countries. Even if the Russians
tried to undercut the majors' prices to gain access to the market, 
there was no reason to analyze the Soviet move as being primarily 
'political'. The Soviet Union had historically sold oil to Western 
Europe (as an example it provided 19% of total oil imports to Western 
Europe between 1930 and 1933), and felt it had a claim to part of
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the market. Also, given the production costs of oil in the Soviet Union 
at this time, the Soviet economy's comparative advantage may well have 
been greater for oil than for any other major commodity it could sell 
in the West.
The consequence of this extra amount of cheap oil on the Western 
European market was a further decline in prices, and a further instabil- 
ity of the oil products market.
The import quotas also had a number of consequences in the US 
itself. The effect of separating the US market from the rest of the 
world and guaranteeing a higher than world average price for oil 
produced in the US helped to maintain US production much higher than 
it would otherwise have been (and again contributed to the general 
excess supply which prevailed in the rest of the world). But it made 
the US consumer pay more than necessary for oil and it also encouraged 
a large percentage of all the majors' exploration expenditure to be
96
spent in the US. The discovery of the Alaskan North slope fields 
in the late 1960s can be seen as a result of this policy.
There was another group of companies apart from the 'independents' 
which made their entry into the industry at this time and which further 
complicated the former 'orderly 1 picture of the industry. Their 
presence was only indirectly related to the US quotas. They were
the state oil corporations of the consumer countries, of which the
27 Italian ENI became of particular fame. ENI was encouraged to grow
in response to what Italian policy-makers saw as the monopolization 
of the oil industry by the Anglo-Saxon majors. Once the Italian state 
realized that it was paying an artificially high price for imported 
crude because it was dependent upon the majors' network and therefore 
paid full posted prices for the crude, it encouraged ENI to look for 
oil abroad, as well as letting it import oil from the Soviet Union. 
We have seen that between the late 1950s and 1965 there was a 
general weakening of the monopolistic structure of the industry as new 
firms entered. But this was not automatically the same as a correspond- 
ing strengthening of the producer-states. For example, a similar 
challenge in the late 1920s did not lead to any increase in the relative 
bargaining strength of the producer-states. Other factors, like the 
political sophistication and consciousness of the producer states, are 
therefore of great importance in explaining the developments to come. 
While there was no way the producer states could have improved their 
situation in the 1920s and 1930s, this was not so in the beginning of 
the 1960s. The states did start to take advantage of this new
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situation, as their bargaining strength was slowly improving.
This change in relative bargaining strength was expressed in a 
number of new agreements that were concluded from the late 1950s 
onwards. In particular the 'joint venture 1 agreements along Iranian 
lines were later to be the basis for the Norwegian concession systems. 
But these were initially all concluded with the newcomers to the industry, 
so the attitude of the majors towards the producer-states remained, in 
general, as implacable as ever. The first joint venture agreement in 
the industry was entered into between INOC and ENI in 1957. In 
contrast to the normal agreements of the industry, a 'joint venture 1 
gave the Iranians a 50% share of the profits corresponding to its 
50% share in the investments in addition to the normal 50% corporation 
tax on ENI's earnings, giving a rough 75/25 division of profits in
 
INOC's favour. INOC was not to invest any money until a commercial 
find had been made, while INOC was to be an active partner throughout 
the life of the project. A similar agreement was made between INOC and 
the US independents Pan American Oil Company and Sapphire in April and 
June 1958.
The Saudi Arabians made a joint-venture agreement with a 
Japanese company, Japan Petroleum Trading company, which was agreed 
in 1957. While Saudi participation was a mere 10%, the interesting 
aspect of the agreement was that the new joint company was to be 
fully integrated. The first stumbling moves had been made towards 
producer-participation in downstream activities.
Kuwait made a 20% joint-venture agreement with Shell in 1961. 
This was in retrospect an important event. It was the first time one 
of the majors agreed to state participation. But it remained the only 
joint-venture agreement concluded with any major during the period until 
1965. Another kind of agreement, service-contracts, which also could 
give an increased say to the nation-state, was attempted and introduced 
for the first time in 1960 by Venezuela. In such agreements the 
companies have no rights as legal holders of concessions, which are 
retained solely by the state, but are hired as suppliers of technology 
and knowhow. All decisions concering output etc. rest with the nation- 
state. On paper such an agreement looks extremely favourable for the 
producer-states, but in order to properly assess its economic signific- 
ance one has to know the details of the payment to the companies, 
especially the amounts and price of oil promised as payment, as well
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as the amount of de facto control that the majors exert on the basic 
decisions of production. This agreement was advocated in Venezuela 
by Romulo Betancourt, the leader of Accion Democratica, who in 1960 was 
elected President on a left-wing platform that included the promise to 
nationalize the oil companies. The threatened confrontation between the 
government and the companies was only defused after considerable pressure 
from the US government which at that time had a paramount interest in not 
further upsetting the situation in the Caribbean. (It had enough diffi- 
culties with Cuba.) The US also saw the importance of continuing the 
steady flow of oil from Venezuela to the US. The outcome of the 
confrontation was that the basic relationship between the US and Venezuela 
continued, but that Venezuela set up a state oil corporation, CVP
(Compania Venezuelana de Petroleo), and it was decided that all future
28 
agreements were to be on the basis of 'service-contracts'.
Indonesia was the other country which implemented service-contracts 
during this period. An agreement was reached in 1963 with Esso, Shell 
and Caltex not only with respect to new contracts but also covering 
older and already existing contracts. The division of profit between 
the Indonesian government and the companies was stipulated to be 60/40. 
While the companies had to renounced their temporary property rights over 
the concessions, they retained their rights to all over-ground assets 
used in the production of oil. The Indonesian state oil corporation 
Pertamina was to take over all downstream activities in the Indonesian 
market.
We can now summarize the changing roles of the oil producing states during 
the period 1959^-1965, developments which in the long run were going tp have profound 
influences on Norwegian oil policies. First, a number of new agreements 
were introduced, some of which for the first time actively involved state 
oil corporations of the producing countries. However, these companies 
were initially nothing but paper organisations. Only in exceptional 
circumstances did any of the majors accept the new kinds of agreements. 
It was therefore up to the 'independents' and the consumer-states' oil 
corporations like ENI to offer new and better conditions. Effectively 
the overwhelming majority of all oil continued to be lifted by the 
majors under agreements that involved neither state participation nor 
service contracts.
Secondly, there were some feeble attempts to think in terms of the 
wider spinoff and industrialization aims of the producer-states. This
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expressed itself by the producer-states' wish to integrate downstream 
as well as by acts like trying to discriminate in favour of national
OQ
shipping companies in the transport of crude.
While the period saw the creation of OPEC, the new organization 
remained basically ineffective. In addition to OPEC's unsuccessful 
fight against a drop in posted prices in the early 1960s, the very first 
OPEC conference stated as an aim: "That members shall study and formulate 
a system of ensuring the stabilization of prices by among other means, 
the regulation of production". The only problem with this aim was 
that OPEC had no way of implementing it. The producing-states had no 
say over the volume of production, which was still the decision of the 
companies. There was also a contradictory element in the creation of 
OPEC. The stability (and high prices) in the market for oil products 
was very much a result of the majors' marketing strategies. But inasmuch 
as OPEC was created to undermine the power of the majors, to this extent 
there was a contradictory element buried in the very functions of OPEC. 
This dilemma was never to disappear.
But despite the emerging instability within the oil industry 
referred to above, the majors remained in 1965 dominant. By relying 
on their vertically integrated structures, they still controlled the 
overwhelming part of the world's production of crude and continued to 
earn a healthy (albeit falling) rate of profit. And there was no 
indication that they were lightly accepting as a permanent feature of 
their relationship to producer countries the principle of state 
participation or service contracts. Only in instances where they knew 
that, for political reasons, it was this or nothing (as in Indonesia 
under President Sukarno), were the companies willing to enter into such 
contracts. The bargaining strength of the companies as a whole was 
further enhanced by the fact that where they existed, the producer states' 
oil corporations were in no position to take over the running of the 
oilfields. In addition, most present or future producer states, including 
Norway, were as consumer countries still solidly dominated by the majors. 
The situation was therefore bleak for any Norwegian policymaker who was 
nurturing plans of 'getting tough 1 with the companies as Norway for the 
first time was planning to allocate acreage in the North Sea.
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1.2.2 Norwegian peculiarities
Norway had also been acquainted with the international oil industry 
in its capacity as an importing country before the first concessions 
were formally awarded in 1965. In particular, the general controversy 
about transfer-pricing referred to above had also affected Norway. 
Because Norway was charged full prices on all crude imported by the 
majors during the period, the Norwegian balance of payments suffered 
accordingly. It is a good indication of the lack of power of the 
Norwegian state in the face of the international companies that nothing 
was done to remedy this situation in the period until 1965. The virtual 
absence of any company (whether in the field of refining or distribution) 
to challenge the hegemony of the 'majors' underlined the state's relative
bargaining weakness. As a result of the manipulation of transfer prices
31 whereby imports were invoiced at full posted prices, Seierstad
estimated that the total accumulated loss to the Norwegian balance of 
payments during the 1960s was Kr. 340 mill. The head of the Norwegian 
Central Bank in 1968 pointed to.the activities of the oil companies as
the prime example of how transfer prices could be used to shift profits
32 
out of countries with a high taxation rate.
The transfer price controversy was the first direct indication 
about the difficult situation the Norwegian state faced when it tried 
to deal with some of the largest multinational firms in the world. In 
the short run there was never any talk of remedying this situation by 
creating a Norwegian state oil corporation. This contrasted with the 
experience in other parts of Europe. The French had, in their tradition 
of 'dirigisme 1 , already in the 1920s built up a state oil sector. This 
was put to the same tasks as ENI from 1958 onwards, especially with the 
advent of de Gaulle's nationalism. But any understanding of how Norway 
was likely to act in the long run in dealing with the oil companies can 
only be built on a more thorough understanding of the special features 
of the Norwegian state. As will be argued below, Norway at the time 
was no 'ordinary' Western European state. Its peculiar economic, social 
and political characteristics had great influence on the formation of 
Norway's oil policies. We must therefore examine these characteristics 
in detail. We must however stress from the start that there will be 
no direct and mechanistic one-to-one correspondence between these 
policies and the Norwegian state structure. We rather want to understand
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how these characteristics established the overall direction and broader limits 
of the Norwegian policies with respect to oil.
To provide a better background to an understanding of Norwegian oil 
policies we will highlight two features of the Norwegian state. We will first 
describe the special characteristics of Norwegian economic policy and in part- 
icular Norway's historical relationship to foreign investment. Secondly, we 
will look in more detail at the political conditions in Norway. We will then 
see that the Norwegian state in the post-war period acted as an active, strong 
and interventionist entity, which operated within an unusually stable and 
(for Western Europe) nationalistic political environment.
The theoretical basis for our subsequent analysis is provided by a neo- 
marxist/institutionalist view of the state, where the state is not a neutral 
entity and instrument at the disposal of whichever party wins a parliamentary 
election, but is viewed as an institution which is intimately linked to the 
capitalist mode of production and its preservation. For an outline of the 
theoretical basis of such a position see the author's contribution in Nore 
and Green (1977), which gives the broad framework which structures our think- 
ing on the Norwegian state. According to this, our following description 
of the special features of the Norwegian state can best be understood within 
a framework which postulates that the modern state in its actions primarily 
attempts to take care of two functions. It seeks to guarantee the accumulation
of capital and in different ways tries to legitimate the existing political
34 
structures within Norway.
We must strongly stress that the choice of a theory of the state cannot 
only be related to some a priori and abstract notion of the role of the state. 
It must also be based on the concrete ways that the state has intervened in
the Norwegian economy. It must in short be historical instead of simply
35 being deducible from some abstract theories of the state.
(i) Foreign investment and economic policies
The control over foreign investment is immediately relevant if we 
want to understand a state's relationship to the process of capita,! 
accumulation. History is filled with examples of how the economic 
surplus, especially of less developed countries, has been remitted 
overseas rather than being reinvested in the host country, A policy 
that controls foreign investment can potentially prevent such a 
development, while at the same time it fulfils a number of more
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direct political functions by trying to take advantage of popular 
nationalist sentiments.
One of the striking features of many developed industrialized 
countries was the absence, until the early 1960s, of any explicit policy 
towards direct foreign investment. Norway in this respect has been an 
extreme exception, as the country implemented a law as early as 1906 
which sought to control foreign investment. Of the industrialized 
capitalist countries only Japan has pursued a similar policy for any 
period of time. (The fluctuating role of foreign investment in the 
Norwegian economy, and the various attempts to control such investment, 
is schematically set out in Appendix E.)
By the time the search for oil in the North Sea got under way there 
had been a significant shift in the Norwegian state's policies in 
relation to foreign investment. While the original concession laws of 
1906 and 1917 were still in operation, it was becoming clear that their 
effectiveness crucially depended on the way they were interpreted by the 
state. And since there was a significant amount of discretion in their 
interpretation, these laws seemed to be interpreted in ways which 
favoured the companies concerned. Nevertheless, Norway remained very 
much a 'special case 1 in Western Europe with regard to control of 
foreign investments. For foreign investments to be accepted they still 
had to conform to a number of strictly defined criteria. The most 
interesting of these from our point of view were:
"The foreign-owned industries shall not compete with existing
Norwegian firms, especially against those who mainly produce
for the domestic market"...
"As a rule it will be required that at least 50 per cent of
the capital stock shall be Norwegian-owned. If the required
*Zfi
capital is not forthcoming this rule may be relaxed."
It is now more easy to delineate the policies of the Norwegian 
state in relation to the oil sector. Foreign capital was to be accepted 
as long as national capital was not hurt (a negative definition and 
criterion), while the Norwegians tried to achieve parity with foreign 
investors whenever possible. This policy was undertaken to try to 
control the process of capital accumulation in Norway.
The state's preoccupation in the post-war period with the conditions 
of accumulation also showed itself in regional and industrial policies. 
Such micro-policies were aimed at increasing the overall efficiency of 
the economy, and were particularly called for because Norway has
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historically been characterized by an extremely uneven economic develop- 
ment. This has been most clearly expressed in the dichotomy between 
Northern Norway and Southern Norway, where the South has been by far 
the richer region. This imbalance has also been reproduced, jthough 
less dramatically, in the relation between town and country as a whole. 
This situation continues today, despite attempts by the government to 
pursue regional policies to a much greater extent than, for example, 
in Sweden. Government policies can also go some way towards explaining 
why Norway has managed to maintain a fairly decentralised industrial 
structure (again in contrast to Sweden). 37
As regards the industrial structure itself, one noteworthy aspect 
of the Norwegian state's policies in the post-war period was the lack 
of public ownership as an instrument of industrial policy. The number 
of industries taken over was small compared with other European countries. 
As late as the early 1970s, only 12 industrial firms had a majority
state share.
It seems that the Norwegian state has historically relied on man- 
power policies as an alternative to other kinds of micro-intervention 
to safeguard accumulation. The Norwegian state spent Kr. 1.2 bill, in
1976 on different items destined to increase the mobility and retraining
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of labour. This amounted to 2.6% of the total state budget.
Despite the importance of the micro-economic policies outlined 
above, it was the macro-policies instituted in the wake of the Second 
World War which constituted the most important way that the Norwegian 
state intervened to maintain the process of capital accumulation. The 
development of national accounting and the conscious use of the national 
budget, first introduced in 1946, constituted a definite breakthrough 
for the Keynesian aggregate demand approach to macro-economic planning. 
While the ideas of demand-management had been aired in the inter-war 
period, especially following the Kriseforliket (The Crisis Solution) 
in 1935 between the Labour Party (DNA) and the Agrarian Party, it was 
primarily after the war that such a policy was put into practice. But 
even in the post-war period, macro-policies were accompanied by the 
most stringent rationing and regulatory system that Norway had ever 
experienced. This system was adopted to avoid the potentially disastrous 
inflationary effects of letting the excess liquidity in the monetary 
system (a result of the occupation) work its way through the economy. But 
such a regulation was also necessary to raise the investment rate and
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thereby rebuild the economy after the war. Finally, but related to the 
last point, such direct regulations were introduced to conserve scarce 
foreign reserves. The new macro-policies were put into effect at a time 
when, according to Sejersted, "Norway was probably the most closely 
regulated economy in Western Europe". 40
It was only after 1952, when 'Lex Thagaard 1 (a number of policy 
recommendations seeking to extend the already existing economic 
regulations) was defeated and Norway again became fully integrated into 
the international economic system, that indicative macro-economic inter- 
vention in its own right came to dominate the policy scene. For Norway's 
return to the international economy, through its emphasis on non- 
discrimination and competitiveness on the world market, made the break- 
down of the strict post-war regulations virtually inevitable. This 
return was effectively anticipated when the Norwegian government in 
exile accepted the decisions taken at the Bretton Woods Conference 
in 1944 to work for the freest possible international economic order in 
the post-war period. So it was mainly a question of when Norway was 
to give up its autarchic policies, not if.
The final illustration of the importance of state policies for 
the question of accumulation is seen by examining investment-rates in 
the Norwegian economy. The importance of this example lies in the 
fact that this policy also has a clear and unambiguous relevance for 
the process of political legitimation in Norway.
\
From 1945 to 1958, Norway had the highest investment rate of any 
OECD country. Gross fixed investment reached 32% of GDP in 1958. The
period 1967-71 shows Norway with an average investment rate of 28.2% of
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GDP, second only to Japan with 37.8%. Another, and equally important,
feature of the investment situation was that a much higher percentage 
of total savings in Norway originated from the government than in other
countries. In the period 1958-61, government saving as a percentage
43 
of total saving ranged between 48% and 50%. Because the government's
share of total investments was much lower, there was therefore an 
important transfer of investment funds from the government to the 
private sector, which in the end controlled the allocation of such 
funds.
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(ii) Political stability and legitimacy
There is at any time a close relationship between the state's role 
as guarantor of the accumulation process and its role as legitimator of 
the political system. The success of each of these roles depends 
crucially on the success of the other. Nowhere in the Norwegian case 
study is this more clearly seen than in the immediate post-war period. 
One of the reasons why the Norwegian population was prepared to accept 
high investment rates and corresponding cuts in their immediate standard 
of living in the post-war period was the high degree of legitimacy that 
the Norwegian government enjoyed. Most people at the time accepted 
the then Prime Minister's subsequent description of the situation: 
"In 1945 it was clear for everyone that the 'cake* was too small. 
If living standards were to rise, the f cake f had to grow. This meant 
that production had to grow to lay the basis for an increasing 
affluence." The 'consensus 1 was not, however, total. Sections of 
the working class, in many cases led by the Norwegian Communist Party, 
which in the 1945 elections had obtained almost 12% of the votes, 
campaigned against the introduction of the semi-corporate political 
institutions which accompanied these policies, and voiced their 
opposition to cuts in living standards which followed the high invest- 
ment rate. These challenges to social-democratic policies were 
politically defeated both with the advent of the cold war and as the 
first tangible results of the policy of 'sacrifice' were seen in the 
early 1950s.
The period between the late 1940s and the EEC referendum in 1972 was 
characterized by an unusual consensus in Norwegian political life. 
This is well expressed in the almost total absence of strikes during the 
period. The average annual number of strikes in Norway during the 
period 1945-62 was 23, with a total loss of 136,000 working days,45 
among the lowest averages in the whole world. The reason why the 
majority of the population accepted these policies and politically 
supported DNA was far removed from any explanation which relies on 
ideological 'blindfolding' or treachery from leaders in the labour 
movement; two explanations often used by the left to 'explain 1 this 
period. People felt they were getting something concrete in return 
for adherence to the policies, whether it was a continuous increase 
in their standard of living or regional and industrial policies. The
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continued economic growth in the post-war period and the Norwegian 
distribution of income and wealth which remained extremely even compared 
with other Western European countries were the key factors in understand- 
ing the high degree of legitimacy enjoyed by successive Labour Party 
governments. We will not in this thesis go further into the very complex 
problems related to this legitimization process, and will therefore
disregard what Offe (1973) calls the 'normative' or 'legitimizing 1
46 
system, or what Habermas (1968) calls the 'socio-cultural system'.
But it should be pointed out that the successful post-war capital
47 
accumulation process in Norway led to a general depoliticization.
From now on, we will only bring the ideological/legitimizing factors into 
the open when they are immediately relevant for our analysis. In the
main we will stick to an analysis of the relationship between what
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Slagstad labels the economic and the political-administrative system.
It is against this background that the EEC referendum in 1972 
assumes a great importance, an importance which, as we shall see, also 
had repercussions on oil policies. The outcome of the referendum 
represented a dramatic end of the 'consensus' period of Norwegian 
politics. The referendum, which led to a direct cooperation between the 
Labour Party and the Conservatives in favour of entry, and an unprecedented 
popular mobilization against entry, shattered, at least temporarily, the 
political stability of the Norwegian post-war era.
(Hi) A more general view
We have above briefly outlined two special historical features of 
the Norwegian state which will be of use in understanding Norwegian oil 
policies. It is clear that such a selective description is of limited 
value unless we also understand the more general features of Norwegian 
society. For reasons of space this has mainly been done in footnote 
form below. We will here only schematically point to a number of crucial 
structural features which suggest that Norway, at least until the early 
1970s, did not conform to a standard description of an advanced country 
in the imperialist centre. A number of factors suggest that Norway during
this period enjoyed a "semi-peripheral" status in the world economy:
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- A large part of Norwegian exports were primary or semi-prpcessed goods.
- The Norwegian industrial sector consisted of small and generally weak
50 firms.
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- Foreign investment played an important part in the Norwegian economy, 
despite consistent attempts to control its influence.
But it is not only the economic structure of Norway which in some 
sense can be described as 'atypical 1 within a Western European country. 
The political institutions also show distinct characteristics. Because 
there tends to be a close relationship between the political and the 
economic characteristics of any society, this is of course not 
surprising. But, independently of any such economic determinism for 
the characterization of 'the political 1 , the political history of Norway 
also reveals a number of very special features. In particular the weak 
position of the Norwegian bourgeoisie, the strong anti-centralist and 
anti-bureaucratic political tradition, and finally a strong nationalistic
sentiment, are all factors which will be important in explaining the
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course of Norwegian oil policies. The special position of the
Norwegian state and in particular its close relationship to the Norwegian
Labour Par
tradition.
ty is also part of this special Norwegian political 
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1.5 TOWARDS A MODEL OF BARGAINING
The above overview indicates that there was a situation of mutual 
dependence between the Norwegian state and the oil companies. On the 
one hand the Norwegian state exercised the legal sovereignty over a 
geographically promising area of the Continental Shelf in the North Sea, 
but thought it needed the companies to find and produce the oil. On the 
other hand the companies possessed the necessary expertise to carry out 
a search. They also controlled markets, but needed the consent of the 
Norwegian state to gain access to the promising area which was outside 
their own jurisdiction.
This mutual dependence was similar to what had traditionally been 
observed in the oil industry from the beginning of this century. When 
in Chapter 2 we want to put forward a more formal framework of analysis 
to understand the relationship between the Norwegian state and the oil 
companies, this must therefore partly be based on the historical 
experience of company/state relationships worldwide. These have been 
described above and in Appendix A. But because the Norwegian state 
differed fundamentally from traditional oil-producing states (and indeed 
from other Western European states), our framework will also have to take
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account of the special features of the Norwegian state highlighted above. 
So when the next chapter identifies three objectives of bargaining as 
rent, volume, and spinoffs, the choice of these is based on a combination 
of general insights derived from the history of the oil industry, and 
the more particular features of the Norwegian state.
Such a starting point is indispensable for a satisfactory historical 
approach to the problem at hand. In our view no meaningful framework of 
analysis can ever be constructed in an 'historical vacuum 1 . One's choice 
of key variables of analysis is inevitably influenced by one's perception 
of history.
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CHAPTER 2
THE BARGAINING: OBJECTIVES. OUTCOMES AND POLICIES
Having completed an overview of the oil industry and looked in some 
depth at the special features of the Norwegian state, it is easier to 
construct a framework of analysis which examines in detail the objectives 
of bargaining between producer states and the companies. This framework 
which for brevity's sake we will call a 'model 1 is set out in Part I of 
this chapter. Part II deals with the outcome of the bargaining process, 
while Part III looks at the different policies that a producer-state can 
implement and their effectiveness. Our model has initially been 
constructed at a relatively high level of abstraction. There will 
therefore be some methodological 'victims' along the road towards 
clarification. We are for instance faced with at least three actors in 
our analysis (the third being the Norwegian non-state industries). But 
for the moment we assume that the Norwegian state also represents the 
interests of this third actor. On the other hand, the model as it is 
being presented conforms to the methodological principle of seeing how 
useful a model which contains a niminum number of variables can be before 
any extension is made to its basic structure. It is also important to 
proceed in this way for the purpose of exposition. We will first examine 
each object of bargaining in turn and will start with rent.
Part I: Objectives
2.1 RENT
The main feature of the oil industry compared with most other 
industries is that it permanently gives rise to rent. The division of 
this rent is then the subject of a conflict between the landlord who 
owns the land where oil is produced (normally the nation-state) and the 
capitalist who exploits the oil-field (the oil company). Oil-rent 
originates upstream in extraction, downstream in refining and petro- 
chemical production, and retailing. While it has historically been 
relatively meaningless to separate the three activities due to the 
existence and dominance of the integrated firms, such a separation is 
conceptually quite possible and has lately been made more meaningful due 
to the loss of upstream activities by the companies and the introduction 
of 'federalism* within the present-day oil industry whereby each sub-
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sidiary of a vertically integrated company, whether up- or downstream, 
has to make a profit on its own. *  >
Our task is to find a meaningful definition of rent that will be 
useful for the analysis of the oil industry as well as being theoretic- 
ally coherent. This is no easy task. The question of rent is an
extremely vexed one. Bye refers to the 'anarchic conditions prevailing
 
2 
in this field of study 1 .
An examination of the theory of rent and its historical development 
will be necessary before we can present our definition of oil-rent.
The first part of our concept of rent, differential rent, is based 
on the classical theory of rent. The analysis of differential rent 
from natural resources has changed little since the writings of Marx 
and Ricardo. But because the classical theorists had great difficulties 
in handling rent which existed at the margin (labelled absolute or 
monopoly rent), our attempts to deal with this aspect of rent absorbs
 
important elements of the Marshallian concept of rent. This is hardly 
surprising, as rent theory can still be seen as a battleground between 
Marshall and the classical writers. The nature of this confrontation 
and its relevance to the oil industry is set out in Appendix B.
2.1.1 An inquiry into the nature of monopoly rent in the oil industry
The classical notion of absolute rent is of little use in determining 
the price and therefore the amount of rent to be earned in the oil 
industry, except when it focuses on the political element of absolute
rent (see Appendix B). Our alternative is to focus both on the 
possible monopoly elements, as well as on more explicitly political 
elements, in determining the price of oil and oil products. This choice 
follows from what we regard as a strong tendency towards monopolization 
within the industry which was described in Appendix A. We will argue 
that in the very nature of oil production itself there are powerful 
forces which prevent the normal market mechanism from operating. 
Monopoly and restrictive practices therefore become the rule rather 
than the exception in the industry. Such a view is not uncontroversial. 
It clashes with a very influential school of thought, most clearly 
articulated by Adelman and Bradley, which tries to analyze the operations 
of the world oil market and consequently of oil prices from a competit- 
ive market-equilibrium point of view.
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We will first present Adelman's work as representative of the school 
of thinking that relies on pure market analysis. We will then present 
another school of thought represented by RafaS, which argues that prices 
(and hence rent) are fundamentally politically determined. Finally, 
we will put forward our own analysis.
2.1.11 Adelman f s analysis
Adelman sees costs and oil prices as moving together in the long 
run. Based on this theoretical starting point it is not surprising 
that he has been the most-quoted predictor of the demise of OPEC and 
the collapse of oil prices which in 1978 is close to 50 times the price 
of an incremental barrel in the Middle East.
Adelman's theory of price is complex and must be seen in relation 
to the pecularities of the oil industry. His concept of cost has two 
elements: development costs and discovery cost, both of which it is 
(at least in principle) possible to determine for existing fields. The 
problem arises for new discoveries because, according to Adelman, no-one 
can say anything about the relationship between the amount of money spent 
on exploration and the ensuing increase in recoverable reserves. There- 
fore future discovery costs per barrel are unknown. But it is possible 
to postulate an upper limit to future oil prices which is the price of 
extraction if no further exploration should take place. If the existing 
oil deposits were all to be depleted (and no new deposits found), then 
production costs for future oil would be slowly climbing. This is 
because existing techniques and financial factors tend to 'skim the
cream' of the wells - more oil can almost invariably be extracted from 
existing deposits if one is willing to spend more money on the under- 
taking. (Average recovery rates of existing fields are still only 
around 3o per cent.) Thus total world demand for oil could be satis- 
fied for a long time from existing fields, but with a higher production 
cost per barrel. If therefore no new fields were found we could 
establish a maximum long-run price for one barrel of oil - what Adelman 
labels maximum economic finding cost (MEFC). To the extent that new 
and richer deposits, and better technology both in exploration and 
production become available, so the long-run price of oil will fall 
short of the MEFC.
If companies or governments are willing to invest more per barrel 
in total exploration and finding costs than MEFC, this can, according
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to Adelman, only be due to 'imperfections 1 in the system such as 
governments 1 wish to protect indigenous energy resources.
Based on such a theory Adelman predicted the MEFC for 1985 (some 
15 years after he wrote his major work) to be around 20 cents per 
barrel (real terms). This is the level towards which oil prices, 
according to Adelman, will tend to gravitate in a perfectly competitive 
world in the absence of new discoveries and technological progress in 
oil extraction.
A number of questions immediately present themselves in regard to 
the use of this methodological framework, which relies heavily on the 
market for an explanation of developments in the oil industry.
The first is the obvious question of how can one then explain the 
drastic actual increase in price in recent years. Adelman f s answer 
would be that 'non-market 1 forces are to blame. He states that the 
degree of monopoly is a variable (apart from demand and supply) which 
decides the development of the oil prices over time. But. when do the 
exceptions become the rule? There is relatively little use in saying 
that X is the long-run tendency if this tendency never asserts itself 
in any forceful manner. It has anyway been almost impossible to talk 
about the existence of a "petroleum market" for large parts of this 
century, given that almost all oil has passed through the vertically 
integrated companies.
Secondly, why does Adelman only analyse the MEFC in the Persian 
Gulf? It may not be optimal for the Gulf states to satisfy the whole 
world demand for oil because of absorption problems in their economies 
even if such behaviour would be the most 'rational' from a private 
point of view. In short, Adelman seriously underestimates the absolutely 
crucial political forces that may push a country towards limiting the 
output of oil. (For a further discussion of this see Section 7.7).)
2.1.12 The political perspective
The methodological antithesis to Adelman is represented by an 
analytical tradition where we find writers like Rafag and Chalabi, and 
with some reservations Noreng. These writers claim that the determination 
of the price of oil is primarily political.
According to Chalabi a close examination of the history of the oil 
industry confirms what he labels the administrative nature of oil-pricing.
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He categorically states, "Never in that history were prices set in
y
accordance with so-called market-forces". As an example of his way of 
thinking consider the companies' decision in the post-war period to 
undertake price-cuts of Middle East oil in relation to US oil. Chalabi 
sees this decision as political and not (as is normally claimed) 
motivated by changes in market forces. The basic reason was the concern 
of Western economic planners and oil companies to reduce the cost of the 
oil to the developed oil-importing countries. His article is a step-by- 
step argument that similar political forces have been (and in the post- 
nationalization world of today continue to be) the prime 'mover 1 in 
setting the oil price.
A similar position is taken by RafaS when he writes: "crude oil 
prices do not seem to derive from an economic concept relating them to 
the economics of production or from a commercial concept governed by the 
dynamics of supply and demand, but rather from a strategic concept that 
aims to insulate prices from the continuous fluctuation and evolution of 
the industry.... the only way out of the dilemma (of determining oil 
prices - PN) was to proceed through the strategic and political approach
o
outlined above".
Noreng's position is somewhat closer to our 'compromise solution 1 
outlined below. While he claims that different factors are important in 
explaining the formation of the oil price at different stages in the 
development of the oil industry, he states, "the oil-price has been
influenced under quite different circumstances by factors other than
9 
marginal costs". As an indication of his approach, one of several key
factors which he sees will influence the price of oil in the future is 
"the political relations between OPEC and OECD countries, and their own 
internal cohesion".
Different reasons are put forward why the pricing process in the 
oil industry is so influenced by political considerations. The main 
reason RafaS gives for this state of affairs is that all traditional 
economic market models assume that the oil industry is a competitive 
industry, an assumption which "is in contradiction to the integrated and 
oligopolistic structure of the oil industry".
This does not preclude RafaS from advocating an understanding of 
what he labels the 'technocratic 1 approach to the pricing of oil by which 
he means an understanding of the more limited 'economic 1 elements in the 
pricing process. But according to the thrust of his work such an
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insight is mainly important in setting the relative prices of different 
crudes (relative in relation to the 34° Arabian Light), while here we 
have preoccupied ourselves with the general price level of oil.
For Chalabi the basic reason why the oil price has always been 
'administrable' is because producers are limited in number and any 
barrel of oil which is not produced is stored in the ground without any 
cost. As a consequence the major producers can set the price of oil and 
sell in as great quantities as the 'market 1 can take.
The main problem with the 'political' approach to oil pricing is 
that it leaves the whole outcome of the pricing process 'suspended in 
the air'. Literally anything can happen. As a minimum such an analysis 
has to be linked more closely to an analysis which seeks to identify the 
crucial variables why there has been a high degree of concentration in 
the industry. It is not enough (as Chalabi does above) to ascribe this 
to the few producers in the industry. The world has seen many other 
industries, especially raw material industries, where the same has been 
the case, and where 'market forces' have influenced the pricing process.
2.1.13 A compromise view 
(i) Barriers to entry
The continued tendency towards high prices in relation to production 
costs, and consequently large rents in the oil industry, during the period 
under study, is in our own analysis due to a number of reasons which 
cannot be adequately understood by either of the approaches outlined 
above. The first element in our explanation centres on the relationship 
between a highly concentrated market structure and high prices, a connec- 
tion also mentioned by the FTC Report (see Appendix A, p.302). We will 
start our analysis with one key element in determining market structures: 
barriers to entry.
The most important of the barriers to entry in the oil industry 
is the substantial need for capital required both to enter and to operate 
continuously in the industry. In exploration there may be a need to 
finance an unsuccessful venture over a considerable period of time. In 
production, especially in areas like the North Sea, the capital require- 
ments have been so vast that only a handful of companies have been able 
to raise the necessary capital on their own. While in downstream 
activities the cost of building and putting on stream a refinery
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constructed to attain most economies of scale in the early 1970s were 
upward of $250 million. 12
Furthermore, the companies often exercise a monopolistic control 
over the necessary technology to produce oil, a monopoly which is partly 
a reflection of the high research and development costs in the industry.
The necessity to spread production internationally so that each 
company refinery has access to crude of different qualities from its 
own sources in order to satisfy a particular 'blend 1 of crudes, also 
tends to limit the number of potential entrants to the industry, even 
if 'swap arrangements' between firms can limit such a disadvantage.
(ii) 'Natural monopoly'
While there is relatively little disagreement that the oil industry 
is characterized by. important barriers to entry, a much more contro- 
versial issue is the extent to which the industry could be said to be 
a 'natural monopoly 1 , which could then readily explain the existence 
of rents in the industry. Since the marginal cost of production in the 
oil industry is much lower than the average cost, there has been a 
natural tendency towards oversupply in the industry. Historically it 
has been possible to produce additional output, £r in a relatively short 
time find new reserves, at a price which was below the average cost of
the existing industry. This tendency can be attributed to heavy fixed
1 "** investment which has encouraged companies to push additional crude
onto the market at a price which, being in excess of the modest marginal 
cost (and therefore contributing to a positive cash flow), was not high
enough to cover average cost. The only way to avoid such a disastrous 
development (for existing companies) has historically been to tightly 
control supply through a monopolistic market structure.
The potential instability of the industry, and the ensuing struct- 
ural consequences, can also be formulated in a slightly different way. 
As long as there are economies of scale in the production of crude, 
the expansion of output can threaten the market equilibrium because 
the incremental barrel can be sold at a price which is lower than the 
going price. Monopolization of the industry is again seen as a way of 
preventing this from happening.
The history of the oil industry can be interpreted in the light 
of the above theoretical insights. In particular the unusually strong 
tendency towards monopolization and vertical integration can be seen
34
to be a result of the necessity of controlling supply. No-one has put 
this point of view more coherently than Blair. While attributing some 
of the concentration of the oil industry to phenomena like geographical 
concentration of large reserves, and large capital requirements both 
for production and marketing through vertically integrated channels, 
he nevertheless continues:
"The degree of concentration inherent in the nature of things 
has been insufficient to provide effective control of markets. 
The nature of the industry is such that stability of price 
requires almost complete control of the markets." 
The way such a control historically has been maintained is then set 
out by Blair.
"By means of a web of cartel agreements set up in most of the 
world's consuming countries, they (the majors - PN) secured 
control over most of the world's markets. Through boycotts, 
intimidation, and the active support of government bodies, 
particularly the US State Department, they have been remarkably 
successful in keeping outsiders out."
A largely similar position was taken by Frankel when as early as in 
1946 he wrote:
"Because of the uncertain results of exploration, the high over- 
head costs at all stages of the industry, and a high inelasticity 
of demand in the short run, the industry is not 'self-adjusting' 
in the sense that a fall in prices chokes off supply significantly 
or strengthens demand. Therefore the industry is subject to 
continuous crises in the absence of reasonably strong control 
over supply." *6
Finally, Stork also supports such an analysis when he states: 
"Indeed, the historic dilemma of the US oil industry has been to 
restrict production in order to bolster prices."
The numerous ways that even the US governments, whether federal or state, 
have intervened in the oil industry is a constant reminder of the poten- 
tial problems of output control in the industry. The Texas Railroad 
Commission, which today continues to administer a pro-rata system for 
oil production, was set up in the wake of the collapse of the cartel 
system in the US in the early 1930s which had led to a 90 per cent drop 
in the price of a barrell of oil from the newly found East Texan fields. 
The 'as is' arrangement (see Appendix A, p,298) was similarly set up in 
the wake of a market collapse in Europe in the late 1920s.
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The relationship between vertical integration and monopolization 
is controversial. While it is possible to argue that vertical integra- 
tion is partly a product of special tax concessions that historically
made it advantageous for firms to be vertically integrated, and hence
1 8 is no way is an "inherent" feature of the industry, it is equally
plausible to argue that this industrial feature, which has dominated 
the oil industry since the formation of Standard Oil in the last century, 
is an integral and inevitable aspect of the oil industry. Frankel puts 
it bluntly when he says:
"The strength of the international companies lies in the degree 
of their integration.... The real power that these companies 
haveas the Power of Disposal ... if the international oil
companies would not provide what I like to call this r internal
19 20 
grid' somebody else would have to find a similar structure."
It should be pointed out that our view that the oil industry is a
21 
'natural monopoly 1 is strongly opposed by Adelman.
(Hi) Political influence
In addition to 'barriers to entry' and 'natural monopoly', there is 
a third reason why there has been a tendency towards monopolization in 
the industry. The reason is related to the characteristic of oil as a 
'strategic good'. The UK's purchase of the Anglo-Persian Oil Corporation 
is but the clearest example of this. More recently, as long as the oil 
companies were able to reliably supply at a low cost the ever-increasing 
demand of the Western world for oil, there was a tendency by the
governments to tolerate the continued existence of the oil-company 
cartel. The large influx of foreign earnings from the companies' 
overseas operations which contributed to the balance of payments in
77the mother countries also made the companies more immune to government 
interference in their affairs while at the same time it gave the 
companies a disproportionate political influence in their home countries.
Only one more task remains to be undertaken before we can put 
forward our own definition of oil-rents. We have to decide whether 
there are any limits to the amount of rent that can be collected at 
the margin, i.e. what is the upward limit to the price of oil?
There is the immediate limit that oil must not be made uncompetitive 
in relation to other sources of energy (a fact which is today keenly
27.
appreciated by the OPEC countries). While this may seem an obvious
36
point, it nevertheless has important methodological repercussions, by 
focusing the attention on oil not as a good in itself, but oil as one 
among many sources of energy. This approach is most clearly put forward 
by Masserat, who claims that final oil prices per energy-unit to the 
consumer will tend to gravitate towards the price of US coal. This is 
because the production of US coal gives the average rate of profit for
O A
the production of energy from a global point of view. 
2.1.2 Definition of rent in the oil industry
This concludes our discussion of the factors which determine the 
absolute level of the price of oil, and hence oil-rents, As key explan- 
atory factors we have chosen a combination of political variables and 
the high level of monopolization in the industry. At the same time 
there are clear upper limits to the price of oil determined by oil's 
relation to other forms of energy. Thus long-run trends in the price 
of oil, like the gradual decline in the 1950s and 1960s, only reflected 
market developments in a very slow and hesitating way. The only instance 
where the market mechanism today operates in anywhere like a 'normal 1 
manner within the oil industry is in determining the relative prices 
of the 52 kinds of OPEC crudes once the reference-price of the Saudi 34° 
'marker 1 crude has been set.
The theory of rent as it has been presented so far can give rise 
to a number of definitions of rent which are appropriate with respect 
to the oil industry. We will choose a definition that combines the 
classical notion of differential rent with 'excess profits' that are
being made at the margin as a result of the monopolistic features of 
the industry. There are Marshallian overtones in the definition because 
we claim that rent does not only originate from land.
Broadly similar definitions have been put forward by other writers. 
Van Meurs refers to rent as profit which is in excess of 'normal profits' 
defined as "that profit which is just sufficient to induce the entre- 
preneur to stay in the industry". 25 He also allows for a notion of 
quasi-rent which is somewhat different from the one employed in the 
traditional Marshallian context. Included in quasi-rents are earnings 
that are necessary for the continued existence of an oil company in 
exploration but not in other activities. Mikesell has a slightly wider 
concept of rent, as "any surplus above the current expenditures necessary
O f_
to produce the output".
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The only difficulty with these definitions as they stand is that 
they give no more specific insight into the origin of this rent in the 
oil industry. The only writer who has tried to do that in any systematic 
way is Chevalier (1974) and (1976). Our own definition of rent which 
will now be presented is in broad terms inspired by his writings.
Oil-rents consist of two elements, differential and monopoly rent.
(i) Differential rent is due to the heterogeneity of different 
crudes and production processes. It accrues to those who produce, 
transport, refine and market oil in the best conditions.
Differential rent is made up of various components:
Quality rent:
Gravity, measured in degrees API, is a characteristic of crude oil.
27 The lighter the oil, the higher price it will fetch. Sulphur content
is important due to the substantial pollution to which this component in 
oil can lead. It is expensive to 'desulphurize 1 crude. Normally it is
mixed with 'non-sulphurized 1 crude. But high sulphur content still
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represents a negative rent differential. Due to special local
Conditions, the quality differential may be different in different 
markets (depending upon tastes etc).
Position rent:
Production close to major markets is obviously of importance as 
there can be savings in transport costs. Such a position rent should 
in theory be possible to evaluate from the world-scale quoting and the 
corresponding AFRA rate for tanker transport. But unfortunately there 
are difficulties in using these rates for our purpose. Chevalier 
supports this by stating, "Most of the oil traffic is a steady one.
A company which controls a steady traffic optimizes its fleet and the
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average cost incurred does not depend on AFRA rates variation."
A similar critical attitude is expressed by Tanzer.
Mining rent:
This is an expression of the different production costs which reign 
in different oil-fields. The average cost of extracting oil in the 
Middle East is a maximum of around 30 cents per barrel compared with 
a production cost close to $4 per barrel in the North Sea (1976).
Technological rent:
Technological rent is due to one firm's greater efficiency in 
production, refining or marketing. It can be due to economies of scale 
in these different activities, or one firm's control over technology.
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The above four are all differential rents that are internal to the 
oil industry. The differential rent of the last barrel of oil needed to 
supply a market is zero.
(ii) Monopoly rent reflects the abnormal rates of profit which are 
earned in the oil industry as a whole and are mainly due to monopolistic 
features of the industry.
Monopoly rent results from the high concentration of the industry 
which, at the level of production, is due to natural monopoly, vertical 
integration and high barriers to entry. At the level of circulation 
monopoly rent is due to collusion and restrictive practices which in 
some instances are aided by government policies.
The total amount of rent is then divided between the producer-state 
and the oil corporation. Total oil-rents are therefore the sum of:
(i) taxes from oil-producing countries, in the form of royalties, 
income taxes, bonuses etc;
(ii) after-tax return on capital to the oil corporation in excess of 
the normal rate of profit. (We will later return to a definition of this.)
Taxes charged by importing countries on energy (like sales taxes 
on petrol) are sometimes included as part of monopoly rent. Such an 
extension of the definition will at the present stage not bring any 
further clarification to the problem of the distribution of oil-rent
between the Norwegian state and the companies. It will consequently be
32 ignored.
Our concept of oil-rent can as a first approximation be presented
33 graphically. The weakness with such an approach is that the rent is
presented as undiscounted. We will in Chapter 3 operationalise our 
concept of rent in discounted terms.
2.2 CONTROL OVER VOLUME
While there is an antagonistic bargaining relationship between the 
nation state and the oil companies over the relative share of oil-rent, 
the bargaining between the two 'actors' also takes place with regard to 
other issues. The most important of these is control over volume of 
production. Such control affects the overall size of the PV from an 
oil province and is therefore an aim which is separate from maximizing 
the relative shares of the two actors.
Historically there have been at least four separate reasons 
advanced as to why there should be a conflict over volume of production.
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Until recently the OPEC countries worried about control of production 
because less output from any of the fields implied less revenue for the state 
in question. When payment* to the state mainly consisted of royalties, this 
relationship was even more direct than when income also started to flow from 
profits taxes. As one high OPEC official has said: "Most confrontations
between single countries and the international oil industry have been over
34 
rates of production." The conflict was clear in its origin (and still is
for countries that don't control their own output). An oil company operated 
a vast production network which meant that the only criterion for output 
decision was maximization of the cash flow of the totally integrated firm, 
irrespective of the wishes of the individual producer countries.
Lately the question of volume control has been posed in a slightly 
different manner and also with a somewhat longer time horizon for the 
producer states. It is clear that to maintain OPEC (and thus for the 
producer countries to earn high amounts of future rent by charging high 
prices), the cartel, by formal or informal means, needs to control the 
quantity of production by its members.
A third level of argument in favour of volume control has been put 
forward in countries like Norway and Saudi Arabia, especially since 1973. 
Their arguments are based on the assumption that there is no automatic 
correspondence between the optimum private and social rates of extraction 
of a natural resource. So in order to maximize oil-rents in social terms, 
there may be a case for state intervention to control the volume of production. 
(For a further discussion, see Section 2.2.1.)
The state may finally want to control output for reasons of 'conservation'. 
This can mean refusal to let the companies flare gas, or (less used) forcing 
them to invest in 'uneconomic' secondary and tertiary recovery methods in 
order to increase the exploitable reserves of a field. Whether such an invest- 
ment is "worthwhile" clearly depends upon the different discount rates of the 
state and the companies.
Control over voluenr is normally classified as part of a. wider government
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aim of 'control' over the industry. This is however a very inexact and unclear
concept as it is normally presented. We first want to show that it is difficult 
to separate the state's aims of 'control' and 'rent maximization'. The former 
is a prerequisite for the latter. To do this we have to distinguish between 
the micro- and the macro-aspect of the level of production and speed of 
output. Government interference in the rate of exploration in existing 
fields is different from those guiding state interference on the macro-level, 
e.g. for the Norwegian North-Sea sector as a whole. Most theory addresses
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itself to the exploration of a given amount of a natural resource, in 
effect the micro-case. Micro-control rearranges the private optimal 
depletion path and will affect the present value of an oil-field. 
(But if the same total amount of oil is extracted the undiscounted 
figures will remain the same.) This is the case where the private 
companies are most opposed to government policy, as such regulations 
can upset their existing production plans which are carefully constructed 
according to private micro-economic criteria. As noted above, control 
over the physical production from one oil-field (e.g. by stretching 
production from 15 to 25 years) will change the present value of that 
one field. The direction of the change will however be more difficult 
to ascertain if the change in production-profile stems from a change in 
discount-rates. This is because two variables (the decrease in discount- 
rate and the increase in the life-time of the project) pull the PV of 
the field in different directions. Therefore, while regulating the 
volume at the micro-level still means that the state seeks to maximize 
its share of the oil-rent, the new aspect of micro-control is that the 
overall size of the discounted rent will have changed in response to the 
state's action.
Before we examine the theoretical underpinnings of the case for 
micro-regulation, let us briefly turn to macro-regulation. Macro- 
control will affect the total present value from the oil province such 
as the North Sea as a whole, but will have no effect on the present value 
of our individual hypothetical fields once their production goes ahead. 
The total output from one oil province can be controlled by not issuing 
new licences, a procedure that has been prevalent in Norway. While such 
a control is perceived by the companies as much less of a threat than 
micro-regulation, the companies are not uninterested in the aggregate 
level of output from one region. Leaving aside the historically specific
conditions of the North Sea case (which makes the companies extremely 
interested in production from the area because of the security of 
supply of high quality, high profit oil in a politically stable region 
close to the major markets), there are other reasons why the oil 
companies will be interested in the aggregate level of output. Quantity 
produced affects the economies of scale the companies can achieve in 
manpower training in technologically 'new 1 areas and standardization 
of production gear.
In the following case study we must therefore distinguish between 
'micro' and 'macro' control of volume. But once we have arrived at an
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adequate definition of 'rent', no other and new theoretical concepts 
will be needed to describe the quantitative consequences of volume 
control.
2.2.1 The theory of depletion
The theory of exploitation of a non-renewable resource tells us 
that a profit-maximizing private owner of a natural resource will 
exploit that resource at a speed that will maximize his expected present 
value of the investment. The crucial future variables that the individ- 
ual capitalist has to assess are costs, prices, and future demand. Any 
assessment concerning speed of extraction will be based on private costs 
and benefits as well as the private discount rate. Broadly speaking, 
an expectation of a sinking real price of oil will induce a 
faster rate of exploration from existing finds, as will an increase in
the private discount rate.
To determine the exact conditions for an equilibrium path of 
exploration of a natural resource the best starting point is the work 
of Hotelling, 36 who showed how a micro-economic market equilibrium 
with respect to depletion rates could come about through the operation 
of the market. For a given reserve of a homogenous non-renewable good, 
the optimum rate of depletion is established when the increase of the 
profit margin from extracting oil, and therefore the increase in the 
price of oil (if the margin and costs of extraction remains constant) 
equals the rate of interest. This is because the extra future income 
a producer,would get from leaving the natural resource in the ground 
is equal to the extra income that can be generated from extracting the 
oil and investing the proceeds at the going interest rate; i.e. the 
Marginal Revenue of following both courses of action is equal. 
According to Hotelling there is a natural tendency towards an equilibrium 
in this situation. If the rate of extraction is less than the equilibrium 
rate, supply will decrease and prices will rise, encouraging a higher
level of extraction. If the rate of extraction is greater than the
37 equilibrium rate, the reverse will hold.
The price of the resource will slowly tend to increase over time, 
because the rent (see footnote 37) increases. But this increase is only 
related to the increasing scarcity of the good and within this model has 
nothing to do with rising costs of production. The key insight when we
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deal with production from an existing find is that "A higher rate of 
discount means that T (the time-span of exploitation - PN) becomes
shorter and the initial production becomes higher..."
There are no fundamental difficulties in extending the above 
framework to the case of monopoly. Hotelling shows that the standard 
result that a monopoly will tend to increase prices and restrict out- 
put (and hence act in a f conservationist' manner) also holds for non-
39 renewable resources. But it should be noted that the analysis is more
complicated than the standard textbook comparison between 'perfect 
competition 1 and 'monopoly 1 .
One problem when we extend this optimal depletion theory to the 
case of monopoly arises because a monopolist might use a higher rate of 
interest with which to determine the equilibrium path of extraction and 
subsequently increase the current rate of extraction compared with a 
competitive 'path'. This higher rate of interest may result from the 
higher rate of return that a monopolist can earn elsewhere, and thus 
would tend to counteract a monopolist's tendency to restrict output.
Note that the depletion analysis as it stands has disregarded new
41production, says nothing of intergenerational equity, assumes no un- 
certainty about future markets and technical progress, and says nothing
about the elasticity of substitution between the resource in question
42 and other factors of production. Neither does the analysis as it
43 stands examine the stability conditions of a market for raw materials.
But all of these problems have been subject to theoretical analysis. 
Based on these discussions (the details of which are found in the 
footnotes above), and our previous discussion, there are at least five 
reasons why the state could want to intervene in private depletion 
decisions.
(i) There may be externalities in production of oil, coupled with a 
situation where the individuals who suffer the consequences of these
externalities do not have any way to organise as a collective group and 
thus be in a position to 'bribe' the originator of the externality to 
stop his activity. (The latter is a standard condition for a private 
market equilibrium with respect to externalities.)
(ii) There may be joint production from any field (as when a field 
straddles a national boundary, or in the US a private boundary). In 
that case one individual producer has no incentive to recognize that 
'less' production today implies 'more' production in the future.
43
(iii) There may exist what Strtfm labels "society's conservation-
44 
motive", when a state attributes a positive value to have in its possession
a certain stock of a raw material. A private rate of depletion may 
exhause these stocks because its rate of discount is higher than the 
social rate of discount. In addition to the reasons already given for 
such a situation, where structural dislocations in the economy, as a 
result of oil production are of prime importance, arguments of a more 
distributional character are also important.
The ones who benefit from the production of a raw material are 
invariably different from those who pay the costs of extraction. In 
the Norwegian case (during the period of study) this difference was very 
important in pushing the Norwegian state to decrease the rate of extraction.
Therefore the distribution effects between private individuals of any
45 particular output profile of oil should be considered. Pigou's more
general point that "... there is wide agreement that the state should 
protect the interests of the future in some degree against the effects
of our irrational discounting and of our preference for ourselves over
46 our descendants" is also important to the argument about 'society's
conservation-motive 1 , and if accepted would lower the social rate of 
discount.
(iv) So far all our examples have implied that the state should try 
to conserve existing stocks of raw materials. However, to the extent 
that the state believes it is faced with a monopolistic situation where 
the expected rate of extraction is below the market rate (see above), 
there can be a rationale for intervention to accelerate the private 
rate of production. This may also be the case where the state, for 
whatever reason, has a 'shadow price' of oil which is higher than the 
market price.
(v) The possibility of dynamic instability in private natural 
resources markets presented in connection with Stiglitz's work (see 
footnote 43 above) may also give a rationale for state control over 
volume of production.
Note that our conclusions above will be modified when we analyse 
production from new finds. A lower discount rate will then make new 
finds 'commercial' and then increase production instead of decreasing it.
This theoretical discussion suggests that there are a number of
reasons why the state should regulate the volume of production, even if
48 some economists are very sceptical as
of the state to do so in the real world.
 to the effectiveness and ability
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2.5 SPINQFFS
Our historical review of the industry suggests that the producer 
states, in addition to maximizing their control over the oil-rent, also 
have aimed to use the oil industry to create employment and stimulate 
economic activity within their national boundaries. The producer states 
with in short to maximize the spinoff effects from oil. This aim was 
particularly important for the Norwegian state which was actively trying 
to develop its industrial base (see Section 1.2.2, (i)).
Spinoffs from oil can analytically be divided into two separate 
categories. Forward spinoffs are related to the possible uses of 
crude oil in refining and petrochemical production. In this case 
maximization of spinoffs is related to the aim of maximizing oil- 
rent, because of the high value added and the potential profitability
in processes like petrochemical production. Such spinoffs are not 
maximized for their employment effects mainly because these industries 
are extremely capital-intensive. But in the second category of spinoffs, 
backward spinoffs, which include production of equipment to find and 
extract the oil, like drilling rigs, production platforms and supply 
ships, the wish to maximize employment constitutes an important 
driving-force for state action.
Both kinds of spinoff can lay the foundation for an industrialization 
process in an oil-producing country. In addition, a producer-state can 
use the general oil revenues to start industrial projects totally un- 
realted to either backward or forward spinoffs. Historically a combina- 
tion of low rents and corrupt ruling classes more bent on personal gain 
than on the industrialization of their countries can explain why no such 
developments have taken place in the oil-producing states. An addi- 
tional factor for this was the wish of the companies (particularly after 
the Mossadeq affair) to move their downstream activities to politically 
more secure areas. We shall however disregard the general industrial- 
izing effect of the oil activity and in the Norwegian case study only 
concentrate on the more specific effects which relate to both backward 
and forward spinoffs.
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Part II: The outcome of the bargaining process
Having established that the objectives of bargaining between the 
oil companies and the Norwegian state are oil-rent, volume control, 
and spinoffs, we want to examine which factors are likely to determine 
both the outcome of this bargaining over time, as well as the form which 
state intervention will take.
Within a traditional framework of analysis there are two broad 
ways of explaining and understanding this development, neither of which 
is satisfactory. The first approach is to attempt to situate an 
explanation within the confines of traditional neo-classical theories 
of state intervention in the economy. Our critique of this approach, 
set out in Appendix D, is very important from a methodological point of 
view because a rejection of the traditional neo-classical paradigm 
with regard to the understanding of the actions of the state opens the 
way to an alternative theoretical framework for analysing the state's 
role in the oil industry.
Having rejected a traditional micro-economic analysis of state 
intervention, we must also show why a second and more specific 
bargaining approach to the development of raw material concessions 
is also unsatisfactory. This will briefly be done in section 2.4 of 
this chapter before we present our own theoretical framework in 
section 2.5.
2.4 TRADITIONAL THEORIES
Traditional bargaining theory can deal with the question of the 
division of oil-rent in two different ways: First, the analysis can be 
based on an abstract (and general) theoretical model of bargaining. 
Alternatively, the outcome can be analysed from a 'historicist 1 
perspective on the assumption that once it is decided which are the 
key variables that determine each actor's bargaining strength, each 
case is then treated as being basically different, so nothing in 
general can be predicted about the outcome. We will present and 
criticize these two approaches before we outline our own solution to 
the problem of bargaining.
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2.4.1 Bilateral monopoly and game theory
On the assumption that the oil industry is monopolistic we can 
examine the traditional bilateral-monopoly case of bargaining. Both 
in the Norwegian and in the UK case the oil companies have organized 
themselves into Offshore Operators Committees, which essentially present 
a 'united front 1 to the two producer-states. 50 Unfortunately such a 
general approach is of only limited value, because the outcome of the 
bargaining process under these circumstances is theoretically indeter- 
minate. All we can predict from such a theoretical framework is a range 
of likely outcomes, which in our case is no help in establishing a 
determinate solution. It is also questionable to what extent even to 
establish such a range would help our analysis, since from the outset 
we know the total amount of rent at issue (the present value of the 
field) and by a minimum of a priori historical analysis also can establish 
within what likely range this rent will be divided. If for instance 
there is a worldwide trend towards a 50/50 split of this rent, it is 
very unlikely that any new agreements would deviate significantly from 
such a division. As Ferguson writes about bargaining within this market 
structure, "The precise result is determined by factors beyond the 
purview of economic analysis".
Bilateral monopoly as a general model of bargaining is therefore
of little use on its own, even if the approach may still give limited
52 insight into the question of 'collusion 1 . It is only when this
approach is linked to a more historical view of bargaining that it can 
be more useful.
On a more general level of abstraction one can look for a solution 
to the problem of the division of rent according to game theory. But 
this branch of analysis has not lived up to original expectations in
solving applied studies. Game theory has in particular difficulties
53 in handling non-zero sum games, it is restrictive in its behaviour
54 assumptions, and in conditions of uncertainty gives rise to additional
problems unless we also specify a risk indifference curve for the 
actors. The approach has finally been accused of being 'non-dynamic'. 
We can only agree with Young:
"The game-theorists' conception of bargaining has yielded a 
number of elegant models, but it abstracts away all the dynamic 
aspects of bargaining and severely limits the applicability 
of the concept even in the analysis of static relationships.
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By contrast the economic conception of bargaining as an 
interaction process involving offers and counteroffers 
permits the introduction of dynamic elements into the 
analysis of bargaining.... But the models that have so 
far been derived from this conception are heavily rest- 
ricted in terms of applicability and they exhibit a 
mechanistic quality which stems from the fact that they 
abstract away all the manipulative activities commonly 
associated with bargaining. Moreover neither of these 
conceptions has yielded predictions about bargaining which 
correspond at all well with the actual processes and out- 
comes of bargaining in analogous real world situations." 
But all is not lost.
"... the principal value of these models [of bargaining 
- PN] lies in the insights and conceptual stimulation 
which they unquestionably generate rather than in the 
specific predictions and explanations that can be 
derived from them." 57
For our own specific case study, the main insight from game-theory stems 
from the importance of interdependency and 'dynamic behaviour* in 
bargaining. But the main conclusion still remains that there is no 
simple game-theoretic 'answer 1 to our bargaining problem even if 
the particular problems listed above could be solved.
2.4.2 Historicism, an alternative static model
If we settle for an 'explanatory model 1 on a lower level of 
abstraction as a result of the failures of any general bargaining model, 
we must consider more specifically the problem of bargaining as related 
to oil. The most important representatives of this approach are 
Hartshorn (1967), Vernon (1967, 1973), Penrose (1968, 1971), and Mi'kesell 
(1970). But the way this approach is presented in the literature has 
the disadvantage that only seldom are any formal models of bargaining 
explicitly spelt out. (To the extent that Hartshorn and Penrose 
use any theoretical framework it is the indeterminate bilateral monopoly 
case.) Consequently, this approach tends to neglect the overall view 
of different factors' interrelationship and the consistency of their 
aims. Instead we generally find scattered references to factors that 
have contributed towards the 'strength' of one or the other of the two
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actors in question, which are then used to give a 'solution 1 to the 
bilateral monopoly case. An understanding of the key in any bargaining 
situation between oil companies and nation states therefore tends to 
become implicit rather than explicit, and the approach becomes descrip- 
tive rather than analytical. But on the other hand the strength of 
this half-historical, half-analytical approach should not be under- 
estimated. Based on an intimate knowledge and insight of the oil 
industry, the practitioners of this approach identify key variables 
in the bargaining game, and inasmuch as the approach is preoccupied with 
historical developments, it can give insights to a dynamic approach to 
bargaining.
We will now situate the insights of the historical approach within 
our own theoretical framework outlined in Part I above, mainly in order 
to facilitate their presentation, but also to show that our framework 
can 'absorb' the insights of existing work in this field.
We will not analyse the strength of either of the two actors to 
increase the total amount of rent. Problems such as prerequisites for 
the existence of cartels like OPEC which can push up the price and thus 
increase rents without a corresponding change in the share going to the 
nation-state will therefore not by analysed. At this stage we are only 
interested in factors which influence the division of a given amount of 
oil-rents.
As a first step we will analyse factors which historically have 
served to maintain the monopoly power of the companies so that they 
have been able to expropriate a large amount of the oil-rent. The 
ability to earn monopoly rent is crucially dependent upon lack of 
competition between the major companies as well as on the exclusion of 
new entrants to the industry (among the latter the state oil companies 
which could replace the majors). We therefore have to analyse bargain- 
ing strength in the light of barriers to entry in the oil industry. 
Such an approach will also further help to clarify why the oil industry 
historically has exhibited a high degree of monopoly, a discussion 
started .above.
Control over technology stands out as the most important barrier 
to entry. This is in the last analysis the main objective basis for 
a company's claim of being the only entity that can carry out the 
production of oil. It is also an extremely strong bargaining card in 
the hands of the companies because it is possible to view control over 
technology as being much more 'inevitable 1 (and hence politically
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acceptable) than the control over property the companies enjoy in the 
normal concession agreements.
Such a view is supported by a number of writers. A company's 
bargaining position ultimately depends upon the inability of a producer 
state to run the industry itself. The faster a producer state builds 
up an independent oil expertise, the stronger is that state's bargaining 
position. The ultimate bargining threat of any company (withdrawal or 
non-entry) can therefore be undermined or shown to be a hollow claim 
once the state acquires such expertise. It is therefore hardly 
surprising that at the highest level of abstraction, Vernon identifies 
a nation state's bargaining strength as being inversely proportional to 
the scale and the technological complexity of the investment in question. 
Penrose similarly describes the existence of technological requirements 
of investments in the oil industry as being one of the crucial factors 
as to why oil companies historically have earned a rate of return that
f-\7
is higher than the average. The dynamics of negotiations between the 
companies and the producer-states can, as a first approximation, be seen 
as the battle between one actor's control over technology, and the 
other's attempts to catch up in this field.
Even if the nation-state is capable of running the oil exploration 
itself, it will still get the company to undertake the task if it thinks 
that the return of this line of action outweighs the possible costs 
(in whatever form) of acting on its own accord. Such an assessment 
from the state's point of view therefore represents a kind of crude 
'cost-benefit 1 analysis. In deciding whether to grant a concession 
or not, the state weighs up on the one hand, how badly it needs the
oil, and on the other how much it thinks it can get out of the oil
f\ *^ 
company. According to this line of thought, the nation-state will
64 
go ahead with a concession if the former outweighs the latter. But
the nation-state may, for instance, not want to commit all its scarce 
resources (both skilled labour and capital) to investments in one 
industry. If this attitude is strong enough the state may simply refuse 
to commit any state capital to what it regards as a risky project, 
especially if the state is a risk-averter. We consequently at one 
point will have to inquire more closely into the future producer-state's 
attitude to risk.
A third reason why one of the 'actors' may be in a superior 
bargaining situation is its potential access to finance. The importance 
of this point is related to the cost of the investment. The larger the
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cost, the more important such access becomes. It should be noted that 
the World Bank up until 1973 refused to finance oil exploration in 
third world countries, its reason being that finance was already 
available from the major companies.
A fourth factor that historically has contributed towards the 
barriers to entry into the industry was the companies' control over 
marketing outlets, a control which is intimately related to the 
tendency towards vertical integration in the industry discussed above. 
Vernon ^  concludes that the companies 1 control over marketing (together 
with their superior access to capital) have been the key reasons for\
the superior bargaining position of the companies, a factor also 
emphasised by Penrose.
Fifthly the international situation in the oil industry at any 
one time will also influence the bargaining relationship between any 
particular company and state. It constitutes the constraints within 
which everything on the more particular level must operate. In 
Appendix A we saw how the relationship between companies and producer- 
states on several occasions changed in response to developments on the 
macro oil level. The spread of the Venezuela 50/50 principle is only 
one of many examples  Such a process works mainly through a mechanism 
whereby a specific oil company's demand for acreage will be influenced 
by the world situation of demand and supply for oil and other forms of 
energy. Whether the nation-state is dealing with a crude-short or a 
crude-long company also influences the bargaining strength of the 
company in the same way as the number of alternative sources of supply 
they control. Lack of diversified sources has at various times had 
serious effects for oil companies, the most important example being 
Occidental's confrontation with Libya in 1970 (see Chapter 7).
The final factor which affects the bargaining is a producer-state's 
economic situation; in particular its overall energy requirements, its 
balance of payments position, and its need to gain additional revenues. 
But even the relative strength of these factors must be related to the 
international situation of the oil industry. A producer-state will 
always tend to look at the terms obtained by other producer-states
before it sets its own terms of exploration.
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We have so far highlighted a number of specific factors that in 
the view of the historical approach have influenced the division of 
rent between a nation-state and an oil company. But there is one 
factor which has an effect on all the above-mentioned factors and which 
can be seen as a 'common denominator 1 in the bargaining game. This is 
access to information. In particular, the initial bargaining between 
the two actors very often takes place when the state is nearly 'blind- 
folded 1 with respect to information. The companies tend to be in 
possession of all information concerning geological structures, 
expected market developments, costs etc, and can choose which facts 
to present to the nation-state. To what extent this information gap 
closes as time goes by will help to determine the long-run division of 
rent between the two 'actors'.
2.4,21 The political dimension
Apart from the more 'objective' reasons already outlined, a number 
of writers have emphasized 'political' factors in determining the 
division of rent between the companies and the producer-states. 
Appendix A strongly suggests that the history of the industry abounds 
with instances where political influences and pressures rather than 
any objective comparative advantage have given a company access to oil- 
producing fields. This was particularly and blatantly so in the pre- 
1945 era. Tanzer considers the strong position that the companies 
historically have enjoyed primarily to be a reflection of the political 
support that companies have received from their home governments 9 63 as 
well as from the political allies that companies invariably have man- 
aged to build up within the producer-states themselves. Evensen, while 
not being so general, clearly interprets the early part of the history 
of the industry as a reflection of inter-imperialist rivalries. 70 But 
the position of the companies has also recently been defended by general 
political back-ups within the 'mother-countries' in the form of general 
legal provisions like the US Hickenlooper Amendment, This was intended 
to discourage any third world country from taking steps which interfered 
with US business interests abroad . However, too close an identifica- 
tion between companies and the ruling class within individual countries 
(or indeed with individual governments) may have unacceptable long- 
run political consequences for the companies. This is particularly the 
case in the event of a fundamental political change where the companies'
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close cooperation with an 'old' regime may seriously prejudice their 
credibility and hence the possibility of working within any 'new 1 
order. The role of Gulf Oil in Angola represents a recent example.
It is therefore only in exceptional circumstances that the oil 
companies explicitly will challenge the existing political order (as 
in Iran 1953) 0 On the whole it is in their interests to maintain a 
'low profile', and continuously to stress their 'comparative advantages' 
from a technical and marketing point of view. To 'corner' a government 
by making belligerent noises and by threatening blackmail can be counter- 
productive, especially if it leads to an over-reaction by the government 
in question.
There exists an extensive literature covering this more explicit 
'political' aspect of the oil industry (see especially 0'Connor (1955, 
1963), Stork (1975), Tanzer (1969, 1974), Sampson (1975). Because of 
their historical specificity, little purpose will be served by examining 
each case study in detail. It suffices to note that political pressure 
from the 'mother-countries' of the major companies is a factor which 
any concrete analysis will have to take into account 0 But separating 
the 'political' element in the bargaining process is not totally 
satisfactory, because there are strong interrelationships between the 
political and technical aspects of a country's bargaining strength. 
For instance, the decision to build up national expertise to run the 
oil industry is basically a political decision with technological con- 
sequences. Such a political decision may have been taken for no other 
reason than a deep-seated feeling that foreign corporations should be 
kept out of certain industries at all costs. Alternatively, such a 
 political approach' may spur the nation-state simply to buy the 
services of certain companies for a fixed fee (a trend which started 
with the service contracts of the 1960s). ^is is a way for the
nation-state both to play off different companies against one another 
and also to ensure that its political interests (often of a distinctly 
nationalist character) are protected through its retention of full 
legal sovereignty over a producing area.
2-4.22 Static bargaining models: summing up
We .have now used our conceptual framework to classify factors which 
according to the 'historical school' at any moment in time have influenced 
the bargaining strength of our two actors. In addition to purely
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political elements, these include factors which, in one way or another, 
influence the actors 1 monopoly situation, such as the overall world 
situation in oil; control over technology; access to capital and down- 
stream activities; and access to information. In addition the individual 
company's position may depend upon whether it is crude-short or crude- 
long, as well as on the number of alternative sources of production 
upon which it can draw c
Within this framework, the companies' bargaining strength is 
nothing but a mirror-image of the strength of the nation-state which 
they happen to confront. In other words, their strength is mainly a 
reflection of how badly the state in question needs the oil (or the oil 
revenues). This depends upon the balance of payments situation, the 
internal political situation, and the country's overall energy situation.
The problem with such a static approach is not that it is wrong 
per se. On the contrary, it is useful in identifying the importance 
of specific factors such as technology, which influence the bargaining 
relationship. It is rather that this approach does not go far enough 
in its analysis and seems mainly to consist of a fairly arbitrary list 
of factors which affect one actor's 'strength'. Apart from this general 
tendency towards a methodological 'looseness', there are also a number 
of more specific objections with respect to the 'historical' approach.
First, the 'weight' of each of these factors is not known. 
Unless such an evaluation is made, this approach cannot say anything 
about developments of bargaining strength over time. Neither can it say 
anything about the exact 'weight 1 of one factor on the bargaining position 
at any moment of time.
Secondly, if we are interested in how bargaining strength changes 
over time, such a list of factors is. of limited use since it provides us 
with a comparative static rather than a dynamic approach to the problem. 
Thirdly, such an approach tends to obscure the fact that one of the 
main decisions a producer-state must make is how fast it wants oil 
extracted. This decision almost inevitably leads to a choice between 
letting a major international company undertake the production, or 
choosing a state oil corporation to undertake the task.
Fourthly, the approach does not discuss the problem of limits to 
state actions, because it assumes that there are no such limits. This 
(implicit) assumption is especially apparent in the discussion of the 
'cost-benefit' analysis (cf. p.49). This can lead to quite unrealistic 
and thoroughly ahistorical predictions that a producer-state may
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nationalize the oil industry (even without compensation) if only the 
perceived costs are less than the perceived revenues. Without going 
into any detail about the process of nationalizations in raw-material
r
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72 industries, in our view it is clear that such a decision is in no way
the outcome of a rational assessment on behalf of society as a whole, 
but instead is intimately related to the different class-forces that 
are brought to bear on the state at any particular period of time. 
Our alternative approach will try to link different kinds of state action 
to these internal class forces and in this way attempt to establish what 
limits exist for state action in the industry.
Finally, and possibly most importantly, there is little systematic 
discussion by those adopting the historical approach about what form 
state involvement in the industry will take. There is in particular no 
adequate framework for analysing the emergence of state oil corporations 
by linking such a discussion to the fourth point discussed above.
2.4.5 A dynamic view
Orthodox bargaining theory within the context of oil and raw
V
materials has only tried seriously to deal with one of these objections : 
the lack of dynamic perspective represented by a simple listing of 
factors influencing bargaining strength. Indeed it is possible to argue 
that the main insight to be found in the literature concerning the 
process of bargaining in the oil industry has been related to such 
dynamic aspects of the bargaining process. Although there is no complete 
theory which can be applied, the writings of several authors provide 
enough material to give a broad indication in which direction to focus 
our analysis. In this area our task will be to synthesize and extend
already existing insights.
74 The most illuminating contribution comes from Mikesell. He
claims that companies must initially be given an inducement to enter a 
'virgin 1 area by being offered a rate of return which is higher than 
the 'average 1 rate of return. This is partly because the 'risk 1 is 
perceived to be higher, but also because the nation-state is in a 
relatively weak bargaining position in the initial period. (After all, 
the decision that an international company and not a state oil corpora- 
tion is given the exploration right, is normally an indication of the 
inability or unwillingness of the nation-state to carry out this task
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itself.) Once oil is struck and substantial profits start to be made, 
the f pre-strike f claim to resources will be questioned; the state 
will feel cheated, given the normally generous conditions that originally 
were given to the companies. (If no oil is found, however, the state 
quickly forgets about the expenses that the companies have gone to in 
order to carry out such a project,,) There will therefore inevitably 
be pressures towards a renegotiation of existing contracts, something 
which is also clearly brought out by Smith and Wells. The claims by 
the government and the companies for the oil-rent exhibit what Mikesell 
calls f a dynamic logic 1 . If the dice were originally loaded in favour 
of the companies when they committed large amounts of fixed investment, 
then subsequently the relative strengths of the two actors change. 
"Thus some few years after investments have been made, the pressure to 
increase the government's share will grow - and be met by the company." 
Vernon also talks about this pressure towards a renegotiation once
77production is under way, and lists three factors that may bring about 
such a change: First, a national realization of the dependency on, 
and vulnerability to, outside forces brought about by the foreign 
investment; secondly, changing national policy objectives; thirdly, 
the need for increased total revenues on behalf of the government. 
Even if this suffices as a first 'check-list 1 , it says little
about the underlying forces, which is perhaps most clearly visible in
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relation to the third factor. However, come the day when the company
has to take a decision on whether to reinvest profits in the initial 
venture, or to extend its existing operations in the country, the 
balance of forces is again weighted in favour of the company. The 
original state must compete with all other possible areas for the invest- 
ment. Again in the words of Mikesell; "The moment of a new investment
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is the moment of greatest bargaining strength for the company."
The most important precondition for an outcome to follow the 
above description of the "dynamic path" is that the nation-state does 
not itself become capable of efficiently carrying out the tasks of oil 
production, i.e. that the companies manage to maintain their techno- 
logical monopoly. This may not be the case if Vernon is right and there
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is a long-run tendency towards an erosion of technological supremacy.
This means that the technological competitive edge that the companies 
originally held and to which they partly owe their strong initial bargaining 
position, will break down as the host country's knowledge of the oil. industry 
steadily increases and as the learning period for using advanced technology
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decreases. Only a continuous technological development, so that a 
nation-state is continuously trying to catch up with yesterday's 
technology, can prevent such a trend from manifesting itself. Mikesell 
does not, however, rule out a joint maximizing strategy by the two actors 
in such a situation. This can only be dealt with by open or tacit 
recognition by both of certain 'rules of the game'; the most important
consequence of which is that the size of the 'pie' is not reduced by
81 
what he labels "the scramble over the portions". But it then becomes
important which 'pie' to consider; the static one with no new investment, 
or one that assumes continuous development of resources. Both the proper 
inducement to offer the company and the joint maximization strategy will 
differ in each instance. Therefore in the broadest sense Penrose 
characterizes the bargaining situation as a continuous assessment by
both actors as to the costs of 'giving in' to the bargaining opponent
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compared with the cost of resisting his demands.
We have so far developed a dynamic view of bargaining that to a large 
extent has relied on generalisations based on concrete case studies. 
It is in response to the shortcomings of such a mode of analysis that
Chevalier has developed his own more general model to deal with the
83 general trends in the oil industry. But unfortunately there are also
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serious problems associated with his work, so it follows that we will
have to rely on our own framework of analysis to understand the 
Norwegian case study.
We have now examined, both from a theoretical and historical 
perspective, the existing dynamic models which can be used to analyse 
the bargaining relationship between the companies and the producer- 
states. These models differ dramatically with respect to both the 
level of generality and how well they are worked out. And while they 
give a general indication in which direction to continue the search for 
clarification, for each question these models answer, a new question 
emerges. For instance, what form will the increased government 'tough- 
ness 1 take? Are there any limits to this process? How do the different 
factors interact? Will the renegotiation be retroactive or will it 
only relate to new agreements? So even if especially Mikesell's work 
can yield important insights which will will make use of when we 
develop our own approach to the dynamics of bargaining, these models can 
only be viewed as a starting point of an applied analysis. We must also 
remember that almost all thinking about company/state relationships has
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been carried out with reference to third world countries. This has 
inevitably influenced the traditional way of thinking about the issues. 
Analysing a relatively sophisticated industrial country like Norway 
will impose its own 'demands' on our thinking, especially with respect 
to defining the behaviour of a nation-state.
2.5 A NEW MODEL
Our approach to bargaining argues that there are three main factors 
which will influence the outcome and form of bargaining over time: first > 
the change in total expected rent from an oil provice; secondly, the 
international context, and thirdly, the particular nature of the nation- 
state involved in this confrontation.
We will analyse each factor in turn.
2.5.1 Exogenous changes in rent
Within a dynamic bargaining model, inspired by Mikesell, we predict 
that an expected increase in rent from an oil province will lead to a 
response from the state in the form of pressure for changed conditions 
of production. This constitutes our first influence on the bargaining 
outcome. The increased expected rent can arise if there are exogenous 
changes in the operating conditions, for example an increase in the
price of oil and/or a change in the technological conditions under which
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oil is produced. Alternatively, the total expected amount of rent from
a field will increase if the success rate of finding new fields increases 
or if a field is found under more favourable conditions, with better quality 
oil and/or in larger quantities (if there are economies of scale) than 
originally anticipated. Either way we would expect the producer-state's 
terras to harden. There is nothing particularly 'radical 1 or 'socialist' 
in such a 'tightening'. It is rather that any producer-state which does 
not follow such a course can be described as basically incompetent, 
although it is generally the case that left-wing governments on the 
whole tend to be quicker in renegotiating existing contracts. Such 
'tightening 1 behaviour is even expected. As put by an editorial in The 
Times: "To old hands in the oil industry a changing government attitude 
... comes as no surprise.... As oil is found and the area is no longer 
a purely speculative venture, the terms for exploration and production 
inevitably become tougher."86
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But as it stands this theoretical framework cannot tell whether a 
tightening of terms will be retroactive or not. The question of retro- 
activity in concessions is important because the concept itself has clear 
ideological overtones That a producer-state slavishly sticks to a 
principle of no renegotiation of existing contracts is often a result 
of adherence to a legal principle that bears no relation to the best 
interests of that state, something that is increasingly being recognized 
worldwideo If the principle is nevertheless accepted, then it can 
be because it is in accordance with, or thought to be part of, normal 
behaviour in western law; because, in short, it is part of the ruling 
ideology,, Smith and Wells, while stressing the same factors as Mikesell 
in their dynamic analysis, argue on the basis of studying a number of 
mineral agreements in the third world: "Although most agreements are
written to cover periods varying from 15 to 99 years, an agreement
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rarely remains unmodified for more than a few years," and they
continue: " ..«, the practise is clear: concession contracts have been 
constantly altered. Economic, political, and social factors have become 
more potent than legal factors in determining the viability and shape
go
of concession arrangements." Historical data from the oil industry 
tend to give the same conclusion. When the objective conditions under- 
lying a concession agreement change, there is every reason to expect a 
renegotiation of the initial terms. The recently negotiated national- 
ization agreements in the oil industry for example could have been 
expected once the overall bargaining strength of the producer-states 
changed from 1970 onwards 0 Odell writes about the inevitability of such 
renegotiations once the objective conditions change. The companies 
objected strongly to the announced plans of an excess profit tax both 
in Norway and the UK following the quadrupling of oil prices 0 But 
according to Odell, there were large elements of bluff in the companies' 
attitude because the announced plans were in fact acceptable tax
proposals, "about which there never ought to have been any doubt given
89 the size of the rent involved". Adelman shares the same view, even
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if it is stated in a less direct manner.
But the principle of renegotiation is not exclusively confined to 
raw material concessions. It also applies to high technology industries 
in industrialized countries. The US government in its dealings with the 
defence industry is constitutionally obliged to initiate rewriting of
existing contracts if it can be shown that the industry is earning
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'excess profits'. It was the existence of such agreements in the
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West at the same time as the international companies and their home govern- 
ments vigorously condemned any rewriting of existing oil contracts, which
leads one to draw the conclusion that insisting on the inviolability of
92 
existing contracts was partly 'ideological' in nature. We can accordingly
use the fact of whether a producer-state adheres to the principle of non- 
retroactive legislation to indicate how closely such a state adheres to 
the f rules of the game 1 as commonly interpreted ty the West (here to 
mean the OECD countries). This could help to determine, at least in 
an ideological sense, a country's adherence to the 'Western camp 1 . 
(A genuine break with this principle by the Norwegian state in the field 
of oil concessions could have been important as an indication that 
Norway's political adherence to the West was weakening.)
Our first approach to the question of bargaining relies on the 
size of the expected change in oil-rents. While we have postulated 
that terms are likely to tighten as the size of the oil-rent increases, 
the discussion of 'retroactivity' makes it clear that there is much 
less predictability as to whether such tightening will be retroactive. 
It should also be noted that if the key variable is the size of the 
expected rent, it follows that all information about this expected rent 
becomes of prime importance. We have already postulated that 'informa- 
tion' is a commodity which is part of the bargaining process. We can 
now see how this factor fits into our own theoretical framework.
93 2.5.11 A synthesis
Based on our discussion of 'exogenous change', we can use a diagram
which describes the undiscounted rent (footnote 33, above) to analyse
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further the dynamic of bargaining.
The initial bargaining between the oil companies and a producer- 
state about the future claim to the oil-rent can only take place on the 
basis of a hypothetical or 'as if supply curve. The reason is simply 
that no certain knowledge exists about the size of the future rent. The 
key negotiating point is therefore to establish the exact position of the 
supply curve which (given the price for oil) will determine the potential 
(undiscounted) amount of rent. If the companies' negotiating teams can 
locate this supply curve as far to the left and as price-elastic as 
possible, the teams can then claim that very little oil-rent will accrue 
from the geographic area in question. Consequently, the companies could 
argue that there is no reason why the producer-state should
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impose any strict terms and conditions on the exploitation, as such 
terms would achieve little in terms of capture of rent (99 per cent of 
a total rent of zero is still zero), and should the state's policy be 
formed in an awkward enough way it might actually be a hindrance 
towards development (e.g. if the policy were to consist of pre-cash- 
flow area fees).
The way the companies would argue their case can also be established 
by a certain amount of a priori reasoning. They will as pointed out claim the 
supply-curve is located a maximum distance towards the left (S,., in Figure 2.1) 
And the higher the expected necessary rate of return on an investment 
in order to induce a company to enter a geographic area, the further 
the supply-curve will be located towards the left. The standard 
justification for such an attitude is invariably one arising from 
'risk 1 . The important factor then becomes whether such a claim is 
accepted by the producer-state's negotiators. The higher figure the 
state accepts as being absolutely necessary to compensate for 'risk', 
the less oil-rent there is to share between the two bargaining 
protagonists. Thus conceptually the first part of the negotiating 
battle is to establish the exact value of the rate of return necessary 
to induce the companies to enter in the first place.
The second element in the initial bargaining game is to determine 
how much potential monopoly and differential rent there is to be earned 
from the area. Again the companies' bargaining position would be to 
minimize the total amount of rent that potentially exists by consistently 
giving pessimistic estimates of the variables that determine the total 
amount of rent. Once this is recognized, the vital importance of 
information becomes self-explanatory. The actor that can define the 
terms of the bargaining situation has already won half the battle  One 
way of minimizing the actual amount of expected rent is for the companies 
always to argue with reference to the marginal fields. This is a 
bargaining strategy which, if accepted, will minimize the expected 
amount of differential rent. In Figure 2.2, by establishing an 
artificially located point of reference, X,, the companies can give 
the impression that the supply-curve resembles S,, whereas it may be 
more like S_. This is a strategy that may carry less weight as finds 
of different characteristics are made, but it can have some importance 
in the initial stages of the negotiations, when the state's level of 
ignorance is substantial.
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2.1
0
Historically the 'normal 1 outcome of such negotiations has there- 
fore been, not surprisingly, that the companies have managed to acquire 
a high a priori prior claim to future oil-rent.
Once a find of oil (almost of whatever kind) is made, one element 
of risk (that there are no hydrocarbons at all in the area) disappears. 
Accepting the companies' own way of looking at the world, risk decreases 
as the total average costs of finding a field decrease. Consequently 
the supply curve shifts downwards towards the right, and the potential 
oil-rent increases.
If the field found is larger (and/or with more favourable technical 
characteristics) than was originally thought likely, then total oil-rent would 
again increase as a result of shifts in the supply-curve from S^ to S^ 
(Figure 2.3). The 'as if supply-curve (which now of course has a much 
less hypothetical flavour) shifts down and to the right over time. 
But not only does the supply-curve move according to the companies' 
'objective' point of view. This shift is also likely to be perceived 
by the producer-state if the government has increased its access to 
information and expertise.
Assuming then that the situation for both the state and the 
companies changes in the way outlined above, there will be pressure for 
the government to change the terms on which it lets the companies oper- 
ate. This reformulates the essence of Mikesell's 'dynamic behaviour' 
described above. The state will claim that since there is evidently a 
new situation (once it has perceived this itself!), the terms of 
exploration ought to change. In new concessions, terms ought to be 
tougher, while there will be a pressure on the state to renegotiate 
existing agreements.
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Figure 2.5
The basic ideas about the development of bargaining over time have 
thus been given a graphic expression c However, in the above observa- 
tions we have gone further than Mikesell. He tends to relate the 
tightening of terms only to the post-investment period, whereas we 
have seen that it is necessary to say something about the terms laid 
down in the pre-investment period; terms which are based only on 
perceived information. Within this framework a sudden increase in the 
price of oily ceteris paribus > will lead to an increase in the total 
amount of oil-rent in the same way as the dynamic of the 'normal 1 
company/state relationship outlined above. Hence it is likely to 
produce a similar policy reaction from the state as in the case out- 
lined above.
Any producer-state which has no immediate need for oil, and hence 
does not want to maximize its output, is immediately in a much better 
bargaining situation with respect to the oil companies. In Figure 
3.4, this is shown by comparing an output of OQ^, (volume restriction) 
with OQ2 (maximum output). By not having to go for the high-cost 
ventures a volume-restricting state could press for a higher percentage 
of rent per unit of output at the margin (ab). This conclusion has 
important consequences for assessing the Norwegian state's bargaining 
situation in the period when a policy of volume restriction was in 
force.
Figure 2.4
63
2.5.2 Peculiarities of the Norwegian state
The special nature of the Norwegian state, which we have discussed 
at length in Chapter 1, is the second variable which can give insight 
into the development of Norway's oil policies throughout the period 
under discussion. An analysis along these lines is particularly 
called for in the wake of the failures of traditional orthodox theory 
to furnish satisfactory answers to the question of state intervention 
(see Appendix D). It is only by examining in more depth the historical 
peculiarities of the Norwegian state that we can hope to arrive at an 
explanation which does not suffer from the failures of orthodox theory. 
Since the ahistorical properties of the orthodoxy arise out of its 
methodological principle of individualism, our explanation proceeds in 
a different way. As an example, in arguing for an historical, non- 
individualistic examination of the state within the context of Norwegian 
oil policies, let us consider the problem of technological independence. 
The ability of a producer-state to be technologically independent from 
the companies is important in determining the relative bargaining strength 
between companies and producer-states. But the development of techno- 
logical independence is not a natural process, but to a large extent one 
which springs from political decisions. To understand the reasons for 
such political decisions, a more in-depth understanding of the state in 
question is absolutely necessary. This approach is similarly a criticism 
of those who try to draw conclusions from very abstract and general 
theories of the modern state (see p.18). Our insight is partly 
based on an analysis of the peculiar nature of the Norwegian state.
Apart from its neo-marxist overtones, the above approach to oil 
policies forms part of a renewed interest of the approach of the 
'institutional school' of economic analysis referred to in the 
Introduction.
2.5.5 The international context
The third factor which influences the outcome of the bargaining 
between companies and producer-states is the international context of 
the bargaining situation. This factor has tended to be overlooked in 
attempts to analyse the Norwegian policies. Only Evensen (1971) has 
given it major attention, but even in that case there was little
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systematic reference to the influence that the developments in the
industry could have on Norwegian policies. Qdell has also briefly
96 touched on the issue.
We have already, in Chapter 1 and Appendix A, seen the importance 
of adopting an international perspective to understand a country's oil 
policy. The way the 50/50 principle of profit division spread throughout 
the industry is only one of many examples. On an analytical level, the 
international context has an importance on three different levels for 
our case study.
First, the international context in part comprised solutions 
attempted by other oil-producing states which the Norwegians could try 
to imitate. We shall see that the Iranian concept of participation was 
especially influential with regard to Norwegian policies*
Secondly, and more importantly, the international contexts set 
the limits of what the companies were willing to accept in the short 
run as Norwegian policies. For example the companies were at least in 
the short run extremely reluctant to grant a participation share to the 
Norwegian state when they were at the same time rejecting the principle 
of participation in other parts of the world.
Thirdly, an international analysis can indicate the degree of 
interest which the companies are likely to exhibit in the exploration 
of potential new producing areas.
It is our task to show in this case study how the international 
framework, understood along the above lines, constantly moulded the 
outcomes of the state/company relationship in the Norwegian sector of 
the North-Sea.
2.5.4 Summary
We have thus arrived at a preliminary list of three factors which 
influenced the development of bargaining between the Norwegian state and 
the international companies in the period 1965-74. These in our view 
represent the three key elements in any explanation which tries to come 
to grips from a historical perspective with the form and extent of state 
intervention in the Norwegian oil industry during this period. It is 
only by combining an analysis of the three factors that we can satis- 
factorily understand the development of Norwegian oil policies in this
period. To analyse any one of Factor 1: Exogenous changes in rent, or 
Factor 2: The peculiarities of the Norwegian state, or Factor 3: The
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international context, in isolation from the other two is worthless. 
For example, we may determine that there is an objective tendency 
towards a greater state involvement based on Factors 1 and 3. But there 
is no way we can say anything about the form such a tendency will take, 
or the speed at which it will be implemented (if at all), without knowing 
something about the actual historical peculiarities of the state in 
question. It is clear that Factors 1 and 3 provide the overall framework 
for our analysis, but the actual outcome will obviously depend upon 
Factor 2. However, it is only by carrying out our case study that we 
can make a final decision about how useful these three factors are.
Part III: The policy options
So far we have said little about how the rent can be appropriated 
by the producer-state. We have in short neglected the different forms 
of state action and their effectiveness. An analysis of the different 
policy instruments may give us a theoretical presumption in favour of 
one policy outcome in the North Sea, before we examine the Norwegian 
case in more detail.
The different policy instruments can be classified in two ways. 
First, they can be considered according to whether they do or do not 
imply government ownership. At one extreme we can have 100 per cent 
government ownership exercised by a state oil corporation; at the other 
we can have the government's use of purely fiscal measures.
The second distinction which runs between automatic and discretion- 
ary instruments will be the basis for our initial analysis.
2.6 AUTOMATIC VS. DISCRETIONARY POLICIES
A choice between an automatic rent-appropriating system, the 
'auction system 1 , as advocated by Dam (1976) and Crommelin (1974), and 
a discretionary system, can be made both on political and theoretical 
grounds. But before we carry out such an evaluation between the two 
approaches, one general point should be made. It is on methodological 
grounds possible to group together the proponents of the automatic 
system of rent-collection together with the thinking that Adelman 
represents (see Section 2.1.11). Both represent an attempt to apply a 
stringent neo-classical paradigm to the question of oil. There is in
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both approaches an implicit belief in the smoothness and efficiency of 
market adjustments, a deep mistrust of state intervention, and a tendency 
to regard political factors as merely 'exogenous' to the whole analysis. 
According to an automatic system rent is transferred from the
companies by the state by lump-sum cash payments that the companies
98 
offer the state in advance for the right to explore an acreage. The
size of the bids would, according to this view, reflect the expected 
rent that a company anticipated it could earn. If the bids are secret, 
competition among the companies would ensure that the winning bid would
fully reflect the expected rent to be earned by that company. There 
would be pressure for the companies to maximize their bids; if not they 
would simply not get the right to explore the area, which would be 
taken up by somebody else. Such a system would, according to one of
its warmest proponents, "by utilizing the price system, allocate
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resources better within the economy". The companies would not earn
rent, while the most efficient firm (being able to offer the largest 
sum of money at any one time), would get the right to extract the oil.
Proponents of the auction system often compare it with the dis- 
cretionary allocation system, which they (rightly) criticize as being 
unable to collect the full amount of rent. The difference is often 
described in terms of two fundamentally different methodological 
approaches. The auction system relies on the market, while, according 
to Dam, "The argument for the discretionary system boils down to the 
assertion that economic inefficiency is sometimes convenient, that, 
for example, it is useful to a government for political reasons to 
favor local over foreign companies." The implication of his view is 
that state intervention in the economy, as in the discretionary system, 
will lead to inefficiency.
But there are a number of reasons why the auction system is in- 
efficient in extracting the rent and, given the objectives of the 
North Sea states in 1965, could be said to be considerably worse than 
a discretionary system. First, its efficiency depends upon a number 
of crucial assumptions. There must be no collusion among the major oil 
companies. If there is, the whole bidding process becomes meaningless 
as an expression of future expected rent. The chance of such collusion 
is particularly great in a highly concentrated industry like the oil 
industry. Secondly, and equally seriously, the auction approach argues 
that if the oil-province in question turns out to be a bonanza this will 
be balanced out by other cases where no oil is found despite a huge
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amount of money having been spent on the bids. While this may turn out 
to be the case on a world-wide scale, it is scant consolation for a 
government that accepts this system. A bonanza would, in almost all 
countries of the world, immediately lead to the charge of 'having given 
the oil away 1 , with subsequent demands for the rewriting of contracts, 
nationalization, etc. Knowing this to be the case, the companies would 
be reluctant to bid the full amount of expected oil-rent, thus under- 
mining the whole theoretical rationale of the auction system. It is 
therefore not surprising that the quantitative importance of the
auction system has been relatively unimportant. Thus, whereas the 
auction system claims to represent the 'painless 1 way forward for 
company/state relationships, it may in fact turn out that the opposite 
is the case. Finally, the auction system implicitly dismisses any 
arguments based on the 'infant industry' case, by labelling as economic- 
ally 'inefficient' a system that allows for protective measures in 
favour of national involvement in the oil industry. This is especially 
doubtful in an industry like oil, which requires a relatively long period 
of time for the infant to grow into adulthood, particularly with respect 
to the mastery of technology and the high barriers to entry. Apart from 
the above arguments, the auction system also exclusively concentrates 
on the state's aim of rent-maximisation and disregards the relationship 
between the other aims of the state and different policies it can pursue.
On the part of the companies, the auction system is not viewed with 
much enthusiasm. Paying out a relatively large amount of money at the 
beginning of a period can become a considerable burden on the cashflow 
of a company. It also means in practice that only the largest firms 
have a possibility of bidding. As was observed about the situation of 
one offshore field: "The capital necessary to bid on tracts in the Gulf 
of Mexico has eliminated most independent oil operators..."102 This 
scepticism was echoed by PPS, which argued that the auction system was 
only feasible in relatively proven areas; that there were no guarantees 
that the highest bidder was really competent to undertake the work; that 
it gives the state little control over subsequent operations; that there 
was no assurance that the less attractive areas would be explored; and 
finally that it would mop up funds which should be used for exploration.
The one positive thing to be said for an auction system is that it 
can alert the public at large as to the amount of rent that is being 
transferred to the companies.
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2.7 STATE PARTICIPATION VS. TAXATION
Given the unacceptability of the auction system, the main choice 
for Norwegian policy makers was whether to attempt a pure 'tax solution 1 
or whether to try to capture the rent by means of state participation. 
This section will first examine whether there are any a priori theoretical 
reasons for choosing one as opposed to the other. We do this by studying 
the effects of the two policy instruments on the NPV of a hypothetical 
oil-field. The evaluation is initially made on the restrictive assump- 
tion that the state wants to raise a fixed amount of money and that 
state participation is like our Scenario 3, outlined in Section 3.5.1. 
Based on a hypothetical case study, it is possible to arrive at a 
relative evaluation of the different policy instruments. Not surpris- 
ingly, the 'worst 1 policies for a company with respect to a discounted 
variable are those that involve considerable outlays at the very beginning 
of the life of a project. Hence, as indicated by van Meurs, the relative 
rating between different policies would be as follows: "Initial bonus; 
bonus at the discovery-date; then a group of elements comprising: 
fixed royalties, income tax with and without depletion allowance, and 
state participation; and finally rising surface duties." Broadly 
speaking ex ante payments with respect to discovery are rated lowest 
and ex post payments highest, with combinations of the two somewhere 
in the middle.
We now turn to a comparison between state participation and 
taxation, when the company initially foots all the costs, but when the 
state has to pay back to the company its share of all costs after 
discovery. Then the effects of state participation depend firstly 
upon the interest rate which is used to calculate the compensation 
that the firm receives from the state for its initial outlays. If this 
interest rate is less than the internal rate of return that the project
initially yielded, then the act of state participation is a clear short-
107 run economic loss for the companies. Otherwise the state simply pays
a fixed share of capital costs and receives the same share of the 
returns.
A comparison between the two broad sets of policies also depends 
upon the discount rate. A 10 per cent rate of discount will in our 
example bring about a drop in the NPV of a project if state participa- 
tion is introduced. But if all income and expenditure is discounted at 
15% with the compensation rate of return fixed at 12%, we have the 
surprising result that even if the necessary capital-base for the
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companies has shrunk, the NPV to be earned with state participation is
higher for the company (has a smaller negative NPV) than the case with
108 
no state participation at all. So at a discount rate greater than
the IRR it will pay the companies to accept state participation. The 
reason for this is that the compensation paid by the state is assumed 
to be reinvested at the higher rate.
If state participation is compared with taxation, the depreciation 
condition stipulated in the 'taxation package 1 takes on a special 
significanceo The nature of the depreciation schedule is perhaps the 
single most important factor in determining the companies' NPV. 
According to Lovemore:
"... if depreciation continues throughout the life of a particular 
oilfield, each year's depreciation being equal to the percentage 
of the total oil reserves produced in that year, then on a market 
price for the oil of $12 per barrel, in order to obtain a DCF 
return of 25% the net profit per barrel would have to be in the 
order of $3.20+, which is in the Government's view, unacceptably 
high.
On the other end of the scale, if the oil companies are 
permitted to depreciate their development costs as early as 
possible in the production life of the field, thereby ensuring 
that during the bulk of the life of the field the total cash 
inflow will be limited to the net profit per barrel, then to
obtain a DCF of 25% a very much lower net profit per barrel
, ..109 is required. 11
The changes in the Norwegian depreciation conditions are therefore 
crucial variables to analyse.
The relative advantage of state participation compared with a 
taxation package thus depends upon depreciation conditions, 
interest rates for compensation and rates of discount.
All conclusions so far have been made on the assumption that all 
outcomes are known with certainty. When we allow for uncertainty the 
tax solution initially comes out as marginally more favourable to the 
oil company than a participation solution. But when a full apprecia- 
tion is made of state participation under uncertainty, there seems
to be very little difference between the instruments of state partici-
j ^ HO pation and taxation.
So far we have only discussed the effect of one policy instrument 
at a time. But the influence of a policy package which includes more 
than one policy instrument may be greater than the sum of the effects
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of the individual policies that make up such a package, because the differ- 
ent instruments influence one another. The clearest example of such an 
interrelationship is when fixed royalty payments can stop a project towards 
the end of its life, which as a consequence will lead to a drop in total 
government take. But generally this effect can be ignored.
»
Thus when we assess the relative virtues of taxation vs. participa- 
tion as an instrument for capturing the rent for a producer-state, the 
theoretical framework, as it stands, gives no definitive a priori 
reasons for preferring one policy as opposed to the other. This choice, 
both under conditions of certainty and of uncertainty, depends upon a 
combination of the rate of interest used for repayment, the discount 
rate, the IRR and whether the state has to pay for exploration costs. 
However, a company which chooses between different taxation instruments 
would obviously prefer a tax burden which is levied as late as possible 
and a depreciation policy that allows it to write off its investments 
as fast as possible.
2.7.1 Effectiveness
Unfortunately it is seldom that policy makers are faced with the 
choice of how to obtain $X million more from an oil company using whatever 
method seems most appropriate. Therefore, while the former preliminary 
discussion was useful to establish the companies' most preferred policies, 
(ceteris paribus) we have to take the analysis one step further. We must 
determine the likely effectiveness of the different policy instruments. 
And, as we will see, there are plenty of reasons for the state to prefer 
one policy instrument to another once we enter the real world.
»
(i) Taxation
Taxation has been and still remains the most commonly used method 
for collecting rent from the oil companies  But the method suffers 
from at least four potential weaknesses.
The normal way of taxing natural resources is to stipulate a 
rate of tax in advance which is then difficult for the producer-state 
to change. The tax rate initially tends to be low either in order 
that the state can attract foreign investment, or if the investing 
firms can convince the state that their expected return is uncertain. 
But under such circumstances it is widely recognised in the literature 
that, to quote Garnaut and Ross:
"the conventional means of taxing natural resource projects
... cive governments that control the use of the resources
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an unnecessarily small share of the benefits of successful
112 projects."
If an oil strike economically proves unexpectedly successful, then 
the producer-state will immediately be under pressure to change the 
original contracts because the total amount of rent will be higher than 
anticipated. This in turn can lead to instability and possibly to 
reduced investment. Alternatively, if there is a lagged or even no 
adjustment in the government's tax rate, often because of the government's 
adherence to the principle of 'sanctity of contracts', then there will be 
a loss of rent to the state.
Secondly there are extreme difficulties in implementing a 'tax 
regime' of 'fine tuning 1 , by which we mean a system that is so flexible 
that it captures all rents as these arise. Even such a well-planned and 
advanced tax regime as the UK North Sea taxation of 1974 has been unable 
to leave the companies with the 'normal' rate of return, but has instead 
turned out to encourage the very opposite of what it was meant to accomp- 
lish. Such difficulties arise particularly in industries like the oil 
industry where there are continuously changing circumstances.
Thirdly, the 'taxation solution 1 implies by definition that the 
producer-states rely on the services of international oil firms to 
produce their oil. The nation-state will lose potential rent to the 
extent that a firm withdraws its services when the rate of return on 
its investments falls below what it considers its normal return. If, 
on the other hand, a national state oil company was established to 
produce oil, it would possibly be content with a rate of return equal 
to the social discount rate, which is lower than the rate required by 
the company and which would leave more of the rent to the state.
The fourth reason for the 'suboptiraality 1 of a taxation solution 
is related to the many possibilities of tax evasion by the companies. 
To the extent that this loss can be avoided by increased information 
and learning by the state (and is therefore conceptually different from 
the three reasons given above), it can be questioned whether it should 
be included in this list at all. On the other hand, the industry has 
historically turned out to be one of the most difficult to control. 
Whenever the producer-states have considered themselves to be in full 
control with respect to the tax situation, they have invariably been 
faced with new tax-evasive tax management solutions by the companies. 
This does not constitute any definitive proof that this will always be 
the case. On the other hand it is an indication of the difficulty 
which any taxation solution will have to solve.
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Agreements in the past contained not only weak clauses in the 
form of low tax percentages, but the producer-states were often also 
'short-changed 1 in the computation of these percentages. Most of the 
companies' opportunities for 'tax management' have been due to the 
international and vertically integrated nature of the oil industry and 
the subsequent possibility of manipulating intra-firm financial trans- 
fers. Such actions have not been confined to less developed countries 
with a weak administrative structure like Iran in the 1950s. During 
the 1960s such practices also led to drains on the balances of payments 
and shortfalls in corporation taxes paid to the importing countries, 
including Norway Csee p.17). The major companies, according to 
Tudgendhat, even went to the point of setting up new subsidiaries 
for reasons of 'tax management'.
For a producer-state it is also necessary for tax purposes to 
monitor the production costs of the companies. But this is no easy 
task, especially if there is an historically strong corporate link 
between the suppliers of the investment goods to the oil industry and 
the producing company. To deal with such a situation, the producer 
state will have to train an experienced staff which must have ready 
access to comparative cost data to check the data received by the 
companies. This interestingly almost requires that there is a state 
oil corporation through which the tax authorities can obtain such 
information. An effective tax regime from the state's point of view 
may therefore presuppose the existence of the state-participation 
solution,which we initially saw as an alternative to a 'tax solution 1 .
Garnaut and Ross have advocated what amounts to a progressive 
tax on raw material extraction in order to devise a type of taxation 
that is immune to the objections presented above. The tax rate is 
meant to increase when certain threshold internal rates of return have 
been reached so that the 'tax holiday' which every firm enjoys after 
the end of its investment period would be inversely proportional to 
the profitability of the project at hand. Such a solution would also 
make unnecessary the ad hoc negotiations which take place between 
investors and host governments and would decrease the bureaucratic 
and administrative burden of implementing such a scheme.
Even if such a scheme would go some way towards making the 
'taxation option' more attractive and in part solve some of the 
problems outlined above, it still leaves open a number of questions. 
First of all, what determines the specified interest rate under which
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"the value of net assessible receipts from the beginning of the proj- 
ect" is to be computed? This is equivalent to answering the almost 
impossible question of which rate a producer-state should set as 'normal* 
or 'acceptable 1 before the resource tax comes into operation. Secondly, 
while such a tax system has on one occasion been implemented (the 
Bougainville copper mine in Papua New Guinea), it is still to early
to evaluate how it has turned out in practice. And thirdly, the tax
I 17 i.- v, 
system still relies on the company's "revealed profitability", wnicn
does not solve all the problems connected with a producer-state's 
monitoring of costs.
118 (ii) State participation
We will now examine the effectiveness of state participation as a 
policy option. The historic trend towards state participation has in 
most cases been parallelled by the development of state oil corporations 
which control part of the oil-rent through their equity holdings. 
We will assume that the equity share of Statoil is part of the state's 
share of rent and that there is a correspondence between Statoil's 
equity income and the benefits to 'society as a whole', here represented 
by the central government. As we shall see later, the functioning of 
Statoil led to strong disagreements within Norwegian political life 
where one of the main points of disagreement was precisely whether such 
a correspondence could be assumed  The effectiveness of the state's 
pursuit of this policy will therefore firstly depend on how much of 
the rent collected by the state oil corporation is passed on to the 
central state qua state. If there is a tendency for a state oil corpora- 
tion to develop corporate aims of its own, which implies that there 
is no automatic congruence between the interests of the state oil 
corporation and the state, then the policy option of state participation 
may be less advantageous for the producer-state than originally thought. 
The pure financial strength of a state oil corporation may give it sub- 
stantial financial 'muscle* in its bargaining position within a nation- 
state, so that it may try to pursue aims that conflict with the overall
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aims of the state. On a relatively trivial level it may try to give
its own personnel a number of 'perks' normally unavailable to state 
employeeso More importantly, such a company may unilaterally want to 
pursue a policy of expansion, whether internationally within the oil 
business or through diversification into other areas. This tendency
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for state oil corporations to become 'states within states' is a 
frequently observed phenomenon within the industry, which has assumed
serious dimensions in as politically and geographically diverse cases
120 121 
as SONATRACH in Algeria, Pertamina in Indonesia, and the French
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state oil sector. This tendency is perhaps not so surprising
because the state corporations are often staffed with personnel who 
have been trained within a 'traditional' industry, and whose behaviour 
thus to some extent reflects the normal practice and ideological 
attitudes of that background. In particular the urge to expand seems 
almost irresistible in the oil industry, irrespective of whether the 
capital that finances a particular firm originates from the state or 
from private sources.
The second reason why state participation may be 'non-optimal' as 
a way of extracting rent is related to the potential loss that such a 
policy can entail. To the extent that state participation means higher 
costs of extraction or lower efficiency than an alternative solution, 
it is legitimate to talk about a 'sub-optimal 1 policy in a restricted 
sense of the word. There is, for example, often considerable political 
pressure that any joint venture shall buy or rent goods and services 
from the producer-state's national suppliers, often at higher cost than 
the international going price.
But even when we take the above very real problems associated 
with state participation into account, this policy instrument still 
has one clear advantage over taxation as a way of extracting rent. 
By taking up a set percentage participation, the state will, due to 
its equity ownership, automatically and without any further ado receive 
at least a corresponding percentage of the rent from an oil-field. 
(In addition it will of course also receive normal taxes from the 
companies' share of profits.) Such a policy will tend to increase a 
producer-state's control over the oil-rent.
Apart from the greater assuredness that state participation gives 
the state to control the rent from an oil-field, a state's preference 
for a participation rather than a pure fiscal solution may be related 
to the importance that state participation has for the producer-state 
in the pursuit of other aims than rent-maximization. Without antici- 
pating in detail our later analysis, we can briefly give some general 
reasons for this.
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One likely explanation can be found in the importance which state 
participation has for volume control. A joint venture agreement which 
involves a state oil corporation as a member of the producing consortium 
puts the state in a much better position to influence the production 
profile from individual fields than either a taxation or an auction 
solution. (On the other hand, as long as private oil firms are involved, 
there will always be pressure for the joint venture to conform to the 
most profitable production profile from a private point of view 0 And 
private firms will always be able to argue that they entered such an 
agreement on the understanding that no such interference was to take 
place.)
The second reason why nation-states may want to opt for state 
participation is related to the maximization of spinoff and balance of 
payments effects of the oil industry. State participation can aid a 
process of spinoffs because the scope for discrimination in favour of 
national suppliers increases with the expansion of the state oil sector, 
especially if this takes place through a state oil corporation.
However, despite these alternative aims, the final and most import- 
ant reason for choosing a participation solution is given above. State 
participation when analysed as a concrete real-world phenomenon, rather 
than an abstract theoretical possibility, gives a producer-state a 
number of potential advantages, compared with either a tax solution 
or an auction system, in controlling the rent in the oil industry.
2.8 CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this chapter we have analysed different aspects of the three 
objectives of bargaining between the companies and the producer states. 
In conclusion we will briefly examine the consistency of state policy 
with respect to these three aims. How are they interrelated? To what 
extent are these aims contradictory?
Oil-rents and volume of production:
We have already shown how control over volume is just another way of 
maximizing rent in social terms by using a social rate of discount. 
To the extent that control over volume implies a slower rate of extrac- 
tion, this means that the state will get access to its share of the 
income from the oil-rents at a later date and/or it will receive less 
income than if the production of oil was carried out according to purely
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private criteria. If the producer-state imposes cuts in production 
for the companies this implies that these will suffer a financial loss. 
The state will therefore be under pressure to Compensate 1 them in some 
way. To the extent that such a compensation takes the form of a cut in 
the company's taxation burden this means there is a contradiction 
between the two aims.
Volume regulation and spinoff:
Assuming that the nation-state is capable of securing a fixed percentage 
of all spinoff activities from an oil province, then there is a contra- 
diction between these two aims. A restricted volume means less spin- 
off s, ceteris paribus. However, in the case where the spinoff industries 
have to break into a new market there may be no contradiction between 
the two aims. A slower rate of output may make it possible for these
industries to 'catch up 1 . This choice has been perceived by public
123 policy-makers.
Spinoff s and rent maximization:
From a short-run perspective there may be a contradiction between 
maximizing spinoffs and the maximization of rent, if volume control is 
used as a way of increasing spinoffs. But in the long run this contra- 
diction may change. A development of national spinoff industries can 
increase a producer-state's ability to undertake the task of producing 
oil itself, and hence be instrumental in excluding the companies from 
future access to oil-rents altogether.
Balance of payments and volume of production:
The maximization of the balance of payments effect from oil exploration
often features as a separate aim that nation-states should pursue. It
124 has been particularly important for understanding the UK case.
The fulfilment of this aim is normally presented as being intimately 
linked to a maximization of volume of production. There is however no 
such easy and direct connection between the two. The net balance of 
payments effect of oil production does not only depend upon volume of 
production. It also depends upon the national content of spinoffs; the 
ability of foreign companies to repatriate the profits it earns from 
oil production (and hence touches on the degree of foreign ownership
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in the oil sector) as well as the amount of capital raised abroad; and 
finally the amount of value added accruing from oil which is being 
processed nationally.
Our analysis of the overall relationship between the international 
companies and an oil-producing state which can be of use in analysing 
the Norwegian case study has now been concluded. We have put forward a 
new framework of analysis because the existing attempts to conceptualise
the relationship between producer-states and companies, be they of a
127 general or more specific character, have turned out to be unsatisfactory.
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CHAPTER 3
OUR CASHFLOW MODEL AND OPERATIONALISATION OF THE
BARGAINING VARIABLES
One of the aims of our work is to quantify the outcome of the barg- 
aining process between the Norwegian state and the oil companies. A 
crucial part of this task will be to determine the state/company division 
of rent over time. To successfully do this we must first operationalise 
the definition of rent given in Chapter 2. This is done in Part I of this 
chapter. We must then construct a detailed cashflow model for North Sea 
fields. The latter task, which is accomplished in Part II, is necessary 
to find the total amount of rent from hypothetical finds in the North Sea. 
Our cashflow model also incorporates different state policy instruments, 
both in the form of taxes and participation. This helps to determine the 
division of the rent between the two protagonists in the battle for the 
oil rent. How this division changes over time can then help us to say 
something about the shifts in the relative bargaining strength between 
the companies and the Norwegian state.
Part I: Operationalisations
3.1 OPERATIONALISATION OF THE CONCEPT OF RENT
Having defined rent in the oil industry, we are still faced with 
the task of operationalising the concept. This is a lengthy and compli- 
cated task. Before arriving at the final definition that we will use 
throughout the thesis (p. 89 below), we have to face three questions:
(a) We must find an adequate measurement of profitability.
(b) We must choose an appropriate discount rate.
(c) Finally we must deal with the problem of risk and uncertainty. 
We will discuss each problem in turn.
3.1.1 Measurement of profitability
Given our definition of rent (p.36), we must first find an adequate 
measurement of profitability. Unfortunately there is no accepted 
discounted method of measuring profitability. According to Newendorp: 
"There is probably no single method of calculation that completely 
describes all the dimensions of profitability." We will initially
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single out the three most important and most frequently used measure- 
ments of profitability. Their nature, and interrelationship, is readily 
appreciated by means of the formula
t-y c 
x = z   1
t=o (i + zy
where Ct refers to a positive or negative cash flow from an investment 
at time t 1 , X is the (Net) Present Value of the project, and z is the 
rate of interest.
Or in graphic form:
0
t=0
The three common measurements of profitability can then be expressed 
by using the above formula.
1. Pay-out time is found when z=0, x=0
2. Internal rate of return (IRR) = z
When X = 0 and y = lifetime of the project
3. Present value (PV) = X
When y = lifetime of the project and z = the chosen discount rate, 
(When the cashflow is computed post-tax X is labelled Net Present 
Value (NPV)).
. Appendix C evaluates in detail the merits of these different 
measurements for our purpose and concludes that the best starting point 
for an operationalisation of oil-rent is to find the present value of 
an oil-field. This is because the IRR-criterion does not tell us any- 
thing about the relative importance of the companies' absolute share 
of oil-rent from a given field. An IRR of 50% on what is 5% of total 
capital outlay of an oil-field is relatively unimportant from a point 
of view which wants to emphasise the state's overall control over rents. 
We will, however, make use of the IRR criterion later on when we want to 
assess the influence of specific policies on the companies,, The simple 
undiscounted criterion of 'government take' does, on the other hand, 
not tell us anything about the time perspective of the investment. 
It therefore remains an unacceptable measurement of profitability and 
rent unless we postulate that the timing of costs and revenues to the
81
state is of no importance. But this measurement does nevertheless 
have a crucial importance with respect to the absolute size of the 
government's share, which the IRR says nothing about.
5.1.2 The 'normal* rate of profit and the rate of discount
Having decided that the PV of a field can serve as a proxy for 
the oil-rent, we still have to determine the 'normal rate of profit 1 
in order to operationalize our definition of rent. We will see that 
there are difficulties in determining this magnitude for the private 
sector, and hence that there are difficulties in determining which 
discount rate to use to find the PV. This is because the discount
rate, in an equilibrium situation, can normally be approximated to the
2 
'normal rate of profit' in the economy.
The determination of the exact magnitude of a 'normal rate of 
profit' has been the central and underlying element in the confrontations 
between governments and oil companies in the North Sea. There has been 
full agreement between the two that part of this rate of return should 
include amortization for former costs of looking for oil. But the key 
conceptual problem arises when one assesses the future investment needs
of the companies. Should one consider as 'rent 1 the amount of profit 
above 'normal profits' which is necessary to finance future (and in- 
creasingly expensive) exploration of oil? As Adelman has put the case:
"Part of 'rent' must be regarded as 'quasi-rent' because it is a surplus
3 in the short run, but not in the long run." We will return to this
problem in the more specific historical context of the North Sea, and 
at the moment just point to a number of general problems that arise 
if such a procedure is accepted 
First , it makes it possible for the oil companies to claim that 
there never are any 'excess profits' earned in the oil industry, given 
the huge needs for new investment in the industry in the coming decades. 
Cases have been known where all notions of 'excess profits' have dis- 
appeared in company accounts because the companies have assumed that
60% of their future (and expected higher) capital costs should be
4 
generated from internal funds and therefore were part of costs.
Secondly, and closely related to the above point, the oil industry 
has always had a remarkably high degree of self-financing. Maintain- 
ing such a high level in an increasing cost situation automatically means 
a lower declared rate of return. But there is anyway nothing intrinsic-
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ally desirable from a social point of view in maintaining such a high 
degree of internal finance in the oil industry.
Thirdly, in order to justify the existence of high profits, one 
must argue that higher profits for the companies will lead to a more 
intense exploration activity. This may be the weakest 'link 1 in the 
chain of argument because there has recently been a tendency for oil 
companies to use their oil profits to diversify into non-oil fields 
like insurance, supermarkets, motor-hotels etc. This was particularly 
true in the US in the aftermath of the OPEC price increase in 1973/74. 6 
Furthermore, the alleged lack of competition between different sources 
of energy, often controlled by the oil companies, has also cast doubt 
on the validity of this link. 7
Fourthly, there are three main criteria which can be used by a firm 
to determine its discount rate: the marginal opportunity-cost of capital 
for the firm; the cost of capital; or a combination of the two (see 
below). The choice between these different criteria is of great 
importance, because an acceptance of the first may yield a private 
rate of discount which is higher than the second one.
We will argue here that within the context of the North Sea, if 
we are to choose a private discount rate, it is the second criterion
which should constitute the basis for an appropriate discount rate. 
The reason for this is twofold:
A firm which is confronted with two projects, one in the North Sea 
and one say off South-East Asia, which both yield high rates of return, 
has to make one crucial assumption when it chooses one project and uses 
the other as 'opportunity-cost of capital 1 . It has to assume that the 
second project will always be available into which the firm can re- 
invest at the high rates of return the earnings from the first project. 
If the second project is not available in the future, but only when the 
original choice had to be made, then the opportunity-cost of capital 
when the original decision was made is irrelevant for a full 
appreciation of the project.
If, on the other hand, there are no capital constraints on a firm, 
then even a firm which permanently earns a rate of return in 
excess of the 'normal 1 rate (and which therefore will have a high 
opportunity-cost of capital) will be induced to invest in projects as 
long as its expected return is in excess of the cost of borrowing. 
The main question is therefore to determine whether there are permanent 
capital constraints for a firm operating in the North Sea. I.e. can a
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firm invest as much as it wants in the North Sea? The existence of the
o
consortium method of financing suggests that this is the case. On 
the other hand it can be argued that there is a continuous constraint 
on the number of rigs, skilled personnel, and a lack of continuous new 
acreage. However, all of these constraints can be said to be temporary 
constraints, and hence there seem to be good a priori reasons why no 
capital constraints exist in the North Sea. As a consequence the 
relevant rate of private discount for our purpose is the cost of 
capital.
The roost important consequence to follow from this is that the 
common method of adjusting the private rate of discount upwards in 
periods of inflation by the whole expected rate of inflation is 
incorrect. We can only adjust for inflation to the extent that this 
higher inflation rate has already been reflected in higher interest 
rates.
(i) Social vs. private rate of discount
But there are not only difficulties in defining the appropriate 
private rate of discount. It is also possible to argue that the private 
and the social rates of discount for projects in the North Sea differ. 
We will not review here the whole literature concerning the difference 
between the private and social rate of discount, but rather deal with 
the problem within the context of the North Sea.
When evaluating the return from a project in the North Sea in order 
to decide whether the project should be undertaken or not, such an 
assessment can be made either from the standpoint of society as a whole 
or from the standpoint of a private oil firm. It is possible to have a 
situation where a society might be willing to develop a field, while 
the private firm will not do so because there is a difference between 
the private and the social rate of discount. If the investment 
criterion is that a project will be undertaken as long as there is a 
positive expected present value to be earned, then it is possible to 
imagine a project which when evaluated at the (higher) private rate of 
discount will yield a negative present value, while at the (lower) 
social rate of discount will give a positive present value. The main 
reasons why there is a difference between the private and the social 
rate of discount will now be made clear.
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A private company which makes a micro-economic assessment about 
a future investment must try to incorporate a notion of uncertainty 
into its calculations. For the specific firm there is a fixed stat- 
istical chance that the future level of key variables will deviate from 
the expected mean (even if this mean can be assumed known by the 
existence of future markets). To compensate for this uncertainty the 
firm normally requires a rate of return which is higher, and hence 
uses a higher rate of discount than if the future was known with 
certainty, or if these uncertainties did not exist. With respect to 
oil production from one oil provice, the most obvious risk, which would 
cancel out in the event of full state ownership, would be the geological
risk and the corresponding size of the oil deposits which have been
12 
shown to be log-normal distributed. By contrast the state is not
subject to this risk; hence it will then be able to base its calcula- 
tions on the mean of the future expected value of the variables in
13 question. its discount rate is i ower than the private sector's rate.
A second argument is conducted at a slightly different level of 
abstraction. It argues that only a social rate of discount should have 
any meaning for policy-makers because the private rate of discount is 
largely irrelevant in oil production in the historical situation of a 
number of producer-countries. We have argued that oil production gives 
rise to permanent rents. Because the income associated with these rents 
does not correspond to the value of goods and services used in the production 
of oil, but rather reflects the transfer of an economic surplus from 
other parts of the economic system to the oil-producing state, a number 
of particular problems tend to arise in oil-producing states. If we 
talk about relatively large producers these rents can lead to important 
structural problems for the economies in question. These are most often 
described as 'absorption-problems', but hide a number of different pro- 
cesses. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates face the 
problem that there is not enough productive investment within their own 
boundaries on which this rent can be spent. Since a number of other 
outlets for their investments are closed for political reasons, their 
social opportunity rate of return is the rate obtainable in so-called 
'safe 1 placements in the Western financial markets, normally long-run 
US treasury bonds. This rate is certainly drastically lower than the 
private oil companies ' discount-rate. For other countries like Norway 
even the expectation of large future rents from oil production in the
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North Sea has led to an overvalued currency and the highest unit costs 
of production of any OECD country. This tendency will increase in step 
with the oil production itself. These effects plus the more long-run 
indirect effects of the increased state expenditure which will follow 
as a result of the oil revenues in the 1980s, can result in a deep 
structural transformation in the Norwegian economy. (See Chapter 7 for 
a description of some of these likely changes. This trend was already 
visible in the partial collapse of some Norwegian export industries in 
1977-78.) Iran is today in a broadly similar situation where agricultural 
production has dropped drastically as a result of the structural changes 
related to oil. Different societies will value these consequences of oil 
production differently. But the main point is that because of the 
characteristics of oil production (high rents) it is in the above cases 
almost impossible to limit any analysis of depletion to the micro-economic 
depletion path of one single oil-field using a private discount rate. 
Such an exercise should be largely irrelevant when a nation-state decides 
whether to produce oil or not, which depends much more on an analysis of 
the wider structural and political implications of oil production.
For us, the main consequence of the above discussion is that the 
social rate of discount becomes the appropriate di-count rate to compute 
the rent from oil-fields in the North Sea, and that the rate of discount
must be lower for the state than for the private companies, i.e. the
14 
state should exploit oil at a slower rate than the companies.
Two comments should be made in this context.
While the social rate of discount may be the theoretically correct 
discount rate, in our economic case study it is not the state which 
decides whether to develop the field or not. This decision is taken 
by the private company according to its own criteria. Hence it is 
possible to argue that the relevant discount rate is the private one, 
since it is the companies' decision which 'counts'. If a project's 
IRR falls between the social and the private rate of discount the 
state can only develop this project if it pays a subsidy to the firm 
(as long as it won't undertake this project on its own through a state 
oil corporation).
Despite the difference between the 'theoretically correct' and 
'politically relevant' rates of discount, this difference may not be
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as large as is often assumedo By choosing the cost of capital instead 
of the higher 'opportunity-cost of capital' as the relevant private rate 
of discount, this means that the difference between the private and the
social rates of discount shrinks, even if we must stress that a differ-
15 
ence does indeed exist.
(ii) Risk and the rate of discount
It is frequently postulated that the oil companies need a return 
above the 'normal' or 'minimum' rates of profit to protect themselves 
against the 'risk' in the industry. We will frequently find represent- 
atives of both governments and companies talking in such terms to justify 
their own actions. We will now examine what consequences (if any) 'risk' 
has for the determination of a 'normal 1 rate of profit and hence for the 
rate of discount.
Before we analyse the different ways of measuring risk and assess 
to what extent 'risk' is a legitimate concept in the industry, we must 
look more closely into the different origins of risk in the oil industry. 
These are four-fold: economic, engineering, geological, and political. 
Economic: This category of risk involves all variables that directly
or indirectly affect the money-variables (as opposed to the physical 
variables) in our discounted cash analysis. In this category we include 
variables like the level of future prices. But because companies are 
only interested in net prices (i.e. post-taxes), economic risks must 
be seen in relation to the next category of risk, political risk. 
Political: This risk element consists of factors that affect the net 
value of the relevant money-variables (for instance by new taxation 
measures). The definition of political risks may be extended to mean 
the threat of losing the whole capital value of the existing assets, 
for example in a situation of a total nationalization without compensation. 
Engineering risks refer to the material basis for the expected cost- 
elements in our analysis. It includes risks related to the introduction 
of new technology as well as to the normal day-to-day functioning of an 
oil-field in hazardous conditions.
Finally, geological risks are connected to the exploration phase. 
Here risks are related both to the probability of finding oil as well 
as to the likely amount of recoverable oil. Most analysis of risk is 
directed towards this aspect of risk. (For a further analysis related 
to geological risks in the North Sea see Section 4.3,1.)
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All these elements of risk have one crucial, but often neglected, 
factor in common: risk is not something that necessarily only works in 
one direction and contrary to the interests of the oil companies. Risk 
can also give pleasant surprises. Taking each category of risk in turn 
we see that prices may go up; the depreciation schedule used by the 
government may be more favourable than originally thought; technological 
changes may favour the tasks of the companies; and the oil province 
in question may turn out to be a 'bonanza 1 . This immediately suggests 
that no simple statement that the oil industry is a 'high-risk 1 industry 
will be sufficient. First of all we have to distinguish different parts 
of the industry and also relate risk to the cash outlays involved. 
Exploration in the North Sea is cheap, but relatively uncertain comp- 
ared with production, which is very expensive but relatively certain, 
especially after the top of the learning curve has been reached (see 
footnote 8 above). Secondly, one can insure against risk. This is 
possible both politically (through different government export guarantee 
schemes like the British ECGD) and also to cover engineering risk (through 
ordinary, albeit expensive, methods of insurance).
Compensation for risk is traditionally thought to require a higher
18 rate of return on investment. But how much higher? Determining the
rate of return that compensates for risk is impossible without making 
specific assumptions about the nature of the risk in question. Using 
a high interest rate as a discount rate simply indicates that the firm 
in question wants to recover its investments as soon as possible. If 
the relevant perceived risk by the company is located somewhere in the 
medium- to long-run, then such a procedure obviously makes sense. If it 
isn't (and for example the outlook in the medium- to long-run seems 
relatively stable with respect to economic risks like prices and 
incomes), but the relevant risk is expected in the short run, then such 
a procedure seems much less appropriate, because there is no way the 
investment can be recovered before the risk appears. And in the oil 
industry it is the very short-run prospects which are generally regarded 
as being of crucial importance; not the least because this is the period 
when a substantial amount of any loan finance is normally due to be 
paid back.
Secondly, the procedure of using high interest rates to account for 
risk tends to work against any project which has a long time perspective 
and can then lead to serious misjudgements with respect to investment 
decisions (see p.313). The contradictory nature of this criterion
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is especially seen if a high discount rate is used to adjust for 
political risks, e.g. in third world countries. A high discount rate 
encourages a rapid exploration of natural resources which can then lead 
to accusations by the host-government that the resources are being 
exploited 'irresponsibly 1 , which in turn may increase the political 
risk of nationalization.
Finally, in many contexts it may be important to differentiate 
between different degrees of uncertainty. Imposing one interest rate 
on the whole combination of different investment possibilities is there- 
fore a far too simplified procedure. We need a procedure by which 
different risks of different projects are expressed. As one observer 
has said:
"How does one establish the 'minimum cut-off 1 level of profit- 
ability? Is it right to reject a relatively certain project having a 
rate of return of 24 per cent (relatively certain in the sense 
of having a high probability of obtaining the predicted cash
flow) in favour of a high-risk, rank wildcat which if successful
19 will yield a rate of return of 34 per cent?"
The choice of one single discount rate to reflect these different
20 conditions is clearly too arbitrary.
In this section we have both questioned the prevalent view that 
the oil industry is inherently a high-risk industry, and criticized the 
normal way of describing 'risk 1 . This leads us to try to find other 
solutions to the measurement problem of risk.
5.1.5 Uncertainty
One solution to the measurement problem is to incorporate the 
concept of uncertainty as a substitute for 'risk 1 into a model of oil 
exploration. Such a procedure is relatively new within the industry; 
some observers suggest that it had little importance until the mid 
1960s.
The incorporation of uncertainty is in principle quite straight- 
forward. The expected monetary value of a project is the net expected 
present value of the project multiplied by the probability of occurance 
of that project. Thus the Expected Monetary Value (EMV) of drilling a 
well in the North Sea equals the expected present value of this 
investment times the probability that the well may yield a commercial 
find minus the probability of drilling a dry hole times the cost of
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22drilling such a hole. It is also possible to incorporate the prob- 
ability of the likely size of a find which will complicate the analysis.
If the PV element in this formula has been computed by using a 
discount rate that is equivalent to the 'normal 1 rate of return, then 
any final EMV becomes an indication of the return over and above a 
'normal return 1 , the requirement of our original definition of rent.
We will broadly try to follow such a procedure in operationalising the 
concept of 'risk 1 . The initial expected success rate in the North Sea 
is set equal to the success rate for wildcat drilling in the world as 
a whole. As drilling developed in the North Sea this rate then changed 
according to the developments in the North Sea.
This way of evaluating uncertainty incorporates what we call the 
'mean-risk' which accounts for how the mean of the expected income moves 
as the success rate of drilling changes. But it disregards what we can 
label 'variance-risk 1 , i.e. the distribution of PV around the mean. 
In short it disregards the kind of risk which makes a firm prefer a 
certain income of $X to an outcome with a probability of 0.5 that it 
will earn $0.5X or $1.5X.
Our operationalization of risk disregards this latter risk element 
and only deals with the former. This nevertheless goes a long way
towards the common usage within the industry of classifying risk. When 
companies state that the 'risk' in the North Sea has decreased, they
7 7
normally mean that the chance of finding oil has increased. But in 
order to establish the quantitative importance of the second kind of
risk we will run a number of sensitivity tests for our basic cost and
24 revenue data as well as for the drilling success-rates.
3.1.4 Conclusion
We are now in a position to operationalize our definition of oil- 
rent. We want to determine the PV of an oil-field using a social rate 
of discount, adjusted to risk by incorporating the success-rate in 
exploration.
Once we have determined the total rent from a field, we can then 
examine in more detail the division of this total rent between the 
companies and the Norwegian state.
The one author who has come closest to a similar definition of 
rent is van Meurs (1971). Using his conceptual apparatus both in 
situations of full certainty as well as in situations of uncertainty,
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he tries to analyse the relationship between companies and producer- 
states in terms of division of rent.
There are nevertheless a number of unresolved problems in relation 
to his methodology. First> his basic assumption that the present
value of investment per barrel is an increasing function of total
25 
reserves is questionable. Secondly, he is never very explicit on
which rate of return on capital to use to find the 'floor-level' for 
the computation of rent (the problem we have discussed in considerable 
detail above). Is it the opportunity-cost for the firms in the oil 
industry, or simply the average social rate of discount? Without such 
a closer specification, his analysis remains non-operative. Thirdly, 
he assumes that all profit going to exploration will have to be earned 
in extraction. This is not necessarily true. In the real world it is 
thought that companies have an annual general fund which they spend on 
exploration the origin of which is all the different activities that a 
vertically integrated firm engages in.
5.2 OPERATIQNALISATION OF VOLUME CONTROL AND SPINOFFS
We need no new concepts in order;to handle the consequences of 
depletion controls. The effects of any such controls at the micro-level 
will be fully reflected in a change in the PV of an oil-field. A 
macro-regulation of volume will on the other side yield no effects on 
the PV and its division for the individual find.
The operationalisation of spinoffs requires relatively little 
theoretical elaboration. We are first interested in the percentage 
of total capital expenditure necessary to bring a field into operation 
which is spent in Norway. This figure is therefore not only an indica- 
tion of how well the Norwegian state as a state is doing in the spinoff 
industries, but is also an indication of how well both the Norwegian 
state sector and and the Norwegian private sector together are doing. 
Secondly, we are also interested in the total amount of forward spinoffs 
like petrochemical industries, refineries etc. that were established 
within Norway as a result of the oil production.
It should be noted that in neither of the two cases would an 
'optimum' policy from the Norwegian state's side necessarily mean that 
all forward and backward spinoffs accrue to Norway. We should also take 
into consideration the important content of the final output and the amount 
of export orders won by the Norwegian industry (largely private) engaged
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in forward spinoffs. Finally, such a monetary quantification of 
spinoffs says nothing about the way that the state helps or supports 
private industry in gaining spinoff orders. We will in particular 
return to this latter point as the case study unfolds.
Part II: The model
We have constructed a computer cashflow model for different 
hypothetical fields in the North Sea in order to determine the total 
rent which originates from oil production in the area. This cashflow 
model, which can incorporate different notions of 'participation 1 , will 
be used throughout the Norwegian case study to determine the division 
of rent between the Norwegian state and the companies. It differs in 
a number of ways from other cashflow models previously used to analyse 
the situation in the North Sea. This is a convenient point to highlight 
these differences.
5.3 THE DIFFERENCES FROM EXISTING MODELS
In contrast to the analysis carried out by Official White Papers 
and oil economists in the past, which has relied on undiscounted figures 
to determine the division of rent between the Norwegian state and the 
international companies, we have assessed the historic division of rent 
in discounted terms. The first official Norwegian government report
that treated the division of rent in discounted terms was not presented
o/-
until 1975 and then did not deal with any historical material. Our 
attempts to carry out a discounted analysis from 1965 should therefore 
represent a step forward in the understanding of the Norwegian state's 
historic role in the North Sea. It is in particular important to
transcend the major weakness implicit in the undiscounted analysis that the
27 
state and the companies do not care when they earn the net revenues. And
even if cashflow models today tend to use discounted figures in their 
results, the interpretation of these results is often confused because 
their theoretical underpinnings are not often properly understood. 
Furthermore a discounted analysis is not universally accepted. Major 
works like Robinson and Morgan (1978) still examine the state's take 
in undiscounted percentage terms.
Secondly, the majority of cashflow models that have been developed 
to analyse North Sea oil-fields do not mention government participation.
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28 ?Q "^n (Williams (1972), Ministry of Finance (1975), Surrey (1976), NS_
(1976) 31 ). The ones that do (MIT (1976), 32 Statoil (1974 33 ) make 
explicit what is only implicit in the first group of models: a state 
participation of X per cent means that the state gains access to an exact 
corresponding percentage of either the undiscounted or discounted net value 
of the field. Most importantly, as will be made clear later, in none of 
these models would participation affect the companies 1 internal rate of 
return. As opposed to such a procedure we have developed four different 
participation schemes which correspond to the four schemes operative in the 
Norwegian sector up until 1975, none of which under normal assumptions 
give the straightforward results outlined above. The only example in 
the North Sea of the very simplified version holding true would be in 
case of participation as understood by the British National Oil 
Corporation (BNOC) in the fifth round of concessions, where BNOC will 
pay a fixed percentage of total costs and receive a corresponding 
percentage of total output.
Our third extension in comparison with what are 'normal 1 assumptions 
in cashflow models refers to the treatment of exploration costs. 
Instead of just listing the exploration costs, including the cost of 
delineation wells attributable to one field, we assess the average 
number of wells it takes for a company to find a commercial field within 
one oil-producing province. But only a minor part of this total explor- 
ation expenditure is attributable to one specific field. Consequently 
in the instances where the state is liable for part of the exploration 
costs we need to assess the percentage of exploration costs attributable 
to the block where a commercial find is made. All other exploration 
costs, including the costs of drilling dry holes on blocks where a 
commercial find is never made, should be counted as costs to the 
company, even if these according to all agreements concluded during the 
period of study are not shared by the Norwegian state. Such procedures 
tend to increase the total costs incurred by the company compared with 
a traditional analysis, and should be included as a real resource cost 
of finding a new field. This procedure has the advantage that it 
allows us to assess in a more realistic manner the often-made claim 
by the companies that they need a rate of return on capital in excess 
of the 'normal* because of the high cost and risk of exploration.
The fourth albeit least novel modification from most cashflow 
models is that we choose the social rate of discount to assess the PV 
of the different fields.
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While the assumption of a zero-sum game implied in our definition of 
rent is not necessarily relevant in all situations (e.g. to understand 
the division of rent between OPEC and the international companies as a 
whole when the price of crude quadrupled in 1973-74), it nevertheless 
serves well as a working hypothesis with respect to the confrontation 
between the Norwegian state and the companies where the price of oil 
is exogenously given.
Finally, our model is constructed around what we label a 'historical 1 
methodology. To empirically 'fill 1 the cashflow model we will use data 
as they were available at the time when the specific negotiations between 
the Norwegian state and the companies took place, i.e. we try to re- 
create the bargaining situation in the light of what was known at the 
time of each bargaining round concerning costs, tax conditions, and 
revenues, and not in relation to what subsequently turned out to be the 
case. This seems to us to be the only correct procedure if we want to 
have an insight as regards the historical effects and dynamics of the 
issue of participation. To be more concrete; the only way to know 
whether a new participation agreement entered into in 1969 constituted 
a 'tightening 1 as far as the Norwegian state was concerned, is to evalu- 
ate such an agreement in the light of the 1969 expected costs and 
revenue figures. The final outcome is irrelevant for such an assessment.
To obtain such data we have made use of company or independently 
computed figures as they appeared in the professional press, stock- 
broker reports, and newspapers at the time of each negotiating round. 
Such a procedure has never before been undertaken to help to analyse 
in a historic manner the development of the Norwegian oil concessions. 
Only the roughest ideas in the form of 'government take 1 figures have 
historically been at the disposal of any analyst who has wanted to
examine in more detail the nature of the participation agreements as
34 
well as the first 1965 round of concessions.
A different methodological perspective also requires us to consider 
the value of one variable which is disregarded in traditional analysis. 
This is the total percentage of the PV which in one form or another 
goes to the state. Orthodox theory is only normally interested in the 
amount that the state earns in taxation from the share of PV which 
originally accrued to the company. If however one also has a general 
interest in the overall role of the modern state and if in particular 
one wants to analyse the state's role as a productive accumulating unit, 
the division of the state's share of PV earned from taxation as well as
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from the state's role as a capitalist enterprise also becomes important. 
It should by now be clear that the direction of this investigation 
is somewhat different from what is normal in traditional cashflow
analysis of the oil industry, and that this perspective brings forth 
different categories of analysis. The tools of analysis outlined 
will hopefully help us to understand in a more complete way the 
genesis and history of the concept of participation. Finally, our 
cashflow model can be of more general analytical value, for example, 
by spelling out the consequences of different policies and trying to 
understand what options at any one time were open to the Norwegian 
policy-makers.
3.4 SUMMARY OF THE BASIC MODEL
Our next task is to describe in detail the model we will use to 
determine the present value of hypothetical oil finds in the North Sea 
and its division between the private companies and the Norwegian state. 
In this chapter we only examine the variables that are necessary to 
accomplish this task and point to their interrelationship. In 
the following chapters, which deal with the historical development of 
Norwegian policies, will we empirically establish the value of these 
variables.
The different participation scenarios negotiated in 1969 and later 
are all superimposed on a 'basic 1 cashflow model which if necessary can 
be run without any participation scenarios. This was the case in 1965 
during the first round of allocation of acreage on the Norwegian 
Continental Shelf when no participation agreements were negotiated. 
Assessing a 'no participation 1 case in all post-1965 historic cases 
also facilitates a comparison of the final outcome with what the outcome 
would have been if no participation agreements had been negotiated.
We will now examine in detail each of the variables necessary to 
find the Present Value of the field and the division of rent. Since 
this model underlies all the subsequent case studies which are to 
follow, considerable space will be devoted to an examination of its 
basic assumptions. We will then outline how we tackle the problems of 
government participation and problems like the introduction of the 
Norwegian special tax.
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REVENUES
3.4.1 Price
The price in our model is chosen to equal the price of a barrell 
of crude as realised in the Western European market. There is an 
immediate problem with respect to such a price which was highlighted 
in the Norwegian transfer-price confrontation of the 1960s 
(see p,17), It is very doubtful whether the value of a 
barrel of oil to a vertically integrated firm was best expressed by
the free-market price of oil given the small and unrepresentative nature
35 of the spot markets where such a price was determined. Throughout
the 1960s and early 1970s, the spot market became the 'dumping ground 1 
for excess crude from the majors. Therefore, at least until 1972, 
the price used in our calculations can be said to be an understatement 
of the true price of what the oil was worth to the companies. Hence t^e
state's absolute share of rent would have been overstated as the present 
value of the field was higher than our calculations suggest 0 Counter- 
balancing this however is our treatment of transport costs. Because 
we assume the use of pipelines, our chosen price refers to landed oil. 
If the oil had to reshipped to other countries for further processing, 
transport costs come in addition to the pipeline costs we have included. 
On the other hand, if there were major refineries where oil was landed 
the latter argument tends to lose its force. This corresponds to the 
situation after 1972, when it was clear that at least oil from Ekofisk 
would go to Teeside where Phillips owned a major refinery. But when 
the Norwegian state could take out crude in lieu of royalties and also 
started to gain direct access to participation-crude, the pricing 
problem gradually became less important. After 1974 it was however 
replaced by the new problem of setting an appropriate 'norm price' 
whereby it was up to the Norwegian state itself to fix a 'fair market 
price' of oil.
3.4.2 Production profile
The second variable which helps to determine total revenue is the 
shape of the production profile. Different production profiles will 
matter little if we are only interested in undiscounted figures of 
state and company 'take', as long as total output is the same. But 
our discounted figures are very sensitive to different production 
profiles. The faster a field is exploited, the better the discounted
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position for the company (if costs remain reasonably constant). While 
there are technical limits as to what is the 'best 1 or 'optimum 1 
production profile of a field (for example a too rapid exploration may 
bring about 'fingering', whereby part of the reserves are lost due to 
water inflow in the field), there is also an element of choice as to 
which profile to use. The choice of a profile may depend on the crude 
needs of the specific company extracting oil and also reflect the 
bargaining position of the companies compared with the state.
As our production profiles (see Table 3 ), we n^ve chosen 
the ones used by Surrey (1976). They are based on figures submitted by 
the companies for their intended (and actual) production profiles in 
the UK sector of the North Sea, as of 1976. In addition we have con- 
structed a production profile broadly using the same assumptions for a 
hypothetical 1 billion barrel field (Table 3.2). The Surrey production figures 
tend to have a longer production run and a lower peak output than 
almost all the other comparable models. The 1 billion barrel example 
for Statoil (1974) has a production that lasts for 18 years, while we 
assume a production span of 26 years, while the Ministry of Finance 
(1974) assumes a 23-year profile for a similar field. The difference 
becomes accentuated when comparing our production profiles with the MIT 
model, whose 700 mill, field has a lifespan of 14 years compared with 
our 26 years and a much higher yearly maximum production which lasts
6 years, compared with our own maximum output which lasts 4 years.
We will nevertheless use the Surrey production figures throughout 
the case study, given that they are based on actual production profiles 
supplied by the industry. But by doing so it should be noted that the 
expected present value of the field and the profitability will increase 
if production is speeded up. So in order to properly assess our results 
we have also run a sensitivity test for these using the MIT (1976) 
production profiles. (This latter procedure was also undertaken to 
counter the possible criticism that we have kept the production profile 
fixed throughout the period.)
We assume that revenues accrue from the field from the beginning 
of the fourth year of investment. For a field with more than one plat- 
form this is a reasonable assumption, as not all investments need to 
be completed before making one platform able to produce. And even for 
a one-platform field it can be assumed that production can take place 
even if all production wells are not finished.
TABLE 3.1 97
THE PRODUCTION FLOW SPECIFICATIONS *
First year of exploration
First year of development, last of
exploration
Year
1
2
3
Last year of development costs
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
Field
100M
0
0
0
0
0
0
25
40
40
40
34
25
18
14
10
7
6
size
200M
0
0
0
0
0
0
45
60
60
60
52
43
36
31
26
22
18
15
13
11
9
8
6
5
300M
0
0
0
0
0
0
20
50
80
80
80
67
58
50
44
38
33
29
25
22
19
17
14
13
11
400M
0
0
0
0
0
0
10
45
75
100
100
84
75
67
59
53
47
42
37
33
30
26
23
21
19
16
15
13
12
10
700M
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
45
70
105
135
150
150
150
150
130
112
97
84
73
63
54
47
42
35
30
26
23
20
17
15
13
11
* in thousands of 
barrels per day
TABLE 3.2
DATA ASSUMPTIONS RELATING TO THE BILLION BARREL DISCOVERY
PRODUCTION (thousands of barrels per day)
Year 1-7 8 9 10 11 12-16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
Flow 0 30 60 105 160 225 202 169 142 119 100 84 71 59
Year 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 
Flow 50 42 35 30 25 21 18 15 12 10
Source: Author's estimates
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COSTS
There are three cost categories in the extraction of oil: 
exploration costs, development costs and operating costs.
5.4.5. Exploration costs
Exploration costs arise from geological and geophysical surveys, 
and exploratory drilling. Within the category of surveys, seismic 
surveys constitute the bulk of the expenditure. This is the only cost 
element that is cheaper offshore than on land. Offshore, charges of 
dynamite or gas-pistols can be exploded directly in the sea without 
the elaborate digging down of the charges that is necessary for onshore 
surveys. The transport of the seismic registration apparatus is also
easier than on land. This gives an average cost of sea surveys equal
37 to one fourth of land surveys. Magnetometric surveys are also
38 
relatively cheap.
The important cost in the exploration phase originates in 
exploration drilling. The cost of each well sunk depends upon a 
number of variables, the most important being distance from shore, 
depth, weather conditions, depth of target formations, type of rock 
above target and pressure of reservoir. The costs increase exponenti- 
ally in relation to some of these variables. Normally the major 
companies hire the services of drilling firms to carry out exploration 
drilling. In our model we assume that total exploration costs stretch 
over 4 years, with 10% of total costs incurring in the first year and 
30% in the three following years. This figure is the average figure 
of the range given by Williams (1972) (2-6 years). Other studies like 
Ministry of Finance (1974) disregard the exploration costs altogether
and simply state that such costs may come many years before other
39 
costs.
The main problem is to decide how much exploration expenditure to 
attribute to a hypothetical field. We choose to use the wildcat success 
ratio of unexplored territories on a world-wide scale, and compute the 
equivalent costs for finding one commercial find in the North Sea. If 
the commercial success rate of new field wildcats in the mid 1960s (as 
opposed to the percentage that finds traces of oil and gas) was one in 
twenty, then total exploration costs would be twenty times the cost of 
an exploration well. As the geology of an oil province gets better
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and better known, this average should decrease. On the other hand, 
the most promising structures will first of all be drilled, thus 
contributing to a decrease in the success rate in tne long run -
5<4,4 Development costs
Development cost can be divided into the following three broad 
categories:
- delineation or appraisal wells
- production wells and platform costs, including installation 
and equipment
- pipelines.
Once a successful wildcat has struck oil, a number of appraisal wells 
have to be drilled to find the size of the field  It is based on this 
information that the decision is taken whether to go ahead with the 
investment of platforms or not. The costs of appraisal wells can be 
set equal to an exploration well. We can assume that four such wells 
are on average necessary to determine the size of a field.
The cost of development can then be computed based on the cost 
of various installations needed to produce from a field. But development 
costs for one field do not only depend upon the size of the field and 
the depth of water where it is located. There is also a technological 
uncertainty attached to such a computation because it is not un- 
ambiguously known how many production wells and production platforms 
are needed (or are optimal) for a field only on the basis of information 
on size and depth.
But all general studies implicitly abstract from these difficulties 
when they use 'average* production costs for fields of a given size at 
a given depth in order to carry out their cash flow analysis. Following 
e.g. estimates by Shell and Hinde, we therefore assume that it is 
methodologically legitimate to use an average figure for the number of 
wells and platforms needed per unit of reserves. Our model will utilize 
the average figure used by Abbot and Crossman of 18 production wells per 
platform and one platform per 100m. barrels of recoverable reserves to 
find development costs. It should however be stressed that while this 
figure can be used as an average, it must only be regarded as a starting 
point of a full analysis, given the discrepancies of conditions in the 
North Sea. It is for this reason that throughout the case study we 
have carried out sensitivity tests with respect to total development 
costs.
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Production wells can be more expensive than exploration wells 
because the angle at which they drill differs from the normal perpend- 
icular. They will thus both be longer and will have to be drilled with 
more accuracy than the normal exploration well. But because they will 
be drilled from the fixed production platforms, no special rig has to 
be hired. So their final cost is cheaper than the exploration wells even 
if more production wells are likely to be drilled than actually will be used. 
Some wells are also used to reinject gas and water into the reservoir.
We now turn to the most expensive item of the development costs: 
the production platforms. Platforms in the North Sea have historically 
been of two types, the concrete gravity structures pioneered by the 
Norwegians and the more traditional steel platforms. The gravity 
structures were not in use until the latter part of the period we are 
examining. The main costs to take into consideration are the cost of 
the structure itself, and its installation. (For example a flotation 
collar necessary to deposit a steel jacket cannot normally be used 
more than twice.) In addition we must include the necessary equipment 
on the platforms. Of the smaller items we must account for land 
installations (where the pipeline comes ashore), as well as costs to 
cover administration, land purchase, financing costs. Finally we have 
included a 'sundry 1 item. An overview of the distribution of these 
different cost items, and their relationship to total development costs, 
has been given by Cazenove and Lovegrove. Using Lovegrove's 
figures and disregarding the submarine pipeline and the platform wells
which we treat separately, we arrive at the following relative distri-
47 bution of the different components of platform cost:
Platform structure (including installation 71%
Equipment 18%
Sundry 11%
100%
We will on this background assume that if the cost of one of the three items of
platform costs is known, then the total platform costs can be computed. 
Furthermore in line with the assumption made with respect to production
wells, we assume that the platform component of the development costs
48 
shows constant returns to scale.
There are possible differences in the time distribution of total
investments. We assume that the investment is spread over 6 years with
49 
a fixed percentage of total investment costs attributable to each year.
The distribution chosen is identical to the assumption of the MIT model
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(1976). The number of years chosen for total investment costs (6) are 
also identical to the number of years chosen by Williams (1972), but 2 
years less than Statoil (1974). But this latter discrepancy can at 
least partly be explained by the fact that investment costs in the 
Statoil model only includes exploration costs attributable to one field 
and thus disregards unsuccessful exploration expenditure. We also 
assume that there is a one-year overlap between exploration costs and 
investment costs. This seems reasonable as it can be assumed that the 
first delineation wells will be drilled in the same year as the last 
of the exploration wells.
Finally, the costs of pipelines depend upon a number of variables 
like the diameter, depth of water, and weather conditions in the area. 
Pipeline costs will exhibit the classic textbook economies of scale, 
only with respect to the actual material cost of the pipe, while the 
cost of laying a pipe will be more or less the same whether the pipe 
is 30" or 36" in diameter. Because most pipelines are also constructed 
with a fair amount of spare capacity, we will assume that total pipeline 
costs remain constant no matter what quantity is produced from a field. 
As the North Sea as an oil province grows older and a number of pipelines 
will have been constructed, smaller new fields may be able to link up 
with existing pipelines. But during the period we have discussed 
this was not expected to happen.
5.4.5 Economies of scale in development
When all three components of development costs are taken into 
consideration our hypothetical fields will exhibit economies of scale, 
but on a decreasing scale. Pipeline costs are constant while total 
platform costs show constant returns to scale. This is in line with 
a number of statements made by representatives of the oil industry and 
is also used by a number of other studies. Surrey's development cost 
figures can almost be derived by an identical procedure of assuming a 
fixed cost and then adding a variable cost which shows constant returns 
to scale. The common practice of stipulating a fixed sum of 
investment costs per daily barrel (of maximum production) from a
O J_
field also yields economies of scale on quite a substantial scale. 
But this theoretical result has to be counterbalanced by the actual 
technical conditions in the North Sea. According to Kennedy (Drilling 
Editor of Oil and Gas Journal) there had been no economies of scale in
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the North Sea by the end of 1972, something he attributed to the fact 
that "the very big fields have been encountered in the worst conditions". 
This assessment (but not with the same reasoning) was also echoed by 
Shell in their submission to the Norwegian Parliament's Industrial 
Committee 53 in 1975.
Given this background, it seems that our assumption that there are 
modest economies of scale in the North Sea is a reasonable one.
3.4.6 Operating costs
This category includes all non-capital or working expenditure that 
is necessary to maintain the flow of oil from an oil-field. Direct costs 
are labour costs (including cost of supplies), power (both of the prod- 
uction platform and the pipeline), transport and cost of separation of 
oil from gas (if relevant). An often neglected but important element 
of total costs is insurance.
We assume that operating costs are directly influenced by the 
number of barrels of crude being produced per time period, so we have 
assigned a fixed sum per barrel as operating costs. This procedure 
was first used by Hinde (who applied it to gas), but was also used 
in the Gulf of Mexico Study by Weaver (1972) and by Cazenove. Some 
studies divide the operating costs into a variable and a fixed amount. 
This is however a questionable procedure to the extent that the cost of 
insurance constitutes a major part of the fixed element of operating 
costs; the reason being that the value of the platform, and consequently 
the cost of insurance (which is roughly proportional to the value of 
what is being insured) will decrease as the field is being emptied. 
The above argument is only correct on the (reasonable) assumption that 
the platform is not assumed to have any scrap value and therefore only 
has a value in relation to the discounted value of future production 
which will continuously fall as the field is emptied. Given this
background it is easily understood why there is no 'agreed 1 way of
58 treating operating costs. As late as 1975, Lovegrove characterised
operating costs as a 'grey 1 area of analysis, something which is brought 
out by wide discrepancies in the operating costs used by different 
studies. Among other things the treatment of operating costs depends 
upon whether we have a pipeline or a tanker-loading system. Our choice 
of stipulating operating costs on a per barrel basis is therefore a
compromise, which also tends to underestimate the profitability of the
59 
companies.
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3.4.7 Debt conditions and taxes
We have now completed our summary of the cost and revenue factors 
of the basic model which will remain unchanged throughout our case study 
from 1965 to 1974. Total yearly revenues are based on a fixed production 
profile which specifies output for each hypothetical field, and the price 
of crude which can include an escalating factor. Total costs are the 
sum of exploration, development and operating costs, also suitably 
escalated over time.
But the total cashflow in each year is not only determined by 
costs and revenues, but is also influenced by whether part of the costs 
have been financed by loans. Appropriate assumptions can be included 
in the model concerning the conditions for the repayment of loans (rate 
of interest, number of years of 'grace 1 , number of years of repayment, 
when loans are taken up etc). Throughout the study we have assumed 
that loans are raised as investment incurs (and not as a lump sum at 
a specific time), and that interest is still levied during the 'grace 
period' and added to the total debt, but that capital repayments do not 
have to be repaid during the 'grace period'. Repayments thereafter 
take place as a fixed percentage of outstanding debts.
Once the expected present value is found, we can assess the total 
share of this sum, which in one form or anothler accrues to the state. 
The total share going to the state has two components, the tax share 
and the participation share.
The tax share which arises from royalties, corporation tax and the 
special tax depends upon the value of the taxation variables which change 
from period to period, as well as on the percentage of the field which 
is financed externally. The latter is important because interest on 
external debt can be deducted from taxable profits. Corporation tax 
is computed after allowing for deduction of royalties, interest on 
loans (if any), and depreciation according to a straight-line schedule. 
All these tax assumptions have been included in the basic cashflow model.
The results from our basic model are presented in a computer print- 
out which lists the pre- and post-tax present value of the oil-fields, 
assessed at a discount rate of our choice, as well as the pre- and post- 
tax internal rates of return. Finally it gives the undiscounted value 
of the state's 'take'. A number of simplifications have necessarily 
been made in order to arrive at these results. But all the simplifica- 
tions have tended to bias the results in the same direction, giving
104
us a conservative model as regards the expected outcome or expected 
present value of the field, the most important of which is our choice 
of production profiles.
5.5 CHANGES IN THE f BASIC MODEL' 1969
We will now outline how our model deals with the three kinds of 
state participation agreements which were negotiated in 1969; here 
labelled Scenarios 2, 3 and 4 0
3,5,1 Scenario 2 61
An X per cent rate of participation gives the state X per cent of 
total production, but also makes it liable for an equivalent percentage 
of both exploration and development costs. The state's share of explora 
tion costs is initially financed by the company, but is repaid out of 
the state's production. A rate of interest is charged on the state's 
outstanding debt. The state has to finance its own share of the 
development costs.
5.5.2 Scenario 3
This participation scheme is very much like Scenario 2, except that 
the company, in addition to financing exploration costs, also has to 
carry the state's share of development costs. Repayment takes place 
along the same lines as above  
Our computer program deals with these scenarios in the following 
way. In both the above scenarios, the state's share of the exploration 
costs attributable to the particular find is added up on a non-discounted
£ 7
basis. Interest is being charged on the outstanding debt once develop- 
ment costs start to occur. In Scenario 2 once development costs start 
to occur, the state compares the net value of its share of the output 
with the total amount it owes the company. As long as its debts are 
greater than its net income, the state receives no oil, i.e. all oil 
goes to the company. 64
In Scenario 3 the same process takes place except that the 
state's outstanding debt will be greater if the participation rate is
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the same, because the company will also finance the state's share of 
development costs. But the principle for repayment will remain the 
same. We have in both scenarios assumed that the value of the oil 
which is due to the state is the net value, defined as gross value 
minus the state's share of operating costs and royalties.
If the rate of interest at which the state is supposed to repay 
its outstanding debts is less than the discount rate, the concept of 
participation will mean an immediate and direct financial loss to the 
company and vice versa.
Note also that when we talk about the 'cost 1 of participation to 
the company we are talking in fairly restricted terms. The implicit 
assumption that we face perfect capital markets makes the ability to 
raise finance a 'non-problem', while if a private company has to act 
as a bank and itself finance the state's share of exploration and/or 
development costs, this may seriously preclude its own access to 
outside finance.
3.5.3 Scenario 4
The final form of participation negotiated in 1969 was the 'net 
profit' agreement. Within this scenario the state was to get a fixed 
percentage of the companies' profit, once their original investment 
had been repaid out of production. All appropriate calculations have
f- O
been done in undiscounted terms. This form of participation can be 
said to have been the least threatening from the companies' point of 
view in terms of control over the production process. It could in 
contrast with Scenarios 2 and 3 be presented as nothing but a financial 
agreement.
3.6 CHANGES IN THE 'BASIC MODEL' 1972 AND AFTER
In both the 1972 and 1974 rounds the Norwegians asked for a new 
kind of participation scheme, here labelled Scenario 1.
3.. 6.1 Scenario 1
The state pays no part whatsoever of exploration costs, which are 
all paid by the company. But the state pays its full share of development
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and operating costs as they arise. So if the degree of state 
participation is X%, then according to our model the state will receive 
X% of final output, while paying less than X% of total costs.
5.7 DIFFICULTIES
We are now going to investigate in more detail problems which arise 
if we use discounted figures to determine the division of rent between 
the state and the companies; difficulties we must bear in mind when we 
interpret our results.
Consider two different investment projects A and B in Figure 1 
with after-tax (NPV) schedules of A 1 and B; (Figure 2.1). Project A 
has both ia higher IRR and NPV of the two. The discounted value at 
discount rate r^ of the state f s 'take 1 is xy, which in percentage 
terms equals 221 . 100%. For Project B, the discounted value of the
J^ t*
tax-take zz' equals the pre-tax present value of the project, with a
zz f 
corresponding percentage 'take 1 of  , . 100%. Clearly 'takeR ' is
Lit* D
greater than 'take^ 1 . This discussion also makes clear why we can get 
a state 'take 1 of more than 100%. At discount rate r2 , the state take 
ca is greater than the original present value cb, which means that the 
post-tax 'take' of the project at r~ will be greater than 100%.
The problem for an adequate interpretation of the results arises 
if Project B corresponds to a field with a low profitability. Then 
a high 'take' under such circumstances may simply reflect the lower 
profitability and the lower PV and NPV of that project, compared with 
the results from a field with a higher profitability (Project A), and 
is unrelated to any other explanation like a high degree of state 
'militancy'.
The reason for such an anomaly is to be found in the nature of 
the taxation system. Due to the weight of royalties in the taxation 
package, the drop in the PV as a result of taxation will never be 
proportional to the pre-tax present value of the field (i.e. 'fine 
tuning' in taxation is not operational). As long as royalties are the 
main element of the state's tax income at relatively low levels of 
profitability, then with a given output total royalties will tend to 
be a fixed sum independent of the PV of the project. Hence the differ- 
ence in absolute size between xy and zz f may turn out to be relatively 
insignificant, leading to the difficulties outlined above. (The 
variable royalty rates introduced in 1972 would have rectified the 
above anomaly only partially.)
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So while we maintain that the discounted measurements for rents
are superior to the undiscounted, they also give rise to problems that
71 
there are no simple and easy ways to solve.
PV and NPV
discount rate
Figure 2.1
3.8 THE MODEL: SUMMING UP
The discussion about participation has one major consequence for 
our procedure. In order to find the state's total access to the oil- 
rent we must add all rent that Statoil will earn through its 'participa- 
tion share 1 to the rent that the state will appropriate through taxation, 
(Note that Statoil pays taxes like any other company.) Then, based on 
the present value of the field, the discounted value of total taxes, 
the discounted value of the participation share, and the net present 
value if no participation had been introduced, we can derive a number 
of categories which we will use throughout our study.
(la) 'Total state take' = Statoil's Present Value (PV) + discounted 
value of the state's tax income from the company share as a percentage 
of the total PV of the field. This measures the state's total access 
to the rent of a field either by tax or by participation. This total 
state take can then be separated into taxation and equity shares.
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(2a) 'Taxation 1 share = discounted value of taxes levied on 
Statoil + discounted value of state's tax income from the private 
company as a percentage of the total PV of the field.
(3a) This taxation share can also be seen in percentage of total 
state take (la above) in which case it measures the weight of taxation 
(as opposed to equity ownership) in the state's access to rent.
(4a) * Equity share 1 = discounted value of Statoil's net income 
from equity in percentage of total PV of the field.
(5a) (4a) can be seen as the percentage of total state take, in 
which case it measures the weight of equity in the state's access to 
rent. In short it says something about the weight of 'state capitalism' 
within the Norwegian oil sector.
(6a) Finally we can find a discounted approximation to the 
traditional concept of 'state take', i.e. the present value of the 
state's tax income from the private company's share divided by the PV 
of the company's share. In this measure we single out the influence 
of taxes on the company's share and thus disregard other influences 
like participation.
Throughout we have assumed that the total PV of the field is the 
sum of the PV of the Statoil and the PV of the company's share. This 
sum differs slightly from the PV of the field 'as if no participation' 
due to the different debt structures of Statoil and the private 
company. In order to facilitate a comparison with more conventional 
calculations we can also derive an equivalent number of undiscounted 
categories:
(Ib) Total state take = Statoil's net cashflow + undiscounted 
total taxes from the company's share as a percentage of the net cash- 
flow of the field as a whole.
(2b) 'Taxation-share' = undiscounted value of all taxes levied 
on both Statoil and the company as a percentage of the net cashflow 
of the field as a whole.
(3b) As in (3a), this tax-share can also be seen as a percentage 
of the total state take (Ib above).
(4b) 'Equity-share 1 = undiscounted value of the state's income 
from Statoil's equity as a percentage of the net cashflow from the 
field as a whole.
(5b) This equity share can again be seen as a percentage of the 
total state take (see 5a).
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(6b) The traditional 'government take 1 , i.e. the taxes collected 
by the state from the company's share as a percentage of the net cashflow 
of the company's share.
Again all cases are assumed to be with debt, and the net cashflow 
of the field the sum of Statoil's and the private company's cashflows.
Finally one general point needs to be made. Our model helps us 
to quantify not only the total amount of rent which accrues to the 
state, but also the form in which the rent is appropriated by the 
state. But a mere percentage figure (4a), (5a), (4b), (5b) conceals 
a number of problems which arise in relation to the introduction of a 
large state sector. Parallel to our quantification of rent we therefore 
continuously have to assess the magnitude of participation, how 
effectively and how independently a state sector can pursue its own 
aims.
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CHAPTER 4
1965: THE ORIGINAL TERMS
Chapter 1 outlined the historical background to the manner in which 
Norway in 1965 entered the 'oil-age 1 . This chapter will deal with the 
outcome of the first allocation of acreage to the oil companies which 
took place in that year. It will concentrate on its effects on the 
division of oil-rent, the possibilities it gave the Norwegian state to 
control output and the development of a Norwegian spinoff industry. One 
important bargaining disadvantage in the Norwegian state's dealings with 
the companies at that time was its almost universal lack of information 
about all key aspects of the oil industry. We will return to this 
factor of bargaining throughout the chapter.
4.1 THE BASIC CHOICE
Chapter 2 has shown that there are several policies a nation state 
can choose when a new oil province is opened up for exploration. It 
can at one extreme adopt an 'auction' or a Danish system of allocation. 
At the other end of the spectrum of alternatives it can hand the whole 
area over to a state oil company. The choice between or the 'mix 1 of 
these different models is of crucial importance. Once Norway opted for 
the discretionary system, which is located somewhere in between the two 
alternatives outlined, then Norway's ability to pursue its own national 
oil policy became more limited. Concretely it meant that the terms 
Norway offered the companies had to compete with the terms offered to 
the companies in the rest of the world in general, and in other North 
Sea states in particular.
To better understand why Norway chose the discretionary allocation 
system, we must first explain why the option of majority state involve- 
ment was not chosen by Norway from the very start. We will then analyse 
why Norway also rejected the 'auction' or the Danish system.
4.1.1 Norway and the 'state owner'ship option'
A full state involvement in the oil industry relies on three 
basic preconditions:
- The undertaking has to be technically feasible for the state, 
both from a financial and a manpower perspective.
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- There has to be a political will to implement this solution.
- Speed of exploration cannot be the prime aim of the nation state. 
(see below)
Why was the role of the Norwegian state in this initial phase 
regulatory, when it was later to become much more interventionist and 
active? One explanation centres around the claim that the most import- 
ant decision in Norwegian oil policies was the decision to start explor- 
ing for oil in 1965, a decision which made the speed of extraction a 
key variable. Once a decision was taken to go ahead with exploration 
quickly, one almost excluded by definition a decisive state involve- 
ment from the start. This was because even if state involvement was 
feasible it would always take time to build up a competent state entity 
to deal with oil production.
No Norwegian firm either had the experience or the capital to go 
ahead with such projects (a situation very different from the UK). 
While the UK could have managed to raise enough money to finance a 
state oil company, access to capital on the international market for 
the Norwegian state might have been more difficult. With an official 
policy from the international financial institutions like the World Bank 
not to lend money to petroleum exploration (see Chapter 2, p 0 50), finding 
enough capital could have been very difficult indeed. If the state had 
followed a policy of waiting, and patiently built up Norwegian expert- 
ise while using hired drilling expertise, the prpject could have been 
undertaken by a state entity. However, such a line of action was 
never seriously discussed.
But could not the Norwegian state have played the different 
companies against one another (as in the Middle East where the European 
State Oil Companies like ENI tried to break the hegemony of the majors), 
and negotiate some kind of product-sharing/entrepreneur-contracts with 
the companies, as the next closest thing to an active state role? 
In principle such a deal could have been envisaged, but there are no 
indications that the project was ever seriously discussed. It was in 
fact a totally unanimous Storting that accepted the broad outlines of 
the ! 1965 package 1 . Not even the only party to the left of the Labour 
Party (the Socialist People's Party, SF) raised any objections. 
Perhaps less surprisingly, none of the bourgeois opposition parties 
argued against the proposed role of the state in the adopted policy 
package. While Norway was later to become the first major offshore 
producer country around the North Sea to implement the principle of
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state participation, and while the 1965 terms were finally to come 
under criticism, it is noteable that in 1965 there was an almost complete 
consensus among policy-makers that the state should not intervene as a 
productive unit in the oil industry. During the late 1960s the arguments 
for this policy of non-intervention became more coherant. They are set 
out in more detail in Chapter 5.
We must also make reference to the UK case, because the UK had a 
major influence on the formulation of Norwegian oil policy. A 'state 1 
solution in the UK in 1965 would probably have had fundamental effects 
on the Norwegian policy. But a combination of political obstacles and 
balance of payments arguments 'killed' any initial major state involve- 
ment in the UK offshore industry. The detailed reasons for this are set 
out in Appendix G and in Section 4.2 below.
4.1.2 Norway and the 'Danish' system
In order to assess the 1965 package more fully we must also look 
at the two other organizational patterns that were not chosen. In effect 
the auction system was never seriously considered as being an appropriate 
method of extracting the oil-rents or laying the foundations for the 
Norwegian policies. The reasons for this have already been touched on 
in Chapter (pp. 65-68 ), and little more needs to be added here. On 
the other hand there was a serious possibility that Norway would have
adopted a Danish system, where one firm or group of firms would have got
2 the exclusive right of exploration of an area. According to the former
Secretary of the Oil Council, Gulnes, it was indeed only by "sheer luck"
3 that Norway did not adopt the Danish allocation system.
This type of concession would have given the company in question 
untrammeled freedom to act independently, especially if there was no 
specific work programme attached to the licence, as was the case in 
Denmark.
But even if there had been a work programme, the company is normally under 
this system free to choose where within the whole area it would drill the 
exploration wells. One unfortunate consequence of such a system of 
concessions is that, once granted, there are very few ways that the 
state can intervene if new circumstances should make this desirable. 
Secondly, if the holes turn out to be dry, the general evaluation of 
the area may fall drastically even if the dry holes simply reflect the 
geological assessment of one company or consortium. This means that
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attempts to attract new companies on favourable terms if the first one
4 pulls out may be difficult for the state. Thirdly, the exploration
record of such a company/consortium may be very bad, especially 
if the Danish experience is anything to go by. Not 
even the dispute over the dividing line with Germany's offshore 
territory is really enough to explain why only three offshore wells 
had been drilled by early 1968, 5
It was this Danish system that Phillips wanted the Norwegian state 
to adopt when it first applied for an exploration licence in 1962. As 
noted before, this was rejected. But in addition to f luck f (to 
quote Gulnes, above), it was the belief that the 'Danish 1 system was 
incompatible with a thorough and rapid exploration of the Norwegian 
Continental Shelf that finally convinced the Norwegian authorities 
that such an allocation system should not be adopted.
4.1.3 The outcome
Once a pure 'state' solution on one hand or an 'auction'/Danish 
system on the other was ruled out, it became clear that the terms 
offered to the companies internationally would be of great importance 
for the formulation of the Norwegian policies of 'discretionary allo- 
cation'. A state solution need not take much notice of such inter- 
national comparative factors, while the auction system requires a minimum 
of state policy planning. Thus the main thrust of the argument presented 
to the Norwegian Parliament by the special Commission created to estab- 
lish the 1965 terms of exploration was made on the grounds of how they 
compared with the terms of the other countries of the North Sea region. 
It stated:
"By introducing a taxation system which, compared with the 
systems of other countries is less advantageous for those 
who take the risk of looking for and producing oil, this will 
easily lead to a situation where the oil companies will look 
for opportunities elsewhere. In the North Sea area it will 
be especially natural and simple for the international comp- 
anies to compare the taxation systems of the different North 
Sea states.... The taxation system can then contribute towards 
a move by the oil companies to explore areas where the 
financial conditions are best." 6
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A good part of the work by this Commission then proceeded to compare 
the Norwegian and the UK taxation systems, and in its conclusion to 
suggest a reduction of 9% in the normal company taxation for the oil 
companies which were to operate on the Norwegian Continental Shelf, 
so as to be on an equal footing with the other North Sea states. Of 
these, it was the UK policies that were the main influence on the 
Norwegian policy. As the Norwegian Commission of the Continental Shelf 
stated, "The Commission acknowledges that it has borrowed many ideas 
from the provisions which apply to exploration and exploitation on the 
UK Continental Shelf." 8
It is indicative of the low level of knowledge and/or interest 
among the Norwegian parliamentarians that most of the time of the 
debate discussing this issue was taken up by arguments of whether the 
necessity of lowering the Norwegian rate of taxation to get it in line 
with that of the UK was, in the words of one MP, "an excellent example 
of how our taxation rules are less favourable for our industry than 
the equivalent taxation rules in other countries". The end result 
was that the Storting unanimously accepted the recommendations of the 
Commission. In order to decrease the total tax burden on oil companies 
operating in Norway to make it comparable with the total UK taxation 
rate of 53.75 (which included royalties and bonuses), the effective 
Norwegian corporation tax was cut by 9% for the oil companies and the 
royalty rate set at 10% instead of the UK's 12.5%. But as opposed to 
the situation in the UK, Norway did not concede any specially favour- 
able depreciation rules. This meant that the total percentage figure 
of taxation "must be seen in a totally different light compared with a 
situation if such a rule had not existed". This latter regulation 
must be borne in mind when we compare in undiscounted terms the outcome 
of the Norwegian taxation rules with those of the other North Sea 
states, which showed that Norway still had a high total government 
'take 1 .12
 4.2 OPTIMALITY OF NORWEGIAN POLICY AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO UK POLICY
Having established that the Norwegian policy makers felt they 
had no choice but to adjust the Norwegian terms of exploration once the 
UK had laid down its terms (and thereby indirectly vindicate the importance of 
'the international context 1 as a factor of bargaining) we now claim that it 
would only be by pure chance that the Norwegian terms would be optimal
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from a Norwegian point of view. (Optimal is here defined in relation 
to the aims of the Norwegian state as outlined in Chapter 1)« The 
reason for this was first that the factors that underlay the formula- 
tion of the UK terms could by no means be said to apply to Norway.
Secondly, it will be shown that the UK policy, as it was 
finally formulated, was not even optimal with respect to its own aims. 
Consequently it would only be by the most incredible of coincidences 
that Norwegian policy, based as it was on UK policies, could be said 
to be optimal, being twice removed from its own version of optimality.
The UK's situation differed from that of Norway on at least four 
crucial counts.
The most important of these was the UK f s role as 'mother country 1 
for two of the 'Seven Sisters' (BP and Shell). Their interests were 
very much in the government's mind when the original policies were 
formulated. This is made explicit in the following government statement 
made at that time.
"If the UK were to impose onerous financial terms (with
respect to oil concessions - PN), it may incite OPEC
countries to follow suit to the detriment of our overseas
13 
oil-interests and the Balance of Payments."
Given these companies' political weight, it would also have been very 
difficult to argue for any state oil corporation to be set up as a 
possible competitor to BP and Shell.
The later Lord Balogh has stressed the influence of the Foreign
14 Office in the formulation of these terms, thereby suggesting that it
was not the whole state apparatus that was behind such a policy, but 
rather the foreign policy establishment. He then went on to say: 
"It is equally silly to claim that had Britain acted other- 
wise (than implementing the original terms - PN) it would 
have encouraged the Arabs to squeeze the British companies 
more. This is still a reminder of the Imperial syndrome 
which holds that our behaviour influences other people against 
their own interests and that they are unable and stupid enough 
not to realise what is in their interests. It should be said 
that the OPEC experts are among the world's foremost experts 
on these matters and have proven to be superb negotiators." 15 
Secondly, the UK industrial structure was much more developed than its 
Norwegian counterpart, especially in the crucial field of heavy 
engineering. Consequently UK industry was potentially in a better
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position to reap some of the spinoffs from oil-related activities than 
Norwegian industry, if it had been given the chance. The situation was 
so different in the two countries that any attempt to impose the same 
terms with respect to the companies could almost a priori be said to be 
incorrect. When talking about protection for a national spinoff industry 
we are not necessarily referring to specific protectionist clauses, but we 
also consider the speed of extraction as a crucial policy instrument. 
A slower speed of extraction would almost certainly have meant a higher 
degree of spinoffs going to the UK. This was explicitly admitted by 
Sir Robert Marshall, Secretary of State for the Department of Industry: 
"In embarking on a policy of rapid exploitation from the 
very start O .o successive governments realized that in 
doing so less time was left for their own indigenous 
industry to make itself ready to seize opportunities." 16 
The above argument by Sir Robert Marshall is intimately related to 
the third level of difference between Norway and the UK. The balance 
of payments situation differed fundamentally in Norway and the UK in 
the mid 1960s. Consequently any argument for a maximum amount of 
production of oil (and thus the freest possible rein for the companies) 
was in the UK almost invariably referred to in balance of payments 
terms. It was thought that a maximum rate of extraction would maximize 
the balance of payments effect of oil. But the balance of payments 
argument was only valid under a number of strict assumptions. The net 
saving from oil on the balance of payments in the mid 1960s (when the 
rent element in the final crude-price was relatively small) originated 
from that part of import saving which was made by the contribution of 
UK companies; whether goods and services for production were made in
the UK; and whether profits earned by overseas companies were ploughed
18 back into the national economy. Given the (conscious) sacrifice of
involvement by UK companies to speed of extraction, and the relatively 
lax tax proposals suggested, one can see straight away that the balance 
of payments effect of oil production from the start had to be less than 
the 'optimists' thought. By examining the 'spinoffs 1 , this conclusion 
is certainly reinforced.
The final, but perhaps most crucial difference in the basic 
position between Norway and the UK in 1965 was that the UK expected to 
find gas, while Norway expected to find oil in the North Sea. The 
Norwegians thought that nothing but oil would be a commercial proposi- 
tion, because gas found in the Norwegian sector was too far from the
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major markets. (There was at the time only one very small gas
distribution system in Norway.) Alternatively, if Norway sold its 
gas to other countries it might be paid a lower price than for oil. 
The UK, on the other hand, initially thought most hydrocarbons in its 
sector would be in the form of gas. This belief originated because 
Groningen and the area immediately off the Eastern Coast of England 
are geologically identical. Echoing this view, PPS wrote early on 
in the exploration phase, referring to the UK sector, "The probability 
is that the North Sea bed contains primarily gas rather than oi! 0 M 
The significance of the different expectations about which hydrocarbon 
would be found is profound. Oil was an internationally traded 
commodity which at the time had (with all its reservations) one common 
international price. Gas, on the other hand, had to be sold locally 
due to the difficulties of transport. In the UK it was also stipulated 
that the gas had to be sold to a monopoly buyer, the British Gas 
Corporation, which would give any national government a very strong 
bargaining position. It might virtually 'give away 1 the areas in the 
North Sea during the original round, but it could redeem all blunders 
(at least with respect to division of rent) by refusing to pay anything 
more than the supply price for the gas it bought. And this is more or 
less what happened. While the Gas Board in the UK certainly did not 
use its potential bargaining strength fully, it nevertheless tried to 
recuperate some of the rent by offering a lower than 'market 1 price for 
the gas. This possibility was, of course, known earlier by both the 
companies and the public. But it is a reasonable guess that the
companies did not expect it to happen. Perhaps they had overestimated
21 
their political muscle to prevent such an outcome. Norway, on the
other hand, had no way of recuperating any 'lost' or 'foregone' rent 
by such maneouvres, if oil was found on the Continental Shelf, because 
oil was a commodity where there was no monopoly buyer.
We can therefore conclude that at the very outset Norwegian 
policies were unlikely to have been 'optimal' because they were 
modelled on the UK policies which, as we have seen, were based on 
completely different premises. This conclusion needs, however, to 
be supported by more specific Norwegian material.
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4.3 INFORMATION
It is possible to show how the companies' control over information 
in general, and geological and technological information in particular, 
was a key element in negotiating concession terms for a virgin territory 
like the North Sea in the mid 1960s. As outlined in Chapter 2, this 
had important consequences for the tax system which was originally 
imposed on the companies and the ensuing division of rent. The question 
of information has both a national and an international dimension. We 
must argue that the state's ignorance and misunderstanding was not 
limited to Norway, but also existed in the UK, given the key role played 
by UK policies in the formulation of the Norwegian policies.
4.5.1 Geological information
In order to evaluate what constitutes relevant information with 
respect to the negotiations between the Norwegian state and the companies, 
we need a short introduction to the geology of oil exploration. There 
can never be a 100 per cent certainty that there is oil in a geological 
formation, without first drilling an exploration well. We are conse- 
quently only concerned with degrees of uncertainty in our analysis. 
This uncertainty is influenced by a number of variables, which can
only be properly evaluated by understanding the preconditions for the
22 
existence of oil. These preconditions for the existence of oil are
only satisfied in sedimentary rocks. The companies will therefore 
never show any interest in an area if there are not sedimentary rocks 
present. In addition, a number of factors are relevant for a successful 
find of oil.
The larger the area and/or thickness of the sedimentary rocks, 
the greater the chance of finding oil.
The frequency and size of traps give an indication of whether 
there is oil in a geological formation. But the existence of one of 
the different kinds of traps, the stratigraphic trap, is almost impossible 
to identify by traditional geophysical methods because its existence is 
not related to definite geological structures.
Finally, older sediments tend to contain gas, while younger ones 
most often contain oil.
It is detailed knowledge about these factors that initially gives 
the key to a guess of whether oil exists in an area or not. The more
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promising parts of a sedimentary basin tend to be drilled before the 
less promising ones, which increases the chances of finding oil in the 
initial exploration. A counteracting influence is that knowledge of a 
basin increases as time goes on and as more and new geological informa- 
tion is being made available from the continuous drilling of new wells. 
Still it is a rough rule of thumb among oil geologists that 80 per cent 
of all oil from an oil province is found as a result of the first 20 per 
cent of all wildcats.
The Norwegian state's access to information related to oil was 
one of relative ignorance. The first Norwegian official specifically 
hired to deal with oil-related questions (Secretary to the Oil Council, 
Nils Gulnes) started work on 1 January 1965. No economist was hired 
until 1970; until then lawyers were the dominating professional group 
dealt with oil. This tends to suggest that there was very little 
specific information available to the state at the time to counteract 
the information of the companies. It is known that by 1965 the state 
did not even employ one single person who was capable of interpreting
the seismic data that the companies were filing with the state as part
24 
of the original agreements. The first geologist was not hired until
January 1968.25
The companies 1 official of 'public relations' view that the chance 
of finding any oil off the Norwegian coast was slim, and that (to put 
it a little forcefully) the companies were almost doing Norway a favour 
by looking at all, was fully accepted by Norwegian public opinion and 
politicians. For example, the Special Commission whose report constituted 
the basis for the proposals of the fiscal regime implemented in 1965 
remarked: "The commission would in this context (the need to attract 
foreign investment in the oil industry - PN) again remind Stortinget 
about the great risk of oil exploration on the Continental Shelf,
o/:
especially in such an unexplored area as the North Sea." In the
27 debate in the Storting, others talked about "the great risk" that the
companies were taking in looking for oil. This attitude was shared at 
the top policy formulating level. Gulnes has suggested that the 
Norwegian cabinet at that time had no belief that there was any oil in
the North Sea and regarded the whole venture as an exercise of extreme
28 
optimists.
The Norwegian state's ignorance and pessimism was by no means shared 
by the companies. Phillips had studied geological information about
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the Norwegian part of the North Sea as early as 1959. And after the 
company's initial seismic surveys it concluded that there probably 
existed sediments of Mesozoic-Tertiary age off Norway - a significant
piece of information because such sediments account for well over
29 90% of the world's proven oil reserves.
Two AMOCO geologists wrote in 1965 that: 
"... the seismic maps (of the North Sea - PN) do show the 
presence of a number of very large structural traps, as 
well as many of moderate size. If a fair part of them 
contain hydrocarbons, then all will be well. Furthermore, 
the size of the as yet nearly virgin area to be explored 
is a great attraction. Not many like it, almost untested, 
are left in the Free World. Statistics concerning 
discovery ratios alone suggest that a number of fields 
should be found."
A Phillips executive talked in 1967 about the geological potential 
of the northern area of the North Sea, where he said a huge sedimentary
basin lay between the crystalline basement rocks of the land area of
31 
Norway and the highly indurated older sediments of Scotland.
According to other sources the full size of this basin was not
32 
realized by geologists until 1965, but the earlier suspicion of the
existence of such geological formations gave the companies (in their 
own words) "sufficient time to do a great deal of preliminary seismic
work before being faced with the difficult decision of choosing the
33 
acreage to apply for". In the words of a top Norwegian Shell
executive, the situation in 1965 was that:
"We knew enough  .. the interest was there.... Basins 
of this size, with the knowledge of the thickness of the
sediments, the existence of traps and saltdomes ... all
34 
lead to the conclusion that oil could be found."
The relative cheapness of offshore seismic exploration also meant 
that the North Sea was better explored than most 'virgin' areas, which 
further decreased the companies' level of ignorance. 35
So while the companies by 1965 had a reasonably realistic 
assessment of the oil-producing potential of the region, the Norwegian 
government was largely ignorant. And even if this geological informa- 
tion was handed over to the Norwegian state, it did not, as we have 
seen, have any expertise that was capable of interpreting the seismic 
data.. Therefore to all intents and purposes the Norwegian government
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knew little about the potentialities for oil production that existed 
off its coasto
British geological data was relevant for the Norwegian case study, 
because there was a considerable overlap between the acreage offered 
by the two governments in the central parts of the North Sea. The 
British, like the Norwegian government, continuously underestimated 
the chance of finding oil in the North Sea. The UK government also had
 z/-
access to very little expertise. Since the overwhelming part of 
the seismic shooting prior to 1964 took place in international waters, 
the UK government, according to its own statement, "could not demand
information as to the cost or result of their (the companies')
37 operations"o The UK government has in retrospect claimed that "very
little indeed was known about them (the opportunities on the UK
38 Continental Shelf - PN)." This pessimism of the possibilities of
finding oil was well reflected, as one study puts it, "in the failure
to give adequate warning to either industry or the communities directly
39 
affected about the possibilities of oil".
But as in the Norwegian case the companies knew better,, Sir 
Kenneth Hutchinson, Deputy Chairman of the Gas Council, said in June 
1965: " ... it is permissible to say that the results (of the seismic 
surveys - PN) have exceeded the expectations of the most sanguine".40
The described discrepancy in access to information between the 
companies and the North Sea states concerning the likely extent of 
expected oil reserves also continued after 1965. As late as 1972 Ode11 
was to write, "the lack of information concerning the resources is more 
than sufficient to arouse suspicions that the oil companies find it
advantageous to keep the facts of the rapidly developing situation
41 from the public and the government policy-makers in Western Europe."
Because of this factor's significance for the bargaining situation in 
Norway, we will repeatedly return to it as the case study 'unfolds'.
4.. 3,. 2 Technological knowledge and cost-data
In a bargaining situation, the companies will, in addition to 
the geological uncertainties, normally also stress the technological 
difficulties associated with moving into a new area. This will 
strengthen their hand in any negotiations by minimizing the expected 
amount of rent to be earned from an area. The North Sea was no differ- 
ent in this respect. The situation was described as 'forbidding' and
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doubt was even expressed as to the technical feasibility of producing 
oil in the North Sea at the time,, But it is important to remember 
that most of the technical problems of the North Sea have arisen by 
the movement of oil production into the northern parts of the North 
Sea (east of Scotland and Shetland), and that the area in question 
during the mid 1960s was the much shallower and, from the point of view 
of weather, more manageable southern and central parts of the North Sea. 
Within this area there is no doubt that the Norwegian acreage presented 
the gravest problems, but it will be argued that the companies did not 
feel in any sense that the technical problems involved were insurmout- 
able. One study addressing itself specifically to the comparison 
between the conditions in the Gulf of Mexico and the North Sea stated 
about the drilling part of the operation:
"For the most part the basic drilling equipment (derricks, 
bits, mud system etc) and operating procedures used during
exploratory drilling in the North Sea are identical to
43 those used in the Gulf of Mexico."
And in relation to the phase of production from fixed platforms: 
"To date, the fixed platforms installed in the North Sea
have been similar to those used in the US except that some
44 
of them have been bigger and stronger."
So no qualitatively new technological breakthrough was considered
45 
necessary to move into the North Sea.
So much for the immediate prospects in 1965. But what were the 
long-run perspectives for the deeper parts of the North Sea? It could 
have been argued that if the companies at the time felt unable to go 
any deeper than say 300 feet, then the North Sea as an area would not 
have been very attractive to them as it would not have been large 
enough. But also on this count there was clear optimism on behalf of 
the industry. According to one executive, floating platforms implied 
the possibility to
"drill deep exploration tests at acceptable costs even on 
the outer edges of the Continental shelves.... And with 
the continuing improvement of the platform devices, it is 
possible to engage in year-round drilling without un- 
acceptable interruptions in some of the most hostile waters
46 
of the world."
According to this executive the basic problem of oil exploration in the 
North Sea was not one of technology. It was rather one of the price 
paid for gas and oil.
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The question of costs, which was intimately related to technology, 
was in the long run going to be of crucial importance in the bargaining 
game. Without adequate access to cost data and in the absence of their 
own expertise, there was no way that either the UK or the Norwegian 
state could evaluate the rate of return from a field e Consequently 
there was no way the state could determine whether it had pulled off 
the best bargain possible or not. It is indicative of the importance 
of this item that even if the companies after a while made geological 
material freely available to the state, they refused as late as 1973 
in the UK case to hand over actual cost figures.
In the end the more blatant optimism exhibited by the industry 
vanished as the realities of the North Sea made themselves felt. For 
instance the general expectation that drilling could take place all 
year round which was repeatedly expressed at the beginning turned out 
to be unrealistic during the first years of operation. Similarly the 
cost estimates might have been too low. But here we must re-state an 
important methodological point. We are interested in how the different
actors perceived the situation in 1965, not so much what turned out to 
be the case, because the negotiations took place based on these original 
perceptions.
4.5.5 Price negotiations
The Norwegian government could have influenced the division of 
rent in its favour by adopting a 'posted price 1 system of oil-pricing. 
This system which at the time operated in all main oil-exporting 
countries had developed into a method of increasing the share of rent 
going to the governments as the difference between the world market 
price and the higher posted price which was the basis for computing 
all taxes and royalties, widened. Insisting on a pricing system 
according to 'posted price 1 also made life easier for the producer 
countries because they did not have to preoccupy themselves with the 
internal prices of the vertically integrated companies.
The Norwegian government did not adopt such a pricing formula,
but instead settled for a 'fair market price* as the basis for tax
«. 50 payments.
As Evensen, the main Norwegian negotiator at the time, was to 
state later: "These formulations were the result of long discussions
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with the oil companies during the preparation of the Decree." 
A number of companies wanted the selling price to be the basis for 
any calculations related to taxes. But this was, according to Evensen, 
unacceptable to the Norwegians. The peculiarities of the marketing and 
pricing structure in an industry dominated by vertical integration and 
the corresponding small and hence unrepresentative size of any spot- 
market for oil which would have served to determine the 'selling price',
52 
ruled out such a solution.
4.5.4 Summary: Information
We can conclude that the formulation of Norwegian oil policies from 
1965 was made on very shaky foundations. The Norwegian state's general 
level of information, so important for the negotiations that were to 
determine the expected division of rent, was generally weak. There was 
a consistent underestimation by the Norwegians of their bargaining 
strength. And the Norwegian state's ignorance was not limited to 
geology, technology, and costs. As made clear in Chapter 1, Norway 
also underestimated its general bargaining strength. This is also 
suggested by the Norwegian decision to exploit the oil as rapidly as 
possible. An analysis of Norway's energy consumption pattern in the 
mid-1960s shows that, due to its large resources of hydrocarbons, Norway 
would be in the long run less dependent on imported oil as an energy-source 
than the other OECD countries. Oil's relative weight in the total import 
bill was therefore potentially less than for the majority of these countries. 
This suggests that Norway was in no desperate hurry to exploit the oil and 
could have afforded to postpone exploration without too large a sacrifice. 
But instead Norway opted for a 'swift' exploration programme. As has been 
stressed, this had important consequences for which concession system to choose,
The companies, on the other hand, were well informed and equipped 
to tackle the technical tasks confronting them in the southern part of 
the Norwegian sector. Only when it came down to an understanding of the 
consequences of the vertical integration of the industry did the 
Norwegians put clear demands to the companies.
Contrary to the Norwegian (and UK) governments' pessimism about 
finding and producing oil from the North Sea, it would have been 
difficult, for anyone who opened the professional oil press at the time 
to miss the general attitude of euphoria. As PPS wrote in May 1964:
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"Altogether, the present onrush to the North Sea ranks about the most 
exciting episodes in the history of the oil industry." 54
And even if the companies performed the ritual complaints against 
the 'onerous 1 and 'inequitable 1 tax terms laid down in the UK, by 
1964 according to one observer they were at the same time 'falling 
over themselves' to get concessions.
4.4 DIVISION OF RENT: A QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS
We will now determine how the 1965 policy package would have 
divided the rent between the Norwegian state and the companies. To 
do this we must first employ our 'basic model' developed in Chapter 2
and quantify those cost and revenue variables which are necessary to
57 determine the PV of a hypothetical North Sea field.
4.4.1 Exploration costs
- Cost per exploration well in the North Sea was in 1965 expected
58 
by the stockbrokers Cazenove to be around $2 mill.
- The worldwide success rate per commercial find for wildcats
drilling in new acreage remained surprisingly constant at around
59 5 per cento
Total average exploration costs per new field in the North Sea 
should therefore, according to our model, total $2 mill, x 20 = $40 mill.
4.4.2 Development costs
The expected cost of a fixed production platform for a North Sea 
field was in principle derivable from Gulf of Mexico figures, because 
the Gulf was at the time the main offshore producer-area. (Figures 
from the Alaskan Cook Inlet were still very tentative.) The data we 
have available is a high-cost estimate of installed costs of production 
platforms in the Gulf of Mexico in 1967, based on data from platform 
fabricators. 60 The high-cost element allows for minor changes in the 
design of the platform during construction, difficult sea floor conditions 
and bad weather during installation. A 14-24-well platform at 250 feet 
of water (at that time the limit in the Gulf and the average depth of 
Norwegian acreate in 1965) would have cost $4.1 mill.
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These initial figures were then 'topped up* by the companies to 
account for tougher weather, higher flows of sea current and a number 
of other 'unknowns 1 in the North Sea. Given the industry's relatively
optimistic declarations about the technological possibilities of
f\? 
production in the North Sea and based on discussions with the oil
companies, we assume that the development costs in the southern part 
of the Norwegian Shelf were initially thought to be 50 per cent higher 
than those on the Gulf.
These cost assumptions would then give total platform costs 
(when the cost distribution in Chapter 3 is taken into account) 
of ($4.1 mi 11..(platform) + $1.0 mill, (equipment) 63 + $0.7 mill, 
(sundry) x 150%. In addition to the platform costs we must add the 
cost of drilling 18 production wells and the cost of the pipeline to 
find development costs.
The distance from the southern part of the Norwegian sector to possible 
landing points in the UK is an average of about 200 miles. Despite the 
regulation in the Royal Decree of 9 April 1965 about landing oil in 
Norway, there was already at this early time doubt about whether oil, 
if found, could be landed in Norway due to the 'Norwegian Trench'. 
This was especially so if the find should turn out to contain gas, 
for which there was no grid system, nor industrial use in Norway. 
In addition, the technological difficulties in laying pipelines across 
the Norwegian Trench were indeed substantial.
Initial assessments of total costs of a pipeline in the southern 
part of the North Sea varied between $280,000 per mile 64 and $210,000 
per mile. We will therefore assume an average price per mile of 
$245,000, something which gives a total estimated pipeline cost figure 
of $49 mill.
Total development costs for a 100m. hypothetical field in 1965 
would therefore tentatively be: (all figures in $ mill.)
3 delineation wells @ $2 mill 6
Platform (including installation) $4.1)
Equipment $1.0) x 150% 8.7
Sundry $0.7)
18 dev. wells @ $1 mill. 18
Land installations 0.7
33.4 
Administration, land purchase, financing
costs, and reserve for unforeseen problems
in a new producer area: 5.6
39;0 
Pipeline 49.0
$88 mill. 
or $0.88/bbl
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This compares with a 1967 US Department of Interior average computed 
development cost per barrel of $0.70 in the Gulf of Mexico. It cannot 
be stressed too strongly that our figure is only meant to give a general 
idea about the magnitudes involved rather than to provide an exact cost 
estimate. In order to see what difference higher (and lower) development 
costs would have meant for the PV of the fields, we have carried out a 
number of sensitivity tests (see p.131).
4.4.5 Operating costs
The final cost to be computed is expected operating costs. We 
assume an average operating cost of $0.45 per barrel, which is in line
with the Gulf of Mexico figures, as there are no particular reasons 
why the harder weather conditions in the North Sea should have the same 
influence on operating costs as it had, for example, on the cost of 
platforms. But again because this figure is relatively unsure, we 
have as a sensitivity test run a number of scenarios with 30% higher 
and lower operating costs.
4.4.4 Price and volume
The average price of one barrel of crude oil delivered in the UK, 
the most likely place where oil was to be landed, was in 1965 $2.46, 
which we have rounded to $2.50 per barrel. Because of the uncertainty 
about the size of average expected production we have run a number of 
different scenarios, ranging from a 100m. to a 700m. barrel field.
4.4.5 Expected trends
We now have to decide what the most likely trend of both costs and 
revenues were to be from 1965. The international oil industry had seen 
a continuous drop in the monetary price (not to mention the real price) 
of oil from the late 1950s onwards 0 There were however signs in 1965 
that the nadir had been reached. PPS 70 in an article headed Turn of 
the Tide? predicted that oil prices would again start to rise (a pre- 
diction which subsequently turned out to be correct). We have incorpor- 
ated the assumption that prices would increase by 2% p.a. while costs 
would increase at the average international rate of inflation of 3%. 
The real price of oil would as a consequence continue to drop, but only
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at the relatively modest rate of 1% p.a., a reasonable assumption when 
the overall situation in the oil industry is taken into account.
4.4.6 Debt conditions, and the social rate of discount
The majority of the firms that were offered acreage in the 
Norwegian sector were 'majors 1 or firms which come very close to this 
category. Their level of self-financing of new investment was very 
high by any standards. We have therefore chosen the average need for 
external finance to be in the region of 10%. (Some companies like 
Shell and Esso would have been expected to pay for all investments out 
of their own funds while the smaller companies like Hydro would have 
to find external finance.) We have set the average rate of interest 
on the international capital market to around 9%, but the rate 
fluctuated considerably. We have also assumed that loans would be re- 
paid over five years with one year's 'grace 1 . There was at the time 
no officially defined social rate of discount. This was first stipulated 
in 1975 when it was set equal to 10% (Finansdept. 1975). We will however 
use this figure as the social rate of discount from the very start. A 
similar figure has been set in the UK, France, and the US.
4.4.7 PV and NPV
Based on the above revenue and cost assumptions, the cost functions 
outlined in Chapter 2, and the social rate of discount, we can find the 
PV of hypothetical 100m. to 700m. barrel North Sea fields.
Having estimated the PV of hypothetical fields in 1965, we then 
assess the state's tax-take in order to arrive at how the rent would 
have been divided according to the 1965 'package'. The relevant tax 
variables were in 1965: 
Depreciation: 10 years straight line 
Royalty: 10%
Corporation tax: Norway decreased the local corporation tax for the 
oil companies from 19% to 15%, while the 5% contribution to the tax 
districution fund was waived. The effective tax rate thus decreased 
9% from a maximum of 54.3% to 45.3%, consisting of 30% state tax and 
15.3% local tax. Corporation tax would be assessed on the following
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Table 4.1
Assumptions 1965
Year 1965
Price $/bbl 2.50
Price escalation % 2
Total exploration cost ($m.) .40
Development costs 100 ($m.) 88
200 127
300 166
400 205
700 322
Discount rate 10
Operating costs ($/bbl) 0.45
Cost escalation (%) 3
Percentage debt (i) Company 10
(ii) Statoil
Rate of interest 9
Years grace 1
Years spread 5
Participation NONE
basis: 45.3% x (Total Revenue - /depreciation + interest repayment + 
royalties + operating costs + losses brought forward;). Losses could 
be brought forward up to a period of 15 years as opposed to the normal 
10 years. Thus the companies' yearly net cashflow according to the 
1965 conditions which helped to determine the NPV (i.e. post-tax) 
would be:
Total Revenues - Total Costs - Royalties - Repayment of capital and 
interest - Corporation tax + New loans. *
4.4.8 Results 1965
The companies' expected post-tax IRR varied between 2.7 and 11.2% 
depending on the size of fields. (For a summary of the results see 
p. 133). W"1611 interpreting this return we should bear in mind that we 
have used very cautious figures and that the notion of exploration risk
has been incorporated into our analysis. Figures of this magnitude
72 
cannot be interpreted as any kind of 'bonanza 1 for the companies.
But neither can they sustain the widely held view, outlined in detail 
above, that the companies were almost doing the Norwegian state a favour 
by exploring for oil and that what they were undertaking was a complete
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leap in the dark. It is worth pointing out that our possible undiscounted 
average profit margin per barrel over time of $!(+) in the North Sea
compared favourably with the prospective return of most company
73 investment anywhere in the world at the time.
The initial expected returns must have seemed especially attractive 
in view of the position of the North Sea close to the major consumer 
markets, in political conditions which were far removed from the 
instability of most oil-producing states. In addition it should be 
stressed that the 'true 1 return on investments in the North Sea to 
any US or UK company would be very difficult to assess. All taxes 
paid by US oil companies abroad during this period could be deducted 
directly from US profits (and not treated only as being part of 'costs') 
(see Appendix A, p.305).
Furthermore if the cost figures were overestimated, and in 
particular if there were greater economies of scale than assumed in 
our model, then the situation would immediately improve for the 
companies. (For the complete results of our sensitivity tests, see 
Appendix F.) A 30% decrease in development costs would have meant a post- 
tax IRR for the 700m. field of 18.5%, an increase of more than one-third 
compared with our original result. And because a number of experts 
thought that the geological structures in the North Sea would yield 
large fields, there was hope that these potential economies of scale 
(to the extent they existed) could be realised. BP's main geologist 
at the time, Gaskell, was quoted as saying about the North Sea:
"... there would be plenty of room for several fields of
100 million tons (700m 0 barrels - PN) of producible reserves,
giving together an annual production of a few tens of millions
tons of oil." 74
Of equal importance to the companies' rate of return would have 
been a faster rate of extraction. Using our alternative MIT production 
profile for the 200m. and the 700m. fields, the IRR would have increased 
to 15.9% for the 200m. field and to no less than 27.0% for the 700m. 
field. Thus it is quite understandable why the companies wanted to 
bring the fields into production as fast as possible.
An expected annual increase of 1 per cent, instead of a decrease, 
in the real price of one barrel of oil, would also have had great 
consequences for the profitability of the project, leaving it with a 
post-tax IRR of 12.8% for the 200m. field, and 15.5% for the 700m. 
field; while a change in the operating costs seemed to have less 
importance.
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Even if all these different factors are not cumulative, it is 
easily seen that even some more optimism with respect to what was 
expected to be the situation in the North Sea would have had a great 
influence on the expected IRR. So while the computed IRRs were just 
about acceptable as they stand, because we have used conservative 
figures and assumptions, it can be concluded that the companies were 
taking no tremendous risk by going into the North Sea in 1965. On the 
other hand, an increase in development costs by 30% would have left the 
companies with rates of return of 6.1% and 9.0% for the 200m. and the 700m. 
field respectively.
Since the state in 1965 had no equity role, it could only capture 
the rent in the form of taxation. The undiscounted percentage state 
'take 1 varied between 72 0 6% and 54.4%. If we concentrate on the 
commercial fields (where the IRR is greater than the discount rate), 
this was broadly in line with official Norwegian estimates at the time. 
The high take for the 100m. field is due to the inflexibility of the 
royalty instrument of taxation for fields with low profitability.
The discounted take (when meaningful - see p.106)
was as expected much higher, ranging from 99.2% to 86.6%. As pointed 
out in Chapter 2, this high figure was mostly due to the relatively low
profitability of the hypothetical fields. The 700m. field with 30% 
lower development costs would have given a much more modest state 
'take 1 of 59%. It should therefore be strongly stressed that this 
high 'take' had nothing whatsoever to do with the negotiating skill of 
the Norwegian policy-makers. As argued above, the Norwegians had little 
or no idea about the value of what was buried below the North Sea. 
Their only negotiating 'coup' could be said to be related to the drawing 
of the borderline with the UK, but this was unrelated to the Norwegian 
state's relationship with the companies.
Norway introduced a special tax concession for the companies in 
1965. But the debate in the Storting would probably have been even 
more subdued had the parliamentarians known how little difference such 
a move would have had for the companies' expected rate of return. Its 
introduction would have reduced the IRR for a hypothetical 200m. field 
by no more than 1.0% and the 700m. field by a similar amount.
In a similar vein of analysis, if the success rate in the North 
Sea turned out to be better (or worse) than the expected world average, 
this would also have had relatively little influence on the companies'
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Table 4.2 
Results 1965
Project appraisal for all fields
100m
Present value ($m.) -5.0
Pre-tax IRR (%) 8.9
Post-tax IRR (%) 2.7
Net Present Value ($m.) -39.1
200m 300m 400m 700m
Table 4.5
Total government take
(discounted)
Table 4.4 
Undiscounted results
99.2 
+ =
86.6 
> 100%
Pretax profits
per field ($m.)
Traditional
state 'take 1 (%)
81.2 280.0
72.6 _ 56.9
459.9 686.3
55.7 55.1
1389.3
54.4
IRR. Accepting a success rate of 1:30 (and thus taking the companies 1 
continuous statements about the 'riskiness' of the operations in the 
North Sea at their face value) would only have decreased the companies' 
expected IRR by 0.8% and 1.8% for a 700m. and a 200m. field respectively. 
This is as expected, because the exploration costs constitute a smaller 
percentage of total costs for the larger fields.
4.4.9 A long-run perspective
Because renegotiation was ruled out as a policy instrument, few 
possibilities were left to the Norwegian state to ensure that the state 
received a larger share of the oil-rent in the long run than it would 
have done in 1965. The only one that has been mentioned publicly was 
that the state during the 1965 negotiations reserved 'key blocks' for 
itself for future exploration.
However, the number of blocks that fell into this category were 
limited, thus decreasing the quantitative element of such a move. 
More importantly, if the state had very little geological expertise 
at its disposal in 1965, how did it know which were the 'key' blocks?
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It could be argued that the state simply decided that the blocks for 
which there had been most applications should be denoted 'key 1 blocks. 
Such a procedure, however, would almost certainly have been met with 
fierce opposition by the companies. This information still remains 
'classified 1 , but we can reasonably infer that since no complaints from 
the companies ever reached the press on this specific issue (while they 
certainly did on a number of other issues such as taxes), the probability 
that the state acted in such a manner must have been minimal. The 
selection of 'key 1 blocks therefore must have been a rather 'haphazard 1 
process.
4.5 VOLUME
Apart from maximizing its share of the oil rent, a producer- 
state also seeks to control the volume of production. We 
shall see how the Norwegian state in 1965 tried to encourage (and to 
what extent it succeeded) bringing about a 'rapid and thorough' 
exploration of the North Sea. This stated aim in turn implied that 
the state wanted a rapid production as there was no way the Norwegian 
state politically could have prevented (or indeed wanted to prevent) 
productj.cn once oil had been found. Such an aim contrasted sharply with
what was to become Norwegian policy from the early 1970s onwards when 
there was a clear attempt to decrease the expected volume of production.
Whilst it could be inferred that Norway was following a cautious 
of "conservationist" line with respect to volume of production because 
only 81 blocks or 25% of the area south of the 62° was originally 
licensed, such a conclusion at closer sight is unwarranted. It v/as 
the reluctance of the companies that led to such a small figure being 
licensed, and had nothing to do with any 'foresight' of the Norwegian 
government. The companies applied for acreage in the southern part 
of the Norwegian sector where their geological assessment of the
situation was most optimistic. But the Norwegian government initially
78 
offered all 278 blocks in the Norwegian sector for licensing, a fact
that should make for some scepticism with regard to the state's later 
claims that all along it had been following a well worked out and long- 
term strategy (for example with respect to the 'key 1 blocks discussed 
above). An alternative interpretation could always claim that if the 
companies had shown an interest in all blocks, the government would
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never have given them all away 0 But there were at the time no indica- 
tions of any initial restraint on this count from any policy-maker. 
There is, on the contrary, no doubt that all the policy-makers at the 
time wanted a rapid rate of exploration, and therefore were happy to go 
ahead with exploration efforts at. full speed. This aim was indirectly 
stated in a Norwegian Government White Paper in 1965/66 which said: 
"In order to achieve a rapid and thorough investigation of the
Continental Shelf ... the Department of Industry has attempted to
79 distribute the blocks ... in different geological structures."
We will now discuss whether this aim was in fact fulfilled. To 
ensure that an area is thoroughly explored, it is not enough to get 
companies to bid for acreage. A concession also has to ensure that 
concrete work is carried out by the companies once they have obtained 
access to a block. This was meant to be accomplished in four ways.
First, the cost of a reconnaisance-licence was negligible:
Kr. 15,000/year. Secondly, the relinquishment stipulations would,
80 
according to the Norwegian state, induce faster exploration. As
was said by a civil servant in the Ministry of Industry, "No company
81 
will want to hand back unexplored territory." Thirdly, the
Norwegian government argued that the progressive area costs, levied
82 
after six years, would induce a company either to continue to
explore or to give up its acreage because there was an increasing cost
of doing nothing. Finally, a thorough and rapid exploration would be 
ensured by work programmes which were regarded as the state's main 
policy instrument. The work programme therefore became an important 
part of the negotiations between the companies and the Norwegian state. 
Under such negotiations, even if both actors may want to find oil as 
rapidly as possible, a company may still only want to drill a well to 
a relatively shallow geological layer where it thinks that the chances 
of finding oil are the greatest. On the other hand, the nation-state, 
in order to get the fullest overall picture of a geological province, 
may want the same well drilled much deeper (and hence at a higher 
cost). Thus the object of negotiations is not only the number of wells 
to be drilled, but also the depth to which they are to be drilled. 83 
We also know that one applicant withdrew because of the heavy financial 
undertakings in connection with the work programme.
As made clear in Chapter 2, negotiations about the work programme 
can be seen as a substitute for the bonus bidding practised under the 
'auction' system of concessions. To the extent that there was real
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bargaining about the work programme and that one company would try to 
get a block by 'outbidding 1 another applicant, this view may be right. 
However, there are few indications that the Norwegian government 
played one company against another in the nearly 50 meetings that took 
place between the Oil Council and the companies during the period
O c
between the submission of applications and the granting of licences. 
Furthermore, subsequent descriptions of the negotiations only stated 
that changes in work programmes,-took place "to some extent", 86 
thus at least modifying Trasti's original description which implied 
that there had been strong antagonisms and bargaining in this field 
(see Footnote 83 above).
The outcome of this bargaining was a work programme that the
Norwegian government itself on a later occasion described as 'relatively
87 
moderate 1 . It committed the companies to one well every second
block (30 wells on 78 blocks).
The government also tried to follow a strategy described as
89 
'site-owner strategic consideration', according to which both
promising and unpromising blocks were allocated together in the same 
announcement of block allocations. In theory, by coupling the blocks 
that are seen as being attractive to the companies together with blocks 
with a lesser geological potential, one can ensure that the latter ones as 
a minimum will be drilled. If they had been offered on their own, it
is not certain that this would have been the case. The state can in 
this way 'force' a more balanced exploration of an oil province, 
which contrasts with the 'auction' or the 'Danish' system.
Did the work programme together with the other administrative 
measures achieve its aims? This question is doubly important if one 
argues that gaining knowledge of the Continental Shelf (as opposed to 
trying to maximize its share of oil-rent) was the principal aim of the 
Norwegian state during the first allocation round. The conclusion must 
be that to some extent it did, mainly as a result of the work programme. 
The importance of the other three policy instruments mentioned above to 
bring about a thorough exploration was less important. Given the size 
of the companies in question, the relative cost for the companies of 
sitting with unused acreage for speculative purposes in the medium run, 
was negligible. But on the other hand the possibility of a massive 
collusion between the major companies to keep the North Sea just 
'ticking over 1 while they depleted their resources in the Middle East 
was to some extent prevented by this policy.
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Finally, no matter how much the Norwegian state wanted a rapid 
exploration, the Norwegian Continental Shelf was nevertheless deemed 
relatively unimportant by the companies, compared with the UK sector. 
It was reported in November 1965 that most of the companies had to 
postpone drilling until 1967, largely because of the lack of suitable 
equipment, most of which was being used in the UK sector. The argument 
that Norway need not have granted the concessions so quickly is strength- 
ened by examining the general long-run strength of the Norwegian 
bargaining position. Norway had perhaps more time at its disposal 
than was commonly thought.
4.6 SPINQFFS 1965
As noted in Chapter 1, the third aim pursued by the Norwegian state 
was to maximize the spinoff effects from oil. As late as 1972 one of
the main architects of Norwegian oil policies regarded the spinoff
91 
effects as the main element in a successful oil policy.
When the first concessions were granted in 1965, Norwegian industry 
was confronted with a completely new field of activity in which it had 
no experience whatsoever. At that time the potential offshore market 
totalled Kr. 600 mill, (the expected cost of the initial exploration 
work programme). The possible sectors where Norwegian industry could 
get a share were supply bases, drilling rigs, and supply ships, while 
it could not initially compete with regard to the supply of sophisticated 
drilling equipment like Christmas Trees and derricks. But even the 
willingness by Norwegian industry to capture the first part of the 
spinoff market was in doubt. As was later pointed out by the Director 
of Norges Industriforbund (the Norwegian CBI), there was at that time
no guarantee of any finds, so why should Norwegian industry invest money
92 in a sector that might disappear tomorrow? Such thinking, if widely
held, did not rule out involvement in the exploration phase, but it 
certainly prevented industry from grasping the long-run possibilities 
that could spring from future production. This attitude was reinforced 
by the limited resources available to Norwegian industry. At that time 
there were also full order books for the Norwegian shipyards; an added 
incentive not to take too much notice of what was happening offshore. 
This interpretation is reasonable on the assumption that knowledge about 
the potential of production from the North Sea remained unknown to the 
Norwegian state, a point we have already argued. Only to the extent that
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such knowledge was available, but was not transmitted to industry, can 
we say that state policy with regard to spinoff was a failure.
The Norwegian state from the start realized that the oil spinoff 
industry was an industrial sector where restrictive practices and 
monopolies played a role. This was most clearly put some years later 
when a government Minister argued that some regulations for the offshore 
industry were necessary on the grounds that the companies "use their
traditional subcontractors because they do not have sufficient knowledge
93 
of the potential Norwegian suppliers". Consequently a very mild
encouragement for Norwegian industry was arrived at during the 1965 
negotiations in the form of a "gentlemen's agreement" which was specified 
in the following terms:
"It is a precondition (for the granting of a licence - PN) 
that the licensee shall use bases in Norway, and use
Norwegian industry and Norwegian manpower to the extent
94 
that these are competitive in price and time."
But this agreement was not at the time put in written form.
There is no doubt that there were stronger means by which Norwegian 
industry could have been favoured, and we shall see how the Norwegian 
state's support for the spinoff industries expressed itself more forcefully
over time. But the Norwegian state claimed to be afraid of reprisals 
against its shipping industry if it implemented protective measures in 
the offshore industry. National preferential policies were already at 
that time making life difficult for the Norwegian ship-owners, and it 
was thought that Norway could not pursue a protective policy at home 
while demanding a non-protective policy abroad. This line of argument 
is a close copy of the UK arguments about how 'onerous 1 terms in the 
North Sea could damage BP and Shell worldwide, and the same arguments 
can be levelled against this Norwegian belief as was levelled against 
the UK arguments (see p.116). The fact that this argument had 
weight at all might tell more about the strength of the Norwegian ship- 
owning class and its ideological beliefs than adequately describe the 
world. After all, one of the main discriminators against Norwegian 
shipping was none other than the US!
But compared with the situation in the UK, even such a 'gentlemen's 
agreement' for the national spinoff industry was an advance. It has 
been argued (and it was certainly felt at the time) that UK industry did 
not need any protection. But even so, one criterion in the UK licens- 
ing conditions introduced by the Labour Government in 1965 could be
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interpreted to favour UK offshore interests; namely the contribution
* 95 
which had been made by the applicant towards the national economy.
This could have helped to discriminate in favour of UK firms generally, 
and also put some pressure on foreign companies to buy their offshore 
equipment in the UK (which, however, did not seem to have happened). 
A similar condition was also echoed in the Norwegian explanation of 
the original terms:
"The department has taken account of whether the applicants 
by retailing outlets in Norway, in the use of Norwegian ships 
or in any other way has contributed towards or in the future
will contribute towards the strengthening of the Norwegian
i ,, 96 
economy in general."
In the Norwegian sector this rather timid move of state support for 
private industry does not seem initially to have had much effect. 
While Norwegian industry did not take advantage of this encouragement, 
part of the blame must also go to the state for not thinking about the 
next possible policy step if oil or gas was to be found. According to 
one critical observation at the time, no government White Papers during 
the two years after the first licences had been granted had discussed 
from a principled and macro- point of view such possible consequences
Q7 for Norwegian industry. This critic pointed out for example that
if foreign companies were to take all the gas likely to be found, this 
could lead to a decreased competitive strength of the indigenous 
Norwegian chemical industry.
In only one industry was there an attempt to take advantage of the 
new situation. The Aker group (owned by ship-owner Fred Olsen) signed 
a contract to build a semi-submergible drilling rig, 'Ocean Viking 1 , for 
ODECO. The construction was based on US drawings, but with major modi- 
fications. The rig was delivered on time in 1967 and became the second
rig to operate in Norwegian waters. The construction also entailed
98 
cooperation with other shipyards in Scandinavia and gave Aker
99 important experience, but little profit. Aker also ran the Norsco
supply base near Stavanger, but that also without much pecuniary reward. 
But apart from the above isolated examples (and the almost inevitable 
national involvement in catering and helicopter services), Norwegian 
industry did not take much advantage of the new industry on its 
doorstep.
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4.7 CONCLUSION: 1965 TERMS
It is possible to argue, on almost any criterion, that the 
Norwegian terms that were laid down in 1965 were weak. The only object- 
ive that was to some extent fulfilled was the wish for a thorough and 
rapid exploration of the Norwegian Continental Shelf. But given the 
companies' basic interest in the Shelf, and the geological promise of 
the Norwegian acreage, one can legitimately ask whether this aim would 
not have been fulfilled anyway. And even if this was not the case, 
this objective was fulfilled at the expense of almost all other 
objectives. We have seen that the state's maximization of oil-rent from 
hypothetical fields was made difficult mainly by the Norwegian state's 
almost total lack of information, and that the companies' expected IRR 
was indeed acceptable, especially in view of Norway's proximity to the 
Western markets and its stable political system. There were further- 
more no long-run safeguards for a rent-maximization on behalf of the 
state, especially as renegotiation was ruled out as a policy instrument. 
And there were no agreements for transferring knowledge and expertise 
to the Norwegian state. The spinoff effects from oil were poor and 
there was no short-run or long-run coherent plan to maximize Norway's
share of the rent by direct ownership in exploration. In the words of 
an American oil executive some years later: "The 1965 law was a hell 
of a good law."
To explain this situation one does not need to have recourse to 
any conspiracy theory. Oil was a completely new field for Norwegian 
policy-makers. And once Norway decided to explore its Continental 
Shelf, it had no choice, given the lack of any Norwegian state alter- 
native, but to fall into line with the terms already offered (especially 
by the UK) to attract the companies. But the UK policy-makers made as 
many, if not more, mistakes as their Norwegian counterparts, which 
indirected affected the Norwegian terms. What we will see happening 
from 1965 onwards is a concerted attempt by Norway to rectify the 
initial errors and miscalculations. It is the special role that the 
state played in this process that will be the centre of our analysis in 
the next chapters.
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CHAPTER 5
THE INITIAL SEARCH: 1966-1970
As suggested in Chapter 4, the companies must have been extremely 
pleased with the conditions of exploration offered to them during the 
first round of concessions. But they still had to find the oil.
ESSO was the first company to start drilling in the Norwegian sector 
using the semi-submergible rig 'Ocean Traveller 1 , hired on a three-year 
charter from ODECO. It spudded the first well in July 1966. Indications 
of oil were found in the second test well in 11/25, 112 miles west of 
Stavanger, in 415 feet of water, but these were not in any commercial 
quantities. ESSO then sank five consecutive wells with no further 
traces of oil or gas. Phillips joined the search with a second sub- 
mergible in July 1967, but AMOCO/NOCO had to abandon the use of a con- 
verted whaler as a drill ship, due to the difficult weather in the area. 
Phillips found a condensate field in 7/11 in their second attempt, the 
news of which was publicly known in July 1968. But when the third apprai- 
sal well turned out to be dry, Phillips declared the field uncommercial 
if exploited on its own. The prospect of oil production was however 
taken so seriously that the Norwegian state formed a commission to look 
into the problems of a possible pipeline to Norway from the field which 
was called 'Cod 1 .
While this was going on, safety rules in the form of a Royal Decree 
of 25 August 1967 were laid down by the Norwegians and a second round 
of concessions were offered to the companies in May 1969, following 
long negotiations. Three different systems of 'carried interest 1 were 
for the first time introduced. These have already been described in 
detail in Chapter 3. Only Shell was unaffected by any new agreements. 
The only new conditions imposed on the company was that it should train 
Norwegian civil servants. These agreements only related to new con- 
cessions, so there was no 'retroactive' legislation involved.
At the time these new policies were interpreted by the industry as 
being "more stringent" than the 1965 ones. It is our task later to 
determine whether this was so.
Drilling then got under way both on the old and the new concessions 
and on 23 December 1969, in the 33rd well drilled on the Norwegian
Continental Shelf, Phillips found the Ekofisk oil and gas field. A
2 total of Kr. 750 mill, had by then been invested in the search on the
Norwegian Continental Shelf.
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As pointed out in Chapter 2, the companies will, at least initially, 
try to conceal their real appreciation of a production area in order to 
maintain the best possible bargaining situation vis-a-vis the state. 
Part of this process was to continuously point out the difficulties 
encountered in the North Sea and generally to underestimate the chances 
of finding oil. This process was clearly expressed in the period leading 
up to the Ekofisk find. The professional oil press was particularly 
'schizophrenic 1 in this respect. On one hand it tended to mirror the 
public relations stands of the companies. On the other it knew enough 
of the real situation at times to break through this facade and state 
that the outlook was by no means bleak. The OGI wrote in May 1969 that 
"The success ratio off Norway has been less than encouraging. Every 
prospective discoverer faces a difficult and costly production operation." 
And it seemed that this sentiment was echoed in the concrete actions of 
the industry as the number of rigs and wells drilled dropped during the 
winter and spring of 1969 and only picked up marginally following the 
handing out of new concessions in May of that year. At least sections 
of the Norwegian civil service seemed to share this sentiment of pessi- 
mism. One of the reasons put forward in justifying a new round of con- 
cessions in 1968/69 was that the companies were 'running out of steam 1 . 
It was even suggested that if one of the major companies withdrew it 
could become difficult to get the rest of the companies to fulfil their
work programmes, so immediate would be the collapse of all confidence
3 in the Norwegian acreage.
But the shortfall in drilling activity., interpreted as a sign of 
decline in company interest, might not have signified any fundamental 
collapse in company expectations. Given the existence of a continuous 
shortage of drilling platforms, any reallocation to the UK sector could 
indicate nothing but a temporary shortfall in activity as all operators 
tried to fully explore the 50% of the acreage which they had to hand
back to the UK state by 1970. After all, the interest shown by the ten
4 groups that applied during the second round of concessions was a good
enough indication that the Norwegian shelf in no way could be declared 
'uninteresting'. This point is brought out most clearly by a statement 
made about the UK sector as the search for oil moved northwards into the 
same geological structures as the northern part of the Norwegian Shelf. 
Callow observed following a visit to Shell's headquarters in October 
1969 after the COD-find, that "from the way the Shell officials 
spoke it was becoming a question of when, not whether, oil was there"
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("there" refers to the northern parts of the Continental Shelf). He 
also observed that:
"while the industry was only too happy to mount a massive 
public relations campaign in its battle for higher gas 
prices, a discreet, unified silence was maintained about 
oil prospects."
This was hardly the attitude of an industry that had lost all interest 
in the North Sea. The extent to which the companies at the time knew 
the geological potential of the Norwegian Continental Shelf is clearly 
expressed in a historical overview which Noroil recently wrote 
about the Frigg field. According to them,
"A female geophysicist in Elf convinced the management to 
pursue a more detailed study of the Frigg area (when the
second Norwegian licensing round was announced - PN) and
7 the study indicated the presence of a large structure...
Of primary interest to the geologists and geophysicists
was a large 'beautiful' structure which today is the Frigg,
Odin, N E Frigg, E Frigg and S E Frigg finds."8
It is part of the story that the Frigg field was found in April 1971, 
with the first wildcat spudded in the area.
Finally, there had been a remarkable success rate in the search for 
gas in the UK sector,, The UK Minister of Power, Mr R. Marsh, in the
beginning of 1967 said: "Exploration ... over the past two years has
9 been so remarkably successful as to invite an attitude of overoptimism."
At that time 24 wildcats had been drilled with 5 or possibly 6 commercial 
finds. This ratio one year later declined to approximately one commercial 
find in ten, still way above the average world-wide ratio.
Superimposed on this strong geological interest in the North Sea 
there was also a more intensified general interest shown by the companies, 
which was due to the changing international circumstances. According to 
World Oil of July 1968, the massive move to offshore activities took 
place because:
"Major producing nations' political instability and demands 
for a larger share of the production dollar makes it more 
attractive to search for reserves in secure areas even at 
higher costs."
It is in order to understand this aspect of the situation in the 
North Sea that we have to examine the global situation of the companies 
in this period.
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This will make clear why the companies were very far from losing an 
overall interest in the Norwegian acreage. While the Norwegian state, 
despite the first changing of terms in,1969, was still taking a relatively 
pessimistic expectation of the future, this sentiment was, on a closer 
reading of the situation, not shared by the industry whatever their 
'public relations' statements suggested. Two months after the letter 
from the Oil Council to the Department of Industry (p. 143 above), the
OGI headed its North Sea Report "Big offshore hunt scatters to Holland
   12
and Norway..." One year later the same journal observed in response
to the assertion that activities in the North Sea were on the decline: 
"The extent of this offshore operation still continues to stir the 
imagination."
5.1 THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT
As predicted in Chapter 2, following a first find of oil the
Norwegians now felt themselves in a position to tighten the terms they
14 offered the companies. But what form this tightening was to take
remained undecided. The Norwegian policy-makers could choose between 
five approaches, all of which had at one time or another been practised 
by other oil-producers. These were: increase in taxation; joint ventures 
with or without the active participation of a state oil corporation; 
net-profit deals; service contracts; and finally production-sharing 
agreements. All these ways to increase the power of a producer-state, 
with the exception of the production-sharing, had been used in the oil 
industry in the period to 1965. Their increased use among producer- 
states in the period 1965-69 strengthened the resolve of any Norwegian 
policy-maker who might have wanted to follow their example. What we 
witnessed in this period was therefore not any qualitatively new develop- 
ments on an international scale, but rather an intensification of an 
existing trend in concession patterns.
In 1967 a joint-venture agreement was signed between The Kuwait 
National Oil Company (60% owned by the Kuwaiti state, the rest by 
Kuwaiti nationals) and the Spanish company Hispanoil (a combination 
of Spanish state and private interests), where the national oil 
company for the first time had 51 per cent of the shares of the joint 
undertaking. All risk was carried by the Spanish company until a 
commercial find was made. Hispanoil was, in addition, forced to pay
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all the normal Kuwaiti income taxes. Joint venture agreements were 
also signed between Saudi Arabia and ENI in 1967 giving the state oil 
corporation Petromin the right of a 30% participation in an integrated 
firm. State participation was negotiated in 1968 between the Libyan 
state oil corporation LIPETCO and the French state company Auxirap; 
the same year as an agreement was reached between Abu Dhabi and the 
Japanese Mitsubishi company. We can see that the principle of state 
participation was spreading rapidly, even if the only agreement 
negotiated with any of the majors remained the Kuwait/Shell agreement 
of 1961. (We disregard the very special Iranian situation in the wake 
of the 1954 'nationalization'.)
The concept of service contracts was also spreading. Venezuela 
offered the exploitation of areas south of the Lake of Maracaibo in 
1968 on the basis of such arrangements. It received offers from, 
among others, the majors, but finally rejected them all as being 
unsatisfactory and asked for new bids. The important element in this 
development was, in the words of one observer, how this might be "the 
first sign that the major international companies operating in 
Venezuela accept a development where service contracts can become an 
important element in a country's oil policies".
Iran entered into service contracts with the French state company 
ERAP in 1966 under conditions where the French company was guaranteed 
between 17.5% and 22.5% of total output (a figure considerably lower 
than in most joint venture agreements), to a price that was equivalent 
to production costs plus what would in normal concessions have been 
paid per barrel in taxes. Iraq followed in 1968 with an agreement 
with ERAP which was closely modelled on the Iranian agreement of 1966, 
even if the Iraqi situation was very different from that in other oil- 
producing states. But the principle of service contracts was everywhere 
fought by the majors, with the possible exception of Venezuela.
The only new policy alternative which had emerged in the period 
1965-69 was 'product-sharing 1 contracts. This kind of agreement was 
pioneered by Indonesia, which at the same time continued to sign more 
traditional agreements like service contracts. On one interpretation 
the product-sharing agreements were nothing but service contracts where 
the foreign company got a certain percentage of the oil to cover its 
costs (40% in the Indonesian case) plus some more as profit on the 
venture. (In Indonesia a 65/35 division in favour of Pertamina of the 
profits earned from the remaining 60 per cent was agreed to.) In the
147
Indonesian case there were also several stipulations which further 
weakened the 'bite* of the original service contract, and therefore 
made them more acceptable to the majors.
Neither net profit agreements nor a simple increase in taxes, 
royalties or bonuses had been much utilized by the producer-states 
during the 1965-69 period in their bid to increase their share of the 
oil-rent. This was perhaps not surprising, given the mood of the 
producer-states at this period. In June 1968 the OPEC conference 
recommended to its members that "On the grounds of changing circum- 
stances ... for those who have still not done so, to take up participa- 
tion". There were no immediate consequences of the OPEC resolution 
cited above, especially as the majors were still unwilling to compromise 
on the question of participation. But the question of new forms of 
agreement had for the first time been seriously put on the agenda, 
something the Norwegians fully appreciated.
Partly as a consequence of this development, the companies also 
felt themselves to be under increasing long-term pressure in their 
traditional producing areas. A more militant stand by the new govern- 
ment of Libya headed by Ghadaffi and by Algeria also contributed to a 
new sense of instability in the industry. And even if the failure of 
OPEC to act decisively about the participation question and the 
collapse of the 1967 oil embargo which followed the 1967 Arab-Israeli 
war was seen to be an indication of the powerlessness of the producer- 
states, few people in the oil industry took this to be a permanent state 
of affairs. For the companies it was becoming more and more a question 
of when the old concession system was to change, not if. The only 
surprise, when it finally came, was how fast the change did come about. 
This feeling of impending change, coupled with projections of a con- 
tinued increase in the world's energy demands, made the companies more 
eager than ever to gain access to the North Sea.
Events closer to home also influenced Norwegian policy-makers, but 
this time in a somewhat more ambiguous fashion. The fact that the 
companies did indeed pull out of the German sector after 11 dry holes 
and no commercial finds of oil or gas made it clear that the companies' 
statements that there were limits to their patience,had some validity. 
This was a pertinent point for Norway, which still had to rely on state- 
ments by the companies regarding the interpretation of geological data 
in order to get a full view of the situation. The situation did 
not improve until 4 geologists were hired to work full time for the 
Ministry of Industry in the middle of 1969. 17 The early attempts by
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the Dutch state to obtain state participation and a larger slice of 
the total oil rent likewise had met with determined opposition by the 
companies, which rejected the Dutch terms on 8 August 1966. The pro- 
posed Dutch terms were stringent by the standards of that time. For 
example the government wanted a veto power over all actions by the proposed 
joint ventures, n° matter what the size of state participation, and also
sought to implement the most stringent fiscal take of all the states in
18the North Sea. These terms were never implemented, despite the ob- 
vious attraction of the Dutch offshore acreage, which was close to 
Groningen and close to the major markets. When the terms were changed 
following the inauguration of a new government in 1967, there was an 
immediate rush onto the Dutch Continental Shelf.
But even in the North Sea area there were successful precedents 
for any Norwegian policy-maker who wanted to tighten the terms offered 
to the companies. Sweden, in 1969, gave all the rights for exploration 
and production of oil to AB Oljeprospekting, a company half made up of 
state-owned companies and half of private interests (including the oil 
company OK owned by the Cooperative Movement). The aim was clearly to 
keep any future oil production in Swedish hands and to keep foreign 
risk capital out of this sector of the economy. However, it was en- 
visaged that foreign companies would be used as contractors.
And in the UK a similar critical attitude towards the international 
companies expressed itself in the form of the suggested creation of a 
National Hydrocarbon Corporation (NHC), a kind of British state oil 
corporation. This suggestion appeared at the same time as the contro- 
versy over pricing of the North Sea natural gas,which was set by the
state more in line with a 'cost-price 1 instead of 'market-price 1 (as
20 the companies pressed for). The suggested creation of NHC was in
response to a call by the National Union of Miners at the Labour Party's 
Annual Conference in 1966 for a report on the "advisability of public
ownership of all operations concerning the production of natural gas and
21 oil in Britain or on the British Continental Shelf". The final report
from the Labour Party study group (which included Peter Odell) did not 
recommend any nationalization of oil, but saw in the end the NHC as a 
supplement to the private companies very much along the lines of ENI and ERAP. 
It was to play a direct role in both production and distribution of oil
and gas as well as owning pipelines. That the whole project in the end
22 
was scrapped by the Labour government of the day is largely irrelevant
for our argument. We merely want to point to the abundance of cases 
which potentially represented a break with the traditional structure of
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the industry and which could consequently have served as an example 
for the architects of the second stage of Norwegian oil policies. It 
was after all one of the major virtues of the initial period of the 
operation of the Norwegian Oil Council that they travelled extensively 
in order to absorb new ideas about the organisation of the oil industry
5.2 DIVISION OF RENT
We will now evaluate the second Norwegian round of concessions in 
the light of its potential effect on the division of oil-rent between 
the state and the companies. To do this we must determine the value of 
the cost and revenue variables as they were expected to be in 1969.
5.2.1 Exploration costs
We maintain our cost assumptions from 1965 about the costs of 
exploration and production wells. Even if the initial easy optimism 
about year-round operations in the North Sea had been rudely shattered, 
new drilling techniques like turbo-drilling had also made drilling in 
the North Sea easier. Further, technical progress was also 
expected to take place. According to PPS, summing up the situation 
after the World Petroleum Congress in 1967:
"In so many areas, offshore work is only beginning, and the 
next few years are likely to see a great development in work
on the shelves, both in geographical spread and in the
24 techniques of operation."
25 Shell, in an internal management brief of November 1968, assumed
that the average cost of a production well offshore was less than $1 
each ($11.5 mill, for 2 delineation wells and 12 production wells). This 
yields a cost per exploration well of less than $2 mill, if we as before 
assume that the cost of each delineation and exploration well is the 
double of a production well.
Each step-out well on the Ekofisk field was assumed to cost £0.5
26 
mill, in 1970, a figure which is roughly in line with a British Labour
Party study of 1968 which assumed a cost per exploration well of £1 mill. 
($2.4 mill.).
Given that Cod had be found before the 1969 allocation, it was 
clear that the Norwegian sector contained oil. In order to take account
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of this new situation, which meant that the chance of finding oil in
*.
the North Sea had increased, we have lowered the average success rate 
for the new acreage in the Norwegian sector to 1:12. The final figure 
is somewhat arbitrarily chosen, but must also be seen in relation to 
the phenomenal success that the companies had had in the UK sector of 
the North Sea; the general optimistic geological assessment by- the 
companies in the Norwegian sector; as well as the standard practice of 
assuming that in any area the success rate at least initially will tend 
increase as more knowledge about the oil province is acquired.
5 0 2.2 Development costs
Based on what was said above, the average cost of a delineation 
well is still assumed to be $2 mill. The best basis for a computation 
of the expected platform cost is a Shell study of 1968. This is the 
first available study this author found which related specifically to 
the North Sea. A fixed platform constructed for between 300 and 400
feet of water, but excluding installation, would, according to this
28 internal study, cost $7 mill. Using the cost distribution assumed
in Chapter 2, total expected costs for a fully operative platform for 
a 100m. barrell field with 18 production wells in the North Sea comes 
to $44 mill., when reserves are included
3 delineation wells @ $2m. = $6m.
Platform costs = $7m. )
Installation = $3.5m 0 ) <t14
Equipment = $2.5m.) = * 14
Miscellaneous = $l.lm.)
18 production wells @ $lm. = $18m.
$38.1m. 
Land facilities (7%) 1.7m.
Reserve to cover administration,
land purchase, financing costs $4m.
$44m.
The last element to fully determine total development costs is the 
cost of a pipeline. It was in this field that the most dramatic 
(indeed the only) major change in expected cost conditions compared 
with 1965 was to take place 0 The laying of a 30-inch natural gas
pipeline from the Leman field in the southern sector of the North Sea
29 in the end cost $600,000/mile, almost three times as much as expected.
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But this could be said to have been an exceptional figure. As the 
Shell study stated, "the costs were greatly influenced by hold-ups
due to bad weather, so the actual realistic planning figure was 
probably considerably less. We have chosen as an average figure a total
pipeline cost of $400,000/mile, a figure which is well supported by
31 
Wenger who estimated costs to be between $280,000 and $560,000/mile,
depending upon the diameter of the Iine 0 The assessment is also in
line with the estimates given in 1968/69 about the cost of a pipeline
32 from Cod of the order of $450,000/mile. The expected average pipeline
costs in 1969 therefore totalled $80 million (200 miles @ $400,000/mile), 
and total development costs for the 100m. field would have been 
$124 million.
5.2.3 Operating costs
There were no indications that the average expected operating costs 
in 1969 compared with 1965 would have increased in any dramatic way. 
We have therefore conservatively assumed an increase in line with 
general inflation to 55 {/bbl.
5.2.4 Price
The price of a barrel1 of crude delivered in the UK in 1969 was 
around $2.80. 53
5.2.5 Expected trends
The price situation in the oil market continuously improved for 
the companies from 1965 onwards  The assessment of a falling real 
price of oil made in 1965 was clearly turning out to be too pessimistic, 
as the growth in the world's demand towards the 1970s for the first time 
threatened to outstrip the growth in the supply. Some even expected an 
acceleration of this trend, the most notable being an internal Shell 
study which already in the late 1960s predicted a dramatic increase 
in the price of oil, but not until the 1980s. But it is clear that 
the majority of the companies and the Norwegian state took a relatively 
sanguine attitude to what was happening, and that very few expected any 
dramatic change in the oil price. We have therefore assumed that the 
real price of oil would increase by 1% p.a. With a continuous world
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inflation at an average rate of around 3%, a figure we will also use as 
our cost escalation factor, this meant an expected increase in price of 
around 4%.
5.2.6 Participation
We have in Chapter 2 outlined the important variables that determine 
the effects of the three participation scenarios negotiated in 1969. 
What remains to be done is to give a numerical value to these variables.
(i) In participation scenario 2, where the company covers both 
the exploration and investment costs of the state, these were to be repaid 
at whatever the Eurodollar market medium-term interest rate happened to
 7 r t
be in any one year, which we have set to 10%. The Frigg field was 
developed on the basis of this agreement, and we will use the 5% 
participation rate of that arrangement in our example.
(ii) We have assumed that the same interest rate was used in the 
state's agreements negotiated under scenario 3, where the companies only 
carry the exploration costs. The exact interest rate for the state's 
repayment has never been made public for these agreements, but informa- 
tion received from Norwegian civil servants makes us believe that this 
approximation is reasonable. (We will in due course show that even a 
major miscalculation on this count would have had very little effect 
for the division of rent.) As participation rate for scenario 3
agreements, we have chosen the final rate of 40% for the 036 agreement
37 
which was the basis for the Heimdal find.
(iii) In scenario 4 we assume an average participation rate of 17.5% 
which corresponds to the rate in the 027 and 030 agreements between 
ESSO and the Norwegian state.
We now have to establish the percentage of finds attributable to 
one block, data which is relevant for the participation scenarios 2 and 
3. The companies will drill a number of blocks where no commercial 
deposit will be found. We have assumed that only one-fourth of total 
exploration expenditure can be attributed to a block where a commercial 
find is expected. The state will therefore only pay its participation 
share of the total exploration costs attributed to the successful block.
This follows from our expected 1:12 success rate and the assump- 
tion that on average three holes will be drilled in each block (the 
compulsory work programme of 1969 specified a minimum of one well per 
block). Hence on average 4 blocks would be drilled before a commercial
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find was made, and 25% of total exploration costs can be attributable 
to the successful block. Note that we assume that there are possibly 
more than one structure to drill on each block so that the two first 
exploration wells in a block can be dry.,. while a third can still 
yield a commercial find.
So2.7 Other assumptions
In line with the weakening profitability of the companies and the 
increasing costs of finding new deposits of oil outside the Middle East, 
we have assumed a further drop to 80% in the level of self-financing 
compared with 1965 for the companies. All other assumptions are un- 
changed from 1965. A summary of all assumptions is found below.
Assumptions 1969
Price $/bbl 2.80 
Price escalation % 4 
Total exploration cost ($m.) 24 
Development costs ($m.)
Fields in mill./bbls 100 124
200 168
300 212
400 256
700 388
Operating costs ($/bbl) 0.55 
Cost escalation (%) 3
Percentage debt
Company: 20 
Statoil: 0
Rate of interest 9
Years grace 1
Years spread 5
Discount rate 10
PARTICIPATION SCHEME: (Percentage state share) 
Scenario 2 - Repay exploration costs later 40 
Scenario 3 - Repay exploration and development costs later 5 
Scenario 4 - Net profits 17.5 
Rate of interest'for cost repayment in scenarios 2 and 3 10
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Tax: In 1969 important changes were announced in the Norwegian tax system. 
The general state tax for corporations was to be reduced from 30% to 26.5%, 
giving a total effective tax rate for the oil companies of 41.5%. This 
decrease was widely anticipated in political circles and there is every 
reason to assume that the oil companies and the Department of Industry 
firmly assumed in their spring 1969 negotiations that such a policy would 
be in operation, even if the new rates were not to be made effective until 
the financial year starting in January 1970. In the 1969 negotiations 
we have therefore assumed an effective tax rate of 41.5%.
In 1969 it was also decided that distributed dividents should be
38 
made deductible. But because of the special organizational nature of
the great majority of oil companies on the Norwegian Shelf, it was in 
1969 very unclear whether these would be able to deduct the distributed 
dividend in the way stipulated by the law. Because of this uncertainty, 
which was not sorted out until 1971, we have decided to ignore for the
1969 round of allocations this ability of the companies to deduct
39 distributed dividends.
5.2.8 Results: IRR and the state f s share of rent
Plugging the 1969 cost and revenue assumptions into our model, 
Table 1 shows that the expected present value of any find in the North 
Sea had increased by 1969 compared with 1965. The main reason for this 
increase was the decrease in the expected exploration costs and the 
increase in the price of oil, which more than compensated for the shown 
cost increases. The Norwegian state's way of reacting to this situation 
was to increase the 'toughness 1 of its terms. But this increased 
'toughness 1 took the form of a demand for participation instead of 
pressing for higher taxes. As a matter of fact the effective rate of 
taxation had fallen for reasons totally unrelated to the oil industry, 
a development it took the Norwegians' oil policy some time to 'catch 
up' with.
The three different participation scenarios agreed on in 1969 
had some influence on the expected IRR of a project, but, as we shall 
see, they meant much more for the overall division of rent. Analysing 
each participation scheme in turn we note that:
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(i) Scenario 4
The net profit agreement made the average IRR for the companies 
decrease by an average of 0.9%. (Deduct the final post-tax IRR in 
Table 5 . 2 from what the IRR would have been without any participation, 
i.e. the post-tax IRR figure in Table 5.1). While this was not the 
most favourable participation scenario from the companies' financial 
point of view, it was nevertheless the scenario which ESSO was happiest 
to accept in 1969. This may indicate that it was not the financial 
aspect of the participation schemes which was the main worry for ESSO 
at the time, but rather that of 'control 1 . Scenario 4 is the closest 
one can get to a complete 'sleeping' state participation, and any company 
which at that time put an important value on the long-run maintenance 
of total operational independence would have tended to favour such a 
participation scheme even if this meant a slightly higher financial 
loss compared with other scenarios.
One significant feature of this kind of participation agreement 
is its complete absence of risk for the state. In effect the partici- 
pation is very much like an additional taxation. But possibly as a 
consequence of this the 'effective 1 rate of participation for the state
was small. This can be seen from an analysis of the 'hidden' rate of 
participation (Table 5.6), defined as the difference between the state's 
share of the PV from participation and the percentage participation 
rate. (A 40% rate of participation which yields 44% of the PV to the 
state will have a x 100% = 10% 'hidden' participation). In this
case the state had a participation rate of 17.5%, but Statoil only took 
around 11% of the pre-tax present value of the field, giving a negative 
'hidden participation'.
Because Statoil does not pay out any money (and hence only has 
positive cashflow), it is meaningless to compute Statoil 's IRR in this 
scenario. But the value of this kind of participation can nevertheless be 
measured. The additional potential net present value accruing to Statoil as a 
result of such a participation agreement would have differed between 
$6.4 mill, for a 200m. field and $27.7 mill, for a 700m. discovery 
(Table 5.3).
(ii) Scenario 3
For both Scenarios 2 and 3 we would on a priori ground expect 
little difference between the 'participation' and 'no participation'
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IRRs of the company, given our special assumptions that the rate of 
discount equalled the rate at which the state's debts to the company 
should be repaid. The small difference would then originate from the 
different debt structures and from the fact that exploration costs 
are not discounted, so that the state's share is computed out of the 
simple sum of total exploration costs, leaving the companies at a small 
financial disadvantage. Scenario 3, with its small 5% participation 
rate, was for the above reason seen as almost costless to the company. 
On average the IRR would only decrease by 0.3% as a result of the 
implementation of this scenario.
But in the event of a significant increase in this participation 
rate, the difficulties for the companies of raising finance could have 
become a problem. Furthermore, it should be borne in mind that this 
kind of participation was also without any risk for the state, which did 
not have to commit a single penny to the project. This may explain why 
the participation rate agreed for this type of participation was the 
lowest (5%) of all the different participation agreements entered into 
at the time. But because of the minor effect this participation scenario 
would have had on the NPV of a firm (representing a difference of no
more than $3 mill, for a smaller and $10 mill, for a larger field 
compared with a 'no participation' case), it is almost impossible to 
argue that it could ever inhibit the development of a field.
This kind of agreement would give the state control over between 
66.4% and 80.6% of the present value of a field (Table 5.4), which is 
on average only 3 percentage points higher than what the situation 
would have been without participation. It can therefore be concluded 
that this participation scheme is not particularly significant as a 
revenue collector for the state. But the Norwegian state was not 
necessarily only interested in revenue at the time. This participation 
agreement (in contrast to scenario 4) gave the state access to valuable 
information by its participation in the operating committees. This 
was a positive result from the state's point of view, on the reasonable 
assumption that access to information is not a free good.
(Hi) Scenario 2
In this scenario the 1.2% average difference between the pre- and 
post-participation IRR, while still modest, was the most important of 
the three scenarios. But as the importance of exploration costs to total 
costs decrease as field size increases, the difference between the pre-
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and post-participation IRRs tends, as would be expected, to decrease 
(as does the degree of 'hidden participation 1 ). At worst the private 
firm will have its IRR decreased by 1.7% as a result of the participation, 
And the more successful the exploration efforts (and the smaller the 
total exploration costs), the less the decrease of IRR to the company. 
Concentrating on the percentage of present value accruing to the 
state by participation, this percentage will for both scenarios 2 and 
3 depend upon the interest rate at which the state repays its debts to 
the company. As long as this rate is less than the discount rate, the 
'effective 1 participation rate will be greater than the 'agreed 1 rate. 
This will also be the case because the state does not repay its full 
share of total exploration costs necessary to find a commercial field. 
But it should be made clear that, while these variables are important 
from a theoretical point of view, they are less important in practice. 
A change in the rate at which Statoil's debts are repaid to the companies 
from 10% to 5% will increase the PV going to Statoil from the 700m. field 
(scenario 2) by a mere $0.2 mill. ($59.6 mill, to $59.8 mill.). For the 
same field in scenario 3, however, the influence is somewhat larger;
an increase in NPV from $9.9 mill, to $11.6 mill, (or around 16%). 
This is easily explainable due to the larger sums involved in scenario 
3. Similarly, if the percentage of total finds attributable to one 
block changes to 50%, Statoil's NPV in the same blocks as above 
decreases as expected by $1.3 mill, (from $59.6 mill, to $58.3 mill.) 
and $0.2 mill, (from $9.9 mill, to $9.7 mill.) respectively.
In this scenario Statoil captures a maximum of 47% of the PV for the 
smaller fields decreasing to 42% for the 700m. barrel field. When total state 
take is considered, including income from Statoil, the state 
would have captured up to 93% of the smallest commercially viable 
field. This share would have increased to 79.8% for the 700m. field 
(Table 5.4), 17.8% of which is due to the state's equity-share. The 
trend which was later to become so pronounced in the form of Statoil's 
increased role as a capitalist collector of rent therefore was starting 
to assert itself. The NPV (i.e. discounted profit from equity) 
accruing to Statoil reached between $13.3 mill, and $59.6 mill, (or 
between $93.7 mill, and $497.7 mill, in undiscounted terms). Since 
Statoil was now also investing money (the development costs), it 
became meaningful to state that the post-tax IRR for Statoil was between 
15% and 16% depending upon the size of the find. Indeed an investment 
worth making for the state 1
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RESULTS 1969
TABLE 5.1 PROJECT APPRAISAL FOR EACH FIELD
Field:
Pre-tax IRR (%)
Present Value ($m)
Post-tax IRR (%)
Net Present Value ($m)
* No state participation assumed. Because 
Statoil, participation may marginally affect
TABLE 5.2 PROJECT APPRAISAL AS SEEN BY THE
AS A WHOLE*
100M 
13.8
17.8
6.3
15.6
200M 
21.9
96.8
13.2
21.3
3COM 
21.8
147.9
14.2
42.2
400M 
21.3
197.9
14.5
62.3
700M 
22
386.3
15.7
138.9
of the different debt-structure of 
the PV of a field.
COMPANY++
Participation
scheme
No. 2
No. 3
No. 4
Criteria Field:
'Pre-tax IRR (%)
Post-tax IRR (%)
Net Present Value ($m)
'Pre-tax IRR (%)
Post-tax IRR (%)
Net Present Value ($m)
Pre-tax IRR (%)
Post-tax IRR (%)
Net Present Value ($m)
100M 
11.3
4.7
15.4
13.5
6
16.4
13.3
5.5
18.2
200M 
19.5
11.5
7.1
21.5
12.8
18.7
21.2
12.2
14.5
3COM 
20
13
19.6
21.4
13.9
38.3
21
13.3
31.1
400M 
20
13.6
31.7
21
14.2
57.1
21
13.6
47.2
700M 
21.2
15.1
78.9
21.7
15.4
129.9
21.2
14.7
110.5
Participation assumed to be in force.
TABLE 5.3 STATOIL'S POSITION***
Participation
scheme
t
No. 2
.
No. 3
No. 4
Criteria Field:
Pre-tax IRR (%)
Post-tax IRR (%)
Net Present Value ($m)
Net Present Value ($m)
Net Present Value ($m)
100M 
*
*
*
*
*
200M 
25.7
15.5
13.3
2.6
6.4
300M 
24
15.7
21.3
3.9
10.4
400M 
22.8
15.5
29.1
5.1
14.2
700M 
22.6
16.1
59.6
9.9
27.7
*** Internal rates of return cannot be assessed for the scenarios numbered 
3 and 4, because the flow to Statoil will always be positive. (Strictly, 
post-tax IRRs can be computed since Statoil will pay taxes in the year after the 
field has been closed down, but here little meaning can be attached to them.) 
Consequently the IRRs will be infinite, and as such their use in project" 
appraisal is partly lost.
159
TABLE 5.4 TOTAL STATE TAKE FROM BOTH EQUITY AND TAXES (discounted)
(in % of PV of field)
	Field: 100M 200M 300M 400M 700M
as if no participation 97 78 71,5 68.6 63.8
Scenario No.2  * g2 j 86.7 84 79.8
Scenario No.3 * 80.6 74.1 71.1 66.4
Scenario No.4 * 85.7 78.9 76.1 71.4
TABLE 5.5 THE IMPORTANCE OF PARTICIPATION:
Statoil's NPV (income from equity) as a percentage of total 
discounted state income from a field,
Field: 100M 200M 3COM 400M 700M
Scenario No.2 * 14.8 16.7 17.5 19.4
Scenario No.3 * 3.3 3.5 3.6 3.8
Scenario No.4 * 7.8 8.9 9.4 10
TABLE 5.6 THE PROPORTION OF THE PRESENT VALUE ACCRUING TO STATOIL (%)
Statoil's pre-tax present value as a percentage of the total pre-tax present 
value of a project, 'Disguised r refers to the difference Between this percentage 
figure and the official participation rate as a percentage of the latter,
Field: 100M 200M 300M 400M 700M
Scenario No.2
Statoil's proportion of PV * 46.8 44.5 53.3 41.7
(representing disguised amount of) * (17) (11) (8) (4)
Scenario No.3
Statoil's proportion * 5.8 5.5 5.4 5.2
(disguised) ' * (16) (10) (8) (4)
Scenario No.4
Statoil's proportion * 10.7 11.3 11.5 11.6
(disguised) * (-39) (-35) (-34) (-34)
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TABLE 5.7 TRADITIONAL MEASURE OF STATE PERFORMANCE (discounted)
Scenario
Scenario
Scenario
Field: 100M
No . 2 *
No. 3 *
No. 4 *
TABLE 5.8 STATE'S SHARE OF RENT FROM ALL SOURCES
Scenario
Scenario
Scenario
TABLE 5.
Scenario
Scenario
Scenario
Field: 100M
No. 2 *
No. 3 *
No. 4 *
9 TRADITIONAL 'TAKE 1 (undiscounted) +++
Field: 100M
No. 2 *
No. 3 *
No. 4 *
200M
86.
79.
83.
3
5
2
300M
76
72
76
.1
.6
.3
400M
71
69
73
.8
.5
.0
700M
65
64
67
.3
.5
.7
(undiscounted)
200M
72.
54.
57.
6
6
8
200M
52.
52.
53.
7
4
6
300M
71
53
57
.6
.6
.0
300M
51
51
52
.6
.4
.6
400M
71
53
56
.0
.0
.4
400M
50
50
51
.9
.8
.8
700M
70
52
55
.4
.4
.8
700M
50
50
51
.3
.2
.2
State discounted income from taxes from the private company as a percentage 
of the PV of the company's share of the field.
Statoil's net cash-flow + undiscounted taxes from company share as a 
percentage of the net cash-flow of field as a whole (with debt).
Taxes from the company's share as a percentage of the net cash-flow of the 
compani es' share.
* Uncommercial as IRR < discount rate
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Table 5.4 shows that the scenario with the highest participation 
rate'not surprisingly gives the state the highest control over the PV 
from a field, which in the case of scenario 2 reaches 92.7% for the 
200m. field. This is almost 15 percentage points higher than what it 
would have been if no participation had been in force. This decreases 
to no more than a 2.6 percentage point difference for scenario 3 (200m. 
field).
We could be tempted to compare the three scenarios at the same 
participation rate, but should exercise some caution in uncritically 
using such a procedure to measure the 'effectiveness 1 of the different 
scenarios. The three scenarios have different participation rates 
exactly because their effects differ from one another.
We have so far disregarded Shell's 1969 agreement which did not 
involve any kind of state participation. Their IRR would have fluctu- 
ated between 6.3% and a very acceptable 15.7% (Table 5.1). By focussing 
on this, we can at the same time say something about how sensitive the 
results are to changes in our exogenous variables. Following the pro- 
cedure from 1965, we see from the results outlined in Appendix F, that 
a drop in development costs by 30% would increase the expected post- 
tax IRR for a 700m. field (scenario 3) to 19.9% compared with the 'no 
participation' outcome of 15.7%. More modestly, a drop in operating 
costs to 39{/bbl in the same circumstances would increase the expected 
IRR to 15.9%.
Again it seems that only a slightly more optimistic view of the 
future of the North Sea would have made a significant difference to 
the companies' investment decisions. And if we should take the Shell 
price study referred to above more seriously we see that a 2% increase 
in the real expected price of oil would have meant an increase in the 
IRR to 19.1% for a 700m. field. Compared with the steadily dropping 
profitability which the industry experienced through the late 1960s 
both the original and these returns would have been very acceptable 
indeed.
5.3 THE STATE'S INVOLVEMENT IN OIL PRODUCTION
We have in Chapter 4 examined why no exclusive state solution 
was chosen in 1965. We will now analyse in more detail why the 
Norwegian state in the period 1965-1969 continued its passive policy 
with respect to productive state involvement in the oil industry. 
While participation agreements had been negotiated in the second
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round of concessions, still no state oil corporation existed, so the 
different participation scenarios remained virtual 'empty shells'. The 
government's attitude was on this point clearly influenced by the 
attitude of the only body with any knowledge of Norwegian oil matters, 
Oljeradet (The Oil Council), which in 1968 wrote the following to the 
government: "At the moment the Oil Council will not recommend state 
involvement in exploration."
The main argument put forward by the state against any direct 
state involvement in the oil industry was the alleged risk involved. 
This was a clear continuation of the argument used in 1965. In a letter 
to the Department of Industry on 27 February 1968 the Oil Council 
argued that:
"the part of the Continental Shelf under Norwegian
jurisdiction is so extensive and so scantily explored
that such an undertaking (direct state involvement - PN)
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from the state would be extremely (sterkt) hazardous."
The risk would also increase, it was argued, because the Norwegian 
state would not be able to spread the risks of exploration world-wide 
over a number of fields in the same way as the majors would be able 
to do.
A further reason had to do with the government's unwillingness to 
spend any public money on 'risky' North Sea ventures. And once this 
is made an absolute starting point, then it follows almost automatically 
that state involvement in drilling (which includes a risk element) gets 
excluded. It is interesting to note that in all later state involve- 
ment on the Norwegian Continental Shelf the state has attempted to up- 
hold the principle of letting the companies, and not the state, bear the explora 
tion risk. (It was only with the advent of Statoil drilling on its own 
account in 1976 that this principle was abandoned.) While risk of 
course was present in the North Sea, we have argued that during this
period it was exaggerated and anyway decreasing. This tended to weaken
42 
(but not totally remove) the state's rationale for its policy.
One largely unknown episode during the negotiations in connection 
with the second round of concessions clearly brings out the state's 
reluctance to take risks. Rinde Oil Corporation, an independent 
Californian oil company, was one of the ten applicants for blocks in 
the second round of concessions. Three of these were later withdrawn 
and one rejected as disagreements arose over the question of work pro- 
grammes and other conditions of exploration. The rejected application
44 
was that of Rinde Oil Corporation, as Wenger makes clear. But,
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according to Wenger, Rinde Corporation also offered the Norwegian state 
50% participation in its concession. The reason this proposition was 
rejected must have been very important for the Norwegian state, because 
the Norwegians were at the time generally trying to press for state 
participation. The most likely reason then for a refusal was the 
Norwegian state f s wish to stick with major companies in the exploration 
of the North Sea. This was also consistent with the Norwegian un- 
willingness to implement an auction system of block allocation in the 
North Sea. For the state it was a question of picking the company 
which, because of its expertise in offshore drilling, would expose the 
state to a minimum amount of risk with respect to accidents and ensure 
a thorough exploration. A small company like Rinde presumably offered 
better conditions in order to compensate for this weakness, but for the 
Norwegian state the preference for risk-avoidance was paramount. Hence
Rinde's application was rejected, despite the offer of a higher
46 participation rate.
The second reason why the Norwegian state initially declined to 
participate directly in drilling was due to the capital needed for such
an undertaking. St.meld, no.11 stated: "The necessary investments sur-
47 pass the possibility of the Norwegians", while the Oil Council argued that
what the state "would have to invest by necessity would have to be so 
enormous that they would burst the (rammer) limits for a Norwegian state 
budget".
But as it turned out the total yearly exploration expenditure 
of Kr. 145 mill. on the Norwegian Shelf constituted no more than 0.6% 
of the total 1968 state budget. It is only if we take the Oil Council's 
argument to include production expenditure (which it does not explicitly 
do) that the argument becomes marginally more convincing. But the 
Norwegian state f s access to overseas credit to finance such projects was 
much better in 1969 than it had been in 1965. Because the Eurodollar 
market had recently been created and Europe was awash with US dollars 
looking for placement, it seems that the Oil Council's argument presented 
above was unconvincing, if not downright inaccurate.
The third reason given by the Norwegian state for not involving 
itself directly in the production process was related to wider questions 
of foreign policy and the ability of the major companies to respond to 
Norwegian initiatives in a way that might harm Norwegian interests. 
According to the Oil Council, direct state involvement was to be avoided 
because of "problems of sale and distribution, problems of foreign 
policy like regard to our tanker fleet etc." Again, while we recog-
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nize that this was perceived by the policy-makers to be a major problem, 
we must also analyse the extent to which this was objectively the case. 
Judging by former experiences of countries which had attempted to defy 
the majors, there was until 1968 (when the observation was made) a 
disturbingly high failure rate. In 1968 60% of the Norwegian tanker 
fleet was on time-charter to the majors. 51 While it was unlikely that 
the companies would have broken existing charters with Norwegian ship- 
owners, the possibility that they would not take on new ones, either 
on long-run contracts, or in the spot-market, could not be discounted 
by any Norwegian policy-maker. And given the extent to which the 
Norwegian economy as a whole depended upon the invisible earnings from 
shipping to cover its balance of trade deficit, this potential pressure 
constituted a formidable threat to the stability of the Norwegian economy. 52 
This question also has to be seen within the context of Norway's 
adherence to the Western Alliance. In 1968 it was primarily third-world 
countries, often with a socialist ideology, which tried to make 
definitive breaks with the oil companies, something a genuine state 
participation at that time would have represented. Such behaviour was 
after all not expected, nor (it is quite possible to surmise) would it 
have been tolerated within the Western alliance.
We have now analysed three reasons why the Norwegian state adopted 
a cautious attitude towards state involvement in respect to the second 
round of concessions. Two of these we have found to be debatable on 
'objective 1 grounds, while the third constituted a more genuine reason 
for the state to have wanted to avoid a confrontation with the companies 
and their home governments.
We have not discussed the potential threat by the companies to pull 
out of the area altogether. The overview at the beginning of this 
chapter should make it clear why we think such a threat was never 
credible.
But while we have outlined the basic caution of the state, there 
is still little doubt that, within a paradigm of non-intervention of 
the state in production, the Norwegians made a reasonably good deal. 
For instance the exposition of the role of the majors is not complete 
without an analysis of what kind of blocks Shell received in 1969. 
Because of Shell's refusal to accept state participation or even a net
profit clause, the company did not receive blocks which were high on 
the list of 
two blocks.
53 their priorities. In fact no oil was ever found on these
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But on the other hand there are ample suggestions that the majors 
were well pleased with the outcome of the second round of concessions. 
One director of Shell said that "All we had to do in exchange for two 
blocks was to train people from the Norwegian Ministry of Finance/ 
Industry. This was a very good deal indeed." And neither Shell nor 
Esso yielded to the principle of participation. This was important 
(but of course not decisive) for their own bargaining in the Middle East.
It is thus possible to conclude that, while the Norwegian terms 
had tightened and reacted to a changed external situation, no qualita- 
tive change had taken place in the relationship between the companies 
and the Norwegian state. The basis for such a change,which was to 
centre around the creation of a state oil company, had however been 
laid.
5.4 THE STATE'S RELATIONSHIP TO PRIVATE NORWEGIAN INDUSTRY AND SPINOFFS
We will now focus on the Norwegian state's relationship to Norwegian 
industry as this was expressed in the second round of concessions. During 
the 1965-69 period it is reasonable to believe that the Norwegian state 
considered Norwegian interests to be identical with the interests of the 
Norwegian private sector. Therefore when the Department of Industry was 
looking for ways in which it could contribute to "a greater Norwegian (PN 
emphasis) role in the exploitation of the possibilities on the Continental 
Shelf", this policy was congruent with a methodological framework which 
sees the state as being in a subservient and 'gate-keeper 1 role in relation 
to Norwegian industry (to borrow Solo's phrase from Appendix D, p. 324). 
In this sense the state's role was a true reflection of its reluctance to 
actively engage itself as a productive unit in the oil industry. It is 
only with the formation of Statoil in 1972 that the state intervened 
as a productive unit in its own right.
The Norwegian state's 'gate-keeper' attitude is most clearly seen in 
the conditions imposed on production consortia where there was Norwegian 
capital involved. The Petronord group obtained four blocks in 1969 where 
the Norwegian state had a right to participate along a sliding scale from 
5 to 12 per cent, all depending upon whether Hydro (at that time owned 
49% by the state, but very much run like a private company like BP) 
maintained its initial 13.6% share, or exercised its right to increase 
this share to 24.1% or 34.6%. Thus the actions of the state were seen as 
complementary to the actions of the Norwegian private firms, with the 
latter being the 'first' or the 'moving' element. The state acted largely 
in response to the desires of the Norwegian firms, not on its own initiative
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The Amoco-Noco group, which was granted two licenses in 1969, 
and where the Norwegian Oil Consortium participated with a 25% share, 
was the only group (with the exception of Shell) which in 1969 did not 
have to enter into any state participation agreements. This was again 
as a response to the considerable Norwegian private participation share 
in the consortium. The state's action again becomes most immediately 
comprehensible mainly as a supporter of Norwegian industry.
Finally, the state could have given the relinquished areas on the 
Continental Shelf (the companies had to return 25% of the acreage after 
six years) in any new round of concessions to Norwegian private interests.
Alternatively it could have issued some of the Norwegian 'key 1 blocks
58 to the private sector, which had been kept back by the state.
While these ideas were seriously discussed, their suggested 
implementations were overtaken by events, and in particular the creation 
of Statoil.
The state's attitude to private industry was also clearly shown in 
its relations to the spinoff industries. As will be made clear in 
the next chapter (Section 6.5), there were no fundamental changes 
in the terms guiding the relationship between the companies operating 
in the North Sea and Norwegian spinoff industries in the period 1965-70. 
Following Phillips' COD find, a special commission was formed to look 
into the consequences of shipping the gas from the field to Norway. 
The report was published on 19 September 1969 and, in line with the 
general guidelines envisaged for state/private relations, exclusively 
preoccupied itself with the possible consequence of gas production on the private 
sector's use of energy and the possible repercussions for a petrochemical 
industry in Norway. But there were no discussions as to whether this 
was to be a state owned industry or not. In light of what was later 
to happen in this field, with a strong state involvement downstream, 
this omission is important as an indication of how the Norwegian state 
was viewing the state/private relationship at the time.
On the other hand, as in 1965, there was no way in which the 
Norwegian state could force Norwegian industry to participate either 
in actual production or in the spinoff industries. Norsk Industri, the 
journal of Norsk Industriforbund (the Norwegian equivalent of the UK's 
CBI) stated that until the first find had been made on the Norwegian
Continental Shelf (COD), not much advance planning work had been done
59 concerning how to utilize the hydrocarbon resources in the North Sea.
But once the first finds were made, this mouthpiece of Norwegian 
industry firmly recommended an extensive programme of "analysis,
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evaluation and coordination 1 ; even if the state as late as St.meld. 
no.11 (1968-69) didn't find it could fully recommend the entry of 
Norwegian industry into what was still an area where no commercial 
finds had been made.
5.5 TOWARDS A CHANGE IN STATE ROLES
We have outlined how the Norwegian state during this period 
continued to behave like a 'regulatory 1 state, by fundamentally playing 
a passive and non-interventionist role in the oil industry. But within 
this overall framework, which also has been partly recognized by Turner 
(1975), Naustdalslid (1975a) and Hellem (1974), other developments took 
place which were in no way recognized by the three authors, and which 
in themselves threatened to transcend the limits of the then existing 
policies outlined above. These developments were to lay the foundation 
for a clear shift in Norwegian policy in the period up to 1972. 
Naustdalslid argued that the Norwegian state in an administrative sense 
was unprepared for a major find in the North Sea, while we have continuously 
stressed the role of the Oil Council, which plays no important part 
in his work and which was instrumental in formulating Norwegian policies 
in this period. Indeed the most important change in the oil policies 
from a long-run point of view, the introduction of state participation, 
was a direct result of an initiative from the Oil Council. In a similar 
way Hellem sees the Norwegian state's action until 1970 as being basic- 
ally "reactive", while we have attempted to show that, while its overall 
policies may have fitted this description, within the framework import- 
ant initiatives were taken. These became of special importance compared 
with the situation in the UK where there was no change with respect to 
toughening the terms of exploration, despite the remarkable success 
rate in UK waters. Likewise Turner, in his otherwise comprehensive 
review, fails to stress the peculiarities of the Norwegian or the 
international situation, and therefore provides no convincing explana-
f»9
tion for the shift from a 'regulatory 1 to an 'active 1 state. Also 
by building his argument on the assumption that the shift occurred 
simultaneously with a shift from the view that the North Sea was a gas 
area to the view that it was primarily an oil province, the argument 
fails to recognize that the Norwegians never expected to find gas in 
the first place, and always considered oil to be the main object of 
the search on its Continental Shelf.
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CHAPTER 6
1970-72: FROM EKOFISK TO THE ROYAL DECREE
We will in this chapter analyse how the division of rent, volume 
control and spinoffs in the Norwegian sector of the North Sea developed 
during the 1970-72 period and look in more detail at the formation of 
Statoil. The change from a 'passive 1 to an 'active 1 role for the 
Norwegian state associated with the formation of Statoil was a key 
element in the Norwegian state's oil policies during the 1965-74 period 
and greatly influenced its relationship to the international oil industry.
6.1 AN OVERVIEW
The international oil industry was immediately aware of the signi- 
ficance of the Ekofisk find long before it was declared commercial in 
the summer of 1970. The International Editor of OGJ stated that 
"the huge North Sea find has the entire oil world vibrating" 
and described the find by three words: "Proximity, security, immensity". 
Then there was a sudden dramatic increase in the success ratio of 
exploration. In the first 10 months of 1970 no less than eight fields 
were discovered on both the UK and the Norwegian Shelf in the Tertiary 
Basin where Ekofisk was found. In January 1971 the Norwegian sector
was described by the PPS as "the one outstanding potential oil-producing
2 
area of non-communist Europe", and later in 1971 the explorers found
in block 25/1 further north one of the larger offshore gas fields in 
the world, Frigg 0 When the first official announcements about a
possible third round of licensing were made in the summer of 1972,
3 between 60 and 80 companies showed an interest in obtaining licences.
1972 also saw the interest of the companies moving further towards the 
north. The most dramatic expression of this interest was revealed in 
the UK third round of licensing, some of which took place according to 
the auction principle. The highest bid of $50.5 mill, was submitted
jointly by Shell and Esso for block 211/21, 170 km north-west of the
4 then northernmost field, Frigg.
This undoubted interest in Norwegian acreage showed that any 
complaint made by the companies or their representatives that the terms 
in the Norwegian sector were 'too strict', or that the interest of the 
oil industry in the Norwegian sector was diminishing, must be met with 
more than the usual scepticism. Alarmist statements were not confined 
to the private sector. Especially in the light of the cash-flow results
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below, it is permissible to seriously question the judgement of an 
anomymous Norwegian civil servant who was quoted as saying: "We know 
what it costs to drill out there, and if we give the companies too 
much trouble, they'll walk away as they did in Libya." The companies 
had never felt closer to a real bonanza in the North Sea. And what is 
more, they expected this bonanza to take place in political surroundings 
that would yield no great surprises.
This fact may more than anything else explain the strong reactions 
by the companies when they were finally confronted by relatively harsh 
demands from the North Sea producer-states. They simply had a different 
set of expectations with regard to the behaviour of European oil prod- 
ucers than with the OPEC countries. The industry's level of general 
expectations in 1971 were clearly, and almost lyrically, spelt out by 
one of the industry's journals:
"Security - yes. Friendly, stable, developed countries surround 
the North Sea. In years to come all the host countries may be 
admitted to the EEC, which would facilitate the flow of oil 
across national boundaries in every direction."
This journal had still not changed its opinion approximately eighteen 
months later when it wrote:
"Both government and company spokesmen have a high regard for 
the other side.... The company side (says) that the government
o
has been fair, patient, and understanding."
Another question that may be posed in the aftermath of the string 
of discoveries in the early 1970s relates to the more general problem 
of information and knowledge. There are reasons to believe that Ode11 
was at least partly right when he suggested that the companies did not 
bother to look very closely at the acreage of the North Sea until the 
very late 1960s due to the international strategies they were pursuing, 
and that therefore these discoveries were not totally accidental
The finds would therefore partly be a reflection of the change in. '^ 
company strategy both in the traditional producer-countries, where the 
companies were coming under increased pressure, as well as being ^n 
response to the situation in the southern part of the UK sector where 
they obtained unfavourable terms for the sale of gas. In particular 
there were a large number of undrilled structures which were extremely 
promising, and which had been known about for a long time. Phillips 
had struck oil in 1969 on the north-eastern flank of a huge 400-mile 
long and 200-mile wide Tertiary basin that lies approximately in the
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middle of the North Sea and whose existence was known from the mid-
9 1960s onwards. It was also known that around 90 per cent of all oil
produced in the world by 1970 originated in the kind of rock that 
Ekofisk was found in. And once Ekofisk was found it became suddenly clear that 
much more oil was likely to be found underneath the North Sea in the same geo- 
logical formations. THE OGJ quoted one company representative as saying: 
"There are many, many, structures, some of them of 
exciting magnitude, in the Tertiary basin area" 
and continued:
"The tertiary basins, such as the US Gulf Coast Area, are 
noted for the variety, abundance and complexity of structures 
contained within them.... And the heart of this particular 
basin lies almost totally undrilled."
Furthermore, representatives of the companies became very careless 
about their public statements, something that often happens in the 
euphoria after a significant find. After having complained for five 
years about the impossible conditions and the hard and momentous risks 
the companies were taking in the Norwegian sector (at that time they 
were all drilling in the souther part), it was indeed surprising to 
read in the wake of the Ekofisk find:
"Offshore technology being what it is today, no 
insurmountable problems are seen for Ekofisk. Water 
depth, at an average of 220 feet, is no problem for 
platform builders.... Winds of formidable strength and 
50 ft. seas occur in this part of the world, but they've 
not hindered year-round operations so far.... From a 
difficult-development standpoint this is no Prudhoe Bay, 
despite its built in problems. By comparison, the
logistical, political, and weather problems in the North
12 Sea are minor."
After the Ekofisk find, it soon became clear that Norwegian policy- 
makers wanted important changes to be made in Norway's oil policies. 
Parliamentary Report No.95 presented by the Centre-Right government headed 
by Per Borten made the first suggestions; in September 1970 a committee 
(Knudsen-utvalget) was formed to look into the organisational form for 
the future oil industry in Norway. The main suggestion of the 
Parliamentary Report was that the Norwegian state itself (but with 
the possible aid of Norwegian and foreign contractors) should undertake 
seismic surveys north of 62°, and then sell the final results to the oil
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industry. It was argued that to give exploration rights to some 
companies would give the same companies a de facto right to obtain
subsequent production licences, and thus prejudice the possibility of
13 future Norwegian involvement. So the state decided to undertake the
14
surveys, partly as a result of pressure from Norwegian industry; see- 
ing that private Norwegian involvement off northern Norway would be 
expected to increase.
It is significant that little was said in the report about the 
form that state involvement should take either north or south of the 62°. 
The Oil Council wrote in a letter to the Ministry of Industry on 28 
April 1970 that the existing regulations of April 1965 were sufficiently 
flexible to serve as a basis for granting new concessions south of 62°. 
In particular nothing was said about the need for a state oil corporation, 
North of 62° the situation was different and the Department stated that 
"it would not totally disregard the possibility of a commercial state 
participation". The reason for this stand is interesting. Repres- 
entatives of Norwegian private interests who wanted to start to look 
for oil north of 62° realized that they could not undertake such a task 
alone, but would have to cooperate with the international companies. 
And it was in order to strengthen their own bargaining situation that 
they wanted a state participation of 20% in a consortium dominated by 
private Norwegian interests.
In 1971 a Labour government came into office and presented 
Parliamentary Report no.76 (1970-71). This report did not so much 
contradict the previous Parliamentary Report but took its recommendations 
further and most importantly introduced the key concept of a state oil 
corporation. The new Prime Minister, Trygve Brattelie, had already as 
the head of the opposition in 1970 called for the formation of a state 
oil corporation. Now the Labour Party had a chance to implement these 
ideas. What is extraordinary about this report, however, is how it 
became the basis for an unanimous oil policy of the Norwegian state. 
This unanimity (while being masked by a certain number of ambiguities 
- see below) was to remain intact until the spring of 1974. One 
consequence of this was that it became extremely difficult for the
international oil companies to play one domestic Norwegian group against
18 
another and thus weaken the state's negotiating position. The
concrete expression of this unanimity was what was to become known
as the 'ten oil commandments' agreed by Stortinget in the summer of
19 1971. While these ten basic foundations for Norwegian policy could
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be said to be ambiguous on some points, they were clear enough in 
relation to the formation of a state oil corporation. 'Commandment 
no.8' recommended "the creation of a state oil corporation which can 
protect the business interests of the state and have a satisfactory 
(forma1 1stjenelig) cooperation with domestic and international oil 
interests". The need for state involvement in the industry as a whole 
was expressed in 'Commandment no.7', which recommended state involvement 
"on all apprppriate levels". This was to secure what 
'Commandment nod 1 specified as "national control (styring) and control 
... for all activity on the Norwegian Continental Shelf".
The political justification for a change in the conditions of 
exploration and in particular the role of the state, had thus been 
formulated and accepted. These changes now had to be incorporated into 
the organisational structure of the state's oil sector. This came in 
the form of St.prp. no.113, delivered on 17 March 1972.
Parallel to these political developments, the distribution of new 
blocks proceeded very slowly. While it was becoming obvious that the 
Norwegian state was going to put into practice its new and tougher oil 
policies, this was only initially in relation to a couple of 'farm-in' 
agreements. These were only allowed after the state obtained a higher 
share of state participation as well as renegotiated the royalty rate. 
In one of the agreements the Norwegian state, via a state company, 
Kongsberg Vipenfabrikk, obtained access to acreage on the Dutch Shelf.
Finally, in July 1972, the Minister of Industry, Finn Lied, 
declared that 202 blocks were up for lease, 75 of which were to be
kept by the state. By this time the Norwegian state also controlled
20 the originally relinquished area which had been returned in 1971.
In Norway the companies did not have to return the blocks in any
specific pattern. In the words of one Norwegian civil servant, "Our
21 
map now looks like a jigsaw puzzle  We didn't do it right." But
the expected round of new concessions was postponed. While the 
applications were asked for by the autumn of 1972, only 8 of these 
blocks had been allocated by November 1974, more than two years after- 
wards. The international oil world was for the first time becoming 
acquainted with the Norwegian 'go slow' policy. Labour's Prime Minister 
Bratteli, in a press conference in July 1972, said that since oil was a
non-renewable resource, "we will see to it that this resource is not
22 
exhausted in a hurry, but exploited in a reasonable way." The specific
reasons underlying this statement were not made clear at the time, but 
the companies had been warned.
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with the Conservatives during the referendum campaign. To regain its 
ideological profile and try to recuperate some of the members who left 
during the campaign, from 1972 the Labour Party had a continuous need 
to show a more radical posture. In the next chapter we shall see how 
this concretely expressed itself in Norwegian oil policies.
The December 1972 regulations were the legal expression of the 
trend towards a greater and more important state role in the oil industry. 
PPS even went to the extent of stating that "taking a leaf out of the
OPEC book, the new Norwegian government decided to stiffen the terms for
2ft 
offshore exploration". This stiffening had different elements; there
were important changes in the traditional variables. Area costs were 
increased in order to make it more expensive for companies to hold on 
to their acreage; a sliding royalty rate between 8% and 16% was agreed 
to, while the royalty for gas was increased to 12.5%; the basis for the 
pricing of crude for the purpose of royalties was changed; 50% of the 
area had to be returned after 6 years instead of 25%, and the life of 
a production licence was shortened to 36 years. In addition, the 
principle of state participation was put into legal form. (Its absence 
had not, however, made it impossible for the Norwegian state to negoti- 
ate state participation in 1969). The exact percentage of participation 
was to be determined in each specific case. This last stipulation was 
an indirect confirmation that the Norwegian state had gained an increased
knowledge of the oil industry. While in the past the Oil Council in
particular had used foreign consultancy firms to evaluate existing
27 
contracts, this job now fell to sections of the Department of Industry.
The first economist started work in the Spring of 1971 to make such an
28 
evaluation. The qualitative change took place when the Norwegian civil
servants attempted to press for agreements and conditions which left the 
companies with a given internal rate of return, which meant they had to 
analyse each potential field separately. This introduced a mode of operation 
within the Norwegian Ministry which later was to become both generalized 
and the 'normal 1 way of thinking. It contrasted very sharply with the 
initial bland statements about percentage "government take" as a criterion 
for the development of the state's role. The inputs of the initial 
models were provided by the Ekofisk capital costs which by the beginning 
of the 1970s were given to the Norwegian Ministry by Phillips. The 
official thinking behind this move was that the companies were willing 
to forego a larger percentage share of the total present value of the
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field (i.e. have a lower rate of participation) if the field turned out 
to be exceptional, either in terms of total reserves or in terms of low 
development costs. This was not only because a greater state participa- 
tion rate would decrease the IRR (the effect of which in any case was 
relatively modest), but also because an increased participation rate 
would decrease the companies 1 access to long-term supplies of crude. 
The value of the latter is difficult to assess in monetary terms, but 
even in 1972 carried a positive monetary value to the companies.
6.2 DIVISION OF RENT
We will now examine the significance of the tightened terms of 
December 1972 for the division of rent and use the case of the Brent 
blocks as our hypothetical field. Despite the unofficial 'go-slow 1 
policy, it was thought these two blocks had to be exploited because 
of the finds that had been made just across the median line in the UK 
Brent field. More than 20 companies approached the Norwegian govern- 
ment late in 1972, and the Norwegian government in the end chose an 
agreement which gave Statoil a 50% carried interest in cooperation with 
a consortium of private companies whose two most important members were 
Mobil (as operator) and Shell. This was the highest degree of government 
participation which had been negotiated in the North Sea until then, but 
interestingly enough the terms were immediately challenged by members 
of Statoil. According to reports, Statoil, acting just a few months 
after its creation, would have liked to retain the two blocks
for itself and to use the contracting services of a rig contractor or
29 
oil company to develop them. This was rejected by the political
authorities. Throughout this thesis we have denoted the allocation of 
the Brent blocks as the '1972 round', because negotiations started then, 
even if the final signature of the contract did not take place until 
August 1973. It was also no 'round 1 in the normal sense of the word, 
as only 2 blocks were allocated. But the allocation was very important 
both from a quantitative (the reserves were immense) and a qualitative 
point of view.
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6.2.1 Exploration costs and success rate
As the search was moving into the northern parts of the North Sea 
the average cost of an exploration well increased dramatically even if
OGJ as late as the beginning of 1973 stated that the average cost of a
30 
wildcat in the North Sea until then had been no more than $2 mill.
(This implied that the average historic finding costs per barrel1 of
31 
oil in the North Sea was a very low one of 3<f:/bbl. ) Cazenove
stated that the average expected cost of a wildcat in the northern North
Sea ranged from $2.9 mill, for a rig-owner to $4.1 mill, for a rig-
32 hirer. On the assumption that most companies rented exploration
services, we assume $4 mill, per wildcat drilled.
Because the 1972 allocation only related to two adjacent blocks 
(33/9 and 33/12), our chosen success rate of exploration is based on 
geological characteristics of the blocks in question. There was almost 
unanimity within the industry that there was a great chance of finding 
oil in what was believed at the time to be the continuation of the 
geological structure which on the UK side of the border had yielded the 
Brent field. (Ironically enough, Statfjord turned out to be a separate 
structure.) The Norwegian state had previously been informed by
Shell/Esso that the Brent structure probably extended into Norwegian
33 territory. And by the time the Norwegians in August 1973 settled the
final details in the Statfjord agreement, they must have known that the
34 
Orkney/Shetland offshore basin was as prolific as the Ekofisk area.
The Norwegian state demanded a work programme consisting of no less
than 8 wells f°r the two blocks, which is a further indication that
35 they valued the acreage positively. We have therefore assumed that
the average success rate would be 1 in 5. (In fact this turned out to
be too pessimistic; Statfjord was found with the first wildcat that
was drilled.) Total expected exploration costs would therefore come to $20mill,
6.2.2 Development costs
By the time the 1972 agreement was negotiated, the former uncertainty 
with respect to data from the North Sea was receding. By September 1972 
there were at least four overall evaluations of what it would cost to
 7 £
develop a hypothetical field in the North Sea. From the four alter- 
natives we have chosen Cazenove f s assessment of an average expected cost 
per barrel per day of £760. This was also virtually equal to the
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Ekofisk figure, which at the time was the main reference point as far
37 
as the calculations of the Norwegian state were concerned. The
cost figure was also very close to the expected cost of BP's Forties field 
situated east of Scotland in the same depth of water as the two blocks in 
question. To properly use the Cazenove figure we must deduct the estimated 
£42 mill, cost of a pipeline, which would have left us with a variable 
development cost component of £186 mill, for a field which would produce
300,000 barrels/day. If we assume that such a peak production during
38 
one year equals 10% of the total reserves of a field, this represents
total reserves of 1.08 bill, barrels.
If we follow the cost assumptions made in Chapter 2, the total 
cost for a 100 mill, field would have been:
Total development cost
(including delineation wells)
10% x 186 = £18.6 million = $44.6 mill.
Pipeline cost: (120 miles from , q
the area to Shetland @ £0.35m,/mile = $100.0 mill.
$145.0 mill.
6.2.3 Operating costs
We assume operating costs to have been 75<f:/bbl. This figure was in 
line with the general rate of inflation since 1969, and also tried to 
account for expected higher costs of operating in the very north of the 
North Sea. It could also have been arrived at by using a 'rough' guide 
for finding total operating costs put forward by the stockbrokers Wood 
MacKenzie. They assumed a yearly total operating cost of 4% of
total capital cost, for which a 100m. field would have given average
40 
operating costs of $0.64/bbl. Cazenove assumed yearly operating
costs to be equal to 5% of total capital cost, which with similar 
calculations gives an operating cost of 80<f:/bbl. As an average per
barrell operating cost, taking into account the difficult operating
41 
conditions in the north of the North Sea, we have assumed 75<f:/bbl.
6.2.4 Loans and finance
The financing of Ekofisk made it increasingly clear that loans 
for the purchase of capital goods were available to the companies at 
less than the going market rate. This was primarily due to the export 
finance institutions in a number of Western European countries which
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in a bid to gain orders for their industry were prepared to subsidize 
the purchase of offshore equipment. According to Wood MacKenzie, 
"While some (loans - PN) will be subject to full market rates, lower
interest rates are generally obtaining from equipment suppliers, so
42 that overall an 8% rate of interest should appear reasonable." We
will use the same assumption.
We also assume that the average level of self-financing for the 
companies on the Norwegian Shelf by this date would have shown a 
further drop. And even if a number of small companies (especially in 
the UK sector) would borrow almost all their capital, the continued 
dominance of a number of the majors like Esso and Shell in the Norwegian 
sector, which until then had never borrowed any money for their North
Sea development, makes it reasonable to assume a degree of self-finance
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of 70% for the private companies.
It is more difficult to make a meaningful assumption about the 
degree of self-financing for Statoil. Statoil's investment funds 
originated from the Norwegian Treasury's general foreign funds. To 
distribute this fund according to source (between general funds and loans) 
and assign Statoil's capital to either or both of these is difficult. 
We have therefore somewhat arbitrarily assumed that Statoil (via the 
Norwegian state) borrowed 50% of the needed capital. This percent- 
age depended upon the general amount of borrowing that the Norwegian 
state engaged in on the international market. The larger this proportion 
the larger we can assume Statoil' s dependence on external finance to have been.
6.2.5 Price and production
The average Rotterdam price for crude in the middle of 1972 was 
between $3.00 and $3.25 per barrel and on a clearly upward trend. 
The Norwegian state assumed an average 1972 price of $3.10 in the 
middle of 1972. Given the general upward movement of the market, it 
seems reasonable to assume a price of $3.20/bbl. by the time the final 
agreement about block 33/9 and 33/12 was made. We have also for the 
first time included the cashflow results from a 1 bill, barrel 
hypothetical field. This is a reflection of the large-sized fields 
found in the North Sea (in particular Ekofisk). The specification of 
the production profile is in line with the other production profiles 
used by the Surrey model.
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6.2.6 Expected trends
There was in 1972/73 no doubt as far as the industry was concerned 
about the future price of crude. Already in 1971 PPS carried an 
article headed: "It has to be dearer" which stated:
"Prices may fluctuate in the near future but the longer 
term trend is probably set upwards. The main reason is 
that enormous quantities of oil needed to satisfy demand 
in the 1970s and 1980s will have to be sought for and 
developed in more and more difficult places and that the 
investment for this will have to come largely out of 
retained earnings.... The rise in price will have to be 
greater than the rise in costs because of the need for 
larger earnings...."
We have therefore assumed an expected increase in the real price 
of oil by 2% p.a., a modest assumption given the increasing discrepancy 
between an increasing demand and a relatively stagnant supply experi- 
enced in the oil-market at the time.
With an accelerating world inflation costs would have been 
expected to increase at a rate of 4% p.a., while the price of oil 
should have increased by 6% p.a.
A summary of all assumptions for the 1969 calculations appears 
on p.182.
6.2.7 Other variables
Royalties: A system of variable royalties between 8% and 16% depending
48 upon production was introduced from the autumn of 1972. If the rate
ever increased above 12%, it would never again fall below that rate.
Tax rate: The special 9% reduction in the companies' corporation tax
49 
which originated in 1965 was withdrawn in 1972, leaving the companies
with a total normal tax rate of 50.8%. As described in Chapter 5, 
the Norwegian Centre-Right government announced in 1969 new tax laws 
which gave the firms the right to deduct distributed dividends from 
their taxable income, a move which would decrease the state's total 
future tax income from the oil industry. The aim of this regulation 
was to increase the very low levels of self-financing of Norwegian 
industry and remove what was claimed to be 'double' taxation of
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dividends. It was partly in order to compensate for this shortfall in 
expected revenues (see below), partly as a result of the 1969 decrease 
in state tax, that the Norwegian state decided to abolish the special 
9% reduction in corporation tax.
But the distributed dividends would be 'lost 1 for the Norwegian 
tax authorities if the right to dividend deduction was given to foreign 
firms that exported their dividends. So the Norwegian tax authorities 
could suffer a 'double' shortfall in revenues, first because total 
deductions for the purpose of assessing corporation tax would be larger 
for foreign firms; and secondly because this loss couldn't even be 
partially made up again by taxing dividends within Norway. Therefore 
an average source tax (also called withholding tax) of 10% was introduced 
for foreign firms which otherwise would have been able to avoid having 
their exported dividends taxed within Norway. Statoil can be assumed 
to fall within the same category as foreign firms because the state 
would not be taxed on its equity income.
But the source-tax was only a partial solution. As Ot.prp. no.26 
later stated, the right to deduct distributed dividends "may entail a 
reduction in Norwegian National tax revenues which is only partly
r o
compensated by the withholding tax!'
One aspect of this tax change shows the power that the international 
companies were wielding at the time. US firms were originally registered 
in Norway as branches (filialer) in order to gain tax advantages in the
US (depletion allowance). But such 'branches' could according to
53 Norwegian law not pay dividend to their mother firms. Consequently
the US firms could not gain any tax advantages by the new rules about 
deduction of dividends because, strictly speaking, they did not pay 
dividends. This was one of the reasons we disregarded this aspect of 
taxation in our 1969 analysis (see Chapter 5, p.154). But a 
special tax agreement was concluded between Norway and the US on 3 
December 1971 whereby US companies were given the right to deduct 
divident payments as if they were ordinary subsidiaries and hence 
profit from the overall change in the tax structure.
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Assumptions 1972
Price $/bbl 3.20
Price escalation % 6
Total exploration cost ($m.) 20
Development costs $m. 100 145
200 190
300 235
400 280
700 405
1,000 540
Discount rate 10
Operating costs ($/bbl) 0.75
Cost escalation % 4
Percentage debt (i) Company 30
(ii) Statoil 50
Rate of interest 8
Years grace 1
Years spread 6
PARTICIPATION (%)
Scenario 1 - No repayment of exploration cost 50
6.3 RESULTS
Following our former procedure, we now feed the value of the 
expected variables into our cashflow model to determine the division 
of rent between the Norwegian state and the companies as it would have 
appeared in the 1972 allocation round. The main results are set out 
in Tables 6.1 - 6.9 below. The expected PV of all fields likely to be 
developed following the Brent-block allocation was higher compared 
with the same size fields after the second round in 1969. Cazenove 
claimed that by 1972 profit per barrel when all costs had been repaid 
was higher in the North Sea than in the Middle East. If there had 
been no participation, an oil company could have expected to earn a 
post-tax rate of return of between 10.3% (for the 100m. field) and 
21.6% (for the 1 billion field), with most fields showing a rate of 
return towards the higher end of this range. The increased profitabil- 
ity was mainly a result of changes in the exogenous variables. While 
costs had increased, the price of oil had increased even more, leading 
to an increase in the PV that could be expected from each field (see
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Table 6.1). If there had been no participation, the discounted state 
take would have been relatively low; less than 70% of all rent would have 
gone to the state. The Norwegian increase in participation to 50% 
can be seen as a response to this new exogenously given situation, with 
its subsequent low 'state take 1 . Again, it is seen that the form this 
increase in appropriation of rent took implied no drastic decrease in 
the IRR of the private firms, even if the consequences on IRR were more 
pronounced than for the participation scenarios negotiated in 1969.
In cases like the 200m. field, where exploration costs were rela- 
tively important as a percentage of total costs, participation (scenario 
1) signified a moderate 2.8% difference in the IRR. As the relative 
importance of exploration costs decreased, this percentage dropped in 
the 1 bill, field to 0.9%. This effect was also apparent from the 
decreasing 'disguised participation 1 as field size increases (Table 6.6). 
It should be noted that at least in one instance (the 100m. field), the 
introduction of state participation would have changed a commercial 
field (defined as a field with a rate of return above the discount rate) 
into an uncommercial one. This was the first instance in our case study 
where state participation made such a crucial difference.
By insisting on a 50% state participation, the state's total share 
of the rent jumped drastically to a maximum in the middle 80s (Table 6.4). 
And what is even more important, Statoil's equity share constituted on 
average 30% of the total state 'take' (Table 6.5). The Norwegian state 
had really taken a step into the era of 'state capitalism 1 .
The undiscounted result shows that the traditional state take 
was just below 50% (Table 6.9), which wa? marginally lower than the 
1969 result. But the state's overall access to rent as a result of the 
higher participation rate would have been in the mid 70s (Table 6.8), 
a clear increase from 1969.
Let us now assume that the speed with which oil was to be produced 
could have been accelerated. This would have had a fundamental influence 
on the expected profitability of the 1972 allocation. (All sensitivity 
results are found in Appendix F.) The post-participation, post-tax IRR 
for a company producing from a 200m. field would, according to our 
alternative production schedule, have increased from 15.6% to no less 
than 28.1%. For a 700m. field the increase would have represented more 
than a doubling, from 19.5% to 45.1%. No wonder that the speed of 
extraction from individual firms became one of the major points of 
confrontation between the companies and the state. It is on this back-
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ground easy to understand why the companies in their initial negotiating 
positions would have sought to emphasise the technical difficulties why 
the expected rate of production would not be high. On the other hand 
it is difficult to argue that if there was a possibility of producing 
oil more quickly, this opportunity would not be fully exploited by the 
companies. Therefore, to the extent that the companies in 1972 thought 
that they could produce oil faster than they led the Norwegian state to 
believe, they ultimately seemed to have miscalculated. The Surrey 
production schedules are after all based on actual planned schedules 
in the North Sea.
But speed of extraction apart, a more optimistic evaluation of 
other variables could also have meant a better deal for the companies 
than what we have so far postulated. Greater economies of scale for 
the 700m. field (reduction in development costs by 30%) would have 
meant an increase of the IRR to 24.1%, an increase of more than 4 
percentage points on the original result. A decrease in.operating 
costs to 53<fr/bbl would have meant an increase in the IRR to 20.6%.
The quadrupling of prices and a doubling of costs, developments 
which were just around the corner, were of course largely unpredicted 
in 1972/73. Judging by what most oil-men thought the world had in 
store for them at the time, our own figures about future prices and costs 
would probably have been regarded as rather cautious. And, as we have 
shown, only minor adjustments in a positive direction would have been 
sufficient to raise the expected IRR to well into the 20s if not higher. 
The drive by the oil industry for as quick and as extensive an explora- 
tion as possible can therefore be traced back to the profitability 
conditions in the North Sea as seen at this time. The UK Ministry of 
Energy's own analysis of the cost escalation experienced after 1974 
even goes to the extent of blaming part of the subsequent escalation 
on the euphoric and over-optimistic plans made at the time: 
"... these appraisals (of profitability in 1972 - PN) 
showed very high internal rates of return and net PV, and 
the pressure to go quickly derives directly from this." 
The new era of over-optimism, which strikingly contrasted with the 
former pessimism, had now set in. This new attitude was in itself an 
outcome of the companies' negotiating position. It is likely that the 
only way a number of new firms could have hoped to enter the Norwegian 
Continental Shelf at the time would have been by making extravagant 
claims about possibilities of production to the Norwegian state.
185
Furthermore, once oil was found then the ability of a number of the 
oil companies to obtain external finance for investment became directly 
related to their own reserve-estimates, This tended to exaggerate total 
reserves because there was no independent institution which could check the 
companies' estimates. We therefore have to distinguish the companies 1 
reserve-estimates during the initial negotiations from after oil had been found.
As a consequence of the December 1972 regulations and the increase 
in the state's participation rates under scenario 1, we can conclude
there was an increase in the percentage of PV which accrued to the state
58 
compared with the situation in 1969. On the other hand the traditional
measurement of state take, both discounted and undiscounted, decreased 
slightly. This was so despite the 9% increase in corporation tax for 
the oil companies, which must therefore not be seen as a tightening in 
its own terms, but rather as a compensation for the confusing, complex, 
and contradictory tax changes which took place in Norway around 1970.
6.4 VOLUME
The Norwegian state did not issue any new concessions between the 
1969 round and the autumn of 1974, with the exception of the Brent 
blocks. There was therefore a de facto control of volume by macro- 
regulation; a system which in no direct way challenged the hegemony 
or the autonomy of the oil companies to determine output 
from individual fields. But the 1972 regulations suggested for the 
first time, albeit in an indirect way, that a system of micro-regulation 
could also be considered as a method of volume control. Paragraph 34 of 
the Royal Decree of 10 December gave the Department of Industry the right 
to issue "more specific regulation concerning exploration and production 
of petroleum", which included among them, as specified in subsection (f), 
"steps with a view to ensuring a responsible exploitation of the oil 
reserves (conservation)". While it was initially believed that this
paragraph was sufficient to control volume at the level of the
59 individual firm, later developments suggest that this not the case.
There can thus be no sense in which the Norwegian state during this 
period represented a micro-challenge to the companies, even if the 
lack of issuing new acreage was a source of constant frustration to 
the oil industry.
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Pre-tax IRR (%) 
Present Value ($m) 
Post-tax IRR (%) 
Net Present Value ($m)
Field: 100M 200M
18.8 28.3
45.4 168.1
10.3 18.4
3COM 400M
27.7 27
259.8 356
19.4 19.6
700M 1 bill. 
27.9 28.5 
699.3 1054.8 
20.6 21.6
1 § 4 63.6 109.1 157.5 308.9 484.1
TABLE 6.2 PROJECT APPRAISAL AS SEEN BY THE COMPANY
Pre-tax IRR (%)
Post-tax IRR (%)
Net Present Value ($nf)
Field: 100M
14.5
7.5
-6.7
200M
24.1
15.6
24.6
300M
24.7
17.3
47.4
400M 700M
24.7 26.4
17.9 19.5
1 bill.
27.4
20.7
71.2 147.2 234.8
TABLE 6.3 STATOIL'S POSITION
Field: 100M
Pre-tax IRR (%) 
Post-tax IRR (%) - 
Net Present Value ($m)
200M 
40 
25.8 
41
300M 
35.4 
24.8 
64.2
400M 700M
32.7 31.9
23.8 23.7
1 bill
31.7
24.1
88.7 166.1 254.9
TABLE 6.4 TOTAL STATE TAKE FROM BOTH EQUITY AND TAXES (discounted)
As if no participation 
Scenario No.l
Field: 100M 200M 300M 400M 700M 1 bill
97 62.2 58 55.8 55.8 54.1
* 85.4 81.8 80.1 79 77.8
* For an explanation of the different table headings, see Chapter 5, pp.158-160. 
See also pp.107-109.
TABLE 6.5 THE IMPORTANCE OF PARTICIPATION:
TABLE 6.6 THE PROPORTION OF THE PV ACCRUING TO STATOIL
TABLE 6.7 TRADITIONAL 'TAKE' (discounted)
TABLE 6.8 STATE'S SHARE OF RENT FROM ALL SOURCES (undiscounted)
TABLE 6.9 TRADITIONAL 'TAKE' (undiscounted)
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Field: 100M 200M 3COM 400M 700M 1 bill. 
* 28.4 30.1 31 30 31.0
Statoil's proportion
(disguised)
Field: 100M
*
*
200M
55.8
(12)
300M
53.8
(8)
400M
52.8
(6)
700M
51.5
(3)
1 bill
51.0
(2)
Field: 100M 200M 300M 400M 700M 1 bill 
* 67.3 60.8 57.9 56.8 54.7
Field: 100M 200M 300M 400M 700M 1 bill. 
* 75.2 74.4 74.0 74.8 74.6
Field: 100M 200M 300M 400M 700M 1 bill. 
* 49.2 48.2 47.6 49.5 49.2
* Uncommercial as IRR < discount rate
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It should be noted that the decision taken by the Norwegian 
state to 'hurry slowly 1 during the 1970-72 period was not related to 
the dangers of structural dislocations that would follow a rapid rate 
of production; an argument that would later become crucial. It was 
rather a result of a combination of factors like the outcome of the 
EEC referendum campaign; the dispute with Phillips about the landing 
of oil in Norway (see Chapter 7, p.208) and the realization that a slow 
rate of extraction would increase the bargaining strength of the 
Norwegian state.
6.5 SPINOFFS
While there was disagreement about the future shape of Statoil 
among Norwegian politicians (see below), there was much more agreement 
that Norwegian private industry should try to obtain a maximum of spin- 
off s from the North Sea. This may be partly because it was generally 
believed that there would be no direct state involvement in the spinoff 
industries, and hence there would be no direct confrontation between 
state and private interests.
A later Labour Minister of Industry was adamant that one of the 
key roles of Statoil was "industrial-political" or, as he put it, 
"it is an important task to facilitate the participation of Norwegian 
industries to develop activities based on oil exploration, oil industry 
and petrochemical industry". But even with this broad consensus, 
disagreements were to arise concerning the focus this support was to take,
We have already seen how Norwegian industry had been aided by the 
Norwegian state with the 1965 'gentlemen's agreement', a policy 
that was written into the contracts in 1969, and formalized In 
1972. The compulsion to use Norwegian goods and services "to the 
extent that they are competitive with respect to quality, price, 
service and delivery time" was then written into paragraph 54 
of the Royal Decree of 1972. In addition to this somewhat broad 
formulation it was decided that all relevant Norwegian firms should 
receive the specifications about tenders for offshore equipment 
issued by the companies in order to increase the chances of Norwegian 
industry to obtain orders. This scheme was developed in connection 
with the Norske Industriforbund. The companies also had to report 
and explain to the Ministry of Industry why Norwegian goods and services
189
were not used, and justify their choice. Finally, the government 
created a Commission (Kontaktutvalg) between the Norwegian Ministry of 
Industry and the Norske Industriforbund to inform Norwegian firms about 
the requirements of the offshore industry. The Norwegian state 
justified these special measures with reference to the practice of the 
companies, which "often use their own traditional suppliers because
/  o
they have insufficient knowledge of the Norwegian possibilities".
A more general reason for such a regulation was put bluntly at 
the time by a well-placed Norwegian civil servant who stated: "The 
government has, (however), not been satisfied with the oil companies' 
use of Norwegian goods and services so far". According to him, the 
government was at the time also studying ways to ensure "stricter 
supervision to see that Norwegian industry really gets the possibility
f -7
to participate in the bidding".
Part of the emphasis given at the time to the question of spinoffs 
stemmed, paradoxically, from the relatively low level of crude-prices. 
As late as 1972, expected state income from oil was £100 million by 
1975 (or Kr. 1.3 bill.). Compared with the state income expected 
after the 1973/74 price rise, this was relatively insignificant. 
Consequently the state's main interest stemming from the petroleum 
activities was the possible effects of the spinoff industries on key 
variables such as employment and total industrial activity within Norway. 
The imporance of the question of spinoffs, which was understood by some 
from the very beginning, was later echoed by a broad spectrum of 
politicians. The Conservative Chairman of the Norwegian Parliament's 
Industrial Committee argued vigorously in favour of strengthening the spinoff 
industries, and in particular the petrochemical industry, by saying, "It is 
of no use to be left with the sovereignty and the formal property rights
if we let the value added (foredlingsinitiativet) accrue to other
.,66 
nations."
Apart from the more traditional service activities necessary for 
a drilling operation (catering, helicopter services, coast bases), 
Norwegian industry had no particularly successful record to point to 
in the field of spinoffs. The exceptions were the large Ekofisk storage 
tank built in concrete which was towed onto the field in 1971/72, but 
even this was made according to French specifications. Of advanced 
drilling and development equipment, Norwegian industry only supplied 
gas turbines. It was only in the more classical Norwegian industries, 
such as shipbuilding, where there had been anything like a moderate
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success. Four drilling rigs destined for use in the North Sea were in 
the process of being constructed at Norwegian yards by the end of 1972. 
At the same time a trend towards an international involvement by 
Norwegian private capital as owners of drilling rigs was asserting
itself. By the end of 1972 11 rigs were on order to Norwegian owners,
(\l 
worth an estimated total of £100 mill.
The reasons for the general shortfall in Norwegian spinoffs were
68 first the traditional patterns of supplies pursued by the companies.
But in addition, and existing even after the 1972 Decree had tightened 
the spinoff terms, there were difficulties in ensuring a maximum 
Norwegian involvement. The first arose from the dominance of the US 
in the international petroleum industry. All installations in the 
North Sea had to be guaranteed according to API (American Petroleum 
Institute) standards. But there were at the time, for example, only 
a handful of Norwegian welders who possessed an API certificate, and 
consequently Norwegian industry was at a disadvantage. IThis non- 
permanent problem, which was solved as more welders got API certificates, 
simply serves to illustrate which barriers Norwegian industry initially 
had to struggle with. Of much more serious consequence was the fact 
that each country with a spinoff industry offered financial incentives 
to back up that national industry. What became of importance 
for a success in the spinoff industries was therefore also the relative 
cheapening of finance that these different schemes represented. If an 
American company could point to substantial savings in financing costs 
by using US suppliers (even if the quoted price was higher), then such 
suppliers would be preferred. It was only by 'undercutting 1 the offers 
of the US Export Import (EXIM) Bank that for example the Norwegian 
Eksportfinans could help to gain Norwegian orders. But given the very 
heavy needs for finance, it is doubtful whether the Norwegians had 
enough capital available for such schemes to fully maximize 
Norwegian spinoffs.
Among Norwegian policy-makers everyone agreed that the provision 
of export finance was a legitimate way of supporting a national spinoff 
industry. The Norwegian institution Eksportfinans provided Kr. 100 mill, 
to finance national purchases from Ekofisk, including the cement 
storage tank. But there was disagreement about the use of other policy 
instruments of discrimination. The Norwegian Centre-Right coalition 
explicitly exempted the construction of ships and drilling rigs from 
the provisions of paragraph 54 of the 1972 Royal Decree (see Chapter 7, 
p. 235 for a further discussion of this point.)
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On the above evidence, the Norwegian spinoff policies expressed 
nothing but a desire on the part of the policy-makers to give the 
Norwegian spinoff industry an equal chance to bid for orders  The 
policies were essentially an attempt to remove the monopolistic barriers 
to entry which it was believed impeded the full access of Norwegian 
industry to participate in the spinoff industries, and in this way 
represented no fundamental challenge to the international companies. 
There is no doubt that the Norwegians could have pushed the "protection 
of an infant industry" argument much further than was done. It was not 
until the creation of Statoil that a new and more powerful form of de 
facto discrimination was conceived of.
6.6 STATE ROLES
Our analysis of the 1965 and 1969 rounds of concessions high- 
lighted how the Norwegian state initially pursued a passive policy in 
the oil industry and how in particular the state refused any direct 
productive role. There was furthermore a clear identification between 
the interests of the Norwegian state and Norwegian private industry.
The events which followed the Ekofisk find indicated that this 
former pattern of state intervention was changing. While in some areas 
the state continued to fulfil its passive gatekeeper role, this was 
intensified. This is described in Section 6.6.1, where the state's 
relationship to the creation of SAGA and how it encouraged the concen- 
tration of Norwegian capital is discussed. (The state's treatment of 
the spinoff industry which also shows how the state after 1970 sought 
much more actively to help Norwegian private industry has already been 
discussed above.) In Section 6.6.2 we discuss the state's qualitative 
new role which was brought about by the creation of Statoil.
6.6.1 SAGA and the'people's companies'
After the Ekofisk find it had become clear that not only was the 
state's direct strategy of participation ripe for a revision, but the 
state's role vis-a-vis private Norwegian oil capital also needed a 
complete overhaul. The result of this new policy was a decision that 
the Norwegian state should "contribute to a coordination and a concen- 
tration of Norwegian (private - PN) interests within the Norwegian
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oil industry". The reason given for .this strategy was the 
high risk and capital-intensive nature of the industry which, according 
to the government, made it unlikely that more than one or two Norwegian 
groups could become oil companies in an international sense. The more 
immediate reason for this policy was the wish expressed by 11 Norwegian 
industrial groups to start oil exploration. This wish had been made clear in 
discussions with the state in the winter of 1970. As a consequence 
of this interest, the state was instrumental in setting up SAGA
Petroleum, a merger between the private Norwegian companies already
72 involved on the Norwegian Continental Shelf, and a number of new ones,
in total 91 firms. A number of these new firms were Norwegian shipping 
firms, which between them owned around 10 per cent of the world's 
tanker fleet. The new company thus represented both a large part of
Norwegian industry and had a considerable financial muscle, not the
73 least with respect to its ability to raise international finance.
Even if one state-owned firm was represented among the 91 (Ardal £ 
Sunndal Verk, the largest Norwegian aluminium producer), it was clear 
that the state preferred to keep the state oil sector separate from 
SAGA. This, in addition to Statoil, consisted of Norsk Hydro which, 
to all intents and purposes, maintained its role as a private firm even 
after the state acquired the majority of the shares in March 1971. 
(The state didn't even have the right to appoint a representative 
to the Board.) The Knudsen Commission (see above) at one point 
had considered the possibility of turning Hydro into the new Norwegian 
state oil corporation, but in the end found such a solution unsatis- 
factory because a state oil corporation would be given a number of
74 tasks which "could only be managed by a pure state entity". What
this meant was never discussed in more detail. But there is every 
reason to believe that an important reason for not choosing such a 
solution was the substantial foreign (mainly French) minority interest 
in Hydro. SAGA was also seen as being potentially an international 
company, so it is possible to argue that the state's plan was a 
"division of labour" between the state and the private sectors of the 
economy, seeing that Statoil had no international ambitions.
The state' s preference for SAGA as a representative of private Norwegian 
oil capital was well expressed in its rejection of a number of smaller 
and more speculative Norwegian oil companies. Some of these were set 
up primarily by foreign companies, which realized that their main chance 
of gaining access to the Norwegian Continental Shelf lay in cooperation
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with a Norwegian company. After all, this strategy had worked well in 
the past; it was a pattern which had been accepted in the UK, where a 
number of small companies had obtained concessions; and finally it had
7 f\
the support from at least some sections of the Norwegian bourgeoisie. 
The most blatant example of how such a Norwegian company could act as 
a f front* was provided by Norsk Vikingolje a/s which made an agreement 
in the autumn of 1972 with 12 foreign oil companies (most of which were 
minor companies) on the understanding that once Vikingolje had obtained 
concessions on the Norwegian Continental Shelf, it would do nothing
more but insist on a 10% carried interest in whatever blocks it was
77 given, leaving the rest to the international companies.
But in addition to companies like Norsk Vikingolje there were 
also a number of smaller companies like Det Norske Oljeselskap a/s 
(DNO), which were genuinely national; and which primarily represented 
small investors who wanted to take advantage of what they saw as the 
"impending oil Klondyke". These were quite accurately characterized 
as "People's oil companies". The fate of such companies (DNO was soon 
to be joined by others) was later to become a source of considerable 
friction between the different political parties in Norway. But while 
the Norwegian state's policies consistently stood against the smaller 
national oil companies, support for the creation of SAGA was readily 
forthcoming from all political parties. Apart from the Conservative 
Party, the Labour Party was the most consistent supporter of the process 
of concentration and centralization of the private Norwegian oil-capital 
sector which the creation of SAGA represented.
6.6.2 A new phase; Statoil
The key change in Norwegian oil policy during the period under 
study was the creation of a state oil corporation, Statoil, which was 
to function from 1 January 1973. Statoil was to take over and 
administer the state's participation shares; both the ones concluded 
in 1969 and all later participation agreements.
6.6.21 The international dimension
Throughout the initial process of clarification and search for 
organisational solutions for a future state oil corporation, constant 
references were made to the existence of state oil companies in other
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countries. The creation of Statoil should therefore be seen in
relation to the situation in these countries. We will now show why 
Statoil nevertheless had to face a number of questions which were 
different from the ones which faced most state oil corporations of the 
day, and how the plans for Statoil attempted to deal with a number of 
the weaknesses of these companies.
The main difference was that the European state oil corporations 
were brought into existence in order to supply the consumer states 
with cheap energy, while Norway would be an oil-exporting state. 
So when ELF/ERAP was created in France, ENI in Italy and Hispanoil in 
Spain, this was justified in relation to these states 1 positions as 
importers of oil.
In order to achieve security of oil supplies as cheaply as 
possible the three Mediterranean countries first set up their own 
state oil corporations, which were then encouraged to engage in produc- 
tion abroad. The instrument to carry out such aims was to create a 
fully integrated oil industry (in this sense they were not very dif- 
ferent from Statoil). According to these countries the traditional set-
79 
up of the industry was unable to provide security of supply. Because
the state oil corporations would obtain direct access to crude 'at 
cost 1 , it was also thought that such a state sector would help to 
bring down the cost of imported crude.
Whether the state oil companies managed to fulfil all these 
expectations was less sure. According to Frankel (1968), they got 
into the game much too late. He argued that while a policy of 'entrism 1 
might have made sense in the 1950s when the companies earned consider- 
able upstream profits, by the late 1960s when the state companies 
really became active, this margin had shrunk to around 25<f/bbl, making 
the 'cost saving' argument less convincing. He even argued that their 
existence made the price of oil go up, because the very favourable 
terms offered by the state companies to the producers after a while 
became generalized to the whole industry and thus pushed the tax-paid 
price up.
The partial nationalization of the French oil assets by Algeria 
in 1971 also indicated that 'special' arrangements were no guarantee 
of security of supplies. Still there were advantages with such state 
oil corporations. The cost of oil supplies could be decreased as it 
could mean the discontinuation of the overpricing of crude supplied 
to the majors' subsidiaries. Also state oil corporations could
195
engage in special industrial barter deals which could safeguard 
industrial production.
The Norwegian requirements for a state oil corporation were much 
closer to the situation in a number of producer-countries, which also 
had set up state oil corporations. But most of these were at the time 
nothing but paper organisations. There were in the early 1970s 
probably only three producer-state oil companies that could efficiently 
lift their own oil: Sonatrach in Algeria, Pemex in Mexico (which could 
be taken as a representative of a number of Latin American state oil 
corporations), and NIOC (National Iranian Oil Corporation). Pemex 
was not immediately relevant to the Norwegian case because the state 
had full monopoly of oil production in Mexico. It was the two other 
state oil companies that could be taken to be models, as they could 
more easily be fitted into a system of 'carried interests'. But none 
of these cases completely fitted the Norwegian requirements, and as a 
consequence Norway had to tackle completely new areas in the field of 
nation-state/oil-company relations  For example, in all three cases 
above, the national oil corporations sought to maximize the absolute 
amount of the rent to the nation-state. Thus the moves towards partial 
nationalization in Algeria, and the increasing importance of Sonatrach, 
took place, according to one observer, because
"From 1969 onwards it was clear that Algeria was seeking 
complete 'recovery' of its sources of production, in order 
to obtain full possession of the proceeds from them, for
the purpose of financing very large investments under the
81 first Five Year Plan (1970-73)."
A similar situation could be said to apply to Iran, which also wanted 
to industrialise rapidly. As a consequence, all three state oil 
corporations wanted to maximize their output. But this was not an 
equally pressing aim in Norway, which meant that Statoil was created 
and had to operate subject to different external pressures.
On the other hand both the Norwegians and the Iranians/Algerians 
could not in the short run break with the majors because they were con- 
strained by their own lack of technology, and because they were depend- 
ent upon the downstream activities of the majors. We can therefore 
conclude that while the Iranian and Algerian cases were much closer to 
the Norwegian than was the situation in the other Mediterranean consumer 
countries like France and Italy, there was nevertheless little direct 
precedent for the creation of a state oil corporation in Norway.
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But regardless of the relative merits of state oil corporations 
both in Europe and in the producer-countries as a blueprint, they still 
had one great influence on Norwegian policy-makers. Their mere existence 
indicated that organisational alternatives to the majors could be created if there 
was a political will to do so, and that to be of maximum efficiency a 
state oil company must try to engage in the whole integrated process 
of oil production
The final outcome of the organisation pattern of Norwegian oil 
policies led to the establishment of a state oil corporation which was 
to deal with the business or commercial interests of the Norwegian state. 
Other institutions (the Ministry of Industry and the Oil Directorate) 
were meant to deal with the more overtly political aspects of the
undertaking ('forvaltning 1 ), and the technical regulating aspects of
82 the activities respectively. This solution was contrasted by a Norwegian
Parliamentary Committee to an organisational pattern where the state 
oil corporation exercised the monopoly of extraction of oil (as in
Mexico) and where it "had become natural to let the state oil corporation
8 "5 
execute the state oil policy". There was thus a clear link between
the wider conditions offered to the companies and the organisational 
pattern proposed for the state oil corporation. Norway chose an 
organisational solution for Statoil which was to coincide with a system 
of "carried interest".
6.6.22 Statoil: a traditional view
We now want to start to examine whether Statoil represented a 
threatening form of state intervention for the private oil companies. 
This question is brought into focus by examining the debate in Norway 
that surrounded the creation of Statoil. There were two clearly 
separate notions of what Statoil ought to be, hidden beneath the 
unanimity of the 8th 'oil commandment' (see p. 173 above). One trend 
of thought wanted Statoil to fit into a traditional and "non- 
threatening" state role, where Statoil was mainly seen to back up and 
support the Norwegian private sector, but where the private sector 
maintained the hegemony. According to such a view, Statoil's role 
would appear as the residual of the play of market forces. The other 
trend of thought wanted Statoil to adopt a more aggressive and independ- 
ent attitude towards the companies, which was not primarily determined 
by the immediate needs of Norwegian private capital. We shall examine
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each in turn. The 1972-74 period would see a continued battle between 
the 'traditional 1 and the more 'aggressive' views of Statoil.
The clearest example of what a 'traditional' form of state inter- 
vention could mean within the context of a state oil corporation surfaced 
in the first parliamentary debate where the question of a state oil 
corporation was discussed. Here a Conservative MP pointed out that the 
national consensus for a more 'active' state involvement was nothing 
but a broad and fairly vacuous starting point. What needed to be 
determined was "the kind and breadth of the state involvement". He 
argued that a future state oil corporation as an "obvious prerequisite" 
should "act as a coordinator (samordner) of foreign and Norwegian oil
interests, rather than spread itself right across the spectrum of
85 possible activities from exploration to downstream activities".
This role of the state as a coordinator for private capital 
interests was echoed, albeit in a less strident way, by others who 
sought the state to become a non-operative holding company whose role 
for example in the case of exploration north of 62° was primarily meant 
to increase the bargaining strength of the private companies.
This concept of a state oil corporation is the clearest example of 
how it was not state involvement in itself which was at stake in the 
debate. The 10 'oil commandments' had made it very clear that there 
was an unanimous agreement among politicians that the role of the state
R6
ought to increase. (The necessity of some form of state oil corpora- 
tion had anyway almost automatically arisen once it was decided that 
the state was to receive oil from its participation agreement and as 
payment for royalties.) But what was at stake was the kind of state 
involvement this was to become.
When the Knudsen Commission recommended that Statoil should 
represent the business interests of the state, the company was also 
seen in the same traditional sense as being necessary "as an organ 
which can coordinate (PN emphasis) the interests of the state and the
private industry's interests while at the same time be a partner
87 (samarbeidspartner) with private industry". But, the Commission
continued, "a company with such an industrial-political aim has to be 
fully state owned". So in order to be of maximum use to the private 
national sector, Statoil had to be 100% state owned.
198
6.6.23 Statoil; a more aggressive view
s 
There was a second current of Norwegian opinion that did not view
a future state oil corporation primarily in relation to what it could 
accomplish for and on behalf of the private sector. This current held 
a more autonomous and aggressive view of state intervention. Its members 
advocated a state role which, at least in theory, would act at the 
expense of the private companies  The important distinction became 
whether this more 'offensive' attitude was directed against foreign or 
national capital, or both. Gulnes described 1972 as heralding the 
beginning of a new era, where the state no longer was supposed to be 
simply a 'sleeping partner'. He wanted "an active state participation" 
in the form of a state oil corporation, and implied that it was the wish 
of the Norwegian government that "the (oil - PN) activity shall be 
managed from Norway and to the extent possible by Norwegians. The 
management should not take place in the international oil companies'
headquarters overseas, but be carried out in Norway where we could
88 influence policy over a wide field." Similar sentiments were expressed
by important sectors of the DNA. Ingvald Ulveseth, later Minister of 
Industry, pointed out that the way forward for the Norwegian oil industry 
was "international cooperation with the other oil-exporting countries 
... and away from the situation where the big international companies 
control both the total taxes, and the final price to the producer....
Norway would (instead) have to build a national industry, and preferably
89 
a state industry". The left-Labour MP Thorbj^rn Berntsen was even
more direct in his justification for a state oil corporation. He 
described the principle which was subsequently unanimously agreed by 
Stortinget that "oil resources should be exploited so that they benetit 
the whole society" as "the principle on which Norwegian oil policy ought
to rest. This," he continued, "and not the battlefield where powerful
90 private (PN emphasis) interests try to expropriate the maximum profit"
must be the basis of Norwegian policy. But while both Gulnes and Ulveseth, 
quoted above, were at least verbally critical of the international 
companies, they at the same time opened the door for state cooperation 
with Norwegian capital. Berntsen, on the other hand, was distancing 
himself altogether from private interests, and made little distinction 
between national and international capital. This critical attitude to 
all private involvement in the Norwegian oil industry (whether Norwegian 
or foreign) has continued among the left wing of the Labour Party until 
this very day.
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6.6.24 Fiscal autonomy
The disagreement about the exact role Statoil was to play also 
arose in connection with the amount of 'fiscal autonomy 1 which the 
state oil company should enjoy. This problem can be analysed both on 
the level of Statoil's access to capital and the distribution of its 
future profits. With regard to the first factor, there was an initial 
consensus among Norwegian politicians that if Norway created a state 
oil corporation, lack of access to capital should not become an impedi- 
ment for the efficient running of the new company. Hellem, the MP 
who, on behalf of the Parliamentary Committee of Industry, presented 
the case in favour of granting Statoil such an autonomy (which by 
implication meant a very 'unrestrained' oil corporation), stated: 
"If this company (Statoil - PN) is going to serve its 
purpose of satisfying the commercial interests of the 
state, it has to be able to act on an equal footing with 
other oil companies. It has to be an absolute prerequis- 
ite that the company is allowed full freedom of manoeuvre
and at any time has access to sufficient capital so that
91 it is capable of taking rapid decisions when required to."
As an example of how to deal with the question of the distribution of
future profits, Hellem cited the case of ENI, where 65% of the state
92 
oil company's net profit went to the Italian Treasury. On the other
hand, a number of reasons were also put forward why the development of 
the state oil corporation should be under stricter control as regards 
the company's ability to expand along purely commercial lines. 
Initially this critique came from the right, which wanted to draw a 
very clear line between the commercial and the administrative elements 
of the state's involvement in the oil industry. Its primary aim was 
to ensure that Statoil was not to gain any undue advantages in relation 
to the private companies, and to attempt to limit Statoil's activities
07
to oil extraction. Later on, this critique was also to come from 
the left.
The contradiction in which the politicians found themselves was 
almost inevitable. If the state wanted to challenge the international 
companies once a decision to explore for oil had been taken, the state 
did not have any choice but to develop Statoil along dynamic state cap- 
italist lines as advocated by Hellem. But such a strategy would 
immediately bring into the open the dilemma of political and fiscal
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control of Statoil. (See Chapter 7 for a further discussion of this 
dilemma.)
6.7 SUMMING UP: 1970-72
The period saw a significant tightening of all the three main 
variables we have singled out for special attention, compared with the 
preceding period. This tightening not only took place within the 
context of what we have chosen to call 'traditional 1 forms of state 
intervention, but for the first time we see in the contours of Statoil 
the possibility that the Norwegian state should change from a 'passive 1 
to an 'active' role in the oil industry. To what extent this role was 
actually to be played will be examined in the next chapter, but all 
indications were already at this time that the battle between the two 
notions of state intervention we have described was slowly being won 
by the more 'aggressive' current of opinion.
But we should on the other hand be clear about which limits the 
Norwegian state laboured under,, This was clearly put by the main 
architect of the Norwegian oil policy, Jens Evensen, who said: 
"Different kinds of contracts can exist side by side 
without weakening the principle of law (rettsikkerheten) 
... I do of course (PN emphasis) reject any recommendations 
that advocate a change in existing contracts.""^ 
Compared with the development taking place internationally in the 
industry at about the same time, where rewriting of contracts was the 
order of the day, this must have sounded like honey to the oil 
companies.
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CHAPTER 7
1973-74: CONSOLIDATION OF THE STATE'S ROLE
7.1 BACKGROUND
By early 1975 one could discern what were to become the permanent 
features of Norwegian oil policies  The principal expression of this 
development was the increasingly active role that the state was coming 
to play through the workings of the three-cornered institutional 
structure created in 1972, and in particular through the growing role 
of Statoil, Although this consolidation of the state's role was 
relatively unspectacular by international standards, when seen together 
with demands for an increased state participation and tighter tax rules, 
the policy package of 1974 (described below) was interpreted as represent- 
ing an important change in Norwegian policies. This was well reflected 
in comments made by two sources with very different relationships to 
Norwegian policies. In a comment to St.meld, no.25 (1973-74), the 
Conservative faction in the Committee of Finance (Finanskomiteen) 
stated:
"The government creates by St.meld. Nr.25 a deep 
and fundamental split (strid) about Norwegian oil 
policies and thereby breaks the national unity which 
hitherto has characterized our relationship to (the) oil." 
When the Saudi Arabian Oil Minister Yamani was asked what he thought 
about the Norwegian terms related to the third round of concessions, he
answered that it would be an understatement to call Norwegians blue-eyed
2 Arabs - the Arabs should rather aspire to become brown-eyed Norwegians.
Indications of the new mood of Norwegian oil policies were the two 
confrontations between the Norwegian state and the international 
companies over the landing of oil from Ekofisk and the introduction 
of new tax rules. While in no sense challenging the existence of the 
companies, these episodes represented the first serious public dis- 
agreements between the two sides.
The increased state role in the oil industry appeared at the same 
time that the oil industry, following the 1973 price rise, at a stroke 
became the most important Norwegian industry. This contrasted with the 
position as late as early 1973 when the oil industry was still 
relatively unimportant with respect to the value of total produceable 
reserves, its expected share of GDP4 as well as in its relationship to 
total state income.^
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The third round of concessions on the Norwegian Continental Shelf, 
expected since the summer of 1971 and officially announced in the summer 
of 1972, was postponed yet again in the autumn of 1972. The official 
reason was that the new Korvald government wanted to settle the contro- 
versy about landing of oil from Ekofisk, but the outcome of the EEC 
referendum also played an important part. The new government regarded 
itself as an interim government with one main (and limited) mandate, 
that a free-trade agreement should be negotiated with the EEC before the 
September 1973 general election. Because the outcome of the referendum 
was interpreted as a vote of no confidence in the forces inside and 
outside of Norwegian society most closely identified with the oil 
industry (the multinational oil companies and their Norwegian counter- 
parts), there was also an understandable caution on the side of the 
Korvald government to engage in any new initiatives in the field of 
oil policies. Only in the case of the landing of Ekofisk oil and 
granting of the Brent blocks was action taken. While there was a 
pressure based on geological information for Norway to develop the 
Brent blocks, the granting of these concessions also became part of 
the Norwegian negotiations with the EEC about a free trade agreement.
It had long been known that the EEC wanted to step up the production of
7 indigenous energy resources of Western Europe; indeed this had been
one of the important points in the EEC referendum campaign. Norway, 
which knew there were very good indications of substantial oil and gas 
deposits in the Brent blocks, refused to give the concession until a 
free-trade treaty had been concluded. It is indicative that the leaks 
about the extreme promise of the two blocks came from the Norwegian 
delegation in Brussels, which was led by the former head of the Oil
o
Council, Jens Evensen. On the other hand, one should not make too 
much of the Norwegian bargaining card. The EEC knew that Norway, sooner
rather than later, had to explore the two blocks for fear that the UK
9 side's exploration might "suck them dry".
Then finally on 11 July 1973 the Norwegian state officially 
announced that 32 blocks would be offered for allocation. The closing 
date for applications would be in September 1973, after the General 
Election. This third round was the first major licensing since 1969, 
and was warmly welcomed by the companies. The 32 blocks were concen- 
trated on either 'border-blocks' against the UK or other blocks where 
an increasing knowledge of deep-sea drilling would be required. The 
new Royal Decree of December 1972 would constitute the basis for the
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new concessions, while the major elements to be negotiated were the 
work programmes and the percentage of state participation. The offer 
of new blocks followed a season of relatively modest activity on the 
Norwegian Shelf. But by the time the applications were closed in 
September 1974, no less than 175 companies had applied. This time 
around there was not even any pretence from the companies that they 
were not interested in the Norwegian acreage. By the time the applica- 
tions were received, Norwegian political life had experienced a major 
new upset which was to colour the oil policies over the coming years. 
The general election of 1973 was the parliamentary expression of the 
outcome of the EEC referendum and brought into government a minority 
Labour Party which was dependent on the support of 16 MPs from the 
Socialist Electoral Alliance (SV), a group that consisted primarily of 
anti-EEC forces.
The first negotiating round between representatives of the 
Ministry of Industry and the Oil Directorate and the companies took 
place in November/December 1973. Again the question of state partici- 
pation was in focus. One new development as far as the companies were 
concerned was the state's demand that Statoil might want a sliding 
participation scale. But the companies were also forced to consider 
what the Norwegian demands meant for their bargaining with governments
in other North Sea countries, as by this time Norway had the strictest
12 
set of offshore conditions of any North Sea country.
The second negotiating round took place in March 1974, by which 
time it was clear that only 12 blocks would be offered, two of which 
(36/1 and 35/3) were especially earmarked for the development of deep- 
water technology. The exact nature of state participation was again 
a major negotiating point, but also more traditional questions such as
the extent of the work programmes and the density of seismic shootings
13 
were discussed. It was becoming clear (as first suggested by the
Royal Decree of December 1972) that there would be differentiations 
in the conditions imposed on the companies and that there were wide 
divergencies with respect to the geological expectations and cost 
conditions of the different blocks that were offered.
Difficult and expensive technical conditions were expected, 
especially in the two deep-water blocks off MSltfy. If a high state 
participation was demanded in such high cost conditions, where a heavy 
work programme was linked with modest geological expectations, this 
could have brought down the expected rate of return for the companies.
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This follows from the participation-conditions of scenario 1, where any 
high exploration costs exclusively carried by the company had to be 
set against a relatively modest oil company income share, i.e. a 15% 
share of future profits from a field might be considered insufficient 
to warrant a $100 mill, exploration programme.
In the March negotiations the companies were also for the first 
time confronted with prospects of a change in the taxation rules. But 
at that time no further details were given, for the simple reason that 
these had not yet been finalised.
The final negotiating round between the Norwegian state and the 
prospective companies took place in the summer of 1974. Statoil was 
also allowed to be represented at these negotiations, despite loud 
objections from the Norwegian opposition politicians, who complained 
about the company's special and privileged position. By this time it 
was thought there were few outstanding problems.
Five licences were in the end offered to the companies on 15 
November 1974. They were much tougher than all former agreements issued 
in the North Sea 0 Statoil's 'carried interest' share was 50% in four 
and 55% in the fifth licence, with an in-built escalation scale which 
would increase government participation to a maximum of 75% for the 
biggest findso The state would thus have an effective majority interest 
in all commercial finds. In addition Statoil would be operator in one 
licence covering three blocks (with assistance from Esso) and would 
have the right to become operator in another block if the finds straddled 
the UK/Norwegian boundary. Hydro became operator, on behalf of the 
Petronord group, in two other blocks. SAGA was initially only given a 
15% share in one of the deep-water blocks, but after the withdrawal of 
Chevron (see below) was granted operator status on 35/3. In none of 
the agreements was the state to pay for exploration costs. In addition 
there were a number of stipulations concerning the compulsion for the 
companies to accept Norwegian trainees, and that the companies would be 
responsible for possible pollution in connection with the drilling and 
production.
7.2 THE TAX CONFRONTATION
The companies had 30 days to accept the Norwegian offer of the 
conditions forthe third round. But before the time limit ran out, the 
details about the new tax proposals had become known. These new tax
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rules were the result of the work of the Commission set up on 15 January 
1974 to review the income of the Norwegian state from North Sea 
activities, headed by the State Attorney (Statsadvokaten).
The Minister of Trade made clear in an interview published after 
the new tax proposals were known that the purpose of the new fiscal 
system was to secure a 'maximum take 1 from the companies' earnings on 
the Norwegian Shelf, following the quadrupling of the oil prices. 
He claimed the companies had already been warned in their March 1974 
meetings with the government about the new taxes. But even so,
according to the FT, "they had never envisaged anything like the
18 proposals presented". The Norwegian terms were presented in a secret
meeting with the companies on 27 November 1974. The suggestions 
included an extra profits tax reaching 40% to be levied on top of the 
normal government take. Furthermore, it was suggested that the 
companies deposit 20% of their total profits in a special account with 
 the Bank of Norway and that a 'ring-fence' principle of taxation should 
be applied to each field, making it impossible to offset profits on one 
part of the Norwegian sector from losses on another part.
The companies promptly threatened to withdraw from the third round
19 if these taxation rules were adopted and an intense lobbying started
against the special tax, spearheaded by the Norwegian Oil Review, the 
magazine which had initially made the conditions public. The magazine
claimed that the proposed tax "breaks with all accepted taxation
ite 
21
20 norms in the free world". The int rnational oil press was not less
dismissive in its characterization.
The Committee which had been working on the taxation problem had 
not been unanimous in its approach. The major aim for the Committee 
was to capture the maximum amount of the increased oil rent, and its 
most concrete point of reference to evaluate conditions in the North 
Sea was the situation in the Ekofisk field. The expected return on 
Ekofisk, given that the majority of the investment had been made 
relatively early in the history of the North Sea when costs were 
smaller, would have been phenomenal. So by arguing mainly from the 
perspective of Ekofisk, it is hardly surprising that the Committee 
wanted to increase the rate of taxation. However, there was an alter- 
native approach to capturing the rent, and this was to ask for govern- 
ment participation in Ekofisk. A minority of three members of the ten-
22 man Committee wanted to renegotiate the Ekofisk agreement.
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Such a solution would have had a number of advantages for the 
Norwegian state. The marginal rate of taxation would have been less 
steep if the case of Ekofisk was satisfactorily dealt with. Further- 
more, it would give the Norwegian state increased control over the 
developments at Ekofisk. On the other hand, it would involve a renego- 
tiation of an existing licence, an unwelcome development for most 
Norwegian policy-makers in view of the principled Norwegian stand on 
this issue. As will be made clear below, a renegotiation of tax rates 
was seen as legally acceptable by the Norwegians, while an intervention
in the participation rates constituted a much clearer break with the
23 principle of "non-retroactive legislation".
Faced with the uproar about the new taxation scheme, the Norwegian 
authorities almost immediately back-tracked. They claimed that the 
'90%' tax law (as it was to become known) were only 'ideas' intended 
to form the basis for 'preliminary discussions' and were not binding
O A
for anyone. This way of describing the initiative is however contra- 
dictory to a later government characterization of the episode which
25 talks in terms of an actual government 'proposal' being put forward.
On Friday 13 December 1974 the Norwegian state, according to
Noroil, "had to retract one of the most ill-considered and inept oil
26 political overtures yet", and the companies were allowed to postpone
the date by which they had to accept the third round of concessions. 
According to the Norwegian authorities this happened "because one could
understand that the companies wanted more time to evaluate the con-
27 cessions in light of the tax proposal which had been published..."
But in reality it was an admittance of defeat for the Norwegian authori- 
ties and served primarily to give the Norwegians time to develop a new 
set of tax proposals, which were presented in an Odelstingsproposisjon, 
no.26, of 14 February 1975. The companies, which all along insisted 
on seeing a close connection between the tax proposals and accepting 
the new concessions, were given a final time limit for accepting the 
third round concessions to 17 March.
All the companies, with one exception, had accepted the concessions 
by that date. Even if the government's tax proposal had not yet been 
ratified by the Storting, the proposals of 14 February gave very clear 
indications of what they would be like. The one exception was Chevron, 
which had been given the operator role on one of the deep-water blocks, 
35/3, to be exploited together with SAGA. Chevron stated that it only 
wanted to accept the offer on the condition that Stortinget passed a
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9 Rtax law which "satisfied the company". But Chevron also knew that 
such an answer was synonymous with a refusal, because the Norwegian 
authorities had made it clear that any conditional acceptance of a 
concession would be regarded as a refusal. The Economist, in evaluating 
the final package, wrote: "Oil companies operating the Norwegian sector
have voted in a majority to stay put", and attributed the Chevron pull-
29 out to the bad geological prospects of the acreage. Even Noroil,
which normally could be described as an extremely pro-industry magazine, 
described Chevron's conditional acceptance as "politically unconscious" 
given the political realities of Norway. Chevron's concession was 
later taken over by BP, while SAGA became operator of the block,, (For 
a further discussion of the special tax, see Section 7.4 below.)
7.3 THE LANDING OF OIL FROM EKOFISK
The second major confrontation between the Norwegian state and the 
companies during the 1973-74 period arose over the landing of oil from 
Ekofisk. The issues involved have been set out in great detail by Owe 
(1974) and highlighted by Andreassen (1973). There is therefore no 
purpose in repeating the complex background to the decision reached by 
Stortinget in April 1973, which led the Ekofisk oil and gas to be piped
to the UK and West Germany in spite of the stipulation in Norwegian law
31 that it should be landed in Norway. In exchange for this agreement
Norway obtained a 50% share in the pipeline and secured delivery of 
raw material to its future petrochemical industry.
The agreement was mainly seen internationally as yet another step
32 by the Norwegian state to increase its role in the oil industry.
And from the perspective of rent-division, the Norwegian insistance on 
a 50% share in the pipeline avoided a potential loss of rent to Phillips, 
The company could have charged a high price for transporting oil through 
the pipelines and thus transferred profits to a separate pipeline 
company outside the jurisdiction of Norwegian tax authorities. This 
was avoided by Statoil becoming co-owners of the pipeline.
But there were also some more principled issues arising from this
confrontation. First t insisting on landing the oil in Norway would
33 have led to a postponement for 'several years' of the full flow of
gas and oil from Ekofisk because the technical problems of crossing 
the Norwegian Trench first had to be overcome. This in turn would have 
meant a loss of profit for Phillips (and loss of income for the state).
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Given the concession pattern originally chosen by Norway, it was almost 
impossible for the Norwegian state to insist on such a postponement,
*Z A
especially once Phillips had been granted a production licence. A 
postponement would have amounted to a major interference in the micro- 
conditions of exploration for the company, something we have shown was 
virtually impossible for the Norwegian state to carry through, and thus 
represents a major weakness in this kind of concession.
Secondly, while the agreement obviously decreased the manoeuvre- 
ability for the Norwegian state, especially in foreign policy terms, 
the state also managed to secure the interest of the Norwegian spinoff 
industry. This was done by negotiating a steady supply of raw materials 
at favourable prices for the planned petrochemical industry.
Thirdly, the concessions obtained by the Norwegian state from 
Phillips, especially the 50% share in the pipeline (in addition Norway 
only had to raise 5% of the total capital for the project), as well as 
the open confrontation with the company about whether the chairman of 
the joint pipeline company should have a casting vote (a confrontation 
which Norway lost), were paradoxically an expression of the political 
weakness of the Korvald government. Korvald's apparent 'toughness 1 was 
needed to ensure the passage of the proposal through a sceptical 
Storting. Parts of the Labour Party were clearly unhappy with the 
government's recommendations, an uneasiness that only increased when 
LO (the Norwegian Trade Union Congress) recommended a postponement of 
the decision. Opposition to the idea of landing oil abroad was centred 
around the plea that Norway should postpone a decision in order to gain 
more time to further evaluate its oil policy.
Finally, the confrontation said something about the power of the 
international financial institutions. The international bank consortium 
led by First National City Bank refused to finance the Ekofisk pipelines 
if the Norwegian state took control through the Norwegian chairman's
double vote. Given the close connection between the major international
37 banks and the international oil companies, this intervention could be
seen as the companies' joint objection to a de facto Norwegian control 
with installations on the Shelf, a development the industry was not 
willing to accept at the time. What is surprising is how this example 
of overt and direct pressure was not taken up further by the Norwegian 
state and used in its bargaining stand against the companies, something 
that would have been relatively easy to do. It rather seemed as if the 
state was happy not to have this excuse to point to. This reinforces
210
the belief that the Norwegian state was at the time not interested in 
any fundamental confrontation with the companies.
7.4 THE BARGAINING STRATEGY
We can now examine in more detail\the bargaining strategy pursued 
by the companies and the Norwegian state as it expressed itself during 
the third round. Most of our comments will centre around the special- 
tax controversy. On one hand we shall see that the companies changed 
their bargaining strategy from what had historically been 'normal 1 . 
On the other hand the Norwegian state had made dramatic strides in 
its access to information.
7.4.1 Retroactive laws
This time around it was difficult for the companies to claim that 
geological indications were unfavourable and that therefore the 
Norwegian state would have to induce them to explore for oil in 
Norwegian waters. Reference to the high success rate of commercial 
finds on the Norwegian Shelf (see p.215 below), and the large 
number of companies applying for Norwegian acreage in 1973, would 
immediately make such a claim sound hollow. And when oil prices 
increased from 1973 onwards, the traditional argument that profitability 
would be low also fell flat on its face. The companies therefore 
changed their traditional strategy and started to stress a number of 
issues which had been familiar in other parts of the world, but which 
had featured little in the Norwegian debate. One disadvantage of 
changing tactics was that they had to take their arguments much more 
into the public sphere of politics. Their first stand was on the 
question of retroactive laws.
The more general attitude of the companies to Norwegian licensing 
policies was well expressed in the beginning of the period by one oil
executive who said, "There is this constant nibbling away at what you
38 
thought were yours by right." But the strongest statements did not
surface until Norway suggested the introduction of the special petroleum
it : 
40
39 
tax. The companies claimed in a special report tha such an action
was unlawful according to the Norwegian Constitution.
What is interesting about the companies 1 intervention is, first, 
the timing of the initiative, which came only after the state's initial
211
suggestions had been rejected by the companies in early December, and 
the government was clearly on the defensive. So the companies undertook
no public initiative until they felt that they were politically on the offensive 
and the government was temporarily discredited. Then they chose to 
challenge the whole principle of the Norwegian initiative, even though 
the companies had known as early as March 1974 that new tax laws were 
on the way.
The companies 1 judicial judgements were backed up by their 
memoranda submitted to the Finance Committee of the Storting which 
examined the proposal of the new tax. Shell claimed that the government 
had not refuted the arguments put forward. Norsk Agip was "in grave 
doubt about the constitutional validity of the proposed law" Agip 
also interestingly claimed that the crucial variable when the initial
A *7
negotiations took place in 1965 was "total government take", arguing 
that any new taxation law which changed this 'take 1 was unconstitutional. 
This strategy tried to take advantage of the Norwegian government's 
initial lack of negotiating sophistication (when its reference was to 
"total government take" and not to internal rate of return). The 
Norwegians overruled the objections by the companies concerning the 
constitutional nature of the extra tax when Professor dr. juris C.A.
Fleischer, on behalf of the Norwegian state, wrote his answer to the
44 companies 1 special report, and more fundamentally when the special
tax law was finally passed in Stortinget in June 1975. 
7.4.2 Marginal fields
Everyone in the oil industry had to admit that the expected 60.3%
rate of return for Ekofisk was what SAGA chose to describe as "good
45business", which would recuperate its total investment in the stagger- 
ingly short time of two years. Consequently there could be no question 
that the companies could point to a general shortfall in North Sea 
profitability when they negotiated with the Norwegian state. They 
therefore again had to change their bargaining approach and put more 
emphasis on the marginal fields, a bargaining strategy we have already 
anticipated (Section 2.5.11). By 'marginal fields' we here mean fields 
which operate under difficult technical conditions, especially in greater 
depths. The companies' arguments as presented to the Parliamentary Committee
of Finance bears out such an observation. Their cash-flow calculations 
aimed to strengthen their bargaining power, and constantly referred
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to the so-called deep-water blocks that were offered to the companies 
in the third round. Shell's arithmetic example was built around a 
field of 300 meters' depth. This was more than four times the depth 
of the Ekofisk field and much deeper than any field yet found, let 
alone developed at that time in the North Sea. SAGA followed the same 
strategy by focussing on conditions in block 35/3 and other fields where 
they assumed that capital investment per daily barrel of peak production 
was above $5000. By combining this with the view that a commercially 
acceptable project (one where the internal rate of return was not less 
than 25%, a figure never discussed by the oil companies), SAGA claimed
that the suggested taxation laws would exclude "approximately 90% of
47 the Norwegian North Sea". Chevron was one company that in its
submitted material distinguished between the conditions of different
48 depths, but the company then spent most of its letter to the Committee
explaining the situation of the deep-water blocks, in all probability 
preparing the government and public opinion for its decision to withdraw 
from the Norwegian Shelf.
The letters submitted by the companies provide a valuable insight 
into the kind of arguments the companies at that time were using and in 
all probability had used in former negotiating rounds to extract the 
best possible conditions from the Norwegian state. SAGA in its sub- 
mission to the Committee listed five factors of uncertainty which might
affect the internal rate of return: among them a collapse in the price
49 
of oil* The possibility that such risks might also swing the other
way (oil prices might for instance increase even further) was never 
pointed to. Shell followed a similar bargaining procedure in the figures 
it presented to the committee, except that the company also included 
as an uncertainty the possibility that the state set the norm-price 
above the actual selling price for each barrel produced.
It was then up to the Norwegian negotiators to claim that the 
companies were wrong in general, or more particularly were too cautious 
in their assessments of all factors which could influence the IRR. The 
Norwegians' bargaining position in this respect was partly a function 
of access to information, which Norway was acquiring at a rapid rate. 
It was therefore not surprising that the end result of the debate about 
the marginal fields and tax rate was that few of the points raised by 
the companies in February 1975 (while remembering that they had managed 
to stop the earlier and much more serious attack on their interests at 
the end of November the previous year) were accepted by the Norwegian 
Storting.
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7.4.3 Information
Access to geological information and expected costs and prices 
was important for the Norwegian state's bargaining position, as this 
would help to evaluate the net present value accruing to each of the 
two actors. The key institution in evaluating geological data for the 
Norwegian state was the Oil Directorate created in 1972. The Directorate 
served as the main consultant for the Negotiating Office of the Ministry 
of Industry and, together with Statoil, participated in all meetings 
between the Ministry and the companies. The state will independently 
of access to such expertise also have some idea about the prospect of an area 
from old success ratios, the extent of company interest in a specific 
block etc. But no definite assessment can be made when negotiating on 
a block by block basis unless the state has access to more specific 
geological information. While it was a condition of any exploration 
licences in Norway that all seismic data was to be handed over to the state, 
the Norwegian authorities had little independent ability to adequately 
read geological data until Norges Tekniske Naturvitenskapelige 
Forskningsrad (NTNF) in 1969 was given the task of shooting seismic 
data off northern Norway. The 1973 annual report from the Directorate 
even pointedto the fact that because the Directorate was the only 
institution with access to all seismic institutions in the North Sea
it could in certain cases warn prospective drillers in a block about
52 
special dangers like high pressure.
In 1973 the responsibility for seismic shooting north of 62° was 
transferred to the Petroleum Directorate, which in 1973 alone shot 
almost as much as NTNF had shot in the previous four years. The 
Directorate also started to receive all the seismic material from the 
North Sea. There can be no doubt that the Directorate with four 
petroleum geophysicists on its staff at the time of the third round was 
perfectly capable of interpreting the available geological data.
The Directorate also helped to evaluate the expected capital costs. 
From the early 1970s Phillips had to file information about the actual 
cost of investment in the North Sea with the Department of Industry. 
By the time phase II of Ekofisk was finished in 1974, which included 
the installation of five fixed platforms and one storage tank, the 
Directorate's knowledge of the ongoining investment conditions on the 
Norwegian Shelf was extensive., The Ekofisk costs became of great 
importance to the Norwegian state as a basis for assessing the likely
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capital cost of installations in the North Sea, to the extent that the 
1975 special tax proposal was nicknamed 'Lex Ekofisk 1 . In addition,
the Oil Directorate had access to all the structural drawings of the
53 installations so that not only the costs, but also other and equally
relevant information, was available to the Norwegian negotiators.
But present investment costs are not necessarily representative 
for future costs, and it was always possible for the company negotiators 
to claim that Ekofisk was 'unrepresentative 1 cost-wise. On this back- 
ground it is understandable that one of the factors which in December 
1974 made the Norwegian cabinet change its mind over the initial excess 
profit tax proposals was the news that the cost of the Frigg field had 
increased by $600 mill. On the other hand, the Department of 
Industry's negotiators from 1973 onwards started to gain access to 
the expertise of Statoil, whose representatives were present at all 
negotiating sessions. While in the very beginning this might have 
been of relatively little importance, at the end of 1974 Statoil had 
118 employees, many of them with long experience in the oil industry, 
and who if properly used, could have strengthened the Norwegian 
negotiating position.
To strengthen its negotiating position the state should also have had 
access to independent expertise for evaluating production possibilities 
from future fields. The Norwegian Oil Directorate provided such expert- 
ise, in the form of personnel who mastered production geology and 
reservoir technology.
By the end of 1974 the Norwegian state therefore seemed to have 
adequate information of their negotiating position in the North Sea. 
One of the state's major handicaps from the former negotiating rounds 
had thus been removed, and we can virtually eliminate the shortcomings 
of information as an important explanatory variable for the outcome of 
the negotiations of the third round.
7.5 DIVISION OF RENT
We will now turn to what the third round agreements of 1974/75 
meant for the division of rent between the Norwegian state and the 
companies.
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7.5.1 Exploration costs
The acreage on offer in 1974 was geologically of a more unknown 
quality than the Brent blocks had been in 1972. We have therefore
chosen an average find-rate of one in ten, a figure also used by
57 Chevron. This is a very conservative average, both compared with
the assumptions regarding the Brent blocks and the average find-rate in
the N<
five.
orwegian sector, which until then had been a remarkable one in 
58
Because general exploration costs had increased and two of the
blocks offered were in deep water, we have increased the assumed average
59 cost of an exploration well to $4.8m. or 20% up from the 1972 figure.
Any increase in costs beyond that must be set against the continuous 
technological development that was taking place in the North Sea at the 
time. Directional drilling had initially turned out to be difficult 
in the northern parts due to large holes and soft formations. But, 
according to OGJ, "Several years of work in developing new techniques 
and new drilling fluids have helped to overcome the hole problems." To' 
average exploration costs would there have been an estimated $48 mill.
7.5.2 Development costs
By the time the Norwegian third round of concessions was 
negotiated, much more was known about the cost levels in the North Sea 
as a result of the development of the Ekofisk and Forties fields. For 
the first time loading of oil directly into tankers on the field rather 
than transporting it through pipelines was seriously raised as a 
possibility of transport. One reason for this was that laying a pipe- 
line was turning out to be extremely expensive, not the least because 
existing deep-water pipe-laying barges were in short supply at the 
time. It was therefore clear that the construction of a pipeline 
could only be economical for the very largest fields, unless smaller 
fields could be linked to existing pipelines.
We have assumed that on-field loading would be used for the 100m. 
to 400m. fields, while a pipeline system would be used for the 700m. 
and 1 billion fields. This is partly based on economic considerations, 
partly on security of supplies. The companies preferred not to rely 
on tanker loading for their larger fields, given the discontinuous 
nature of the production flows, especially throughout the winter. The
216
on-field loading development costs we have assumed to consist of one 
component which exhibits constant returns to scale and reflects the 
extra cost of the loading equipment. For a 200m. field this extra 
equipment consisted of two ELSEMs ('Exposed Location Single Buoy
/-o
Mooring System 1 ) totalling $8 mill. To this we have to add the 
second element of development costs, which existed whether the field was 
to be served by a pipeline or by field loading. Basing its derivation 
on costs per daily barrel we assume the final figure for a field with 
a maximum output of 40,000 bbls/d to have been between $3,400 
and $4,025. per daily barrel. We will bias our cost estimate 
towards the Lovegrove figure, as this was specifically constructed 
with offshore loading in mind. This yields a permanent cost component 
of $145 mill, for the 100m. field, giving total development cost for 
a 100m. field with on-field loading of $150 mill. Development costs for 
all other fields with direct loading can then be computed.
Due to the new technology of concrete platforms that had just been 
introduced in the North Sea by 1974, we have to discontinue our former 
procedure of simply multiplying the constant development cost share 
by seven and adding the pipeline costs to find the total costs for a 
700m. field. While steel platforms were still in use in the North Sea 
at the time, such a change in assumptions is necessary because the 
concrete platforms were a Norwegian invention, and any field developed 
in Norwegian waters would be under great pressure from the Norwegian 
state to order concrete platforms.
We assume an average pipeline cost of $1.8 mi 11./mile. This 
cost was in line with the expected average cost of laying the Forties 
pipeline ($1.6 mill./mile) when we take into account that the 
market for pipelaying barges was tightening, and was also close to
/- o
Baxendell's expectation of $2 mill./mile. But the distance from 
the allotted 1974 acreage to shore varied much more than in former 
rounds of concessions. The Maltfy deep-water blocks were almost 
immediately adjacent to the Norwegian coast, while the southern blocks 
were almost 200 miles from any likely spot of landing. While an 
average distance of 150 miles for the pipeline may be on the high 
side, it may help to neutralize the higher expected development costs 
in the deep-water blocks closest to shore. Average pipeline costs 
were therefore expected to total $1.8 x 150 mill. = $270 mill.
Lovegrove*s study can again be used to find the expected platform 
costs. His 800m. barrel field example of a concrete platform has a
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non-pipeline development cost of $930 mill., which for a 700m. field 
would yield a cost-component of $812 mill.
This would yield total development costs for a 700m. field of 
($270 mill. + $812 mill.) = $1082 mill, and the cost for a 1 billion 
field computed in a similar way to. .equal $1440 mill. This latter figure 
was exactly equal to Chevron's total cost for a similar sized field.
Our total expected development costs range between $1.50 and $1.40 
per barrel . This is slightly higher than aggregate figures presented
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by Brown in Smart and Saster who assumed $1.20/bbl, but towards the
bottom of the range of the OECD figures of $1.50-$2.00. 
7.5.5 Operating costs
The expected operating costs in 1974/75 were still uncertain 
because no field at the time was producing oil in the North Sea. 
There was a greater difference in expected operating costs per barrel 
than for any other cost category. Four studies gave operating costs 
as different as $0.23/bbl, $1.00/bbl, $1.53/bbl and $1.60/bbl. ?3
We will use an identical operating cost per barrel for the two 
kinds of production systems and give a relatively large weight to the 
tanker loading system. Bearing in mind that two of the planned fields 
with tanker loading at the time had the higher than average expected 
operating costs between $1.55 and $2.10 per barrel we feel the 
average MacKay figure (footnote 73) of $1.00/bbl should be biased 
upwards to $1.50/bbl. This is also reasonable in view of the higher 
figure used by Statoil (footnote 73).
Given the particular uncertainty about operating costs we have 
as before carried out a sensitivity analysis with both higher and 
lower operating costs.
7.5.4 Financing and debt
As suggested by Aronsen, we assume a continuous drop in the 
degree of self-financing from 1972 onwards as the capital needs for the 
development of new fields in the North Sea continuously increased. Some 
of the majors (like Shell and Esso) could still be expected to rely on 
their own self-generated funds. Other firms, however, relied on 
external finance for up to 90% of their investments. We have there- 
fore assumed an increased share of company debt compared with 1972 to
77 
50%, with Statoil showing a corresponding increase to 70%.
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We assume that the interest rates obtaining for developing a field
78 in the North Sea still were somewhat below the market rate, but that
they had increased in line with the general rise in interest rates as
world inflation accelerated from 1973 onwards. As an average we assume
79 a rate of 11% running over 7 years with 2 years' grace. The easier
repayment conditions In 1974 compared with 1972 can be seen partly in 
the efforts made by specialised bodies like the European Energy Bank 
to foster a higher degree of self-sufficiency in the European energy 
market.
7.5.5 Price
The export price of 34° Arab Light was 1/1/75 set at $10.46 
(the posted price was $11.25) 0 Assuming for simplicity a fixed trans- 
port cost per barrel from the Gulf to Europe of $l/bbl independently
of the world spot rate, and sulphur-premium of 45<f:/bbl, and a 
fixed profit margin per barrel of 22<f/bbl (introduced by the OPEC 
countries in January 1975), we arrive at a possible market price of 
crude around $12.10/bbl, on the assumption that North Sea oil would 
not undersell Middle East oil. But this is not an absolutely correct 
price for North Sea oil, because of transport costs from the tanker- 
loading field to the refinery. We have previously not been forced to 
take this factor into account as we have only assumed pipeline transport. 
Also the size of the profit margin and transport costs from the Gulf
make a price of $12.10/bbl less certain. We have consequently chosen
82 
a conservative market price of $11.50/bbl.
7.5.6 Development of costs/revenues
The OPEC countries 1 price rise of 1973/74 could have been regarded 
as a 'once and for all' increase which had restored the real price of 
oil to what it had been in the late 1940s. Disregarding the frequent 
predictions about the 'inevitable 1 break-up of OPEC, it would never- 
theless seem a reasonable assumption at the end of 1974 that the main 
future battle for the OPEC countries would be to try to maintain rather 
than further raise the real price of oil. We will assume that this fight 
would only be expected to be partially successful and that the real price of 
oil would decrease by 1% p.a., i.e. the expected rise in costs in line with 
average world inflation rates of 7% would be parallelled by an increase 
in price of 6%. 83
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7.5.7 Other assumptions
Participation-rate: In the 1974 concessions the principle of flexible 
participation rates depending upon the top level of production84 were 
for the first time introduced. Little detailed information has been 
released about the magnitude of state participation except that 
Statoil's initial participation rate was to be 50% in four and 55% 
in the fifth concession, which were issued in 1974. The top level 
rate of participation was stipulated to be 75%. 85 We assume that a 
maximum level of participation is reached for fields larger than 1 
billion barrels recoverable reserves (a gigantic field by any 
standards). Because it is stated "that in virtually all areas where
commercial finds are made Statoil's participation share will be above
Rf\ 50%", we assume that the participation rate starts at 55% for a
100m. field and increases by 2.5% for each 100m. barrel field until 
it reaches 70% for a 700m. field. It then reaches 75% for the 1 
billion field. 87
Depreciation; Straight-line 6 years.
Corporation tax: 50.8% of net income before corporation tax which 
is defined as:
Income - depreciation - interest - operating costs - royalty - losses
88 
carried forward - distributed dividends.
Special tax: 25% of f net profits'.
Discount rate: The 12% discount rate is a compromise between the 10% 
used by WM, and the 15% used by the Norwegian state, 91 but we have 
also used a higher discount rate in our sensitivity study.
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Assumptions 1974
Price $/bbl 11.50
Price Escalation % 6
Total exploration cost ($m.) 48
Development costs $m. 100 150
200 300
300 450
400 600
700 1,095
1,000 1,440
Discount rate 12
Operating costs ($/bbl) 1 0 50
Cost escalation (%) 7
Percentage debt (i) Company 50
(ii) Statoil 70
Rate of interest 11
Years grace 2
Years spread 7
PARTICIPATION
Scenario 1 - no repayment if exploration cost
100 55
200 57.5
300 60
400 62.5
700 70
1,000 75
7.6 RESULTS 1974
We can now estimate the likely division of the rent between the 
companies and the Norwegian state as they were expected to be when the 
negotiations for the 1974 blocks took place. The results are set out 
in Tables 7.1 - 7.9.
The price rise of 1973/74 was the one factor which overshadowed 
all others and which almost on its own redefined the exogenous circum- 
stances under which both the companies and the Norwegian state operated, 
The total PV of all fields grew so much that new taxes as well as 
renegotiations of the old contracts were urged. The increased amount 
of rent had also important consequences for the depletion debate (see
7.7 below). Even if costs by the time the third round agreements 
were about to be signed had almost doubled compared with 1972, the PV
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of the 700m. field had increased from $699 mill, to $2072 mill c or 
almost tripled (Table 7.1).
If the Norwegians had done nothing special to compensate for 
these fundamental changes, and simply continued with their 50% parti- 
cipation under the old tax rules, this would have left the companies 
with a very good return indeed (see p 0 224) and control over a large 
proportion of the rent. So again the Norwegian policy-makers reacted 
to changes in exogenous circumstances, this time by introducing a 
flexible participation scale and a new tax, the special profit tax. 
But the exact way this was done was a mirror image of the actions taken 
previously by the state, which tried to maintain the expected IRR of 
the oil companies at what the companies themselves claimed was a 
'reasonable 1 level, i.e. 20-25%. At the same time the state tried to 
get access to a maximum amount of the rent by direct equity ownership 
(Table 7.6).
Even if the effects of participation on IRR in no sense could be 
said to be negligible, its effect rapidly diminished as the size of 
the fields grew, because the relative importance of exploration costs 
decreased. While participation decreased the IRR for the 100m 0 field 
by 12%, for the 700m. field the decrease was reduced to 2.9% (Tables 
7.1 and 7.2). This is also seen in Table 7.6 where the amount of 
'hidden 1 participation declines as the field size increases. In 
particular it should be noted that the companies in 1974/75 were earning 
their highest ever rates of post-tax return on new investment in the 
North Sea (expected post-tax returns ranged between 22.6% for the 700m. 
field and 31.8% for the 200m. field). At the same time as they were 
bitterly complaining in public that they were in the process of being 
squeezed out by the new Norwegian and UK legislation. At least from a 
financial point of view, their claim seems largely to have been under- 
mined by our results. Turning to the sensitivity tests (Appendix F), 
we see that if the companies could have managed to accelerate their 
production, the post-tax, post-participation IRR would have increased 
to a staggering 72.1% for the 200m. field and 69.7% for the 700m. field. 
However, such an outcome should be counterbalanced by a possibility of 
even further increases in costs beyond our own estimates. But even a 
30% increase in total development costs would have meant a relatively 
modest decrease in the expected IRR of 3.5% for the 200m. field (from 
31.8% to 28.3%) and 3.5% (from 22.6% to 19.2%) for the 700m. field.
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Pre-tax IRR (%) 
Present Value ($m) 
Post-tax IRR (%) 
Net Present Value ($m)
Field: 100M 200M 300M 400M 700M 1 bill,
58.2 61.8 50.2 43.8 36.5 36.0
401.7 765.1 1005.3 1238.7 2072.3 3054.8
39.5 42 35.4 31.3 25.5 25.4
TABLE 7.2 PROJECT APPRAISAL AS SEEN BY THE COMPANY
Field: 100M
Pre-tax IRR (%)
Post-tax IRR (%)
Net Present Value ($m)
42
27
48
.4
.5
.8
200M
47
31
100
.6
.8
.4
300M
41
28
127
.1
.8
.2
400M
37
26
146
.1
.4
.7
700M
32
22
174
.4
.6
.7
1 bill
32.4
22.7
214.1
TABLE 7.3 STATOIL'S POSITION
Pre-tax IRR (%)
Post-tax IRR (%)
Net Present Value ($m)
Field: 100M 200M
145.1 125.1
109.2 90.3
87.3 170
300M 
79.4 
59.1 
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400M 
62 
46.3 
269.9
700M 
45 
32.4 
497.2
1 bill. 
42.7 
30.9 
761.3
TABLE 7.4 TOTAL STATE TAKE FROM BOTH EQUITY AND TAXES
As if no participation 
Scenario No.l
Field: 100M 200M 300M 400M 700M 1 bill
67.1 65.7 65.5 65.6 69.3 69.6
87.9 86.9 87.4 88.2 91.6 93.0
TABLE 7.5 THE IMPORTANCE OF PARTICIPATION
Scenario No.l
Field: 100M 200M 300M 400M 700M 1 bill, 
24.6 25.5 26.4 27 26 26.6
* For a clarification of the meaning of each table, see Chapter 5, pp. 158-160 
See also pp.107-109.
TABLE 7.6 THE PROPORTION OF PRESENT VALUE ACCRUING TO STATOIL
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Statoil's proportion 
Disguised participation
Field: 100M 200M 300M 400M 700M 1 bill 
61.1 61.0 62.9 65.1 72.0 76.6
(11) (6) (5) (4) (3) (2)
TABLE 7.7 TRADITIONAL MEASURE OF STATE PERFORMANCE (discounted)
Field: 100M 200M 300M 400M 700M 1 bill 
69.1 66.6 66.3 66.5 70.5 70.8
TABLE 7.8 STATE'S SHARE OF RENT FROM ALL SOURCES (undiscounted)
Field: 100M 200M 300M 400M 700M 1 bill 
85.3 85.8 86.8 88.0 91.0 92.6
TABLE 7.9 TRADITIONAL 'TAKE' (undiscounted)
Field: 100M 200M 300M 400M 700M 1 bill. 
65.4 65.8 66.6 67.6 69.8 70.3
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Thus, even if costs had gone up further, all that was needed to 
counterbalance such a development would have been a modest increase 
in the speed with which a field was exploited. Cheaper operating 
costs by 30% would have only meant a marginal increase in the 
companies' IRR of 0.9% for a 700m. field.
Expected IRRs on the new fields were therefore by any criterion 
generous. When we examine the return on fields that had already been 
developed during the period when costs were much lower, returns were
indeed staggering. Wood MacKenzie assessed as late as October 1975 the
93 
IRR on Ekofisk to be no less than 66%.
The introduction of the special tax in 1974 upset the marginally 
downward trend of the state's pure tax take, which had been observed 
from the second round onwards. So even if a large slice of total state 
income would originate from the state's ownership of Statoil (a maximum 
of 27% for the 400m. field - Table 7.5), this slice was less than in 
1972, even if the rate of participation was at its maximum 25% higher. 
But despite this trend towards a levelling out of the importance of the 
equity share around 30% of PV, the state's total share of the rent 
when both taxes and equity income are included reached on average the 
high 80s in both discounted and undiscounted terms (Tables 7.7 and 7.9),
with corresponding 'traditional takes' of 70.5% and 59.8% for a
94 hypothetical 700m. field.
7.7 VOLUME
From 1971 onwards there had been continuous postponements in the 
allocation of new acreage on the Norwegian Continental Shelf, even if 
there was never any coherent or very explicit justification for such 
a policy. A full justification was finally presented in St.meld, no.25 
(1973-74), which launched a debate on the optimal rate of Norwegian 
production which has continued ever since. Because the limit on output 
was probably the most controversial aspect of Norwegian oil policies, 
and a key factor in understanding the Norwegian state's negotiation 
position in 1974, it will be examined in some detail. The question of 
volume controls also threw up a number of problems in the relationship 
between nation states and oil companies, which at the time were unique 
to Norway.
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First, the justification for a depletion control (to the extent 
that it has existed) changed over time. Initially such controls were 
seen in relation to the immediate and direct effects they had on the 
oil industry. As a result of the increase in the price of oil in 
1973-74, this perspective changed and the indirect consequences became 
the main justifying force.
Evensen summarised the earlier reasons for the Norwegian state's 
initial reluctance to maximize the output from the North Sea as: 
" - a wish to gain experience and knowledge", 
" - a wish to develop a strict and independent oil policy", 
" - a belief that these areas (the Norwegian Continental 
Shelf - PN) will increase enormously in importance and value 
with the ever-increasing demand for oil and gas",
" - the wish to reserve these potentials for coming
96 generations".
97 The justifications are fairly standard within the context of
state/company relationships. The two first reasons were clearly 
related to the wish to increase the Norwegian state's bargaining 
position in relation to the oil companies, while the third simply 
constituted an attempt to apply the principles of the optimal conditions 
for the exploitation of a natural resource. The fourth represented a 
debateable general philosophical principle.
But what is important about these reasons is not what they say, 
but rather what they don't say. There is no mention of the indirect 
effects of oil production on the Norwegian economy, the element which 
later was to totally dominate the Norwegian oil debate. The first to 
point to such indirect effects was Seland (1973), who already in 
December 1971 speculated about the effects of an annual Norwegian oil 
production of 150m. tonnes. While no-one at the time seriously thought 
that Norwegian oil production would reach such levels, the substance of
Seland's vision was interesting enough. He predicted that in such a
98 
case Norwegian exports would price themselves out of the world market,
and the Norwegians would end up "building for each other, teaching each
99
other and shaving each other". His prediction that Norway would be- 
come what amounted to a 'rentier state' had a lot in common with 
Mabro's analysis of the development in Libya. But Seland did not 
choose an oil producing state as his example. Instead he used the 
structural changes in the USA between 1850 and 1870 when the huge 
production of grain for export from the US mid-west priced the traditional
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US export industries centred on the east coast (like ship-building and 
shipping) out of the world market.
The indirect effects of oil production as described in St.meld. 
no.25 were mainly a result of the large amounts of oil rents which 
would accrue to the Norwegian economy from each produced unit of oil. 
The effect of this factor is therefore proportional to the price (or 
more correctly the profit margin per barrel) of crude, and were of 
relatively minor importance until the price of crude dramatically started 
to increase. It is on this background that Naustalslid's criticism 
that the Norwegian state did not adequately prepare itself for the full 
impact of the oil age, is partly misplaced, as this impact only became 
crucial after 1973/74.
The first indirect effect related to the deep-seated consequences 
of oil production on the industrial structure. It was initially 
estimated that the increase in aggregate demand from oil would make
up to 80,000 workers, or one fifth of all workers in industries exposed
102 to international competition, change their jobs in the period to 1980.
The main mechanism for this process was the Ministry of Finance's 
estimate that for each Kr. 1 bill, in added income spent within Norway 
there would be a transfer of 8000 jobs from the internationally 
competitive 'external 1 sector of the Norwegian economy to activities
which exclusively catered for the protected internal market in the
i u i- j ^ . 103 
'sheltered sector'.
It is curious that the Ministry of Finance in its discussion 
explicitly ruled out a second indirect consequence of oil production, 
which would have operated through the exchange-rate mechanism. While 
it assumed that the Norwegian Krone would be in a stronger position as 
a consequence of the large income from oil, it claimed that this 
"will not harm those industries exposed to competition" because it 
would keep domestic price-rises down. Such an argument completely ruled 
out the crucial effect that a higher exchange rate would have on the 
competitiveness of traditional Norwegian exports on the world market. 
The stronger Krone would lead to the closure of a number of these 
industries, which helped to maintain a decentralised industrial 
structure. Given the peculiarities of the Norwegian social formation, 
with its emphasis on decentralization and regional balance, this was 
a development that no Norwegian government could have remained indifferent 
to. A particularly powerful element in the opposition to such induced 
structural changes, which especially were expected to hit the textile
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and food-processing industries was found to be among women; as a dis- 
proportionate number of the workers expected to change jobs due to the 
indirect effects of oil would have been women.
Based on its analysis of the indirect effects of oil, the Ministry 
of Finance assumed that a yearly maximum of Kr. 6 bill, should by 1980 
be added to Norwegian internal aggregate demand. While not justifying 
this fiture in any detail, it is clear that such an injection (an
estimated 3-4% increase in total demand) represented an upper 'toler-
107 ance limit' for structural changes in Norwegian society. It is
also possible to argue that an accelerated inflation could follow from 
a potential excess demand as a result of a decision to plough the pro- 
ceeds from a higher volume of production back into the economy. The 
reason was that the amount of money earned in the oil sector from a 
given amount of oil bears no relationship to the value of capital and 
labour expended in its production, due to the high level of rent in the 
oil price.
But whatever the reason given at the time for not rein ject ing all
oil revenues into the domestic economy, it was clear that the differ-
ing 
ence between the expected oil income of Kr. 15 bill, per year and
the 'acceptable' level of domestic use of Kr. 6 bill, had to be disposed 
of through some kind of capital export. And there were legitimate 
questions asked why Norway should increase its oil production simply 
to increase this capital export. This was especially so if this
exported capital would only realize a rate of return on the international
109 
money market which was below the current rate of inflation.
In addition to the indirect effects there were also other and more 
direct effects related to employment in oil production and the spinoff 
industries. By attracting, often in an unplanned manner, labour from 
peripheral areas, it was thought the oil industry would drastically 
accelerate the break-up of the traditional social and economic structures 
of the society.
But there were (and still are) other potentially threatening 
direct effects from oil activities. The dangers of an environmental 
catastrophe in the North Sea is an element that constantly contributes 
to the opposition to a fast level of exploration. A full-scale blowout 
of a well under winter conditions in the North Sea could take 6 months
to control, by which time 1% million tons of oil may flow into the
sea. The consequences of a blowout could be disastrous for the
environment in general and the fishing industry in particular. The
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increased weight given to environmental and ecological consequences of 
Norwegian oil activities has also meant a general distrust towards 
further industrialization of Norway based on oil. This has for 
example led to vigorous opposition to the establishment of new petro- 
chemical industries in Norway, with a corresponding decrease in the 
need for a high production volume in Norway.
To exemplify what is meant by an 'acceptable 1 rate of depletion 
in view of the indirect effects of oil production, the Ministry of 
Finance used an output of 90 mill, tons of oil equivalent. While the 
90 mill, tons figure was only meant as an illustration, and in effect 
was at least partly chosen on the assumption that the equivalent of
one more Ekofisk would be found on existing acreage on the Norwegian
112 Shelf, the figure soon took on an almost mythical character. Some
political parties (SV and Senterpartiet) argued that 50 mill, tons per 
year was an acceptable output, while 90 mill, tons was too high, without 
specifying in any detail why this was so. But the suggested 'roof on 
production was also attacked on more theoretical grounds by Norman, 
something that drew a quick and dismissive answer from the Ministry of 
Finance.
The theoretical arguments just referred to had clear political 
overtones. Norman's objections were taken up by Conservative MP 
Arnljot Str^mme Svendsen, who used his arguments to argue in favour 
of a higher 'roof on Norwegian oil production. Apart from this, 
opposition to this aspect of Norwegian policies was widespread inter- 
nationally. According to The Times such a restriction of output was 
"the most controversial aspect of Norwegian policies" which on many 
occasions were attacked by oil-company representatives outside Norway. 
The reasons for this opposition were manifold, but one important aspect 
was the international oil situation when it became clear both to 
Western governments and to the companies that North Sea supplies were 
extremely valuable to them. William Dullforce explained this when in 
response to a question of what the companies' interest could be in the 
Norwegian Shelf in the light of the stiff conditions of the third round,
he wrote, "The answer is a reasonable, if modest, profit, but above all
117 
an assured source of supply in times of shortage". On this background
it is understandable that the Managing Director of Norwegian Esso should 
call for an increase in the output from the Norwegian Shelf to an 
annual production of 120 million tons per year. He gave only two 
reasons for such a stand: "expectations of the rest of Western Europe"
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and and the need for extra income to finance the further developments
"    * 118 in Norwegian waters.
A number of well-known oil economists got involved in the Norwegian 
depletion debate. Their theoretical justification for an increase in 
production differed. Adelman (1975) used a combination of commercial 
and political criteria in order to justify a maximum rate of output from 
Norwegian sources. His main economic argument was based on the assump- 
tion that the OPEC cartel would break in the not too distant future and 
that consequently oil prices were destined to drop dramatically. For 
Norway therefore to resist the rapid exploration of a resource which
it would not be economical to produce in a few years' time was, according
119 to Adelman, clear folly. Concerning the problem about the excess of
revenues accruing to the Norwegian state, both Adelman and another
120 
critic of the Norwegian policies, Qdell, suggested the rational (and
theoretically totally feasible) solution of exporting the excess 
revenues. Adelman claimed that this might be no problem "because the
international capital market is a known territory for a number of
121 Norwegians", and even went to the length of suggesting that Norway
set up family planning clinics in India and Bangladesh (sic) to dispose 
of the financial surplus. Odell recognized the potentially disruptive 
aspects of a rapid depletion of the oil for the structure of the 
Norwegian economy, but as a suggested solution stated that "Surely it
is not beyond the ability of Europe's sophisticated financial circles
122 to devise appropriate means whereby these problems can be avoided".
This could only mean capital export in some form or another. In line 
with this point of view, the Norwegian CBI urged that "a considerable
part of future oil incomes ... ought to be made available for economic
123 
activity in other countries in the form of capital exports from Norway".
There is no doubt that there could have been a technical solution to 
the problem of rapid depletion on the Norwegian Shelf, in the form of 
capital exports. What made the Norwegian situation more problematic 
was that this solution was not politically acceptable.
Odell also advanced a number of other points in favour of increased 
Norwegian production which were more immediately relevant to Europe's 
situation, and which fell within his repeated calls for a policy of
*1 O A
autarchy in the field of energy for Europe. He argued that Norway, 
by increasing its production, could provide some guarantee against the 
OPEC cartel's strong control over supply of energy to Western Europe, 
and the ensuing possibility of political and social unrest on the
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125 European continent. But he didn't confront the awkward question of
why it should be in Norway's interest to undermine the power of OPEC, 
seeing that Norway's interests in keeping high oil prices were virtually 
identical with OPEC's. It is also difficult to claim that say an 
extra 50m. tons output per year from Norwegian waters would make any 
crucial difference to Western Europe's energy supplies. So it is 
legitimate to guess that there were also other reasons behind Odell's 
argument. Perhaps the most likely explanation was that a loosening of 
the volume controls would lead to a corresponding decrease in the 
overall pressure on the individual companies. The two were seen to be 
interrelated because the cry for tight control of the companies was 
first voiced in a coherent manner by St.meld, no.25.
A final possible reason for Odell's stand could have been the
argument that the development of Norwegian oil resources would enhance
1 Jf\ 
Europe's competitiveness vis-a-vis the US.
But all these arguments were basically irrelevant to the 
Norwegian state at that particular time in history.. Norway could not 
be expected to feel much responsibility for European capitalism as a 
whole, especially in the aftermath of the Norwegian EEC referendum. And 
Norway was already planning to produce ten times as much oil as it needed 
for its own consumption, with the corresponding absorption problems. 
So not surprisingly neither Odell's nor Adelman's pleas for a faster 
rate of extraction got any kind of overt support from the Norwegian 
state.
It is interesting to note that an alternative way to decrease the 
expected excess revenues, but which was neither mentioned by Odell nor 
Adelman, was the purchase by the state of foreign industry in Norway.
This policy was explicitly mentioned in St.meld, no.25 as a rational
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alternative to capital exports, as it would have the same consequences
with respect to aggregate demand within Norway. Presumably its political 
implications were too threatening to discuss in further detail.
7.8 SPINOFFS
Following the early disappointments of the Norwegian spinoff 
industries, culminating in the great majority of the orders for work 
on Phase III of the Ekofisk work being awarded to foreign firms, the 
situation began to change in 1973/74. Norwegian industry started to
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make its presence felt in a number of key fields like rig-building, 
concrete construction and supply-ship building. On the other hand, 
Norwegian industry was still unable to penetrate a number of the more 
sophisticated industries related to offshore activities. In addition 
the period saw a clarification in the future of the Norwegian petro- 
chemical industry. This whole process took place under the strict 
guidance and influence of the Norwegian state, whose role in relation 
to the national and largely private spinoff industry became more 
visible than ever.
The first Norwegian drilling rig was completed in 1967, but no 
large-scale production got under way until the Aker H-5 design won 
favour with the rig contractors. The H-3 prototype, a semi-submers- 
ible rig which was specifically designed to operate in rough water 
conditions on the Continental Shelf, was put on the market exactly at 
the moment the oil world's interest started to centre in earnest on 
the North Sea. The first H-3 was contracted in 1971 and delivered in
early 1974. By mid 1974 Norwegian yards were contracted to build 18
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semi-submersible rigs, 17 of which were of the H-3 design. In
addition Aker exported the H-3 design to other shipyards in Singapore,
129 Japan and Finland. The majority of the rigs built under the
Norwegian flag were contracted to Norwegian ship owners, whose role
in the drilling-rig market was akin to their former role in the tanker
130 
market. By May 1975 a total of 65 rigs with a Norwegian ownership
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share representing 75% of all rigs in the world, were under con- 
struction or on order; 20 of these rigs were to be built in Norway.
We were thus witnessing a sudden and dramatic growth in the 
Norwegian share of the world's rig market. In addition to Norwegian 
ship-owners building H-3s at Norwegian yards, and thus supporting 
Norwegian spinoff industries, Norwegian yards also gained orders for
direct export to other countries, even if these orders only accounted
133 for one-eighth of the total value. 10% of all Norwegian shipyard
134 
workers were employed in building rigs in 1973 and 1974. On this
background it is hardly surprising that one Scottish newspaper wrote, 
"Norway is emerging as a leading force in a field of expertise
(drilling-rigs - PN) which was until recently largely dominated by
135 the US". But given the likely demand for rigs in the North Sea,
it was already clear at this early date that not all Norwegian rigs 
could gain employment in home waters,>but were forced to seek employ- 
ment elsewhere.
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The construction of the Ekofisk tank by Norwegian firms represented 
a breakthrough in the use of concrete in offshore waters. But it was 
the Condeep (from the term 'Concrete Deepwater Structure') design which
was in this period to become the great success as far as the Norwegian
1 "^6 
spinoff industry was concerned. The first Condeeps to be ordered
were built by a group of Norwegian entrepreneurs - Norwegian Contractors, 
after specifications made by the Civil Engineering firm H^yer-Ellefsen. 
Each of the structures required around 500 man-years to be finished, 
and cost between £20 and £30 mill. (Kr. 3-400 mill.) including the 
decks, which were also made in Norway. The third order came in the 
autumn of 1974 for a booster platform in the Frigg field, and by 1975 
the Condeep licence had been extended to the UK and Sweden, and
a total of five platforms were on
order. According to Industriens Servickontor, these orders 
represented a total value of more than Kr. 3 bill., compared with 
Kr. 32.3 bill, for the total value of Norwegian exports in 1975, but 
the national/international division of the order was diametrically
opposite to that of the drilling rigs. 84% of the orders represented
138 foreign orders, while only one order went to Norwegian waters.
The final field where the Norwegian national spinoff industry did 
very well was in the field of supply ships. As the activity in the 
North Sea picked up, the demand for supply ships also increased. It
is estimated that each rig needs on average 4 supply ships to function
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satisfactorily. ' , As was the case with the exploration platforms,
Norwegian ship-owners often operating in consortia played an important 
part in this development. Norwegian owners had by the beginning 
of 1974 a 50% share of all supply ships under order in Northern European 
yards; 50% of which again were built in Norway. The ships were often 
built at small or medium-sized yards along the Norwegian coast, and 
were thus very important for regional employment. In addition to 
Norwegian orders, there were foreign orders for 30 ships, worth Kr. 
600 mill, at Norwegian yards. Again, Norwegian supply ships 
branched out to other parts of the world, as it was clear that the 
Norwegian fleet of 150 ships could not all be employed in the North 
Sea.
Despite the great success of Norwegian spinoff industries in a 
few fields, this was not a generalized phenomenon. In the supply of 
more advanced drilling technology Norway was without any possibilities 
of catching up with the more traditional suppliers. The same was the
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case with production of pipelines and pipeline barges. So that total 
Norwegian deliveries as a percentage of total investment on the
Norwegian Continental Shelf in the period up to the beginning of
143 1975 had been as low as 15%. But this was an average figure, and
therefore included, for example, the whole investment programme for 
the first phases of Ekofisk, where no major Norwegian order (except 
for the storage tank) was secured. As we have seen, the Norwegian
record became progressively better as time went on. It also conceals
144 the 40% export content of the Norwegian spinoff effort. And when
viewed in absolute terms, taking into account the relative smallness 
of the Norwegian industrial sector, we see that the total production 
for the spinoff industries totalled Kr. 2.5-3.0 bill, in 1974,
increasing to Kr. 5 bill, in 1975. This compares with the total
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value of Norwegian exports in 1973 of Kr. 23 bill.
One of the key results of the negotiations concerning a pipeline 
to Norway conducted in the spring of 1973 was that Phillips guaranteed 
the Norwegian government sufficient quantities of NGL to produce 
250,000 tons of ethylene annually over a period of 15 years, to be 
delivered to a non-specified point in southern Norway.
Such an agreement was very favourable for the establishment of a 
Norwegian petrochemical industry. It meant first a guarantee of 
long-run stability of supply for the new industry, a factor which
should make the whole project more competitive compared with a number
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of other European petrochemical plants. But in addition the deal
also guaranteed very favourable prices for the NGL. There was a fixed
price escalation factor of 3% p.a., well below the expected rate of
inflation. No freight would be charged for the transport of the
NGL from Teesside to Bamble in Telemark which was earmarked to
148 become the site for th6 new industry. If the Norwegian state wanted
to buy more than 250,000 tons p.a. it could do so at a price that would
149 
also decrease in relation to the world market price over time.
These price and supply conditions negotiated by the Norwegian 
state would automatically benefit whichever companies which in the end would 
control the petrochemical production. It is therefore hardly surprising 
that there was an intense conflict about which company was to exercise 
this control. A Negotiating Committee established to work this out 
failed to reach an agreement when it submitted its recommendations i 
in October 1973. Further discussions, chaired by Statoil, likewise 
failed to bring any solutions, but on 24 January 1974 the three main
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firms involved: Statoil, SAGA and Hydro, accepted the government's 
proposed solution. The final solution was much less than the private 
sector had hoped for. A cracker was to be built in Ramble, and to be 
operated as a joint venture, Hydro having a 51% interest, SAGA 16% and 
Statoil 33%. A separate joint venture will be responsible for the 
polyolefines plant, where each of the three firms would have 33% of 
the interest. The total investment cost was estimated to be Kr.1.6 
bill. and the majority of the products would be sold within 
Scandinavia.
In their attitude to the petrochemical industry, the political 
parties reflected an almost 'normal 1 attitude in their relationship to 
state/private industry. SV on the left wanted SAGA excluded from the 
projects, and advocated a 50/50 division between Statoil and Hydro. 
The Labour Party supported the final proposition; the centre/right 
parties, with the exception of the Conservatives, wanted to restrict
Statoil's role to 10% in both instances; while the Conservatives
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wanted only a cooperation between Hydro and SAGA.
7.8.1 The state's role
To understand the development of the spinoff industry, we will 
concentrate on an explanation which highlights the policies and inter- 
vention of the Norwegian state in this process. The tightening of the 
rules guiding the use of Norwegian goods and services in the Royal 
Decree of December 1972 was to a limited extent important. But this 
essentially 'passive' means of controlling the purchase pattern of the 
companies met with a number of difficulties, which the Norwegian govern- 
ment could do little to redress. Norwegian firms complained about the 
very short time period given to them before answers for tenders had to 
be given, as well as the very demanding and extensive tender documents 
that had to be completed by the firms. It therefore seems that this 
approach which in theory might have done a lot to increase the Norwegian 
share, in practice turned out to be less than fully successful.
The key importance for the Norwegian spinoff industry during this 
period was the formation of Statoil. Norwegian policy-makers were in 
this respect placed in a real dilemma about Statoil's role. While there 
could be no doubt that Statoil was meant to actively promote the supply 
of Norwegian spinoff industries, Norway's offshore industry would 
also have to export its products to the rest of the world. There was
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a familiar and potential contradiction between moves towards Norwegian 
protectionism and Norway's needs for non-restricted export markets. 
The solution which was found highlighted the ideological nature of the 
problem under discussion. The government stated that the production 
of supply ships and drilling rigs were exempted from the provisions of 
the Royal Decree of December 1972, because "as a leading shipping 
nation we must be careful with regulations which can be perceived to 
be discriminatory policies". (Discrimination was thus exluded from 
the part of the spinoff industry where Norwegian industry had been 
most successful and consequently needed it least.) At the same time 
Statoil and the Ministry of Industry were engaged in a supply policy 
which to all intents and purposes were discriminatory, and which 
actively served to safeguard the interests of the Norwegian industry. 
We are here referring to the consequence of Statoil f s presence on a 
number of operating committees. While in the cases where there was no 
state participation (as in Ekofisk), Norwegian interests were taken 
care of by representatives of the Department of Industry and the 
Petroleum Directorate, this role was taken over in a more direct and 
active way by Statoil in the cases where state participation had been 
negotiated. There can be little doubt that Statoil's membership of the 
operating committees could partly explain the much better 
Norwegian share in the Statfjord field. 156 On the Statfjord field 
Statoil as the biggest single partner exercises a veto power over 
the subcontracting (but not necessarily a decisive voice). With Statoil 
on the operating committees the chances of pushing Norwegian firms to 
enter the bids for orders, or simply discriminating in their favour, 
was much greater than when this role was only fulfilled by the Oil 
Directorate.
7.9 STATOIL
Our next task is to analyse the increasingly important role of 
Statoil in Norwegian oil policy and the reaction to this growth both 
from the companies and from the Norwegian bourgeoisie. When Statoil 
was formed on 1 January 1973, it was a completely open question what 
kind of company it would become. The two approaches to the future of 
the company, outlined in Chapter 6, stood strongly against one another, 
But by the end of 1974 it had become increasingly clear that Statoil
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was in no sense becoming a passive and subservient state oil company, 
but was developing into an autonomous vertically integrated company. 
Full vertical integration for Statoil was an explicit aim of the
Norwegian government. By 1974 Statoil was rapidly becoming involved 
in exploration, exploitation and transportation projects on the Norwegian 
Shelf. It was further set to enter petrochemical production while
wanting to buy a share in the refinery which was being built by Hydro
159 
and BP on the Western Coast near Mongstad.
Because of the political weakness of the Korvald government of 
1972/73, which was fully preoccupied with the EEC question, Statoil 
received few detailed instructions during its first year of existence, 
and the company had a relatively free hand to engage in all 'suitable 1 
projects related to oil activities (as stated by its first charter voted 
by Stortinget in June 1972). Following its creation Statoil immediately 
started to prepare itself to become an active participant in the search 
for oil. The company first took over all the state's 'carried- 
interest 1 agreements in the North Sea. As a consequence the company 
needed more capital, which it obtained from Stortinget. As a 
result of the stipulation in the participation agreements Statoil became 
directly represented on the operating committees in the Frigg 
field and participated from the very start in the exploration of the 
Brent blocks. But no direct representation was obtained on the 
Ekofisk field.
In the spring of 1974 it became clear beyond any doubt that Statoil
would actively be favoured by the Norwegian state in the field of opera-
2 2 tion. 9 blocks (2 of which however were only 1km and 12km ) had been
given specially to Statoil in 1973, and Statoil's plans about how to 
exploit them were presented to the Ministry of Industry on 8 February 
1974. They were all located in the vicinity of or were actually 
border blocks with the UK; but some of them were earlier 
relinquished acreage which probably was of bad quality simply because 
of the way that relinquishment had taken place in the past. Statoil was 
given a relatively free hand about how to develop these nine blocks; 
for example, whether it should choose major companies as partners. 
But it was still made clear by the Norwegian authorities that all the 
normal safety rules would have to be obeyed. The productive upstream 
role of Statoil was further confirmed when Statoil became operator in 
three blocks offered in November 1974 and announced that it was planning 
to drill itself in the southern part of the North Sea in 1975.
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In addition to these activities, Statoil acquired the expertise 
to interpret seismic data during the summer of 1974, and set up a 
commercial geological data bank (STATEX) together with another state 
company, Kongsberg Vapenfabrikk.
While there can be no doubt that Statoil was planned to become 
an operative company from the start, there were nevertheless shades of 
differences among the advocates of an active role for the company. The 
Oil Council in a letter of 17 November 1973 stressed the high risk and 
heavy capital commitments that an operative role for Statoil implied, 
and advocated that initially Statoil should concentrate on "especially 
promising blocks which can be satisfactorily explored by a relatively 
simple work programme".
7.9 0 1 Statoil and the Norwegian oil companies
St.meld, no.30 (1973-74) was a final confirmation that the small 
Norwegian oil companies such as DNO and Norse would get no cooperation 
from the Norwegian state, either in the form of concessions or in 
financial or technical help. Despite intense lobbying from some
I (_ -7
quarters, there was a fairly unanimous opinion that these companies, 
to quote the Director of Statoil, A. Johnsen, "are only oil companies 
in name", which contributed nothing to the development of Norwegian 
technical and commercial expertise. The Labour Party faction of the 
Industrial Committee of Stortinget in the spring of 1974 further 
rejected the small companies because their lack of technical expertise 
would make them more likely to be subject to pressure from the inter- 
national oil companies.
But in opposition to the state's hostile attitude towards the 
small companies, there was a continued sympathy for the position of 
SAGA. The government made it clear that even if Statoil was seen as
the main instrument of Norwegian oil policies, SAGA still had a role 
to play even as operator on the Norwegian Shelf. The roles of Hydro and 
SAGA were explicitly taken into account when Statoil was awarded the 
nine key blocks in the beginning of 1974. The exploitation of these 
blocks should aim "specifically at promoting further development of 
the Norwegian oil industry and coordination within that industry, giving 
it the desired concentration and efficiency" (PN emphasis). The 
state's attitude towards SAGA in the field of exploration must also be 
seen in relation to the development of the Norwegian spinoff industries.
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SAGA was given a foothold in the new petrochemical industry and it is 
therefore important to evaluate SAGA's involvement as a whole.
Finally, there was an informal 'division of labour' worked out 
between SAGA and Statoil concerning the international involvement of 
the companies. During the discussion about the formation of Statoil, 
no principled position had been taken by the Norwegian state on whether 
Statoil should engage itself in non-Norwegian activities. But in an 
interview in 1974 Statoil's managing director Arve Johnsen said that, 
"We have such great tasks on the Norwegian Continental Shelf within the 
next one, two and three generations that we have no temptation to go 
out (beyond the Norwegian Shelf - PN). He added: "I regard it as 
natural that such groupings as SAGA have to look beyond the national 
boundaries.... It is only Statoil which has no need to do this, given
the formation of Norwegian oil policies."
The fact that SAGA received the full political support of the 
Norwegian bourgeoisie, in particular represented by the Norwegian 
Conservative Party, made Statoil's relationship to SAGA more complicated. 
Because the development of Statoil into a dynamic state oil corporation 
was thought to fit badly with the wishes of the Norwegian bourgeoisie, 
this social class fought a defensive 'holding' operation to slow down 
the growth of Statoil.
The initial strategy of the Norwegian bourgeoisie had been to make 
Statoil into a non-operative holding company. This was advocated by 
members of the Norwegian business community as well as by the Knudsen 
Committee. The director of Norsk Brendselolje (BP) claimed in 1972 
that the necessity for any company to be fully integrated would force 
the Norwegian government to invest Kr. 8-15 bill, into the venture, which 
he strongly argued against. While this led him to totally reject the 
concept of a state oil company, the idea was nevertheless promulgated 
at a later stage by the Conservative Party, who at the time had come to 
grips with the idea of a state company, but nevertheless fought against 
it becoming a powerful commercial entity.
Once Statoil was in operation, the Conservatives made a concerted
effort to limit the strength of the company. Like a sizeable group of
170 the centre parties they opposed the full vertical integration of Statoil.
SV, on the left of DNA, also took a similar stand, but this was based on 
completely different assumptions. While the party was fully in favour 
of full state ownership of downstream activities, SV thought that a 
system where other State companies undertook this task was preferable
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as it would give greater powers of control over the company to
171 Stortinget.
But the Conservatives wanted to go even further than the centre 
parties to limit the power of Statoil. They opposedall independent 
exploration activity by Statoil, opposed Statoil's creation of STATEX, 
and at one point suggested that Statoil should sell part of the state's 
rights acquired by the state through the 'carried interest 1 agreements
that had been taken over by Statoil. It was argued that such a move
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should be undertaken to decrease the capital requirements of Statoil.
When it became clear that Statoil would become a fully fledged 
vertically integrated company, the Conservatives finally tried to ensure 
that Statoil obtained no special competitive advantages. The opposition 
parties' objection to the presence of Statoil in the Department of 
Industry's negotiations with the international companies in connection 
with the third round must be seen as an expression of their fear that 
Statoil would be put in a favourable competitive situation compared 
with SAGA and Hydro.
So the centre/right parties first sought to make Statoil into 
a passive holding company. When this turned out to be impossible, they 
tried to prevent Statoil becoming a fully fledged vertically integrated 
company with a considerable capital base of its own. When Statoil 
finally became such a company, the Norwegian bourgeoisie, politically 
represented particularly by the Conservative Party, tried to minimize 
Statoil's 'crowding-out' effect on the private Norwegian oil sector, 
and tried to ensure that Statoil had to compete on an equal footing 
with firms in the private sector , and in particular SAGA.
SAGA also knew that it could not be totally disregarded by the 
Norwegian state in the long run. According to its Managing Director: 
"SAGA can never become a junior partner (in Norwegian oil policies - PN) 
because SAGA represents a too large part of the Norwegian economy." 
But SAGA was at the same time highly dissatisfied with the specific 
role it had been given on the Norwegian Continental Shelf. The company 
explicitly blamed this on the political authorities when it stated in 
a report to its shareholders: "It gives rise to worry that SAGA 
petroleum this time (during the third round of concessions - PN) will
not get the space (armslag) on the Norwegian Shelf which is commensur-
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ate with its financial strength and technical competence." And
despite being given the operator status on block 35/3 in 1975, as 
late as 1977 NH§ST summed up the situation in the following terms:
240.
"Norwegian privately owned oil companies have been 
given a very meagre chance of involvement on the 
Norwegian Shelf. The Norwegian authorities have given 
the state-owned Statoil clear preference and forced 
the private companies to invest abroad."
Statoil's relationship with Hydro was both easier (both being 
state firms) and more difficult (as potential competitors in the 
downstream market), than its relationship with SAGA. Johnsen even
described the two companies as half-sisters expecting no particular
1 1 f\ difficulties to arise in their relationship with one another.
Hydro was at the time criticised for investing abroad, when an MP 
argued that the maximum number of experts and capital was needed in 
the North Sea. Hydro retorted that it was not for the politicians 
to interfere in the running of the company, and that if Hydro was to 
take notice of such sentiments a whole new principled change had to 
take place in the relationship between Hydro and the government.
7.9.2 Statoil and the international companies
We now want to analyse in more detail the relationship between 
Statoil and the Norwegian state on one hand and the international oil 
companies on the other.
No such analysis can be complete without understanding the situa- 
tion of the international oil industry at the time. This makes 
abundantly clear that the relationship between a state oil corporation 
and the international companies could range from virtual 'cold war' to 
full cooperation. An international overview is also important at this 
point to trace the development of what in Chapter 2 we called bargaining 
factor No.3, 'the international context 1 .
7.9.21 The international dimension: prices and participation
The period after 1970 saw a definite acceleration in the demands 
from the producer-states for a change in the structure of the oil 
industry. This expressed itself both in relation to prices and 
participation, two factors which are closely interrelated.
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Due to the damage of the TAP-line in May 1970 and a general 
tightening of demand in the European markets, the Algerian and Libyan 
producers became crucial in supplying Europe's oil after 1970. 
Sensing that their bargaining strength had increased, and being spurned 
on by the more radical nationalist sentiments of the two countries, a 
meeting in May 1970 between the oil ministers of Iraq, Libya and 
Algeria for the first time hinted that the producer-countries would 
take unilateral action on the question of price increases. Later in 
the year Libya and Algeria obtained an increase in their relative
crude prices, Libya only after having fought for it in a classic
179 
confrontation with Occidental. The confrontation took on a new
dimension because the majors refused to back up Occidental with
alternative sources of crude and hence indirectly condoned a price
180 
rise.
The perceived increase in bargaining strength spread quickly 
throughout the OPEC countries, and the OPEC meeting in Caracas in 
December 1970 decided to press for a tightening of taxes to a minimum 
of 55%, demand an increase in prices, and eliminate all discounts. 
The Teheran meeting of January 1971 was the forum where these demands 
would be discussed as far as the Gulf states were concerned. Little 
will be gained by discussing in any detail the background and actual 
bargaining at the Teheran meeting, which for the first time saw all 
companies officially negotiating together after having obtained anti- 
trust clearing from the US government. The Teheran agreement was 
announced on 14 February 1971, and saw an increase in the posted price 
of 35-40<t/bbl, an elimination of discounts, and a yearly fixed increase 
of 2.5% in posted price to guard against inflation. Since the Teheran 
agreements only concerned the Gulf states, Libya and Algeria had to 
negotiate separately. Libya achieved an increase of 90<jr/bbl in April 
and a number of the standard conditions from the Teheran agreement 
were also made to hold for the North African producers.
Throughout the lead-up to the Teheran conference the companies 
seemed to fight any price increase bitterly. But then there suddenly 
seemed to be a change of mind. According to Rafal:
"The attitude of oil companies vis-a-vis claims for
higher prices changed strangely during the crisis period.
In the early Libyan negotiations in January-February 1970,
a top executive of a leading major oil company stated ...
(that) all it could afford would be about a 5^/bbl increase,
242
beyond which the company would incur losses in its 
Libyan operations. A few months later, the same major 
company spontaneously announced unilateral price 
increases of a much greater magnitude, not only in Libya
but also at the Eastern Mediterranean, where it was not
181 
subject to any specific claims."
We will analyse in more detail the reasons for this increase of 
prices in Chapter 8, but just point out that according to one interpreta- 
tion the increase was related to a definite change in the attitude of 
the US government to the price level of oil. Furthermore, the companies 
had no difficulties in passing on the higher taxes to the consumers.
In Britain the 28<{:/bbl crude price increase was comfortably covered by
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a petrol price increase of 52<f/bbl. In addition, the Teheran and
Tripoli agreements gave the companies breathing space and a long-run 
guarantee of stability and predictability, a major advantage for any 
corporate planner.
But whatever hopes the companies might have had about long-run 
price stability, these disappeared during 1972 and 1973. The upward 
pressure on prices continued as the tightness of supply was accentuated 
by the actions taken by the Algerians and Libyans who implemented cut- 
backs in their output for reasons of 'conservation'; the fall in the 
value of the dollar accelerated; and the sale of participation-crude to 
a number of independent refiners and companies fetched steadily increas- 
ing prices. In May 1973 the Saudis sold their participation-share at
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'record prices', market prices exceeded posted prices, and the autumn
184 of 1973 saw prices of up to $5/bbl being paid on the spot-market.
A meeting to discuss a revision of the posted price was therefore 
called for October 1973. It was only by historical accident that this 
meeting was to coincide with the start of the Yom-Kippur war. Partly 
as a result of the war, partly as a result of market pressures that had 
been building up since 1970, the OPEC countries on 16 October for the 
first time ever set a unilateral posted price. The price was increased 
by 70% to $5.12 for Arab Light, while an embargo on pro-Israeli states 
was asked for by the 'radicals'. 22 December 1973 saw a further 
increase in the posted price to $11.65/bbl. What President Giscard
d'Estaing chose to call "the revenge on Europe for the nineteenth
185 
century" had been completed. During the March 1974 meeting in Vienna
it was clear that a majority of the OPEC countries wanted a further 15%
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rise in the posted price, but this was vetoed by the Saudi Arabian oil
minister in a move not to further upset US interests and desires.
In Chapter 8 we will further analyse the broader importance of this
price increase and how it relates to the question of state participation.
As in the question of oil prices, it was the radicals, Algeria, 
Iraq, and to a certain extent Libya, that from the late 1960s started 
to press for an increased state role in the form of demands for parti- 
cipation. Their demands had both political and economic overtones. 
Politically, they felt that foreign control over the volume, price and 
investment of their most important industries was unacceptable. 
Economically, the alternative of national control could mean both that 
a larger part of the total oil-rent went to the countries in question, 
and also that the absolute amount of rent could be increased. The 
latter effect could arise because output from the national oil-fields 
would be determined in relation to the needs of the individual country 
and not in relation to the global output-maximization of the individual 
oil firm. The question v of volume had again become an important point
of confrontation in the late 1960s when the companies preferred to 
lift an increasing proportion of their total output from North Africa, 
due to the higher differential rent they could earn from that region. 
This led to a relative decline in production from countries like Iran, 
which had demanded a higher share of the output in order to finance 
its increasing industrialization and military programme, and also had 
been shocked to find that until 1967 there had been an informal and
secret understanding among the members of the Consortium to set the
187 level of Iranian output.
Iraq had paid an even higher price for its nationalism throughout
188 
the 1960s. The Wall Street Journal in March 1974 quoted a secret
US government report which stated that IPC actually drilled wells to 
the wrong depth and covered others with bulldozers in order to keep a 
low output from the Iraqi fields.
In addition to these reasons, the Algerians especially saw an 
increased rate of state intervention as a prerequisite for an increased 
government income which was seen as necessary to finance the ambitious 
industrialization plans of Algeria (See Chapter 8, p. 266).
In connection with the OPEC resolution on participation passed in 
1968, Yamani sought in July 1971 a 20% participation share of the Aramco 
fields in Saudi Arabia. Both the OPEC resolution and the Yamani
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initiative must be seen in relation to the alternatives that were 
presenting themselves at the time. In December 1968 Algeria took over 
51% of the Getty operating assets, and nobody believed that they would 
stop at that, especially as the retaliations taken by France did not 
make Algeria change its mind. Simultaneously the constantly tougher 
attitude of Iraq was making itself felt. Iraq relied mainly on the 
French and the Russians to implement its increasingly nationalistic oil
policy which if generalized could spell disaster to the Western
  11 j 189 companies' long-run access to crude.
Yamani therefore presented his version of participation as a 
direct challenge to developments of the kind outlined above, and as 
the best possible solution for the Western companies once some kind of 
change was regarded as inevitable. Given the political situation in 
the Middle East, he argued that nationalization with all its pitfalls
and dangers would become inevitable unless 'participation' was launched
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as an alternative. His arguments for continuing the close coopera- 
tion with the companies (the early Yamani version of participation 
included only a 20% state equity in the producing company, while all 
other aspects of production would continue as before), were however 
justified in a very sophisticated manner. According to Yamani the 
oil industry is potentially extremely unstable unless it is strictly 
controlled. As long as the international cartel maintained its promin- 
ence such control over markets would be ensured, and hence the price 
of crude could be maintained at a relatively high level. The companies 
would in short serve as a necessary 'buffer 1 between the producer-states 
and the consumers. But if the OPEC countries nationalized their oil 
(and got rid of the companies), they would according to Yamani immediately 
start to undercut each other and the whole price structure would collapse. 
One possible solution to such a scenario, namely production-sharing 
agreements between the OPEC countries where the Saudis would inevitably
have been the main element, was dismissed for unspecified "practical
191 and realistic reasons". The companies were not immediately convinced
by Yamani, but also held out as long as possible to get the best possible
deal with respect to the level of compensation for their equity, and
192 also, it is suggested, to give some 'credibility' to Yamani's demands.
The producer-states decided at the 36th Conference in Abu Dhabi in 
October 1971 to meet the companies in early 1972 to discuss the problem
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of participation. Following the usual bargaining process of threats 
and counter-threats, the companies finally accepted the principle of 
participation and in October 1972 a 'grand' agreement was agreed whereby 
the producer-states would obtain a rising participation share reaching 
51% in 1981. But the agreement did not specify exactly what kind of 
participation should be implemented.
The problem for Yamani's notion of participation was that it 
had partly been overtaken by events. While Iran claimed it did not 
need participation because its oil had been nationalized since 1954 
and Saudi Arabia got some support from the Gulf states, Algeria had 
jumped the gun and in February 1971 had taken 51% control of the French 
oil interests in Algeria and offered to buy out all other companies. 
By the end of 1971 only Getty and Elf/ERAP were left of foreign 
companies in Algeria. Libya had by then also nationalized BP's 
relatively modest share of Libyan output. The outlook for Yamani's 
plans did not become brighter when the Kuwaiti National Assembly in 
December 1972 refused to ratify a participation agreement along 
Yamani's lines and wanted 60% participation straight away. Venezuela 
also refused to support Yamani's initiative. In August 1973 Libya 
finally took over 51% of Occidental's concession, which left Libya in 
control of over around 4o% of its total output.
Following the war in 1973, the trend towards increasing 
participation rates accelerated, so the oil industry is today (1978) 
nationalized or in the process of being nationalized in the most 
important exporting countries. Only Gabon of the 13 OPEC countries 
has less than 50% share of the ownership of its oil.. Otherwise 
ownership ranges from 55% in Nigeria, 60% in Abu Dhabi, to 100% in 
Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Qatar, and Venezuela. Kuwait has also fully 
nationalized its oil when we disregard the marginal production from 
the Neutral Zone. In Saudi Arabia, although the Aramco owners still 
retain a 40% equity share, in fact they operate as though the long- 
awaited 100% state takeover terms, already agreed in principle, have 
been implemented.
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7.9.22 The Norwegian connection
Given this rapidly changing international situation, it was hardly 
surprising that there were some disagreements among Norwegian policy- 
makers about the exact form that the relationship between the 
international companies and the Norwegian state should take. Some, 
such as the Director of Statoil, thought there should be a drastic 
redefinition of the role of the majors in Norwegian waters. Others 
thought that Norway should continue its policy of 'carried interest 1 
which seemed to conform more directly to the Yamani notion of 
participation outlined above rather than move towards the more aggressive 
policies of majority state holdings and nationalizations pursued by 
Algeria and Iran.
According to the prevalent view expressed by Norwegian policy- 
makers, the basic role allotted to the oil companies was as contributors 
of risk capital and technological expertise.
One parliamentary report from the Ministry of Industry stated that 
"For the oil companies, the principle is that no matter what the type
of agreement (PN emphasis), they contribute the necessary risk capital
193 
and technological experience". What is interesting in this respect
is not the standard reasoning given for accepting the presence of the 
multinational companies  It is rather the implication that the depart- 
ment had not yet decided what was the appropriate long-run type of 
concession agreement, i.e. whether this should continue to be on a 
'carried-interest basis', service contracts, or production-sharing 
contracts. But in the short to medium run there was no doubt. It was 
explicitly stated that "So far it seems that 'carried interest' agree- 
ments are the most appropriate for realizing the objectives of government
194 participation." This attitude partly clashed, however, with the
sentiments expressed by St.meld, no.25, which stated:
"So far foreign oil companies have held extraction permits 
on the Norwegian Continental Shelf. In the future they
should instead come into the picture as consultants,
195 
contractors, and minority partners."
While this formulation from the Ministry of Finance still left the door 
open for foreign equity interests, when seen in the context of the 
rest of the report there was no doubt that sectors within the Ministry
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preferred an organisational pattern which was along contractual or
196 
consultancy lines. For instance, the report explicitly stated that,
in connection with the control over volume, "... it is preferable to
- -?-*k
directly administer the rate of extraction, so that' possible large
strikes are exploited no more rapidly than deemed desirable by
197 government bodies". Such a direct administration is extremely
difficult to achieve within the context of a traditional carried- 
interest organizational framework, a point the Ministry made when it
stated that "once extraction concessions have been awarded, the
198 possibilities for administering the extraction rate are limited."
Statoil's basic attitude to the question of the role of the oil 
multinationals was best summed up by Arve Johnsen when he stated that 
in five years 1 time he doubted that there would be any parts of the 
world where the traditional concession system would be in operation. 
Instead he believed that there was a trend where "the state keeps the
full property-rights to the resources and instead enters into service
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contracts with well-established companies". There can be no doubt
that this statement at the time indirectly constituted a clear recipe 
for the future course of Norwegian concession policies and Statoil f s 
role in them as the Director of Statoil would have liked to see it.
Johnsen's comment to the effect that foreign oil companies would 
be excluded from exploration north of 62° strengthens such an inter- 
pretation. This was after all not a very surprising stand. It had 
indirectly been referred to on several occasions in the past. The 
Oil Council had already hinted that an operator role for Statoil might 
be the most appropriate policy in the north-eastern areas north of 
62°. It was also a stand which was anticipated in international oil 
circles because "when activities move north, Norway will have come to 
an understanding with the USSR", and it was thought that foreign oil
companies would be excluded from the strategically delicate areas of
201 Barents Sea. - But Johnsen's reported statement drew an immediate and
angry response from the Minister of Industry, partly, it was thought, 
because he did not want to rule out the use of 'carried interest 1 
concessions, but also because he wanted to establish that the oil
policies were formulated by the Ministry, not by Statoil. It was
202 later stated that Johnsen had been 'misquoted', but the whole
episode still pointed to important conflicts in Norwegian oil policies 
at the time.
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Arve Johnsen's relatively critical attitude towards the companies 
was mirrored by and partly sprang from a fairly genuine general scepti- 
cism towards the private international companies within the Labour 
Party. The LP faction in the Finance Committee pointed in 1973 to the 
fact that the multinationals had a dominating position concerning 
production and distribution of oil in the Western world. It then
continues, "This can have many unfortunate aspects as such companies
203 get too great power and influence." Similarly, St.meld, no.25
stated that "The fact that the multinational oil companies exercise
such extensive control over production and marketing makes it a task
204 
of international interest to place them under public control".
When such opinion is compared with the much more docile official atti- 
tude in the UK to the international companies, it is clear that the 
ideological and political climate in Norway was much more sceptical 
towards the companies than in other European countries. Within this 
period the Labour Party was also constantly being pushed from the left. 
SV had a considerable influence at the time with a parliamentary group 
of 16 members, but while it advocated nationalization of the oil
industry in the long run, SV did not put forward any short-run policies
205 that were qualitatively different from those of the Labour Party.
The situation in Norway was finally characterised by the fact that 
the international oil companies did not have the same domestic backing 
as they could count on for instance in a number of other oil-exporting 
countries. This was especially due to the position of the Norwegian 
Conservative Party, which clearly had as its main aim the building up 
of a national oil expertise, and in no simplistic sense could be said 
to represent the interests of the international oil companies. The 
Conservatives made this absolutely clear when they said, "The aim (of 
Norwegian oil policies - PN) is not the greatest possible state activ-
JC\f\ity.... The aim is the greatest possible national effort." 
Concretely this meant, as we have seen, a constant defence of and 
encouragement for SAGA. On several occasions the Conservatives also 
clearly defended the interests of the major companies (cf. the special 
taxation case). But at such times this could be interpreted to have 
been a necessary by-product of the defence of SAGA, which, despite 
its political blessing by the ruling Labour Party, because it was in 
its formative stage still enjoyed a weak position compared with the major 
companies. The Conservatives' main historic role was therefore as 
defenders of the (however weak) Norwegian bourgeoisie represented by 
SAGA.
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7.9.3 Summing up Statoil
On the basis of the above analysis, there can be no doubt that 
1973/74 saw the determined start of Statoil as a productive, vertically 
integrated oil company which was seen by Norwegian policy-makers as the 
very backbone of Norwegian oil policies. A number of issues had not yet 
been clearly sorted out, like Statoil f s final attitude to the multinationals 
or to Norwegian industry. On these points Statoil inevitably got 
involved in the political disagreements within the Norwegian state 
apparatus. But there were strong indications at the time that
Statoil would in general adopt a fairly 'aggressive 1 stance on all the 
above-mentioned issues. And, while the Norwegian policies constituted 
no fundamental threat to the continued presence of the companies on the 
Norwegian Contental Shelf (a point further elaborated in Chapter 8), 
the companies, partly as a result of Statoil, nevertheless had to 
modify their mode of operation in Norwegian waters.
Since Statoil did not have any major share in the earlier fields 
that would come on stream in the Norwegian sector of the North Sea, 
most of the government's revenues would initially come from taxes and 
royalties. But once Statfjord would get on steam in the early 1980s 
then, according to Ministry of Finance estimates, "A considerable
proportion of the public revenues may be expected to be derived from
207 the government's direct participation in oil production".
Norwegian oil policies had come a long way since 1965.
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CHAPTER 8
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND POLITICAL CHANGE: THE REASONS FOR
THE INCREASED ROLE OF THE STATE
This chapter will bring together and attempt to explain the 
developments of Norwegian oil policies in the period 1965-74. To do 
this we will first summarise our basic results, and will start with the 
division of oil rent between the companies and the Norwegian state and 
the form this division took. Our comments will concentrate on the 200m. 
and 700m." fields.
8.1 BASIC TRENDS
8.1.1 Division of oil-rent
According to Table 8.2 there has been a clear and unambiguous 
increase in the overall undiscounted amount of rent which has been 
accruing to the Norwegian state. For the 700m. barrell field the 
undiscounted total government take increased from 54.4% in 1965 to 
no less than 91.0% in 1974 0 For the 200m. field the tendency was 
equally clear, albeit somewhat less accentuated. In 1965 total state 
take totalled 56.9% but by 1974 it had increased to 85.4%.
The form which this increase took is very important. The 
variation of the total undiscounted state take is almost fully 
explained by variations in the rate of equity share (Column 6 
in Table 8.2). What made the difference to the state's increasing 
aggregate share was the increase in the participation ratio, and not 
(with the exception of 1974) a tightening in the rate of taxation. 
The percentage share of rent going to the state which accrued from 
taxation stayed until 1974 surprisingly stable; in the 700m. example 
it fluctuated between 49.2% and 54,4%, only to increase to 70.1% in 
1974 mainly because of the introduction of the excess profit tax 
(Column 2, Table 8.2). The tendency is equally clear for the 200m. 
field. It is interesting to note that to the 
extent that a trend existed at all for the traditional tax-take, there 
was even a slight decrease between 1965 and 1972.
According to the above results it seems as if the Norwegian 
state has been very efficient in its policies of capturing the rent 
from the North Sea; furthermore this process has been a gradual one 
and, most importantly, the 'tightening 1 , with the exception of the
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1974 round, has been one of an increasing equity share. This first 
conclusion coincides with the traditional view of the Norwegian 
policies. However, we shall see that when we now move towards a dis- 
counted analysis of rent division, even if the basic position remains 
the same, it becomes less straightforward and subject to more qualifica- 
tions. In particular our results will have to be seen together with 
the discussion of how this overall take responded to changes in 
exogenous conditions (see Section 8.2.1 below).
Column 1 of Table 8.1 shows that the discounted version of 
all rent going to the state has also increased from 1965 to 1974 0 For 
the 700m. field this development is clear, showing an increase from 
86.6% to 91.6%, while for the 200m. field the take remained relatively 
constant from 1969, fluctuating around 85%. In interpreting the data 
we must throughout bear in mind that the discounted 'take 1 is intimately 
related to the profitability, so when the 1965 high 'take 1 is related 
to the low expected profitability (see Chapter 3, pp.106-107) we have 
a more clear-cut case with a clearer trend, especially for the 700m. 
field.
But it is again a more detailed breakdown of the aggregate data 
which gives us a better insight into how this process of increased state 
access to rent has taken place. From Table 8.1 Column 5, it is 
clear that taxation, both from the private company and from Statoil 
(which pays taxes like any other company) over time played a relatively 
less important part in the state's appropriation of rent. This meant 
that, as in the undiscounted case, the role of equity in the same process 
played a correspondingly increasingly important part (Column 6 
in Table 8.1). As a maximum, equity accounted in 1972 for 30.3% of the 
state's access to the rent of the 700m. field.
This meant that the state was getting increasingly important as a 
controller of the oil industry's oil-rent surplus, not merely as a tax 
collector, but also as a capitalist in its own right. This trend is 
set out graphically in Figures 8.1 and 8.2 for the discounted and 
undiscounted figures respectively.
When recent trends in Norwegian society are taken into account 
this development should not be too surprising. In the period from 1970 
to 1975 the Norwegian state increased its ownership from 30% to between 
45% and 50% of total equity in the Norwegian industry. Statoil is only 
one, albeit the most important, part of a tendency towards 'state 
capitalism' in Norway. (For a further reference to this trend, see 
Chapter 9.)
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We have so far looked at an ignored concept within the oil industry, 
the overall amount of rent going to the state. Not even by singling out 
the taxation element of this 'take 1 have we been able to revert to the 
'normal' practice in oil economics of talking about 'government take 1 . 
This is because we have included Statoil's tax burden within the total 
amount of rent, which may-marginally change the figure due to Statoil's 
different debt structure compared with the international companies. 
We will now revert to the 'normal' practice by only concentrating on 
the state's tax share of the company's present value.
For the 700m. field we see (Column 4, Table 8.1) how in discounted 
terms the 'state take 1 has fluctuated between 56.8% and 86.6%. But 
for the same field the undiscounted state share until 1974 showed a 
clear stability of around 50% (Column 4, Table 8.2). It only increased 
sharply due to the introduction of the special profits tax. The latter 
results are broadly in agreement with official Norwegian pronouncements 
about the conventional 'state take'. For example the state's undiscounted 
post-special-tax fiscal share was expected to be in the region of 
57-67%, while ours was 65.8% and 69.5% for the 200m. and 700m. fields
respectively. Parliamentary Report no.11 (1968-69)'s assessment that
2 
the initial 1965 terms represented an undiscounted state take of 56%
is also in line with our results. And while we are primarily interested 
in the discounted figures of rent division, comparing our undiscounted 
results with the official estimates both gives a check on the latter 
and provides a general check for our own results.
We will now evaluate the effects of the different participation 
schemes on the IRR of the hypothetical fields. However imperfect, we 
assume that the IRR of a project is a key element in any company 
evaluation of a North Sea investment project. Any drastic fall in the 
expected IRR in the wake of the introduction of a participation scheme 
compared with a situation of 'no participation' could therefore be 
seen as a clear challenge to the companies and would constitute a clear 
validation for those who claimed that the Norwegian government was 
getting 'tough' with the companies, irrespective of the changes in 
the basic tax variables. But no such easy conclusion can be drawn 
from our results. One initial comment should be made in relation to 
the rates of IRR estimated in Table 8.3. While by no means constituting 
rates of return that could be said to be 'phenomenal' for the companies, 
when it is remembered that we have already incorporated all exploration 
costs and also consistently used conservative and cautious cost and
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production estimates, the IRRs could by no means be described as
'insufficient 1 . Compared with the 10% minimum IRR expected by US domestic
3 
energy-production it could even be said to be generous. The expected
IRRs also increased steadily throughout the period under study, even 
when participation has been taken account of; something that suggests 
that the companies were less than honest then they argued in large 
publicity campaigns towards the end of the period that their position 
in the North Sea was becoming increasingly untenable. Since the 
financial return seems largely to be unable to explain such behaviour, 
we must at least look for either complementary explanations.
The main rationale for the introduction of the participation 
agreements in the Norwegian sector of the North Sea does not therefore 
seem on the available evidence to have been brought about in order to 
reduce the companies' IRR or their post-tax percentage of the total 
present value of a field. The main consequence from the state's point 
of view seems rather to have been to get access to a larger percentage 
of the total rent originating from the North Sea. It is indicative 
for the way that a modern state tends to act that this was done by 
creating the least possible upset for the private sector, which in the 
process managed to maintain or even increase its IRR.
8.1.2 Spinoffs
The share of the total orders originating in the North Sea which 
were supplied by Norwegian firms increased steadily during the period. 
From an almost negligible percentage in 1965, the national content of 
spinoffs had increased to over 50% on new orders by the mid 1970s. 
There was also an increase in the national component of value added 
from-the production of oil in the form of forward linkages like petro- 
chemical production. Finally, a number of Norwegian firms increased 
their export of oil-related commodities to oil-producing areas outside 
the North Sea. The key element in this overall process was the role 
of the Norwegian state which by a number of methods cajoled the 
international companies to order more Norwegian goods. The state 
also pressed the Norwegian firms to become more efficient through 
mergers, while it encouraged Norwegian industry also to be more 
aggressive in the offshore tendering process.
TABLE 8.1: DISCOUNTED
255
700m. field
1965
1969
Scenario 4 
Scenario 3 
Scenario 2
1972 
Scenario 1
1974 
Scenario 1
200m. field
1965
1969
Scenario 4 
Scenario 3 
Scenario 2
1972 
Scenario 1
1974 
Scenario 1
Total 
state 
take
86.6
71.4 
66.4 
79.8
79
91.6
Of vrt 
Taxation
86.6
64.2 
63.8 
64.3
55.1
67.5
lich: 
Equity
-
7.2 
2.8 
15.5
23.9
24.0
'Take'
86.6
67.7 
64.5 
65.3
56.8
70.5
Tax
100
89.9 
96.1 
80.6
69.7
73.7
Equity
0
10.1 
3.9 
19.4
30.3
26.3
Explanation (number refers to column)
1 = Total state take: (Statoil PV + discounted value of state's tax 
income from company share) as a percentage of PV of the field
2 = Taxation share of 1: (Discounted value of taxes levied on Statoil 
+ discounted value of state's tax income from the company share) 
as a percentage of PV of the field
3 = Discounted value of Statoil's net income from equity as a 
percentage of the PV of the field
4 = The traditional concept of 'government take' i.e. state taxation 
income from the company's share as a percentage of the company's 
share, discounted
5 = Column 2 as a percentage of column 1
6 = (100 - column 5)
All PVs are assessed on the assumption that 
both company and Statoil have debts.
* uncommercial field
FIGURE 8.1
THE STATE'S ACCESS TO OIL RENT*
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igures correspond to columns 5 and 6 in Table 8.1 700m. field
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The figures correspond to columns 5 and 6 in Table 8.2 700m. field
TABLE 8.2: UNDISCOUNTED
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700m. field
1965
1969
Scenario 4 
Scenario 3 
Scenario 2
1972 
Scenario 1
1974 
Scenario 1
200m. field
1965
1969
Scenario 4 
Scenario 3 
Scenario 2
1972 
Scenario 1
1974 
Scenario 1
Total 
state 
take
54.4
55.8 
52.4 
70.4
71.8
91.0
Of wl 
Taxation
54.5
50.3 
50.2 
50.2
49.5
70.1
lich: 
Equity
-
5.4 
2.4 
20.2
25.3
20.9
'Take'
54.4
51.2 
50.2 
50.3
49.5
69.8
Tax
100
90.1 
95.8 
78.3
66.1
77.1
Equity
0
9.9 
4.2 
28.7
33.9
22.9
Explanation (number refers to column)
1 = (Statoil's net cash flow + undiscounted amount of taxes from company- 
share) as a percentage of the net cash flow of field as a whole 
with debt
2 = Undiscounted value of taxes levied on Statoil and company as a 
percentage of the net cash flow of field as a whole with debt
3 = Undiscounted value of state's income from Statoil's equity as a 
percentage of the net cash flow of field as a whole with debt
4 = Traditional 'take' = taxes from the company's share as a percentage 
of the net cash flow of company's share
5 = Column 2 as a percentage of column 1
6 = (100 - column 5)
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TABLE 8.3
1965 1969: 1972 1974
Seen.4 Seen.3 Seen.2 Scen.l Scen.l
700M
Post-tax IRR
as if no
participation 8.5 13.2 13.2 13.2 18.4 42.0
With participation - 12.2 12.8 11.5 15.6 31.8
All figures assume that both Statoil and the private company have debt.
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8.1.3 Volume
The need to control volume of production was until 1973 almost 
exclusively related to the strategy of negotiations between the 
companies and the Norwegian state. A slow rate of extraction would give 
the Norwegian state more time to increase its bargaining strength 
towards the companies. After 1973, however, the key element in the 
determination of an optimum rate of extraction became more related to 
the structural macro-consequences of the volume decisions. Based on 
the situation at the time, a policy of macro-regulations was introduced. 
But nowhere during this period was there any serious talk about
instituting a policy which might interfere with the profit-maximizing
4 
output from a field. Norwegian policy in this field was therefore
broadly similar to the one which was pursued for the rent division; 
achieve the objectives at a minimum cost to the companies. And even if 
the companies were considering the overall restriction of output as 
undesirable and consistently argued against it, there was at no time 
any indication that the 90 mill, ton 'roof on future production in any 
way challenged the companies' continued existence on the Norwegian Shelf.
8.1.4 Overview
- The increase in rent going to the state, and in particular the 
increase in the state's equity share;
- The increased importance of volume control in the post-1973 period;
- The increasingly successful record of the Norwegian spinoff 
industry;
were all outcomes of policies that had at least one common element: an 
increase in information about the oil industry held by the Norwegian 
state. To this extent the increase in information was a prerequisite 
for the developments in the policies outlined above. The Norwegian 
state moved from a situation in 1965 where its knowledge of the parti- 
cularities of the oil industry was extremely limited to a position 
where by 1974 it had access to its own geological experts working for 
STATEX, and could also call on expertise from Statoil, and the Oil 
Directorate.
We will now try to explain the main features of the Norwegian 
policy in the light of the theoretical framework developed in Chapter 2, 
In particular we will relate the outcome to the three key factors which
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we singled out as being important in the Norwegian case: the exogenous 
change in rent, the nature of the Norwegian state, and the international 
situation.
8.2 TOWARDS AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE STATE'S ROLE 
8.2.1 Exogenous change as an 'explanatory' variable
Throughout the period 1965-74 we have seen a clear confirmation 
of our basic theoretical insight that when the exogenous circumstances 
change, expressed by a change in the expected PV of a field, there tended to be 
a subsequent change in the policy variables used by the Norwegian state. 
(But note that the present discussion is different from our discussion 
in Section 8.1.1 above, where we only discussed overall trends of state 
'takes'* The PV of the fields therefore becomes one 
basic building block of our analysis. Because of the inflexibility of 
the traditional tax variables, the Norwegian state tried to adjust to 
the changing circumstances by using a number of other (and complementary) 
policy variables to keep its share of the rent to a maximum. By examin- 
ing each separate round of concessions at a time, we can concretely see 
how this process took place.
The Norwegian 'take' in 1965 was as we argued the outcome of a 
very haphazard process. But once the PV of a field increased by 1969, 
there was a corresponding reaction by the Norwegian state, and an 
increase in the Norwegian state's share of the new PV. This increase 
did not necessarily take the form of increased 'take' in the traditional 
tax sence, but also expressed itself in its access to a larger percent- 
age of the PV by means of participation. Similar adjustments took 
place in response to changes in the PV in 1972 as the oil market was 
tightening up, and with the cost explosion which was to come from the 
mid 1970s still unexpected. This process finally found its most 
dramatic expression in the post-1973 period when there was an important in- 
crease in the expected PV of our hypothetical field, and a subsequent introduction 
of both higher taxes and a progressive rate of participation.
Table 8.4 and Figure 8.3 show the development of the expected 
PV for a 700m. hypothetical field and the corresponding total state 
take if the tax variables had stayed at their 1965 levels, 
and as they finally turned out to be. The difference between the 
two then can be said to constitute the state's 'tightening'.
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It has been clear throughout the case studies that the state's 
reactions to these changed circumstances were by no means instant and 
perfect. We therefore have a varying 'share' as far as the state is 
concerned, with significant 'lags' existing particularly in the 1969 
round. But our main theoretical point that there would be a tendency 
towards a 'tightening' of some variables and changes in other policy 
variables as the expected PV increased,seems to have been amply 
supported. This is a different point from the one made in Section 
8.1.1 above, which established that the percentage share of the PV of 
a field which accrued to the state had marginally tended to increase 
in the period 1965-74. The present insight stems from the realisation 
that there is a tendency for the state to change the value of its tax 
and participation conditions in response to changes in the PV conditions, 
but that this change can be 'swamped 1 by changes in the tax conditions 
which have nothing to do with the oil industry. This is clearly seen 
in the case of participation scenario 3, 1969, above, where the total 
PV going to the state actually decreased in comparison with what would have 
been the case if the 1965 conditions had remained unchanged. The reason 
was the new general tax laws introduced by the centre/right government 
in Norway at the time.
Our framework has so far said nothing about the form that changes 
in the state's role would tend to take. Nor have we made the point 
that the implementation of any new policies presupposes that such changes 
in PV ar^ perceived by the state, i.e. it makes an important assump- 
tion about the state's access to information. Finally, there must be 
a political will to make such changes. We now hope to show that the 
solutions to these questions rely heavily on the two other explanatory 
variables outlined in Chapter 3, the international framework and the 
nature of the Norwegian state.
8.2.2 The international context
We have in the preceding chapters given an outline of the most 
important events which took place within the international oil industry 
throughout 1965 to 1974, and in particular have concentrated on the 
increasing importance of nation states in the industry internationally. 
This has been in response to our theoretical framework outlined in 
Chapter 2, which postulated that there would be three kinds of inter- 
relationship between developments in the international and the Norwegian 
oil industries.
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TABLE 8.4
1965 1969: 1972 1974
Seen.2 Seen.3 Seen.4 Scen.l Scen.l
PV 700m.field (1) 183.2 386.3 386.3 386.3 699.3 2072.3
Total state
'take' ($m) (2) 150.2
Total state
take with 1965
tax conditions
($m) (3) 150.2
307.2 256.4 275.9 552.4 1898.2
269.1 269.1* 269.1 425.9 1196.7
* The fact that for Scenario 3, 1969, column 2 is smaller than for 
column 3 is due to the fact that the change in the general 1969 tax 
conditions which were unrelated to the oil industry 'swamped' the 
increased participation rate 0
FIGURE 8.3
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fl Increased PV to the state as a result of tightening of terms in one form or other compared with the 1965 terms.
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The first kind of interrelationship we postulated was one of 
example and influence. This was an important part of the development 
of Norwegian policies. From the very start the emphasis in the Oil 
Council was to learn from the oil policies of other countries. Extensive 
travelling took place during the first years of the Council's existence 
and the first suggestions made in 1968 about state participation were 
at least partly based on the Iranian organisational pattern. Evensen's 
(1971) major and influential overview of the different kinds of con- 
cession policies open to the Norwegian state towards the end of the 
1960s was at the time a unique piece of work which set out in great 
detail the historical precedents of different policy options. The 
aims and structure of Statoil established in 1973 were clearly based 
on existing state oil corporations both in producer and consumer 
countries, while the possibility (not certainty as it turned out) of 
using service contracts in the nine blocks allocated to Statoil in 
1973/74 was an idea that had its origin in new kinds of concessions 
originally pioneered in Indonesia and Venezuela. These were increas- 
ingly being used on a world-wide scale in preference to the old 'carried 
interest' contracts.
The second interrelationship between Norwegian policies and the 
international situation was based on the degree of interest from oil 
companies towards Norwegian acreage. This interest was in the last 
analysis a result of the companies' global strategies, which again 
was largely a result of the situation in the world oil market. The 
more confident the companies were that alternative sources of oil were 
available outside the North Sea which could guarantee them a reasonable 
profit margin and security of supplies, the less was their interest in 
the North Sea. Similarly the companies might want to deplete their 
deposits in other parts of the world before moving into new exploration 
areas like the North Sea, even if this strategy could clash with an 
alternative strategy which sought to maintain their access to any new 
resources that were discovered. This would be to keep any competitors 
out of new and promising areas, and to maintain an 'inventory 1 of non- 
exploited supplies for themselves. It is possible to argue
(see p.170) that the companies had no immediate interest 
in exploring the centre/northern parts of the North Sea when the first 
concessions were given in 1965. This lack of interest did not come 
about because the area was uninteresting from a geological point of 
view, but because the companies had enough on their hands in the southern
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part of the North Sea, And in any case the companies did not have to 
fulfill their work programmes until the early 1970s and so didn't 
have to start any large-scale drilling until then. Superimposed on 
this situation was an expected general surplus of oil on the world 
market and a continued company access to the fields in the Middle East 
which yielded large amounts of differential rent. Against this back- 
ground it is telling that it was an independent crude-short company, 
Phillips, that was perhaps the most consistent explorer for oil and 
gas in the North Sea. On the other hand BP, the most crude-long of all 
the majors, was the company which rejected Norwegian acreage back in 
1965. 7
From 1970 the companies 1 interest in the centre/northern parts 
of the North Sea increased dramatically. This increase has been 
largely related to the Ekofisk find, but was also a result of the 
predicted world-wide shortage of fuel with an expected accompanying 
increase in prices (already predicted by Shell in the late 1960s - see 
Chapter 5, p. 151) The increased interest was also a result of the 
political instability of the Middle East and the suspicion that no 
(or negligible) upstream profits would in the future be earned in
o
the Middle East.
It is instructive to make a comparison between the UK and Norway 
at this point to show that it is also important through which political 
structures such basic forces are mediated. In the UK between 1969 and 
1972 the newly elected Conservative government imposed what amounted 
to more lenient concession terms instead of perceiving (as did the 
Norwegians) that a fundamentally new situation had arisen, which should 
have warranted a tightening instead.
After 1973, the above calculations changed because the companies 
changed strategy in relation to the producer-states. Following the wide- 
spread moves toward national! zations their aim was now to shift their profits 
downstream. As a consequence the companies got more interested, at
least temporarily, in long-run security of supplies for their downstream
9 
activities. The Norwegian state tried to take advantage of this new
situation. For instance it was widely believed that the German quasi- 
state company Denimex, which represented a state that was primarily 
interested in obtaining long-run secure supplies to the German economy, was 
after 1973 willing to accept stricter terms than were other companies. 
But this 'variance 1 in the different companies' positions was less in 
the Norwegian sector than in other comparable North Sea countries due
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to the longstanding Norwegian policy of mainly giving concessions to 
major companies.
This overview shows concretely how the situation in the international 
oil industry provided the overall framework within which Norwegian policies 
were formulated. So it continuously gave the Norwegian state new possi- 
bilities to act and ask for new terms from the industry. But being linked 
to the international oil world also presented Norwegian policy-makers with 
major problems by acting as a barrier as to what was possible to achieve. 
This is the third kind of interrelationship between Norwegian policy and 
the international oil situation.
One of the main reasons why state participation became increasingly 
important in the North Sea was its growing acceptance by the oil companies. 
Nowhere in our case study do we see a clearer example of how the inter- 
national situation acted as a constraint on the development of Norwegian 
oil policies. We have shown in earlier chapters that from around 1970 
onwards a growing state role by the OPEC countries was, if not actively 
encouraged by the companies, then at least accepted as 'inevitable 1 and 
something the companies themselves would have to make as good a use of 
as possible. The tendency had clear repercussions for Norway, as it 
opened the way for a general change in the Norwegian concession terms. 
So while the majors in 1969 were opposed to the very concept of 
participation, their attitude had changed by 1972, and by 1974 
there were no objections to the concept of participation per se. The 
reason why participation was finally accepted can only be understood by 
reference to a combination of the international situation which we will 
discuss here and the form which participation finally took in the North 
Sea (see Section 8.3 below).
It is only by surveying in more detail the period as a whole that we 
can further understand why there was a continuous pressure towards an increase 
state role in the OPEC countries which culminated in the recent nationaliza- 
tions of the industry. What follows is therefore an extension and a more 
in-depth treatment of the problem than was presented in Chapter 7.
8.2.21 The increased role of the state in the international oil industry
The background to the recent nationalizations must first be seen 
as a distributional confrontation for the appropriation of a given 
amount of oil-rent between the producer-states and the oil companies. 
(We will disregard the importing states' potential claim to part 
of this rent for the moment.) Secondly, it was a confrontation
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at the level of production as the producer-states, the companies and 
the US government struggled to increase the total amount of rent in the 
oil industry as a whole. Both of these objectives were achieved by 
what we choose to label a process of reorganisation of the industry in 
the shape of increased state involvement and eventually nationalisation. 
(The term reorganisation is preferred to 'restructuring 1 , which 
implies a change in the actual process of production.)
The exporting countries wanted a reorganisation of the industry 
first because they felt their share of the rent was too low. Only 
8% of the final cost to the Western consumer of a gallon of petrol 
was in the late 1960s made up of taxes received by the exporting 
countries. During the late 1960s and early 1970s we also saw how the 
OPEC countries continuously fought for an increase in the general price
level of oil. A price rise would have increased not only their absolute share, 
but also the absolute amount of oil-rent to be earned from oil produc- 
tion. The desire by the producer-states to increase the rent that 
they controlled became particularly clear around 1970. The countries 
which initially pushed hardest for nationalisations and which first 
secured a larger share of the rent: Iraq, Algeria, and to some extent
Libya, also had the most explicitly development-oriented ruling
12 
classes. Hence they had an urgent need for additional oil revenues.
The complex relationship between a higher absolute price of oil and
a process of nationalization will be explored in more detail below, but
a direct link was thought by some to exist between the Algerians 1 fight for
higher prices in the early 1970s to provide development funds, and
13 their quest for nationalizations of the oil industry.
The above 'instrumentalist' view of nationalizations goes 
against official OPEC statements which stressed that nationalizations 
did not take place for fiscal reasons, but rather for reasons of 'control'. 
But 'control' is an open-ended and ambiguous concept. If it means 
'control over volume of production', this is simply a prerequisite for 
a maximization of the present value of oil production from an oil-field, 
computed in social terms. Hence it can be identical to the aim of 
maximizing the state's share of the surplus profit.
For the oil companies an increase in the general price level of 
oil was also of great importance, not the least because they had seen 
their distributional share steadily diminish over time. This was 
partly as a result of a higher level of taxation by the oil-exporting 
countries which it was difficult to pass on to the consumers in a
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situation which throughout the 1960s was characterized by a global 
excess supply. The diminished share of the companies was also due to 
a threefold challenge to the majors in the oil market; the rise of 
the *independents' following the US import quota system in 1958; the 
emergence of important state oil corporations in Europe like ENI, 
which tried to outbid the concessions offered by the majors; and the 
increase in Soviet oil exports to the West. The combined expression
of all these factors was a drop in the profit per barrel for the
14 
majors. The reduction was only partly overcome by a sharp increase
in total production. Profit rates for US direct foreign investment in 
the petroleum industry dropped from a 30% return in 1955 to 14.7% in 
1965 and to an all-time low of 11.1% in 1969. The majors' return on 
net assets in the Eastern Hemisphere dropped from above 18% in 1957 to 
level out around 11-12% from the mid 1960s onwards. These figures
are apparently partly contradicted by a number of studies of the majors'
17 profitability in the Middle East. But the Middle East studies may
be partly unrepresentative because the companies had an incentive to 
transfer their profits upstream, showing a high rate of return to crude 
oil production. The incentive was the provision that the total amount 
of tax which was paid to exporting countries could be subtracted from 
total corporate profits and thus decrease the companies' tax burden 
in their home countries.
The shortcomings of these rates of return for the companies first 
became clear when oil exploration and production moved into high-cost 
areas (Alaska, the North Sea) from the late 1960s. The industry was 
used to a very high degree of self-financing, but the profit rates 
earned at the time were insufficient to finance these new investments 
internally. As a result the companies had a clear interest in re- 
organising the industry in such a way as to increase the price of oil,
19 
and hence profits, from the early 1970s.
But for our explanation of the nationalizations to make sense it 
is necessary to explain why the companies were so opposed to price 
increases before 1970. It is possible to argue that the companies 
changed their pricing strategies partly at the instigation of the 
US government. The interest of the US government in higher oil prices 
from 1970 is discussed in more detail below. Such an 'external 1 
explanation for the companies' change in policy seems reasonable when it 
is remembered that the companies in principle are not concerned about 
the absolute price of a goodjas long as it is sold. Companies are
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more worried about profit margins. According to the chairman of Shell 
Transport and Trading: "Pressure from the producing countries on costs 
is something we can learn to live with, provided we are not at the same 
time denied freedom to move prices in the market, so as to maintain a 
commercial margin of profit."
In sum, by the early 1970s there was a widely perceived recognition 
that higher crude oil prices were needed. In this context nationalizations 
became necessary. Increased state involvement and nationalizations 
can be understood as a necessary by-product of an increase in prices. 
The companies knew that if they raised prices on their own, the reaction 
in the West would have been politically intolerable. The producer-states 
therefore had to be seen to raise the price of crude. For this reason 
the companies were willing to accept higher state ownership and in the 
process to formalise a de facto change in the upstream fiscal structure. 
In return, the companies could get higher prices and were guaranteed a 
stable business environment. The Teheran and Tripoli agreements and 
their aftermaths in 1972 did exactly that. As far as the companies 
were concerned the nationalizations were therefore partly a result of 
an already existing crisis in the oil industry. A director of Shell 
wrote later about this period: "It was becoming clear that the role of 
government in oil matters must necessarily grow if a crisis was to be 
avoided."
It is possible that there was also a more 'defensive' corporate 
strategy behind the actions of the companies. They understood that to 
achieve long-run stability to supply their downstream activities 
and to provide a guaranteed outlet for their technological expertise, 
the companies might have to get out of direct ownership altogether. 
Such a move would have the additional advantage of removing the 
politically sensitive question of 'ownership' as a source of friction 
between the companies and the producer-states. By the legal device of 
ownership the demands of the economic nationalists in the oil-exporting 
countries appeared to be satisfied.
The companies' actions furthermore fit in with the general re- 
orientation of the oil companies, which weregradually turning into
'energy corporations'. This move which was anticipated in the late
22 1960s has recently accelerated. The purchase by the oil companies of
other energy sources such as coal, atomic energy, and oil-shales, will
23 ensure them future access to sources of energy. A number of these
resources are to be found in politically 'secure' areas, which could
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yet again provide the companies with the prospect of controlling the
whole integrated production structure. For instance, 60% of all
24 present US coal reserves are owned by the US oil industry. The
purchase of such new interests requires substantial amounts of internal 
finance, which may explain the time pattern of the oil companies' rent 
maximization. A short run maximization of rent in present activities 
may signify a wish to get out of crude-production with a maximum amount 
of money to finance new investments in other sources of energy.
The third 'actor' with an interest in increasing prices was the 
US government. From 1970 onwards the US clearly pressed for an 
increase in the general price level of crude. Oppenheim shows how
the US government's actions were interpreted by the oil producers as
25 
a desire for higher prices; a point of view that has also been
o/:
forcefully put by Chevalier. It was thought that such a rise would 
make a number of indigenous production wells in the US commercially 
viable and therefore help the US to achieve a higher degree of self- 
sufficiency in oil as well as in a direct way help the profitability 
of the US oil companies. The push towards higher prices was also 
related to inter-imperialist rivalries. The US government saw how an
increase in crude-prices would deliver a serious blow to its industrial
27 
competitors in Western Europe and Japan. The problem for the US was
that prices finally increased far more than originally anticipated, 
but this can to some extent be ascribed to exogenous events, notably 
the Yom-Kippur war.
Due to the peculiarities of the oil industry - both its extremely 
high capital/labour ratio and the high rent element in the final price 
- it has been relatively easy for the companies to 'buy off oil workers 
with high salaries and create a type of aristocracy of labour. There- 
fore oil workers have played a relatively minor role in demands for a
28 
reorganisation through nationalization.
We have sketched why there was a simultaneous drive by the 
producer-states, the oil companies and the US for a reorganisation of 
the oil industry. It is important to see that no 'conspiracy' brought 
oil prices to their present levels, or opened the way for the 
reorganisation of the industry. Rather these events were partly 
outcomes of the historically specific circumstances outlined above. 
This interpretation of the rise in the state roles in the rest of 
industry goes some way towards explaining why the companies which operated 
on the Norwegian Continental Shelf gracefully gave in to the demands
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for state participation that the Norwegian state was putting forward 
from the late 1960s onwards.
8.2.5 The Norwegian state and oil
The theoretical framework which helped us to understand the general 
behaviour of the Norwegian state can give no direct and unambiguous 
'explanation 1 of Norwegian oil policies in the period 1965-74. State 
theory is thus not a methodological tool which in any direct sense can 
be 'applied 1 . But it can, when it is coupled with an analysis of the 
political and economic peculiarities of the Norwegian state, show how 
the general content of state action in the shape of an increased state 
control of the oil industry and the form it took,was related to the 
accumulation/legitimization functions of the Norwegian state. We 
emphasize the importance of the political and economic peculiarities 
in any overall understanding of Norwegian policies. This is in response 
to the failure of any pure and abstract theories of the state on their
own to give such an understanding, a point we have developed in detail
29 elsewhere.
Our first aim is to identify the factors which were at work on 
the Norwegian state structure and which in the end made state inter- 
vention seem so 'natural' and 'inevitable' in the Norwegian case. 
We have identified four such factors.
(i) Macro-economic defence and state control
The first factor which can help to explain the increased role of 
the Norwegian state in the oil industry is related to the kind of economic 
policies that the Norwegian state traditionally pursued in the post-war 
period. These policies were characterized by an extreme preoccupation 
with the equilibrium of the Norwegian economic system as a whole at the 
expense of the interests of individual Norwegian capitalists (see 
Section 1.2.2). This historical tradition was directly reflected in the 
attitude taken by the Ministry of Finance in St.meld, no.25 (1973-74). 
Norway was faced with three alternatives with regard to oil production 
which were largely similar to the portfolio choice which at the time 
confronted the OPEC countries with large reserves and small 
populations:
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- Norway could produce oil and invest the proceeds in Norway
- Norway could produce oil and invest the proceeds abroad
30
- Norway could refuse to produce oil and invest in oil-in-the-ground.
Faced with these possibilities the Norwegian state advocated a 
compromise solution. As described in Chapter 7, Norway set a ceiling 
on the total annual oil production of 90 mill, tonnes oil-equivalent 
per year. The main reason for such a ceiling was the threat that a 
higher oil production represented to the stability of the 
Norwegian social and economic system as a whole, because of the 
economy's limited ability to absorb large oil revenues. And such 
control could best be implemented through a higher state involvement 
in the industry. We have earlier shown how a higher state equity share 
was a necessary (but not sufficient) prerequisite for such control.
While Parliamentary Report no.25 made the point that changes in 
production, employment, and settlement patterns continuously take place 
in every society, it explicitly stated that "these changes may be 
considerably accentuated through a rapid development of the petroleum 
activities or through an extensive domestic use of the increased 
revenues". The Report then went on to describe such changes as "the
most important problem which must be considered in connection with the
31 petroleum operations". A prerequisite for controlling these problems
was that "democratically elected institutions must have full control of
32 
all important aspects of the petroleum policy". The Report even stated
that "... in the future they (private enterprises, Norwegian and foreign
- PN) should obtain the right to exploit these natural resources in
33 exceptional cases only". These quotes suggest that when the Ministry
of Finance advocated a more important role of the state in the oil 
industry, this position was based on its preoccupation with the stability 
of the system as a whole.
We must however now move one step further and show why the threatened 
structural consequences of too high an oil production had such an 
important influence on Norwegian policy-makers. We will argue that it 
was because of the peculiarities of the Norwegian state structure that 
the concept of depletion control became important in a way which was 
unique in oil-producing states. We have seen how once the Norwegian 
state realized what importance oil would have for the economy
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as a whole, and especially the threat it posed to the non-oil- 
related sectors of the economy, the state acted by restricting output. 
While the restrictions on the granting of new licences until 1973 were 
more part of the bargaining with the companies over control of tech- 
nology (a slow rate of exploration would give the Norwegians time to 
'catch up 1 technologically), after the price rise of oil it became 
increasingly clear how oil production would affect the industrial 
structure in general. The corresponding restructuring of Norwegian 
industry would not be accepted by large sectors of the Norwegian 
national bourgeoisie who owned the industries that were likely to be 
most seriously affected, nor would it be accepted by the workers in 
the same industries. The contrast between Norway and the majority of 
oil-producing states which often have a desire to break down instead 
of preserve the traditional economic structures in the name of 
'development 1 ,should be clear.
This action is only understandable if it is accepted that the 
Norwegian state intervenes on behalf of the capitalist class as a whole 
in its attempts to induce a balanced process of capital accumulation,
and does not represent or directly articulate the interests of only
34 
one fraction of this class or one industry. This view goes against
Naustdalslid's analysis which predicts a closer link between the Norwegian
     35 
state and the oil companies as a consequence of the oil activities.
The control over volume was also specifically related to the important 
legitimising role of the state, given the particular political situation 
in Norway in 1973. So the restriction in output was not only an automatic 
and inevitable aspect of Norwegian policies, but was also a result of 
political struggles which must at least partly be ascribed to popular 
attitudes following the EEC referendum. The Labour government and the 
traditional Norwegian political machine had just been defeated in this 
referendum and was seeking measures to counteract the growing left-wing 
drift in Norway, in order to legitimize anew its own position. The 
stipulated production ceiling of 90 million tons oil equivalents a year 
(however arbitrarily the exact amount was originally fixed) was such a 
measure. The important antagonisms within the Norwegian state apparatus 
on this question further weakened a traditional "united front" on the 
part of the civil service and facilitated the acceptance of a policy 
of volume control.
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When we put forward the above explanation why Norway implemented 
a policy of volume control we should also bear in mind that there was 
a unique overlap between what could be regarded as a 'rational' micro- 
economic portfolio choice by a landowner (the Norwegian state), and the 
historical factors which put such a weight on the overall stability of 
the Norwegian economic system. Norwegian policy-makers in choosing 
their optimum portfolio of assets were, like their OPEC counterparts, 
forced to consider the implications of a rising or a falling real price 
of oil on the choice between keeping the oil in the ground or investing 
it abroad. And Norwegian policy-makers did not think there would be 
any long-run collapse in the real price of oil. On the other hand the 
risks of using the oil revenues to increase Norway's foreign investment 
could be said to be high. There were at the time negative real rates 
of return to be earned in the international financial markets; threats 
of exchange-rate losses; and even possibilities of nationalizations of 
the oil-producers' foreign holdings. All these factors further supported 
a policy of relatively slow production from the Norwegian Continental 
Shelf.
But the state did not only try to increase its control over the 
volume of production. By 1974 Statoil also seemed set to intervene 
at the expense of both the Norwegian private sector and the international 
companies at the level of extraction. The state was becoming a capitalist 
in its own right which sought parity with the foreign firms. The 
explanation for this must as in the case of volume control partly rely 
on the peculiar nature of the Norwegian state. And again we will first 
turn to the state's role as 'macro-regulator' in Norwegian society.
We have throughout this thesis stressed how an increased state 
participation was a way for the state to increase its control over the 
oil-rent. This higher guaranteed income was necessary in order to 
maintain the Norwegian state's high degree of legitimacy, especially 
in a situation where the rest of the world was heading for a major 
recession. A higher income would provide higher subsidies for 
Norwegian industry "^n °rder j- o maintain full employment. A higher 
income would also provide funds for the large transfer payments which 
were so necessary to keep the relatively equitable distribution of 
income and wealth that Norway enjoyed.
But this urge for a higher income could not be pursued at the 
expense of all other policy aims. Section 7,7 shows how at the
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time there was thought to exist clear limits to the overall amount 
of oil production that the Norwegian social structure could tolerate. 
So the need for revenues had to be satisfied within certain volume 
constraints. There was therefore a short-run trade-off between the two, 
But this trade-off could be improved within certain limits by an 
increased state participation.
On a more theoretical level, but within the same problematic, one 
can interpret an increased state intervention and ownership in the oil 
industry as a solution to the 'fiscal crisis' of the Norwegian state. 
This is to adopt 0 * Connor's paradigm where state action is mainly 
determined by a drive to cover the gap between state income and 
expenditure, a gap which according to him tends to increase over
time. Such an understanding of the problem at hand becomes
especially tempting when we know that Norway in the early 1970s was one
38 
of the highest taxed OECD countries.
At an even higher level of abstraction the explanation for the 
state's involvement in the oil industry becomes an extension to our 
theoretical perspective presented in Appendix D, whereby state inter- 
vention takes place in direct response to a crisis which threatens to
39 
stop the accumulation process. Alternatively, state intervention can
be seen as a necessary prerequisite for a total restructuring of
capitalist relations in order to lay the foundations for a renewed
40 period of capital accumulation. Any of these lines of argument can
then be employed as an explanation for a direct state intervention in 
any industry. For instance, the post-war state takeover of steel, 
railways and coal in the UK can, according to this argument, be seen 
as a response to the low profitability and the need to restructure 
these industries.
At first glance such explanations may seem irrelevant in our case 
because initially there was no Norwegian extractive oil industry. But 
the argument can be made relevant if we interpret the trend towards 
Norwegian state intervention mainly as a response to a crisis in the 
international oil industry (see Section 8.2.2 above). An alternative 
and more general explanation along the same lines could attribute the 
need for a reorganisation of the oil industry to a response to a wider 
crisis of Norwegian capitalism. One way to argue this is to claim that 
heavier state involvement was a result of a threatened crisis springing 
from the structural dislocations which could have followed the increase
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of oil prices in 1973, and therefore represented a kind of 'preventive' 
intervention. In this way we have again returned our explanation to 
the Norwegian state's crucial role as macro-regulator in Norwegian 
society, the historical origins of which we outlined in Chapter 1.
But within the above framework that primarily sees the state in 
1973-74 as representing capital in general, and therefore largely dis- 
regards whether it deals with private or state firms, we do not claim that 
the more traditional functions of the state had been completely dispensed 
with. The state's role as coordinator and guarantor of private capital 
accumulation was also maintained within Norway. The success of the 
Norwegian private drilling and platform construction firms, extensively 
outlined throughout this work, as well as of the other spinoff 
industries, would have been unthinkable without the active intervention
of the state. And, as we have seen, the state's direct intervention as
41 a capitalist within the spinoff sector was minimal.
This intervention was of course not always unproblematic. The 
aim of increasing the absolute amount of spinoffs could (and in the 
1976/77 period clearly did) clash with the constraint of a maximum 
volume of production. The seriousness of this contradiction increased 
as the threat-of unemployment, especially in the engineering industry, 
started to loom. But the key in this context was to understand the 
crucial role that the Norwegian state played in supporting Norwegian 
private capital accumulation. Contrary to the case of extraction, the 
Norwegian capitalists were capable of taking advantage of such an 
opportunity once the state had prepared the ground for them.
(ii) Control of foreign investment
One powerful factor which decides if a policy is to come into 
operation springs from historical precedence. If a proposed policy 
in any way can be said to be a follow-up of previous policies, it is 
often easier to put forward and get accepted. Oil policies are no 
exception to this. It is on such a background that the history of 
restrictions on foreign investment and its subsequent significance for 
capital accumulation is an important contributing factor to an under- 
standing of the development of the Norwegian oil policies. The 
Norwegian 'Concession-laws' from the beginning of this century set a 
precedent for any politician who argued in favour of exercising the
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strictest control over the oil companies. In many cases this history
was directly used in justifying tight control over the international
42 oil companies.
Even the exact historical pattern of events can be of more specific 
value in establishing a policy precedent. For instance two aspects of 
the historical 'cycle 1 of foreign investment in Norway later 'reappeared 1 
in Norwegian oil policies.
First, the decrease in foreign ownership between 1909 and 1918 
was partly due to the Norwegian position as a net capital exporter 
during the latter part of the First World War and the subsequent 
purchase by Norwegian interests of foreign interests in Norwegian 
industry. Thus, once the external situation was favourable, represent- 
atives of Norwegian capital increased their ownership-share of Norwegian 
industry at the expense of foreign industry. The analogy about what 
could have been done with the expected oil surplus is both tempting 
and relevant. The main difference is that today it is the state 
which has been more or less willing to buy out foreign interests in 
the Norwegian economy (hjemkj^p), while during the First World War it 
was representatives of the Norwegian bourgeoisie who took such steps.
Secondly, the state's historic attitude towards rapid structural 
change in Norwegian society is of relevance when it comes to assessing 
the views that surfaced on this subject during the formative years of 
Norwegian oil policies. One of the reasons put forward in favour of 
the 'Concession-laws' was the negative effect they were expected to have 
on the pace of the industrialization process in Norway. According to 
some of its proponents, a slowing down of this process would minimize 
the social costs associated with a rapid industrialization. The 
analogy with the reasoning underlying the limit of 90 million tons 
oil production per year in the mid 1970s strongly suggests that there 
was an important continuum in Norwegian policies towards industrial 
policies in general, and foreign capital in particular. This later 
made it easier to argue for restrictive policies towards foreign oil 
capital.
The willingness to argue against foreign investment in general 
was strengthened by the nationalist and anti-centralist/anti-authoritarian 
streams in Norwegian political tradition. These were probably at 
their height just after the war, and surfaced again in connection with 
the EEC referendum. In between, the pro-foreign investment school
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carried the day; the reasons for which are complex. These pro- 
investment attitudes initially dominated the Norwegian state's handling 
of the oil question. Arguments put forward in favour of increased 
Norwegian control were invariably opposed by reference to 'realism 1 , 
and the 'inevitability' of relying on the companies. But once the 
objective chance came for Norway to partly break away from the 'realism 
argument', especially as Statoil developed, the Norwegian state tried 
to increase its relative autonomy from the companies. This transforma- 
tion, which took place between 1972 and 1974, coincided with the outcome 
of the EEC referendum. The referendum result further undermined the 
general liberal belief of free mobility of capital which, in the last 
analysis, underlay foreign investment in the oil industry. The contrast 
between Norwegian and UK policies can in this respect be very instructive. 
Britain was a country where no tightening took place from 1970 onwards in 
relation to the companies. One important explanation for this was the 
lack of historical precedence of controlling foreign capital which 
existed in Norway.
(iii) Socialisation of production
The third reason why there was an increase in state involvement in 
the Norwegian oil industry is related to the high socialisation in the 
process of production. Concretely this meant that the demands for 
capital necessary both to explore and develop the fields in the North 
Sea were far in excess of anything that could ever be obtained and 
managed by Norwegian private capitalists on their own. This was 
particularly the case until 1972, because oil-in-the-ground, according 
to Norwegian legislation, could not be used as collateral by oil 
companies to obtain finance. But the situation remained virtually 
unchanged after that. This is clearly seen when we consider that total
gross investment in Norwegian industry and mining in 1974 totalled
45 
-Kr. 7.4 bill. compared with a total yearly expected investment of
Kr. 8.25 bill. ($1.5 bill.) on the Norwegian Continental Shelf in the
46 late 1970s. To raise such amounts of finance and undertake investments
on this scale was simply beyond the organisational capacity of the 
Norwegian bourgeoisie.
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But we must take this argument one step further once it is 
realized that the international companies had access to sufficient 
capital to carry out an investment programme in the North Sea. (This 
is not to claim that they had enough capital to carry out such heavy 
investment programmes everywhere, nor that they didn't want the right 
kind of participation by the state to decrease the burden of finance.) 
Why did the Norwegian state overcome its traditional attitude of non- 
involvement in productive industries and intervene directly if indeed 
there was enough finance available elsewhere? The reason is that the 
Norwegian state is first and foremost a national state with a strong 
nationalist tradition. Once it was clear that Norwegian private 
capital was not able to develop the North Sea itself, the choice was 
whether accumulation of capital in the North Sea should be undertaken 
by the state or by the international companies. The Norwegian state 
then opted for a partial state capitalist solution centred around 
Statoil; and not one that exclusively gave the job to the international 
companies. Statoil thus became a surrogate and a substitute for the 
weak Norwegian bourgeoisie in a way that is similar to the productive 
role of the state in a number of third world countries.
47 (iv) Strategic goods and general conditions of production
A fourth reason why the state has increasingly tended to intervene 
in the oil industry can be put forward once it is accepted that oil is 
no ordinary commodity. It is the most important source of energy in 
capitalist societies and therefore plays a distinct and crucial role 
in the process of capitalist accumulation. From supplying 21.5% of
the world's energy supply in 1940, petroleum accounted for 67.2% in
48 1974. It is indeed possible to argue that the post-war boom has been
based on the fact that ample supplies of cheap energy have been widely
available. As Barraclough says, "If communism ... equals Soviet power
49 plus electrification, neo-capitalism equals US power plus cheap oil."
One set of figures is sufficient to indicate how the accumulation 
process during the post-war period became increasingly energy-intensive, 
which meant an increasing reliance on oil. Whereas between 1870 and 
1950 GNP per capita in the US rose sixfold for a mere doubling of per 
capita energy-use, between 1950 and 1973 energy growth per capita 
actually exceeded the per capita growth in production.
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The operation of a modern capitalist system is thus totally 
dependent in the short to medium run on a steady supply of oil because 
of the way capital accumulation takes place in these economies. A total 
cut-off in the supply of oil will bring the accumulation process to a 
halt with the same certainty as if the supply of labour-power was 
withdrawn. It is for these reasons that we label oil a 'strategic 1 
commodity. Based on this we claim that analytically speaking not all 
goods are equal. A commodity which is an input to more than a critical 
number of goods, and for which there are no short- to medium-run 
substitutes, must be categorized as a different kind of commodity: a 
strategic commodity. It is our argument that the state takes a particular 
interest in 'strategic 1 commodities because of its central role in the 
accumulation process. A capitalist state, preoccupied with supporting 
the process of 'capital accumulation', has little choice but to ensure 
the 'security of supply' of such a good.
When defined in this way, oil can feature alongside other basic 
inputs into the production process like roads, canals, railroads, as 
well as steel, electricity and gas, which all traditionally have been 
publicly owned in Western European countries, and which are all 
absolutely crucial for the overall process of accumulation in society. 
An increased state involvement and control of the oil industry would 
thus be a 'lagged' response to a basic and historically verified trend 
within modern capitalism firmly based on the theory of the state put 
forward in Chapter 2.
Unfortunately there is an important problem connected with the 
use of 'strategic commodities' to explain state intervention in the 
Norwegian oil industry, which arises because most of the Norwegian oil 
is exported. Consequently, there will be no need for state inter- 
vention on a large scale to ensure capital accumulation in the 
Norwegian capitalist system. However, if we use an international 
explanatory framework we can postulate that a worldwide tendency towards 
a higher state involvement in the petroleum industry, will also in the end 
lead to a higher state involvement in the Norwegian oil industry (see 
Section 2.5.3).
Section 8.2.3 has outlined how an understanding of the nature of the 
Norwegian state can help to explain Norwegian oil policies. This way of 
arguing goes beyond and is largely unrelated to the more traditional 
explanatory factors such as net'expected present value and the international
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context. Concentrating on the state in a historical manner represents a 
complementary insight into the already existing theories of bargaining. 
At the same time it is logically prior to them in explaining why the 
state should intervene in the oil industry at all. The arguments of this 
section finally make it clear that such state action in the last analysis 
can be related to the basic force at work within any capitalist economy: 
the over-riding need to accumulate capital.
8.5 CONSTRAINTS
While in theory a state has a 'free choice 1 to pursue any oil 
policy it likes, we shall now see that the form of the Norwegian push 
towards an increased involvement of the state (outlined in the last 
section) was not necessarily the most effective way of accomplishing 
the aims of the Norwegian state. It is for example quite possible that 
a process of full nationalization could have been more effective than 
the principle of 'carried interest 1 in fulfilling these aims. But 
full nationalization was not chosen, because Norwegian policies operated 
within a number of well-defined constraints. The chosen policy can only 
be understood and evaluated if these constraints are understood. The 
Norwegian policy-makers successfully implemented a set of policies that 
maximized its share of rent, spinoffs, and volume control, but which at 
the same time did not break with two constraints. Norwegian policies 
did not in any real sense threaten the existince of the (international 
or national) private oil companies; and secondly they stayed within the 
general confines of Norwegian foreign policy.
8.5.1 Constraint 1: Statoil and the nature of the participation 
agreements
We have shown in Chapters 6 and 7 how Statoil did not in any 
meaningful or apparent sense become directly subservient to the 
international companies or the Norwegian private sector, but was 
rapidly expanding into an independent and dynamic vertically integrated 
state oil company. There were even indications that Statoil felt its 
interests to be opposite to those of the international companies, and 
also did its best to avoid being subject to full control from the 
politicians.
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We want to show that even with this background the final form the 
participation agreements took on the Norwegian Continental Shelf 
constituted no basic threat to the companies. This is, in the last 
analysis, why they were chosen by the Norwegians and accepted by the 
companies. The Norwegian policy packages stayed within the constraint 
that the very existence of the private companies should not be challenged, 
Their conditions of accumulation were guaranteed.
There are many ways to explain why such a constraint existed. 
Firstj there were virtually unanimous statements by Norwegian policy- 
makers throughout the period that the Norwegian state wanted the services 
of the international companies. (The only exception was the Socialist 
Electoral Alliance, SV, which pressed for full nationalization of the 
oil industry.) In these circumstances it was extremely unlikely 
that the companies would be subject to a policy that threatened their 
very existence on the Norwegian Continental Shelf 
But given the tendency for politicians to say one thing and then 
do the opposite, the above argument should be reinforced along more 
general lines. If we assume that a challenge to the very existence of 
the private companies in the North Sea would also challenge capitalism 
in its present form in Norway, then an examination of Norwegian history 
shows that no such basic challenge has ever come from within the 
Norwegian state itself. It is therefore extremely unlikely that this 
would happen in the oil industry. And even assuming that there was a 
wish to break with the companies, the foreign policy constraint out- 
lined below would make any such break extremely difficult to achieve.
Finally, the constraint that no capitalist state will actively 
challenge the very existence of private capital (as opposed to regulating 
it, or even achieving parity with it) has been chosen as a basic assump- 
tion for marxist or neo-marxist works on the modern state. We will 
not go into the complexity of this debate here, but merely point out 
that adopting such a methodological starting point is common within a
certain analytical tradition of modern social science. 
8.5.11 IRR
The most direct confirmation of the argument that the form that the 
increased state involvement took in Norway did not fundamentally challenge the 
companieSjis provided by our cash-flow results. They have unambiguously 
shown that the effect of participation on the IRR of the companies was
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relatively modest and that their expected post-tax IRR continuously 
increased throughout the period, despite continuous state 'tightening' 
of terms. And while the change in the system of participation from 
1972 onwards (Scenario 1) represented a worsening as far as the 
companies were concerned (they had to pay a larger percentage of total 
costs to get access to a lower percentage of the final production of 
oil), the relative 'cost' which arose from this kind of participation 
decreased over time. This happened because since 1972 the relative 
importance of exploration costs compared to development costs decreased
at the same time as the success ratio of wildcats increased in the
52 North Sea.
8.3.12 Finance
Secondly, participation 'Norwegian style' may under certain 
conditions turn out to help the financial situation of oil companies, 
and can therefore partly explain its ready acceptance by North Sea oil 
operators. It is the break with the commonly held, but unreasonable, 
assumption that an unlimited amount of capital at any time is available 
for exploration and development in the North Sea which lies at the heart 
of such an assessment.
In order to analyse this aspect of North Sea policies, we must 
differentiate between different forms of finance, and see how different 
firms have different financial requirements. But first, the scale of 
the undertaking must be put in a proper perspective. The investment 
needs in the North Sea are huge by any standards. The total invest- 
ment needs in the Norwegian sector for the period 1976-83 was in 1976
53 
expected to total $14.8 bill. This figure must be seen in conjunction
with the up to $45 billions which could be needed in the UK sector during
54 the same period, because there is no way we can separate the two
sectors from one another. When talking about finance, banks tend to 
assess financing problems on a sectoral (here North Sea) basis.
These $60 billions over the next eight years will come from three 
sources. Internal funds of the oil companies will still continue 
to play an important part in the financing of new investments in the 
oil industry. But as exploration moves into high-cost areas ever- 
increasing investment funds have to be found. Largely because of this 
development, the degree of self-financing of the major oil companies have 
dropped from 85% in the mid-1960s to 73% one decade later.
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Secondly, export financing from different government sources had 
until 1976 accounted for 35-40% of total investments in the North Sea. 
Such credits were often given at very reasonable interest rates which
served to induce the companies to order equipment from particular
57 
countries.
Finally, the Eurodollar market and other banking sources could 
provide the funds which would be issued in the form of medium-run 
(2-10 years) loans with flexible interest rates. The combined size
of the Eurodollar market and other sources of finance was quite
58 
sufficient to finance North Sea oil development.
There were three broad kinds of consortia/groups that operate in 
the North Sea, if we exclude the state oil corporations.
First 7 the international majors, which operated alone or in 
cooperation with other majors. Secondly, the consortia where majors 
operated together with a group of minor companies. This was the most 
common kind of consortium in the Norwegian sector. Finally, there were 
consortia that consisted of minor companies on their own. This solution 
has on the whole been rejected on the Norwegian Shelf.
The major companies at the time still tended to finance their 
investments from internally generated funds, even if there were signi- 
ficant exceptions. BP raised the money for the Forties field in the 
financial market; the total worth of the investment equalled the total 
world-wide capital investment of the corporation for one year. But 
even in the cases where the majors had to enter the market, they 
offered little problem for the financial system as their borrowing 
was based on the strength of their .company's assets. And as long 
as the major oil corporations managed to maintain an acceptable debt/ 
equity ratio (they are in the foreseeable future expected to be far 
above the critical limit), they would have enjoyed a de facto privileged 
status in the financial markets.
The second kind of consortium was faced with greater, but not 
insurmountable, difficulties. In such cases the banks tended to 
evaluate the prospect of the particular field which needed finance, 
and give loans subject to completion guarantees. But it was often 
problematic for banks to give loans to the consortium as a whole, due 
to the weakness of the minors' balance sheets.
The third kind of consortium would only get loans if the banks
59 
obtained "some substantial concessions in equity". Such concessions
would normally take the form of guarantees in the form of royalties, 
often of the order of 3-5%.
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Loans in the last two categories are off-balance sheet loans, 
tied to the prospects of the particular field that needs financing. 
Such loans which take as collateral the oil in the ground were not 
allowed according to Norwegian legislation prior to 1972. But following 
the publication of the Royal Decree in December 1972, this changed so 
that in case of serious default the banks will have the possibility to 
take over the licence and continue the production or appoint a company 
to undertake such a task. This, according to Gulnes, represented "a 
true off-balance sheet financing without a guarantee from the parent 
oil company".
The consequences of this pattern of financing in an imperfect 
world where capital is difficult to obtain, was that Norwegian state 
participation by its very presence helped to secure and guarantee 
loans. Initially, the state participation schemes gave quantitatively 
little help to the companies (in 1969 only scenario 3 committed the 
state to capital outlays). But all later concessions have without 
exception committed the Norwegian state to directly contribute towards 
the development costs of the projects,. To make a full analysis we 
must now distinguish between the state's relation to the major and the 
smaller companies. As shown above, for the smaller companies the role 
of the banks is crucial. But while banks have historically played a
conservative or 'cautious 1 role in the North Sea, their attitude has 
been much more ambiguous when it has come down to state participation 
in the financing of projects. According to one banker, the state's 
participation in a project may even strengthen a bank's overall credit 
assessment of a particular project's request for off balance sheet 
loans, because the state is viewed as a strong partner "that will have 
both the financial power and the incentive to keep the project moving 
forward, even if difficulties are encountered" 
Another banker simply stated that majority state participation 
"may well save the North Sea as a major producing area". In this 
context the banker in question did not only mention the financing of
the investments, but also referred to the government as guaranteeing
64 
a minimum rate of return on investments. A third banker stated
(less surely) that "the doubts about the possible effect of government
65 
participation (on financing - PN) may sometimes have been exaggerated".
It should therefore be clear that state participation in a 
consortium could have clear consequences for off-balance sheet finance 
especially if the loans were given to a consortium as a whole. This
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conclusion is strengthened when it is clear that Statoil is not 
borrowing on the strength of a specific prospect, but is regarded 
within financial circles as being backed up by the Norwegian state, 
and as a consequence has had ready access to international long-run 
finance via the state.
But if the banks in general were not displeased by the existence 
of state participation in the field of financing, the reactions of 
the companies were much more mixed. The smaller and medium-sized 
companies were for the outlined reasons more positive towards the 
idea of state participation than the majors that did not need the 
state's intervention. The managing director of the small UK oil company 
Tricentrol stated in relation to state participation that "We, Tricentrol,
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welcome the British government as a partner."
It can be argued that Tricentrol at the time was in a very 
vulnerable situation in relation to the British state, which had just
r O
bailed it out of its financial difficulties. But the company's 
graceful acceptance of a partnership with the state in financing 
expresses in a very coherent manner the not very often heard voice 
of the smaller and medium-sized companies to whom the state today is 
of an altogether different importance than for the majors. And the 
more even the majors are forced onto the financial markets for future 
loans, the more important Statoil's participation in a consortium 
becomes from a financial point of view.
8.5.15 Rationality and Statoil
But participation Norwegian style was about more than financing. 
The companies as well as Norwegian capitalism in general had to come 
to grips with the creation of Statoil. In this section we will follow 
up and synthesize the discussion in the last chapter and assess what 
Statoil meant for these sectors. However much Statoil's creation 
initially was lamented by the national and international oil industry, 
the subsequent discussion should make clear that Statoil cannot be 
assessed in black and white terms. It represents no absolute threat 
to the companies (nor indeed to Norwegian capitalism). But neither 
is Statoil in any meaningful sense controlled by the companies.
The main question which can bridge a 'national 1 and an 'inter- 
national' evaluation of Statoil is the extent to which Statoil follows 
the same criteria of rationality as a private firm. Private industry
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initially feared that if Statoil was not forced to take 'normal 1 
commercial considerations into account with respect to its investments 
or other corporate policies, this could then play havoc with the stability 
and competitiveness with the rest of the industry operating in the 
North Sea. Statoil could undercut their prices, not being subject to 
the same strict profitability criteria as the private sector, and also 
gain an 'unfair 1 advantage over all other firms if it obtained 
privileged access to information which had been lodged with the 
Norwegian state by the companies. This included all the geological 
information from the Norwegian Shelf, while each company on the other 
hand had to be satisfied with the interpretation of its own experts. 
But fortunately for the private sector no price cutting has taken 
place. And Statoil's advantage from the second factor has been 
limited. While Statoil can still be given concessions outside of 
normal licensing rounds and is present at all negotiations with the 
private companies, it can nevertheless be argued that these privileges 
represent no fundamental break with capitalist rationality for Statoil. 
Statoil is anyway a member of each new concession so their presence in 
the negotiations is to be expected. Statoil's privileges can rather 
be seen as 'reasonable' moves to protect an infant industry. Because 
all private oil companies expect that Statoil will be specially 
favoured, they fight a continuous battle to make Statoil's position
as much equal to their own as possible. But as one director of Shell
71 said: "As long as we play the same game, we are not afraid of Statoil."
And all indications are that Statoil is indeed playing according to 
the rules.
However, oil-men often claim (in private) that the existence of 
a slightly inefficient state oil corporation (if this indeed is a 
correct characterisation of Statoil) helps to set the standard of 'good 
practices' slightly above what they would otherwise have been, thus 
easing the burdens on the private oil corporations.
72 8.5.14 Decision-making procedures
Participation can be a direct threat to the oil companies if it 
affects the optimal micro-economic way of exploring an individual field. 
This may happen if a combination of operator status and a majority 
holding gives Statoil what amounts to a 'carte blanche' when it comes 
to choosing the appropriate technological subcontractors, deciding the
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optimum production profile of a field, etc. But, as we shall now 
see, the situation is nowhere as bad as that for the companies.
The state participation agreements negotiated after 1972 gave
Statoil a place on the Policy Steering Committee (also called the
73 
'Operating Committee 1 ) from the very start of exploration. The
Policy Steering Committee is the main executive and decision-making 
unit of the 'interesentskap 1 , the company that is formed once a 
commercial find is made and consists of all the equity partners of 
the concession. Day-to-day decisions are taken with simple majority
in the Committee, but key decisions require a 'qualified majority 1 ,
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which ranges from 52% to unanimity of all partners.
This is why Statoil, even with a majority share of equity, only has 
a veto power during the exploration phase and for key policy decisions 
during the development phase. It is only fairly straightforward 
decisions during the development phase which can be made by using 
Statoil's majority.
In addition to the voting powers associated with the equity 
situation, the question of operator is crucial. The operator is in 
charge of the day-to-day activity of a concession. This entails 
negotiating investments, developing specifications of equipment to be 
used, drawing up the overall plans for the development of the field, 
and negotiating drilling contracts with independent operators. All 
these functions give the operator a key coordinating role and an 
extremely important indirect decision-making role even if all decisions 
in principle have to be taken by the Policy Steering Committee. The 
company which acts as operator will, by shaping the decisions according 
to its own premises, have a much greater importance than what its equity 
share should suggest. The degree of this influence is clearly seen in 
the Statfjord case which exemplifies the ease with which the formal 
decision-making structure can be bypassed and the de facto power given 
to the operator of the field. This case study also is an excellent 
example of how a large equity holding does not guarantee the state 
access to vital information.
It thus seems that a mere majority share of equity, or even the 
maximum 75% equity share agreed in 1974, in itself is less threatening 
and efficient as a means to ensure effective state control over the 
operations on the Norwegian Shelf than what might immediately be thought 
(On the other hand, the situation is still much better as far as the 
Norwegian state is concerned compared with the initial 1965 and 1969
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agreements. It is also widely believed that Statoil has used its weight 
on the Statfjord Policy Steering Committee to increase the Norwegian 
share of spinoff from that field.)
The real possibility for Statoil to become a threat to the micro- 
economic rationality of the private firms will therefore only appear 
if Statoil, in addition to being a majority equity holder, also becomes 
an operator. This would in particular make it easier for Statoil to 
regulate production profiles and select national suppliers of goods and 
services. But whether Statoil would follow such a course depends on 
to what extent Statoil will obey political as opposed to commercial 
directives. And even in the cases where the companies have accepted
Statoil as both majority partner and operator (as in a few of the 1974
78 
agreements), it was on the explicit understanding that the private
companies should provide technological'back-up' and thus in reality 
perform some of the functions undertaken by the present operators. 
The realisation that 'technological independence' is important for 
our discussion now leads us to a more detailed discussion of that topic.
8.3.15 Technology
The key problem for any oil company which tries to develop a field 
on its own is to coordinate the different tasks during the exploration 
and production phases. It is because the majors have a considerable 
experience in such a supervisory role that they often claim they are 
'irreplaceable' from a technological point of view, and not because 
the companies develop the fields themselves, or because the technology
itself is particularly demanding. Up to 80% of all technology used
79 in the North Sea has indeed been described as 'conventional'. The
great majority of single tasks in connection with oil production in the 
North Sea are undertaken by specialist firms. Such firms can be 
drilling operators, or can be hired as responsible for the overall 
engineering development once a field is found (NPC and Brown § Root 
for Statfjord). Only in exceptional circumstances (like deep-water 
technology) will the companies themselves directly control access to 
crucial technology.
Once Statoil acquires the overall capacity to direct such 
developments, it could in principle become the sole operator of a 
field in the same way that Exxon or Shell is today. The key variable 
is whether Statoil will have a sufficiently large engineering staff
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of its own to direct such a development. According to Lavik, a 
spokesman for Statoil, the company had by 1976 no plans to develop 
such a capacity within its own organisation beyond a relatively 
limited 'key personnel 1 (ntfkkelstab). But Statoil "had taken the
initiative and managed to achieve cooperation between Norwegian
80 expertise through the foundation of Norwegian Petroleum Contractors".
The idea was then that Statoil could make use of the expertise 
developed by NPC. Thus the possibility of making Statoil more 
independent from the majors presupposed a strengthening of its links 
with Norwegian private capital. Historical experience strongly
suggests that freeing a producer-state from technological dependence
81 is very much a political problem. Consider three examples. A
country like Mexico has managed to run its oil industry including down- 
stream activities since the 1938 nationalization largely by using 
Mexican euqipment. Romania is one of the world's most important 
producers of sophisticated drilling equipment and recently India has 
developed the offshore Bombay High oilfield by using Indian technology.
It is within such a context that Statoil's relationship to the 
problem of technological dependence must be seen. Statoil is on the 
one hand an expression of the political will of the Norwegian state 
to become technologically independent from the companies. But still 
there are clear limits to how far this tendency will go. One of them 
is the companies' control of crucial deep-water technology.
But there also exists a political barrier for Statoil to develop 
fields on its own. The existence of this barrier was confirmed in the 
interview with Lavik. When asked whether, once the overall expertise 
was acquired, it was not possible for Statoil to completely dispense 
with the services of the majors, he stated: "If it is politically
acceptable (PN emphasis) this is a possible solution in the North
82Sea." It is the breaking down of this barrier that more than any- 
thing worries the companies in the long run.
On the other hand the private companies seem to confront the 
short to medium run situation with confidence. The openness which 
Statoil technical personnel on secondment to the companies have experi- 
enced both with respect to the learning programmes and with respect to
gaining full access to the internal disagreements within the companies,
8 "5 is a good indication of this confidence. The companies clearly hope not
to antagonise the Norwegian state authorities, while at the same time
84 
expect that their technical services will continue to be required.
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It can thus be said as a conclusion that, while Statoil's 
increasing acquisition of technical knowledge potentially can threaten 
the very rationale for the existence of the companies on the Norwegian 
Continental Shelf, this threat has not so far materialised.
8.3.16 Renegotiation
The final reason why Norwegian oil policies met with little opposi- 
tion from the companies stemmed from Norway's scrupulous adherence to the 
principle of 'sanctity of contracts'. No agreements have been re- 
negotiated; only taxes have been changed. This aspect of Norwegian 
policies was clearly appreciated by the international companies which 
on several occasions have favourably compared the Norwegian policies 
with for instance the UK efforts (however feeble) to suddenly 'catch 
up 1 with existing terms. It is hardly surprising that the companies 
have been grateful. A guarantee of no renegotiation provides for 
increased predictability in the investment environment for the firms, 
a major advantage for any corporate planner. Such a guarantee also 
leaves the companies with very favourable operating conditions from 
the earlier concession agreements, which were very favourable to the 
companies. Finally, such a behaviour from a producer-state has no 
claim to universality. Renegotiation is normal, and Norway has taken 
an unusually 'soft' line in this respect.
We claim that the reason for this is the existence of a definite 
ideological barrier in Norwegian policy-makers which overshadows 
what in broad terms can be described as 'the reality of the situation'. 
The origin of this ideological belief is the general principle of 
non-retroactive legislation in Norwegian law. To the extent that 
such a belief is based on rational (non-ideological) criteria, it 
is related to the ability of the oil companies and their home-countries 
to impose sanctions on Norway in case of retroactive legislation.
Norway's position of no renegotiation has also been fully appreciated 
by the West in general. It showed that however many threatening 
noises might come from Statoil and individuals concerning the future 
of the private oil firms on the Norwegian Continental Shelf, Norway 
was still fully abiding by the 'rules of the game' and staying 
within the Western camp.
8.3.2 Constraint 2: foreign policy
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The second broad constraint within which Norwegian policy had to 
operate was set by Norwegian foreign policy. This topic is too vast 
to examine in any detail in this thesis, and will therefore only be 
mentioned in passing. Here we will concentrate on the question of 
volume control which became the main source of contention between 
Norwegian policy-makers and the West in general. While there was an 
understanding in the West about the reasons for the relatively low 
level of Norwegian production, there was no automatic acceptance for 
such a view. As the chairman of IEA, Dr. Ulf Lantzke, stated in a 
speech in 1975: "In the North Sea Norway and Britain are under a
certain pressure to decrease the EEC's import of crude from non-
87 European sources." A non-identified US civil servant expressed it
somewhat less diplomatically: "If the Norwegians think they can sit
88 
on their oil for ever they must be crazy." Kissinger's
special advisor in the field of energy, Thomas Enders, was very
"impatient" with respect to the Norwegian position on rates of deple-
89 tion during the Washington summit meeting on energy in January 1974.
On this background it is possible to postulate that the ultimate 
external limit for a truly independent Norwegian oil policy would 
only show itself the day that Norway drastically cut its production,
or alternatively point blank refused to open up new and promising
90 
acreate like the area north of 62°.
If such a scenario were to come true, it is highly probable that 
the pressures for an increased output from bodies like the Inter- 
national Energy Agency (IEA) where Norway has been an associate
91 member since 1975, would increase. Such general pressures would
also be transmitted through all the traditional channels that tie 
Norway to the West, be they of an economic or of a more political 
nature. We have for example already seen the importance that the 
Norwegian trade negotiations with the EEC in 1973 had for the develop- 
ment of Norwegian oil policies, to appreciate the potential strength 
of such a connection.
But to recognize such pressures from the Western political 
system in general with respect to the overall volume of production is 
not to underestimate the direct political pressure which e.g. a single 
government could exert bilaterally against Norway. Were for example 
all the major US companies forced to withdraw or to be barred from
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future participation on the Norwegian Shelf following, for example, a 
move by Norway to nationalize its oil, then the US government could 
impose severe penalties on the Norwegian economy. This kind of pressure 
would exist and be of maximum efficiency as long as Norway remained a 
member of NATO. Hypothetical pressure of.this bilateral kind would 
probably be linked mainly to a changed form of Norwegian state involve- 
ment in the North Sea (nationalization). This contrasts with the 
attitude of IEA which, according to all indications, is less interested 
in the specific form Norwegian energy production takes, as long as 
oil is produced for the OECD countries.
Finally, the oil companies would historically have been able to 
bring direct pressure to bear on the Norwegian state if Norwegian 
policy had changed drastically to their disadvantage. Because the 
companies were the main charterers of Norwegian oil tankers on the 
world market, they possessed a strong bargaining card in their deal- 
ings with the Norwegian state. The threat to stop using Norwegian 
tankers constituted, as Norwegian policy-makers were well aware, a 
powerful last argument for the companies in any confrontation with 
the Norwegian state. But with the decreasing dominance of the shipping 
industry in the Norwegian economy from the early 1970s onwards this 
bargaining card has quickly been losing some of its former force.
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CHAPTER 9 
CONCLUSION
Chapter 8 showed in what sense there was an increased role of the 
Norwegian state in the oil industry in the period 1965-74. It also 
outlined the reasons for this development, concluding that there was 
no single or unicausal 'explanation 1 of why this was so. An explana- 
tion must be found in a synthesis of the three explanatory variables 
we singled out for scrutiny in Chapter 2. While the change in exogenous 
circumstances in the form of increases in the expected PV from fields 
in the North Sea, and changed international circumstances, opened the 
way for the developments we have outlined and made them easier to 
achieve, the particular form and manner in which these changes were 
grasped by Norwegian policymakers can only be understandable with 
reference to the historical and political peculiarities of the Norwegian 
state. In particular, the Norwegian state's relationship to the weak 
national bourgeoisie can explain both the state's passive involvement 
in the spinoff industries as well as its more active behaviour upstream 
in setting up Statoil. The state oil company acted upstream as a 
historical substitute for a Norwegian bourgeoisie which for a number 
of reasons was unable to undertake the task of producing oil on its 
own. But in the sector where the bourgeoisie was capable of taking 
advantage of the possibilities offered to it, as in the spinoff 
industries, the state followed a more traditional policy which gave 
a much larger role to the private sector. By emphasising the historical 
peculiarities of the Norwegian state, we also gain an insight into why 
the state was seeking to maximize some variables and not others; a 
definite advance on orthodox economic theory which simply takes the 
aims of a nation state as given. By proceeding in an interdisciplinary 
manner, we have shown that a pure economic analysis which concentrates 
on the changes in the expected PV of a field has been necessary, but 
not sufficient for a satisfactory analysis.
Our approach has also shown that a Norwegian social democratic 
state could (and did) go further in its confrontation with the inter- 
national companies than for instance was the case in the UK. It is 
indeed difficult to classify the Norwegian state's position in relation 
to the companies as in any way 'subservient 1 or 'dependent' in the way 
that the relationship between raw-material producing states and inter- 
national companies traditionally have been described in part of the
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critical literature. Norway clearly came to grips with the traditional 
forms of surplus extraction from the North Sea such as transfer pricing and 
took a number ,of measures to try to control what was a vertically 
integrated industry. It also managed to control the larger part of 
the rents earned. There was likewise a rapid growth in the expertise 
accumulated by the Norwegian state to maximize its bargaining position 
in relation to the companies.
There nevertheless remained a set of barriers beyond which the 
Norwegian state could only proceed with the utmost difficulty. 
Norwegian policy tried to go as far as possible in its challenge to 
the companies without breaking the unwritten rules of the game. This 
meant that once the Norwegian state knew what the bargaining game was 
about, the policy-makers at any one time squeezed the companies down to 
what the Norwegian negotiators thought was the minimum acceptable rate 
of profit for the companies. And once the parameters of bargaining 
changed, either with respect to the international situation or the 
expected PV from the North Sea fields, the Norwegian state tried to 
react to the new situation by changing its terms.
But, because of the companies' control over technology, especially 
for deep-water exploration, because of the companies' control over the 
downstream activities in the Western markets where Norway's oil would 
have to be sold and because of Norway's allegiance to the Western 
alliance, there was no way that it was thought possible to make any 
definitive break with the companies even if it is assumed that this 
was desired.
A basic challenge to international capital could also have put 
into question the Norwegian state's commitment to protecting the 
accumulation conditions of Norwegian capital, and hence possibly open 
up a period of political instability in Norway itself. So even if we 
have shown that where possible the Norwegian national bourgeoisie was 
the benefactor of Norwegian state policies (and undoubtedly also would 
have been so had the international companies' role been drastically 
reduced), the political consequences of such a policy made it much less 
likely ever to have taken place. The links between the Norwegian and
the international bourgeoisie were in any case being dramatically
2 
strengthened as a result of the oil activity, something that would
make a challenge to international capital even less likely.
It is the existence of these barriers and no crude assumption of 
Norwegian state negotiators being outmanouevred by the companies which
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in the final analysis helps to explain both the general outline of 
Norwegian policies as well as the recent failures that the Norwegian oil 
policies have experienced. The period until 1975 gave Norwegian policy- 
makers an exceptional possibility to pursue a set of nationalistic and 
independent oil policies. But these opportunities have not been taken 
full advantage of. Among the most important failures have probably 
been the state's inability to control the operating micro-environment 
in the North Sea, which later was, at least partly, responsible for 
accidents like the Bravo blowout in April 1977 and the widespread use
of subcontracted labour which continues to fall outside the Norwegian
4 labour legislation. Furthermore, the companies are continuing to earn
substantial rent from their earlier investments like Ekofisk and Frigg. 
Finally, no further steps have been taken to develop the concession systems 
towards 100 per cent state ownership.
In summary, the Norwegian policies in the period until 1975 were a 
tribute to the technical competence of Norwegian civil servants who probably 
negotiated the best general achievable set of terms while staying within 
the clearly defined limits of a social-democratic policy. It is the 
latter qualification which makes this at all a meaningful statement. 
When representatives of the Norwegian Labour Party revealed an almost 
naive belief in the state's ability to control the development of the 
oil industry, an attitude which was well expressed by Jens Evensen when 
he bluntly stated: "The organisation of Norwegian oil activity which is 
now taking shape will give Norwegian authorities full control over the 
whole activity", this was not because he was trying to deceive Norwegian 
public opinion. It was rather that he took these external limits as 
being so natural and eternal that any evaluation had to take them as 
their given point of departure. In particular, Norwegian policies tried 
to increase the state's share of the total rent by a process of 
participation which did not imply any fundamental confrontation with the 
companies and which left the profitability of both the private national 
and international firms virtually intact.
We have throughout this thesis stressed that the main instrument 
of Norwegian oil policies in its dealings with the international companies 
was the creation of Statoil. The move away from what was a traditional 
(and partly subservient) relationship between a producer-state and a 
raw-material producing country was only achieved by the development of 
a strong state capitalist sector in the Norwegian economy spearheaded
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by Statoil. The dominance of international capital on the Norwegian 
Continental Shelf was tempered (but, as repeatedly argued, not transcended) 
by the emergence of this single unit of state capital, which probably will
become the dominant force within the Norwegian economy in the coming
7 years.
The oil economy has also accelerated a general trend towards a 
drastically increased role of equity state ownership in the Norwegian 
economy. This heralds a 'state capitalist phase 1 of Norwegian capitalism
whereby the state becomes the most important accumulator of surplus value
8 in the economy. An important long-run by-product of this development
is that it will dramatically increase the general political power of the 
Norwegian state.
It is the meaning of these developments, and in particular what 
they may signify for the future of Norwegian capitalism, which will 
provide the most interesting perspectives for an understanding of 
Norwegian society during the coming 'oil age'. Unfortunately a completely 
new thesis is required to satisfactorily analyse these developments. 
It is however hoped that this thesis, which has sought to explain why 
the state became so important in the Norwegian oil industry in.the first 
place, has cleared the way for such an analysis.
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APPENDIX A
HISTORY OF THE OIL INDUSTRY 1
This historical overview of the oil industry will take us to 1959. 
When seen together with the discussion in Chapter 1, it will provide a
necessary historical background to the Norwegian first round of
2 
concessions. It will also help to concretize our discussion in Chapter
2 about the particular features of the oil industry.
Until World War II (WWII)
The history of the oil industry was, until WWII, characterized by 
an extreme inequality between the producer-states and the oil companies 
as the companies reigned virtually supreme in their dealings with the 
oil-producing states. The agreements were of long duration, covered 
vast areas and were subject to few, if any, methods of control by the 
producer-states. The very first agreement to be concluded in the 
Middle East clearly bears this out. In 1901, a 60-year agreement was 
signed between the Persian state and the British entrepreneur W.K. 
d'Archy where the latter got the right to explore for oil on four- 
fifths of Persia's territory (the northern provinces were excluded 
as they were regarded as being in the Russian 'sphere of influence'). 
In return the Persian Shah received a bonus of £20,000, and the British 
company was to pay 16% of their profit to the Iranians. But because 
the Iranians de facto had no possibility of inspecting the company's 
books, the latter stipulation was somewhat ineffectual.
The later (largely unsuccessful) attempts by the Iranians to 
renegotiate this contract (in 1933 the agreement was extended by 32 
years, but the concession area was cut by four-fifths) led to great 
and lasting bitterness between the company and Iran.
This first agreement serves as a good example of the kind of 
conditions that the companies generally obtained in the Middle East. 
The only general change that took place in the period up to WWII was 
a move away from the fixed percentage profit-tax to a system of fixed 
tax per physical unit of output, normally 4 golden shillings per ton. 
Government income thus came to consist of royalty payments plus some 
bonus payments.
One of the main explanations for the inequality between companies 
and producer-states was that the companies were directly under the
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political protection of their home governments in a more direct way 
than was later going to be the case. They operated in producing states 
which, if they were not outright colonial territories, at least could 
be described as being extremely 'weak 1 states both from a political 
and an administrative point of view.
The structure of the industry remained highly concentrated, even 
if the national origin of the oil companies changed over time. 1928 
saw the basic breakthrough for US interests in the Middle East. Until 
WWI only British firms had been producing oil in the area; since then 
both French and Dutch interests had been let in. Despite their initial 
lack of success in the Middle East, US firms were already firmly 
implanted in Mexico (at that time one of the world's three largest 
oil producers), and in the East Indies. A consortium of seven US firms 
was in 1928 allowed to take up a share of 25% in PRC (Turkish Petroleum 
Company), from 1929 called IPC (Iraq Petroleum Company) after the US 
government had pressured the British to accept an 'open door' policy. 
Butthis was not an unqualified victory for the US. No US companies 
were to be allowed inside 'the red line' (an imaginary red line drawn 
around the former Ottoman empire) except in cooperation with IPC. 
The IPC agreement exemplified an increased contact and cooperation 
between the major oil companies at that time, which in turn led to a 
more formalized cooperation between the major companies. Faced with 
a declining world market during the depression, a formal cartel agree- 
ment (the Achnacarny or 'As is 1 agreement) was concluded in 1933 
between the three major companies in IPC to try to keep market shares 
constant and to protect the overall price level. This agreement 
represents the 'apex' of the importance of the oil companies of the 
period. The fact that a new US company, Socal, managed to gain access 
to the Middle East at that time did not drastically upset the companies' 
opportunity to control the market by formal or informal cartel agreements 
Socal, strongly backed by the US government, signed a contract to look 
for oil in Bahrain in 1930 after Gulf as a member of IPC had been forced 
to withdraw from such a deal. Gulf likewise won access to the Kuwaitian 
territories together with BP in 1934, by which time Socal had found oil 
in Bahrain and was also in the process of expanding its Middle-East 
operations by negotiating a deal with the Saudi Arabians.
Thus by the end of the 1930s the world oil industry was firmly 
controlled by a small number of oligopolistic firms that were colluding 
either in an explicit or a covert manner. These firms had negotiated
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extremely favourable agreements that often covered largfe areas, and 
which were meant to last for a long time, not the least because of the 
almost unqualified support they enjoyed from their home governments. 
This pattern was particularly clear in what was to become the main 
producing area, the Middle East. But it also extended to the other 
producing areas of the world, as well as to the consumer markets.
Only one incident during this period somewhat 'mars' the picture 
of company omnipotence presented above. This is the nationalization of 
the Mexican oil-fields in 1938, which, when viewed with hindsight, was 
the first warning to the companies of what was to come some 40 years 
later. Ever since the 'Mexican Revolution 1 of 1912-15 there had been 
an uneasy relationship between the oil companies and the government, 
which in principle was committed to controlling the companies. 
Despite such an attitude, the US influence in the industry grew and 
Mexico was during the beginning of the 1920s temporarily the world's 
largest exporter of oil. But throughout the 1920s the production 
started to decline parallel with the decline of the productiveness of 
the oil wells. At the same time US interests became focussed on the 
newly-found fields in Venezuela. This development accelerated when 
President Cardenas nationalized the oil industry in 1938, by which 
time the run-down fields were in an extremely bad state of technical 
repair. The immediate result of the nationalization was a complete 
embargo on all oil lifted by the newly created Mexican state oil 
corporation PEMEX.
As far as the US was concerned, the problem soon ceased to exist. 
The US oil companies quickly compensated for the loss of Mexican oil 
by expanding their Venezuelan operations; Mexico eventually paid com- 
pensation for the nationalized fields, and the embargo on Mexican oil 
was lifted in 1942. There was also another characteristic of the 
Latin American oil industry which foreshadowed what was to come on an 
international level. This was the existence of state oil corporations. 
The first, YPA, was created in Argentina in 1927, and by 1940 there 
were also state oil corporations (albeit not particularly efficient 
ones) in Uruguay, Chile, and Brazil, most of which only dealt with the 
distribution and refining of oil.
Apart from the abortive challenge from the Latin Americans, the 
international oil cartel had little to worry about either from the 
producing states or from potential competitors as the Second World 
War started. The oil-producing states (with the exception of Mexico)
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played, in revenue terms, a thoroughly subordinate role as tax- 
collectors, while they played no role whatsoever in any pricing or 
quality decisions for oil produced in their own territory. They got 
extremely little value-added from processing oil at the point of 
production and did not manage (for fairly obvious reasons related to 
the size and distribution of the oil income) to lay any foundation for 
a process of economic growth based on oil. The cartel was in full 
command.
The war
WWII brought no drastic changes to the industry's structure. In 
the Allied effort to quickly maximize the output of existing fields, 
there was very little room for new entrants to the industry, who could 
upset the relatively stable framework of the international oil industry 
(a framework which, in the US, was taken over in December 1942 by the 
Petroleum Administration for War). Neither was there any point in 
investing resources in finding new fields if the time-perspective 
for winning the war was less than what it would take to get new fields 
into production. But the war had other influences within the industry. 
The respective governments took much more interest in the workings of 
the industry. The already existing emphasis on 'security of supply', 
illustrated by Britain's purchase of Anglo-Persian Oil Corporation, now 
became of paramount importance to the war effort. As a consequence, 
individual members of the American administration started to toy with 
the idea of taking over parts of the US interests in Saudi Arabia, 
both with a short-run view of the war, but also with the long-run 
perspectives of an after-war period. The US authorities were concerned, 
as they had been just after 1920, about the size of US oil reserves, 
especially in the light of what must have been a realization that their 
quasi-isolationist world role of the pre-war period was a thing of the 
past. A 'Petroleum Reserve Corporation 1 was actually set up, chaired 
by the Secretary of the Interior, Harold Ickes, but due to intense 
lobbying by the oil industry the whole project was eventually shelved. 
There was however an understanding that the crucial area in the oil 
industry would be the Middle East, so the US government tried to 
further strengthen the US presence in this part of the world. On a 
more immediate level, this was achieved by giving special Lend-lease 
status to Saudi Arabia instead of chanelling all aid through (the
301
rival) Britain. But the emerging dominance of the Middle East also 
brought home another point to the Allied states which reinforced the 
considerable scepticism that existed towards the oil industry during 
this period. The Allied military commanders challenged the Gulf-plus 
pricing system for oil which had, in the pre-war period, been the basis 
for industry pricing (and played a substantial part in explaining its 
handsome profits). Receiving the oil products in the Persian Gulf 
directly from a refinery and then being charged as if the oil originated 
in the Gulf of Mexico was something the Allied Navies, with good 
reason, objected to. But discounting this episode, the pre-war dominance 
of the cartel remained unchallenged. Thus in the words of one observer: 
"The technical and governmental forces which conditioned 
the structure of the industry had, at the end of World War 
II, placed seven companies in a position to supply the 
overwhelming bulk of the foreign non-Communist world's
o
petroleum requirements." 
1945-1959
Once the wartime regulations were dismantled, the continued 
dominance of the major oil companies asserted itself. We can somewhat 
arbitrarily set the end of this era of unchallenged dominance to 1959 
with the introduction of the US import quotas. The period 1945 to 
1949 saw in the major consuming countries an intense government 
preoccupation with control over the oil industry. This was the day 
of rationing, fixed import quotas, continued worry about the 'dollar 
shortage' and hence the balance of payments, especially in the Western 
European countries. All these regulations were in the end dismantled 
(in the name of 'free trade' and to some extent aided by the larger 
'fiscal space 1 opened up by the Marshall Aid scheme). But a historic 
precedent had been set for exerting a tight control over the oil 
industry in the consumer countries, an experience that was later not
Q
to be forgotten by policy-makers. The period from 1948 to the late 
1950s saw the emergence of what can be labelled the 'energy-intensive' 
Western society. The relative importance of oil as a source of world 
energy increased from 24% of total energy consumption in 1949 to 
around 31% in 1960, with Western Europe as the market with the 
highest percentage growth. In absolute terms, total world consumption 
of oil increased from 9.1 millions of barrels per day to 24.8 millions
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in 1962, an increase of 180%. At the same time, there was a move 
towards an increased relative reliance on residual fuels and distillates 
in the Western markets. This 'explosion' of demand had one important 
consequence for the structure of the oil industry. Studies have shown 
that historically it has been notoriously difficult to maintain effect- 
ive 'barriers to entry' in an industry if the market is rapidly expand- 
ing. Consequently there was in the medium run an influx of new 
entrants to the industry, even if in the short run the increase in 
demand was satisfied by the same major firms that dominated the industry 
at the end of the war. Their control over the world oil remained un- 
disputed in the immediate post-war period, something that in 1952 led 
the US government to file an anti-trust suit against them. That year 
a Federal Trade Commission (FTC) report, The International Petroleum 
Cartel, was published. This was a staff-study which was never formally
adopted by the FTC, but nevertheless became of crucial importance both
12 to the Federal Government and to the oil-exporting countries. The
latter invariably pointed to the findings of the report each time they 
were called upon to substantiate their claim that the industry was to 
all effects and purposes an operating cartel. The US government's 
subsequent law suit against the companies for 'restrictive practises' 
turned out to be a very long drawn-out affair. Three of the five
firms agreed to the entry of a consent decree, while the charges
13 14 
against the two remaining firms were dismissed in 1968.
A good indication of the effectively oligopolistic state of the 
oil industry in the 1950s was the companies' return on capital. In 
the period 1955 to 1960 the US oil industries' average rate of profit 
on overseas investment was 22.5%, while the average rate in manufactur- 
ing during the same period was a much inferior 11.5%. The world was 
in effect secure for the majors. In 1953 the 'Seven Sisters' controlled 
87.1% of total crude production, 75.6% of concession areas, 92% of 
total reserves. Their downstream operations were not much less 
impressive. The 'Seven' controlled 72.6% of total refining capacity, 
71.7% of total sales of petroleum products, but their control over the 
world tanker fleet was only a modest 29%.
The dominance by the majors of the world's oil industry was 
equally well reflected in their position in Norway. Norway was during 
this period only interesting for the majors from a downstream point of 
view, and while Norway exhibited some peculiar characteristics with 
respect to the demand pattern for oil products, this had not prevented
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a keen company interest in the market. Already in 1893 0stlandske 
Petroleums Kompagni which was later to become a/s Norsk Esso, was set 
up, and throughout the post-war period there were no marketing challenges 
to the established major companies. Esso had constructed a very small 
refinery at Valley at the turn of the century, but increasingly had to 
import refined oil products, especially from Sweden (with a correspond- 
ing drain on the Norwegian balance of payments). This was not rectified
18 until Esso opened its major refinery at Slagentangen in 1957.
However, there were some ominous clouds on the horizon for the 
majors. Their rate of profit was high, but it was falling. The late 
1950s saw the first quantities of Soviet oil sold on the Western market 
since the 1930s, and the number of new entrants into the industry was 
accelerating. The introduction of the US import quotas in 1959 would 
reinforce this development towards greater instability.
So far we have said very little directly about the US oil industry, 
despite the fact that it was the first country where commercial oil 
production took place. At the turn of the century the US, together 
with Russia, produced 90% of world output, and was a net exporter of 
oil until 1948. One of the reasons for this negligence is the somewhat 
'atypical' nature of the US industry, where a relatively large amount 
of total output still originates from wells producing as little as 100 
barrels per day. A second reason is that the main focus of our study 
is on the relationship between foreign companies and producer states, 
and finally that US internal policy with respect to oil did not have 
profound consequences on the oil industry in the rest of the world, 
except in the widest sense of ensuring that the US had access to oil. 
This quest for 'security of supply' on behalf of the US state could be 
said to have been one reason for the initial overseas expansion in the 
1920s and 1930s.
All this changed, however, with the emergence of the US as a net 
importer of oil from 1948 onwards. The breakdown of the Gulf-plus 
pricing system and low-cost production from the Middle East which over- 
took the Caribbean as the world's most important producer-area, meant 
that the competitive edge of high-cost production in the Gulf of Mexico 
started to be eroded. Even when accounting for freight differentials, 
Middle East oil was becoming competitive with oil from the Gulf of 
Mexico on the East Coast of the US. US companies were therefore 
tempted to look for and produce oil in the Middle East while stopping 
exploration altogether in the US. The consequence of this development
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could be nothing but a further increase in oil imports to the US while 
forcing a number of high-cost producers in the US out of business. This 
is why the US government in 1957 introduced 'voluntary 1 import quotas 
of oil, which in 1959 became mandatory. The consequences of this move, 
which in official policy statements was justified with reference to 
security of supply, but which may equally well be interpreted as a 
classic protectionist move, were to be far-reaching for the inter- 
national oil industry.
The relationship between the companies and the producer-states 
in this period was starting to show some new features, compared with 
previous periods. But the overall relative strength expressed in 
access to oil-rents, remained very much on the side of the companies 
and the home governments that consistently continued to back them. 
One reason for this is relatively straightforward. The period in ques- 
tion coincided with an historic period when the US political and economic 
hegemony throughout large parts of the world remained virtually 
unchallenged; so for a producer-state at this time to challenge one 
of the 'majors' would mean to challenge either the US of the UK 
government.
The most important development of the post-war period in the 
company-state relationship stemmed from the Venezuelan demand for a 
50/50 split of profits between the companies and the host countries. 
Venezuela was still regarding itself as a pure tax-collector, inasmuch 
as it still did not have a state oil company. But it aimed at being 
a better tax-collector. In a Decree of 21 November 1948 the Venezuelan
government insisted that the total amount of taxes (including royalties
20 
and bonuses) going to the state should total 50%. Between 1948 and
21 1951 the Venezuelan share fluctuated between 51% and 68%. The
Venezuelan initiative was soon followed by producers in the Middle 
East, some of whom had become disenchanted by developments in the post- 
war period. By getting a fixed payment of gold per ton (22.5 (f/bbl) 
of oil produced, the producer governments' share of the total rent
were independent of the price of oil which had risen from- $1.28/bbl
22during the war to $2.65 in 1948. Saudi Arabia was the first Middle- 
Eastern producer that followed the lead of Venezuela. After protracted 
negotiations this principle was accepted also for older concessions 
by ARAMCO on 30 December 1950. Kuwait followed suit one year later, 
then Bahrain and Qatar.
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This historical incident is, however, more than an expression of 
the increased importance of nation-states faced with the international 
companies. It also says something about the relationship between 
foreign policy and the oil industry. The reason why the companies so 
easily acceded to the demands of the Middle Eastern states was related 
to the political situation in the Middle East. Given the overwhelmingly 
pro-Israel sentiment in the US at the time, it was very difficult for 
any American administration to channel aid to the Arabs, which from a 
foreign-policy perspective it had a genuine interest in doing. A 
'50/50' agreement would mean an increased transfer of wealth to the 
Arab states, which would have the same effect as an increase in aid. 
In order that this move would not be to the economic detriment of the
oil companies, it was decided that the companies should deduct whatever
23 taxes they paid abroad from their taxable income in the US. This
move, together with the 'depletion allowance' which historically has
given all US companies a further tax credit of 28.5% of the value
of all oil produced (ostensibly as equivalent to depreciation of capital
goods so as to be able to finance the search for new oil) made the oil
24 industry among the lowest tax-paying industries in the US. The
deduction of taxes paid overseas was later to be adopted by the UK, 
so as not to be 'out of line' in its treatment of the companies. 
Therefore a move which by some has been interpreted as indicating the
strength of the oil companies in their ability to pass on any increased
25 demands from the producer-states to the tax-payer, also had much
wider foreign policy overtones.
Iran introduced indirectly the 50/50 system in 1949 by declaring 
a 50% tax on net incomes, but this principle was not explicitly 
accepted until the 1954 Consortium agreement. In the meantime Iran 
and the companies had gone through the most bitter conflict between a 
producer-state and the companies since Mexico nationalized its oil 
in 1938 and which was to influence company/state relationships well 
into the 1970s. Iran was dissatisfied with the 1933 agreement, partly 
because of the fixed royalty payment referred to above, and partly 
because the other taxation proposals offered to Iran at that time gave 
very little tangible results to Iran. As Iranian production increased 
after the war, Iranian income, increased, but at a much slower pace than
production. In 1950 the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company paid more in taxes
27 in the UK than in Iran. Some estimates put the Anglo-Iranian Oil
Company's integrated profit at £180-200 million, compared with Iran's
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28 
share of £16 million. AIOC furthermore tried its best to stop a
national refining industry from being constructed by adhering to the 
Gulf-plus system for crude it sold to Iranian refineries, even if the 
oil came from the Persian fields. Furthermore, there was no systematic 
training of Iranian nationals as stipulated in the 1933 agreement. 
Superimposed on this situation was an increasing political unrest in 
the country, not the least due to a sharply deteriorating nutritional 
situation for the majority of the population, who had never seen any of 
the benefits from the oil production. After initial discussions about 
a new agreement (where AIOC claimed the Iranians wanted a 50/50 share
of all activities of AIOC while AIOC would only give 50/50 on its
29 Iranian operations), the negotiations broke down. The assets of
AIOC were nationalized by an unanimous act of the Persian Parliament 
in April 1951. All further negotiations between AIOC and Iran broke 
down in August the same year, and a number of sanctions were immediately 
put into force by Britain. All Iranian credits in UK banks were 
frozen and all special finance and trade concessions withdrawn. The 
UK Treasury threatened to apply sanctions to anyone who paid for 
Iranian oil in pound sterling. But this was more a pro forma measure 
because in the 18 months following the breakdown of negotiations between the
two sides, Iran managed to sell a mere 103,000 tons of crude on the
30 international market, the equivalent of one day's output before the
nationalization. The US, which originally had remained aloof from the 
confrontation, in 1953 joined the British after there had been promises 
to allow US firms into the Iranian oil-fields once the Iranian Prime 
Minister Mossadeq had been removed. The international petroleum cartel 
as a whole was also worried about the consequences for its position if 
Mossadeq was not properly dealt with. The Iranians could undercut the 
going price (and still earn more than before the nationalization), 
thus potentially wrecking the price and profitability structure of
the industry. Mossadeq was finally deposed by a CIA-inspired coup in
31 August 1953, the Shah returned to Iran, and the companies moved in
again.
Because the majors at this time exerted complete control over 
the downstream activities, there was no way that a producer-state could 
get away with nationalizing or in any other way threaten the hegemony 
of the companies and their mother countries. The outcome of the con- 
frontation was that while NIOC (National Iranian Oil Corporation) in 
theory became the owner of all the concessions, it transferred its
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production rights to a consortium of BP, Shell, the French CFP and 
five major and nine minor (IRICON) US companies. This consortium had 
all the rights to determine prices, rates of depletion, refining 
policies, in effect to take all major decisions. A 50/50 profit- 
sharing agreement was also agreed upon. In the whole history of the
industry there can be no better example of the crucial difference between
32 a de jure and de facto nationalization.
So even if there were attempts to increase the importance of the 
producer-states in the period 1945-57, any successful moves from the 
producer-states were restricted to those of being better tax-collectors. 
All crucial decisions, especially about pricing and output, rested with 
the companies. But at the same time it was becoming clear that an 
effective state oil corporation, with its own downstream activities, 
was crucial if the producer states were to exert any important influence 
on the production process and hope to obtain a major share of the rent.
The hope that oil production was going to become the starting 
point of significant spinoff activities or even the basis of an 
industrialization process for the producer countries suffered a set- 
back during this period. The major refining activities were transferred
33 away from the production centres to the consumer countries. There
were a number of reasons for this. First, the European states 
realized that they could decrease their import bill of petroleum 
products by refining an increasing amount of crude on their own 
territories, and thereby capturing a larger slice of the 'value added 1 
of the products. This process was particularly effective in Germany, 
parts of Scandinavia and Italy. Secondly, there were perceived 
political risks in keeping refineries in the producing areas in case 
there was going to be a repeat of the Iran confrontation. Finally, 
there were technological developments which made it relatively cheaper 
to transport crude rather than petroleum products over long distances.
Chapter 1 shows how as a consequence of the US import quotas which 
were introduced in 1959 the stable and highly monopolised oil industry 
we have described above came under pressure. But, as will be made clear, 
no fundamental changes took place. It was therefore in all respects a 
formidable opponent that the Norwegian state took on in the early 1960s 
when it invited the international oil companies to look for oil on the 
Norwegian Continental Shelf.
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APPENDIX B
MARSHALL VS. THE CLASSICS
Marx and Ricardo ! s development of differential rent is the most import 
ant contribution of the classical school if we want to define rent in the oil 
industry. The analysis of differential rent from natural resources has 
changed little since their writings. But the classical writers also 
used their concepts to show that there is a social dimension to what 
appear as pure economic problems. In this respect there is a fundamental 
difference between the classical theory and the neo-classical theory 
which was to follow. For the classical writers, the return to land 
is neither solely due to the scarcity of this factor of production, 
nor simply the 'objective 1 criterion of differentials in productivity 
of land. It is rather linked to the ownership of land, i.e. the 
ability of the landlord to impose his own claim as owner onto the 
economic agents as he confronts them in the market place.
The identification of rent with the 'unearned 1 income of one 
social class, the landowner, was also a powerful political tool in the 
hands of social thinkers who saw this specific social class as being 
an objective burden on the development of the productive forces at that 
time. If rent is linked to land, then there is no way one can charact- 
erize rent as being due to 'working, waiting, nor risk-taking 1 . Such
income is devoid of real costs, an important political conclusion. But 
while the theories of Marx and Ricardo share the above insights, including 
their definition of differential rent, they still differ on other counts.
If we use the standard interpretation of Ricardo, that production 
at the margin fetches zero rent (and all other land commands positive 
rent), we are withdrawing from reality as far as the oil industry in 
the North Sea is concerned. Here the marginal elements collect a sub- 
stantial amount of rent unconnected with the formal ownership of land. 
Consequently for being of any use to us the Ricardo notion of rent needs 
to be extended and supplemented, as we need to discuss the existence of 
rent at the margin.
Marx turns Ricardo on his head by assuming that rent could
influence the final price of a good in the form of absolute rent and
2 
monopoly rent.
Absolute rent has its origin in the ability of owners of a natural 
resource to extract rent from capitalists even at the margin of 
production.
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Monopoly rent was due to the exceptional value and scarcity of 
some goods like grand vin. Marx never followed up the discussion of 
this concept presumably because he operated on a level of abstraction 
which disregarded phenomena like monopoly.
Marx's theory as it stands is however riddled with problems if 
we want to use it as a theoretical basis for the oil industry. Most 
importantly, Marx claimed that absolute rent (the most important 
element in oil-rents) could only exist in industries with a low organic 
composition of capital. This prevents Marx's theory of absolute rent 
of being general, something that is clearly seen when analyzing the oil 
industry. Here absolute rents coexist with a high organic composition 
of capital (roughly speaking a high capital-labour ratio), an 
impossibility according to the marxian schema.
All marxist theory tells us is that surplus value flows in and 
out of an industry according to the organic composition of the industry 
and the differential rent of that industry. We also know that the 
ultimate limit of this flow is total amount of surplus value produced 
in the economy. But no classic marxist theory seems to be very 
useful to determine the amount of rent collected at the margin; or, to 
put it in other terms, what the difference between market price and 
price of production is likely to be. This difference depends upon 
factors like substitutability of the good in question, total demand 
for the good, its 'strategic importance 1 etc. But there is unfortun- 
ately nothing specifically marxist about such an analysis. It has
3 however been argued by Desai that Marx was not particularly interested
in determining relative prices. According to Murray, Marx first and 
foremost wanted to integrate his theory of rent into the general value- 
theory. This might have been why he paid relatively little attention 
to more concrete studies, and why his theories may be of little help 
for us in our specific case study.
Furthermore it should be made clear that the above interpretation 
of the theory of rent in Marx can be regarded as excessively 'econo- 
mistic'. While it shares its basic perspective with the works of 
Ball (1976), Edel (1975) and Murray (1977) (1978), it is possible to argue 
that according to an alternative reading of Marx the amount of rent 
that a landlord can collect at the margin is mainly an expression of 
the historical strength of the landlords as a social class.
When property in a capitalist economy is under the ownership of 
an individual, a revenue must be paid for the use of this property.
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The extent to which that revenue is paid at the margin depends on the 
struggle between the owners of the property and the producers of 
commodities who want to make use of the property. We can therefore 
say there is a political element in the determination of absolute rent. 
This is a less deterministic approach to the theory of rent stressed 
by Clawson. Methodologically it opens up for an analysis which, 
instead of being deterministic in an economic sense, forces us to 
investigate the historical and political peculiarities of each case 
in which absolute rent is earned. This constitutes the key insight of 
classical rent theory with respect to rent at the margin.
The shortcomings of the marxist analysis in determining
absolute rent and hence price levels for raw materials-has opened 
the way for the neo-classical theory of rent. Marshall attributed rent 
to all factors of production. This represents his clearest break with 
the classical tradition. Even if he reserved the term 'rent 1 for the 
so-called 'free gifts of nature 1 , his emphasis on 'quasi-rents' later 
became a methodological justification for extending the concept of rent 
to all factors of production. Returns in the form of rent are subse- 
quently related to the concept of scarcity, so that returns on all 
factors of production "rest upon temporary or enduring limitations of 
supply". Quasi-rents are still price-determined, but that is all the 
concept could be said to have in common with the classical concept of 
differential rent.
One should not exaggerate the 'break' that Marshall made with 
the classics. As we have seen, there is an important element of 
continuity between the two modes of thinking on the question of rent. 
It is this continuity that makes it possible for us to use some 
classical, and some Marshallian, elements in our definition of oil-rent,
Marshall defined rent as the difference between the price a factor 
earns and the the return necessary to induce the factor to continue 
to be supplied. Its origin was threefold: - pure rent, - quasi-rent, 
- rent of ability. Rent, according to Marshall, has its origins in 
the fixity and scarcity of a factor of production.
Raw material producing land is clearly fixed in supply. It thus 
commands pure rent that normally accrues to the owner of the natural 
resource (in our case the state). The problem in our case arises 
because the government has, on a temporary basis, given the right to 
extract oil to a company as a concessionaire. The conflict between 
the two appears when the government tries to recover a part of the 
total rent earned.
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But the amount of oil is not necessarily fixed in the long run. 
A higher price induces a more vigorous search for oil, and may lead to 
a renewed use of formerly 'dry 1 or abandoned holes. This increase in 
the supply of oil, which follows from an increased price, tends to 
undermine the earning of pure rent, in the same way as certain changes 
in demand conditions would bring about a similar effect.
Quasi-rent is earned by a factor of production which is fixed 
in the medium run. One clear example is an oil production platform 
with no alternative uses. Once it is installed (having no opportunity- 
cost except its scrap value), it will continue to operate as long as 
Marginal Cost is less than Marginal Revenue. The quasi-rent is the 
difference between Average Revenue and Average Cost of the factor of 
production.
The crucial difference between pure rent and quasi-rent is the 
time perspective. Pure rent is associated with the longer run, quasi- 
rent with the medium run. Quasi-rent on personnel (which strictly 
speaking should count as rent of ability), is in the case of Norway 
of little importance. In the short run, manpower in the oil industry 
is linked to oil-producing equipment, but the international oil 
companies can switch their personnel in a short time out of Norwegian 
territory into other parts of the world. Thus there is no quasi-rent 
on personnel that the government can attempt to capture in the same way 
as for invested capital goods.
Finally, Marshall's rent of ability is related to the technological 
skills of the oil companies in exploration, drilling and production. 
However, it is more fruitful to deal with this part of the question 
within the confines of monopoly rent (see Section 2 ,!,!)<
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APPENDIX C
DIFFERENT MEASUREMENTS OF PROFITABILITY AND THE OIL INDUSTRY
This appendix discusses the different methods of evaluating 
profitability in the oil industry.
Pay-out time and government 'take 1
The pay-out time criterion suffers from the fundamental weakness 
that it contains no sophisticated time perspective. One dollar 1 s worth 
of income is equivalent whether it accrues to a company tomorrow or 
just by the time a project breaks even. It is therefore in limited use 
in the industry.
Another undiscounted criterion for profitability is the closely 
related notion of 'government take'o This criterion has been extens- 
ively used in the oil industry by the producer-states to describe the 
division of rent between companies and producer-states. From a point 
of view incorporating the time-element this criterion is even less 
sophisticated than the pay-out criterion, which at least contains some 
notion of time. In the case of 'government take', there is no differ- 
ence between one dollar accruing to the producer-state today or at the 
end of the project, which may lie 25 years into the future. Given 
this basic conceptual weakness of the criterion, one can legitimately 
ask why it is being used at all. One reason is that it may give 
producer-states the propaganda-value of claiming that they are taking 
a 'tough 1 line towards the companies (at times a very useful political 
posture to adopt), while at the same time ensuring that the companies' 
discounted variables (see below) remain as favourable as possible.
Internal rate of return
This criterion has widespread popularity as an indicator of the 
rate of profitability for an investment project. It "has become 
almost universally the method for evaluating producing properties".
The IRR (or 'the discounted cash flow rate of return'which it is 
also often referred to as) is the interest rate that will make the 
arithmetical sum of all discounted cash-flows equal to zero; or in other 
words the maximum interest rate which a firm could pay on the capital 
tied up in the project and still break even. One of the reasons for
313
its popularity has been because "management can easily relate a rate
2 
of return to interest and loan rates etc".
The use of the criterion for pre-tax assessment is also completely 
independent of depreciation and amortization policies. Its extended 
use originates from the early 1960s when there was an increasing
realization that a time element was needed in the evaluation of
3 investment opportunities.
But apart from the obvious step forward that a profitability criterion 
which included a time-perspective represented, scepticism of the IRR 
concept soon grew, even if it remains one of the most widely used 
criteria even today. References to it are constantly made in government 
publications and stockbroker reports when evaluating the oil industry. 
But even so, the concept is open to a number of weaknesses:
(i) This measure of profitability assumes that all cash-flow income 
will be reinvested at the computed rate of return when received. This 
is an extremely far-fetched assumption, especially in cases of the odd 
'bonanza 1 , which yields a rate of return in excess of any 'normal 1 rate. 
This is the most important criticism to be made of the IRR criterion.
(ii) The measure is very sensitive to errors in estimating initial 
investment and the very early cash revenues.
(iii) It abstracts from and ignores that finance may not be readily 
available for investment. Since the IRR says nothing about the 
magnitude of investment, this assumption is often easy to disregard.
(iv) The measure may give multiple IRRs if large investments take 
place late in the life of a project. It is similarly unsuitable if 
one is faced with accelerating projects.
(v) The criterion cannot incorporate uncertainties. 
The IRR concept of profitability also shares one criticism with 
any criterion that is built on the notion of discounting. As the 
criterion stands, revenues received after 20 years are in fact value- 
less at discount rates normally used by private firms. But any firm 
which has the plan of staying in business must think in the long term, 
often with a time-perspective of more than 20 years. Trying to find 
measures that realistically reflect profitability for extended cash 
flows is one of the open questions in decision-making. As one observer 
has noted: "Investments made in the 1930s in East Texas that rewarded 
oil companies handsomely might not have been made had this method 
(IRR-appreciation - PN) been in vogue at the time."
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Firms may therefore be more willing to accept projects which are
'sub-optimal' by the IRR criterion, but which will secure a steady supply
7 
of oil 20 to 30 years hence. The consequences of such a way of thinking
are important, especially for the discussion of the 'necessary return' 
for oil companies to enter and stay in the North Sea.
Present Value (PV)
Of all profitability criteria the maximization of Present Value, 
defined as the cumulative discounted cashflow, is most often compared 
with the IRR. The main difficulty with this criterion is how to choose 
the interest rate (z on p.80) to carry out the discounting. Because 
different investment projects can have PV schedules which cross, the 
choice of the most profitable project depends upon the rate of discount. 
For the private firm the discount rate can be defined in a number of ways: 
(i) as the weighted average of the cost of each type of capital used by 
the firm (equity, loan etc), (ii) the opportunity cost of capital, or 
(iii) a z which is independent of the capital structure, but which is the 
ratio of cash-flow to market value of equity. In addition to this problem, 
the private and the social rate of discount differ (see Section 3.1.2). 
Of other problems, two projects can have the same PV with hugely differing 
outlays of capital. Thus PV is not a completely adequate profitability 
criterion if there are limitations on the availability of capital.
On the positive side, the reinvestment criterion problem which was 
a problem in the case of the IRR criterion ceases to be a problem, 
because the private discount rate represents the firm's assessment of 
the average earnings rate at which future revenues objectively should 
be able to be reinvested.
In an overall evaluation between the IRR and the PV criteria, most 
observers agree that the second criterion is superior both when it comes 
down to ranking and choosing between different investment projects. It 
can also handle the problem of uncertainty. But the difference between 
the two investment criteria becomes of less importance if the projects 
that are compared have approximately the same total life and cash-flow 
patterns.
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APPENDIX D*
NEO-CLASSICAL THEORY AND THE STATE
The orthodox (here used interchangeably with neo-classical) 
treatment of the state follows almost automatically from the general 
equilibrium model of economics.
Such an analysis yields a preliminary list of likely/permitted/ 
desired activities of the micro-intervention of the state:
(1) as a basic guarantor of private property;
(2) as a redistributor of income in order to move along the 
production possibility frontier;
(3) as a rectifier of the possible shortcomings of the market 
so as to get the economy onto the production possibility 
frontier.
Only in the event of a permanent breakdown of the market system as 
for public goods and natural monopolies will the state step in on a 
permanent supply basis.
These three state functions are the basic state roles as they can 
be deduced from the neo-classical paradigm. It is this vision that 
will now be critically examined.
The first and fundamental difficulty with the basic neo-classical 
vision of state action is that most of the intellectual energy that 
has gone into its elaboration concerns the conditions under which the 
government ought to intervene in the economy; the analysis has been 
dominated by the prescriptive or normative side of state behaviour 
which lays down rules for welfare to be maximized. But if we are 
interested in saying something about the size and dynamics of the 
state sector in a modern capitalist society, such an approach is not 
very useful. To say that the state ought to intervene because it 
ought to re-establish the market equilibrium or get onto the production 
possibility frontier, or that the state ought to intervene in order to 
move along the production possibility frontier, is no substitute for 
predicting what the state will actually do or analyse what kind of 
force the state actually is within contemporary society. Normative 
statements will only translate themselves into positive ones if 
governments act on the insights of normative economics. For orthodox 
theory to be useful at this level we must in short establish the link 
between the normative insights of economists and government action. 
If governments have no idea about welfare maximization and, even if
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they do, do not act upon this insight, then normative economics have 
no explanatory power. Alternatively, it can be argued that unless 
governments actually get the market to function and implement 'optimal' 
policies from a welfare point of view, they will be thrown out of 
office.
It is enough just to list these conditions to understand that 
both of these possible links are extremely tenuous. We therefore have 
no choice but to agree with Peacock and Wiseman when they state: 
"Governments have not in the past tried to achieve the 
aims that the welfare theories postulate for them, and 
however much we may deplore the fact, they are unlikely 
to do so in the future. Consequently the prescriptive 
theories are not operational."
The normative approach to the study of the modern state is there- 
fore of extremely limited use for our purpose. The result of the 
profession's emphasis on welfare economics has been an extreme poverty 
in theoretical tools to tackle what the state is today.
One further consequence of this theoretical underdevelopment has 
been that emphasis has been put on the technical and instrumentalist 
aspects of public finance, in the form of questions like: "If the 
state does X what will happen?" Johansen claims this has led to the 
neglect of an approach which wants to understand state action as a 
result of pressure from social classes, while "... an understanding of
the role of the public sector throughout the ages would require an
2 
analysis of the type mentioned above". This shortcoming is admitted
by a number of writers on the subject. Peacock and Wiseman'again 
write: "It can hardly be said that he who wishes to study the subject
finds the tools of analysis necessary for the interpretation of public
3 
expenditure data, laying ready at hand."
Let us now examine, however, what tools actually do exist for an
orthodox analysis of the state, and which may be important for an
analysis of the oil industry.
Public goods
Once having shaken off its normative 'straight-jacket', the basic 
building block for orthodox micro-theory in dealing with a theory of 
the state is the concept of public goods which exist in the case when 
externalities cannot be internalized. Samuelson comments indirectly
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(and negatively) on the concept: " ... if a good can be subdivided ...
4 it isn't a likely candidate for government activity".
Because public goods in the last analysis is derived from the 
notion of market breakdowns and thus is intimately linked with the 
normative view of public finance, its predictive powers should 
strictly speaking be minimal. However, in this case Samuelson gives 
a statement with predictive implications ("isn't likely"). In this 
way 'public goods' becomes the basic concept of orthodox theory when 
dealing with the state on a micro-level. Peston comments pessimistically 
about the current state of the concept when he says: "It may be expected 
that what may eventually turn out to be a successful theory of the public 
sector will give a major role to public goods. But we are not there 
yet" (PN emphasis). 5
Why the confusion is so great among orthodox economists should 
now be made clear. Public goods is first not a simple and unproblem- 
atic concept. While in the broadest sense it is possible to classify 
public goods as a subset of the concept of externalities, it still 
embraces three sub-categories. We arrange the concept according to the 
criteria of non-excludability (if the good is provided to one it is 
provided to all) and non-rivalness (the consumption by one does not 
impede the consumption of the same quantity by others).
The case of pure public goods exists when a good is both non-rival 
and non-excludable, as national defence. Such a good gives rise by its 
nature to the concept of 'free riders'. Any individual can profess that 
he/she does not want the good, yet will be able to enjoy the consumption 
of this pure public good. As there is no inducement for an individual 
to reveal his/her demand for such a good, the state which provides 
this good must employ coercion to get individuals to pay for the good.
As an explanatory variable for state action in general, and oil 
in particular, even the concept of pure public goods is of limited 
value. There are two reasons for this. There will not be a unique 
Pareto-optimal solution in deciding the distribution of public and 
private goods for two individuals with a given income distribution; 
as is the case with two private goods. Secondly the provision of a 
public good will not necessarily be undertaken by the state. Other 
bodies like voluntary organisations or even one large user may supply 
the good.
On a slightly different level, it is possible to argue that the 
concept of pure public goods can say very little in terms of welfare
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propositions. The common welfare criterion of equalization of the 
demand and supply price of a good under perfectly competitive conditions 
becomes meaningless because there is no revealed market demand for a 
public good and consequently it is impossible to establish any price 
for such a good.
The final observation to make in relation to the pure public good 
is that very few activities a state undertakes can be referred back to 
this category. There are other and I would claim more plausible explan- 
ations for the provision of national defence by the state (oil is 
obviously irrelevant in this contest), so we tend to be left with the 
perennial lighthouse as an example.
In the category of quasi-public goods we include rival, non-excludable 
goods and non-rival, excludable goods. The latter concept is often
extended to include cases where "there are increasing returns to scale
7 
with marginal cost much less than average cost", or goods with a
decreasing long run average cost curve, often called 'natural monopolies 1 . 
It is readily seen that the two categories do not lend themselves to any 
easy prediction about state action. Even the latter concept which could 
give a rationale for state involvement in a number of nationalized 
industries (railways, airlines etc.) suffer from one obvious objection. 
There are a number of industries that also exhibit 'extensive economies 
of scale 1 (which is the more used criterion for nationalized industries), 
but which, like the petrochemical industry, are profitably thriving in 
the private sector. This further undermines the operational nature of 
the concept of private goods.
Apart from public goods Samuelson has also attempted to relate 
the state's provision of 'social overhead capital' (transport and 
other infrastructure, R § D etc.) to 'externalities in production'. 
The problem with such a category is that the 'cut-off point beyond 
which an activity exhibits sufficient externalities for it to count as 
'social overhead capital' is totally arbitrary and may vary significantly 
from society to society. As Lionel Robbins has pointed out, there are 
external effects in almost all activities we undertake: "There is 
scarcely anything which I can do outside the privacy of my home which
o
has not some of the overtones of indiscriminate benefit or detriment..." 
His observation is related primarily towards consumption, but can equally 
well be generalized with respect to externalities in production. Thus 
the explanatory importance of externalities in production which give rise 
to Samuelson's 'social overhead capital 1 diminishes drastically.
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The social welfare function
Despite the shortcomings of the concept of public goods, let us 
now somewhat heroically assume that public goods can be unambiguously 
defined, and that in our example oil production could be classified 
as a sub-category of a public good. Then according to orthodox theory 
the exact mix between public goods and private goods in an economy is
gdetermined by 'legislative action 1 . Thus an increase in the state's 
role in the oil industry might come about by such a shift. This leads 
to a discussion of the social welfare function which in principle must 
be said to underlie 'legislative action'. Because the social welfare 
function is presented in basic textbooks as a description of how a 
government arrives at any final equilibrium point, it has clear 
positive overtones.
The criticism of this approach must go back to the basic building 
blocks in orthodox economics, the individual. Because the individual 
is at the centre of orthodox economic analysis, the social welfare 
function cannot avoid taking this as a starting point. That this is 
so well expressed by Buchanan: "The state has no ends other than those 
of its individual members and is not a separate decision-making unit. 
State decisions are, in the final analysis, the collective decisions of 
individuals." The problem for orthodox economics is then how the 
state reflects the interests of every individual in the economy, i.e. 
how the state aggregates all individuals' indifference curves.
Even assuming the above way of looking at the state was correct, 
no such easy aggregation is possible. Arrow has shown how an ordering 
of preferences by majority vote (three individuals choosing among three 
different states of the world) is inconsistent with the basic assump- 
tion of transitivity of choices. But even if this problem is recognized 
by everyone in public finance it is surprisingly not treated as a 
fundamental problem. Musgrave claims that theoretically a 'point-system 1 
where every person can give different weights to a number of alternat- 
ives would do better than majority voting. But sadly, this result will 
not hold if strategy of voting which is a key question in the case of 
public goods (becausebenefits are distributed independently of the 
individuals' contributions to their acquisition) is allowed for. 
Musgrave therefore admits that: "... majority voting may be the better
system, even though point voting would be superior in the absence of
12 
strategy", and consequently lays himself open to Arrow's criticisms.
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One further observation of Arrow's theorem should be made. If one 
assumes that among the three alternatives mentioned above there is one 
alternative rejected by all three individuals as being either the best, 
second best or worst, then Arrow's problem does not arise. The implica- 
tion of this observation is more interesting than what may immediately 
seem to be the case. In a society characterized by consensus where for 
instance the alternative: "The dictatorship of the proletariat is 
desirable" is not wanted by any of our three individuals, then it is 
easy to show that Arrow's problem is no longer a problem. The aggrega- 
tion problem in orthodox economics is solved if and only if we are in 
a harmonious society where the individuals want no 'extreme' solutions.
We have so far merely tackled a technical problem of aggregation. 
We will now critically examine the much more fundamental neo-classical 
claim that the state does what the individuals in that state want the 
state to do. Again a rejection of such a position will open for an 
alternative explanatory paradigm. Even if this claim is never made 
explicit in introductory texts, it is an absolutely necessary part of 
an overall orthodox theory of the state. The main orthodox theoreticians 
to inquire into the process of how state policies and actions are 
formulated are Buchanan and Downs. Their theories represent an attempt 
to apply an orthodox economic methodology to a more 'political 1 field 
and in this sense they are an extension of the orthodox model 
initially outlined.
Buchanan and Tullock claim that individuals minimize the costs
of decision-making by electing representatives to vote on their behalf. 
Apart from the absurdity of the claim that parliamentary democracy is 
a result of cost-minimization in decision-making, their approach has 
the unfortunate consequence of destroying the basic orthodox vision of 
the state and thus to lay them open to a charge of theoretical inconsist- 
ency. It first makes, in the words of Bartlett, "the possibility of 
reaching Pareto optimality extremely limited", as it makes choosing 
between optimal points almost impossible. Secondly, politicians could 
not be described as acting with the full neo-classical rationality and 
self-interest if, once they got into office, they did not mainly start 
to look after their own utility functions (an objective which at least 
partially is contrary to those of the electors). Downs takes such a 
view to its logical conclusion when he introduces a government as an 
actor in its own right which simply has the aim of staying in office. 
Again the first victim is our basic neo-classical model of state
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intervention with its basis of individualism. But in common with 
Buchanan no f in-depth 1 analysis of the basic motives of the state has 
been attempted. Furthermore no inquiry is made within this theory to 
establish the constraints of government policies. It is as if govern- 
ments have a 'free hand 1 to do whatever they like.
Ahistoricism
We have shown the specific inadequacies of the two basic tools of 
the orthodox theory of state involvement on the micro-level; public 
goods and the social welfare function. We will now be more general and 
ask why the present approach is so unsatisfactory. The answer lies 
first in the ahistorical nature of orthodox theory. The relevant 
point to make here is that the importance of the capitalist state has 
drastically changed over time. In particular this has affected the 
size of the state-owned nationalized sector. This should almost on 
a priori grounds make one sceptical of any theory of state involvement 
that lacks a historical or dynamic perspective and relies on ahistorical 
concepts like public goods. In particular orthodox theory says nothing 
about what happens to externalities (and hence public goods) over time. 
Such a theory would have been necessary to understand the development 
of Norwegian oil policies in the period 1965-74.
Until the 'marginalist revolution 1 in the 1870s there was intense 
debate among economists about the proper role of state activity. The 
consensus was well expressed by McCulloch who stated: "Perhaps with the 
single exception of the conveyance of letters, there is no single branch
of industry which government had not better leave to be conducted by
17 private interests." Adam Smith echoed this when he described the role
of the state in the new stage of society which was characterized by
'natural liberty'. He wrote:
"According to the system of natural liberty the sovereign has 
only three duties to attend to ... first, the duty of protect- 
ing the society from the violence and invasion of other 
independent societies; secondly the duty of protecting, as 
far as possible, every member of the society from the 
injustice of oppression of every other member of it, or the 
duty of establishing an exact administration of justice; and 
thirdly, the duty of erecting and maintaining certain public 
works and certain public institutions, which can never be
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for the interest of any individual or small number of
18 individuals to erect and maintain."
By "certain public works and institutions" he included religious and 
other education; care of the impoverished, the incapacitated and the 
unemployed; the construction and maintenance of ports, bridges, 
navigable rivers, aqueducts, and ports.
With the advent of the positivist philosphy, little further thought 
was given to this kind of thinking as economists interested in the state 
became mainly preoccupied with inquiries on how the costs of state 
activities should be financed. This is not to say that the normative 
statements lost their importance. On the ideological level they were 
used repeatedly as justifications of the laissez-faire economic model. 
But especially within the Anglo-Saxon tradition of the profession, the 
idea of state intervention and involvement was almost totally disregarded 
as a question being worthy of inquiry. The state's role remained in- 
distinguishably linked to the operation of a free-market economy; the 
state was performing a 'door-keeper' function. It is the legacy of 
this vision that still dominates economists' thinking about the state. 
Superimposed on this approach has then been the whole tradition of 
welfare economics - the value of which we have already commented on.
It is indicative that even a casual glance at the actual state role 
in a number of Western European economies at the end of the last century 
would immediately have revealed a drastic difference between reality 
and the textbook vision of the state. The industrialization processes 
of France, Germany and especially Russia were intimately related to 
state action. It is therefore perhaps not very surprising that the 
Continental school of economists took the state much more seriously
than the Anglo-Saxons. Indeed the work of economists like Sax, Wagner
19 
and Goldschied all shared the vision of the state as a historical
entity which changed as history unfolded. They saw the state's role, 
not in relation to any timeless or ahistorical set of concepts like 
public goods, but on the contrary in relation to the needs of historical 
development. This approach, which is relatively close to an institu- 
tional approach, we find a much more interesting starting point 0 Not 
until the 1930s and the advent of the depression and Keynesianism were 
Anglo-Saxon economists forced to take the state seriously. But this 
was characteristically not done by changing the vision of the state 
referred to above, but by inventing a new branch of economics, macro- 
economics. The basic vision of the state's relationship to the market
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remained virtually unchanged*land orthodoxy held onto its ahistorical 
concepts. The main new element was that the state was now seen as an 
instrument for carrying out stabilization policies.
Ideology
As a final criticism of orthodox theory's treatment of the state, 
I claim its vision has clear ideological overtones. We have established 
how the model of general equilibrium based on 'free market' operations 
in theoretical terms can give rise to what is considered the 'best' 
solution for society. Consequently it becomes possible to challenge 
anyone who advocates any fundamental changes in the market system by 
pointing out that their solution will bring 'suboptimal' results; a 
significant ideological victory in itself. The rider that any economic 
system can be Pareto-optimal by planning, questionnaires etc 0 , is 
normally hidden in a footnote with the observation that given the 
postulated high costs of operating such an alternative system in the 
form of bureaucratic inefficiencies etc., then the capitalst market 
system is preferable.
Furthermore the concept of 'market equilibrium' is partly an 
ideological concept with little real-world relevance in a world economy 
which is increasingly monopolized and dominated by vertically 
integrated firms. A genuine 'free market price' of oil has probably 
not existed since the end of the last century with the coming of the 
vertically integrated firms.
On a more general level of abstraction, the best indication of the 
ideological nature of the orthodox treatment of the state is something 
we have so far not faced head on, but which nevertheless has been a 
common underlying denominator throughout the analysis. This is the 
neutrality of the state. The state in orthodox economics is a neutral 
instrument which can be used by any political force to carry out its 
policies. At no point is this even presented as a problem to discuss,
let alone is it problematized. For instance the recent attempts by the
20 UK Treasury to influence the acceptance of an incomes policy is seen
as mere 'aberrations' rather than as an indication of the ability of 
parts of the state apparatus to pursue policies independently of 
'political control 1 .
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Conclusion
The exposition and criticism of the orthodox economists' view of 
the state is now complete. We have found it weak in its theoretical 
concepts and crucially wrong in its view of what basic forces influence 
state action. This sorry state of affairs is mainly due to
- the intellectual preoccupation with normative economics
- an ideological blindness in the profession
- basic shortcomings of the orthodox tools of state analysis, and 
in particular its ahistorical and individualistic nature, as well 
as its assumption that the state is a politically neutral institution, 
We can in short logically ask whether a system of thought which according 
to Solo, "came into being as an argument against a government 'meddling',
against 'political interference', a system of thought that is essentially
21 
an apologia for laissez-faire and a glorification of the market" can
ever transcend itself and comprehend within its framework the workings 
of the modern state. Our answer is clearly no and that another 
approach is called for which is non-individualistic and historical, 
and where the state is not a neutral entity and instrument at the 
disposal of whoever wins parliamentary elections, but is an institution 
intimately linked to the capitalist mode of production and its preser- 
vation. It is this vision which will constitute the basis for a better 
understanding of the Norwegian state's oil policies as outlined in 
this thesis. We will thus go against the tendency among neo-classical 
economists that once their own theoretical framework proves inadequate 
then they leave any further search for understanding to the political 
scientists or sociologists. It is our aim to develop an analysis which 
tries to integrate these different levels of analysis.
325
APPENDIX E
NORWAY AND THE CONTROL OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT 1
There is little indication that foreign capital played any 
significant role in the early and very limited stages of Norwegian 
industrialization up until 1890. But the degree of foreign ownership 
in the Norwegian economy accelerated with the development of industries 
from the early 1890s based on cheap hydro-electric power,, These 
investments were undertaken by foreign interests according to Einarsen
"because the Norwegian commercial banks at the time had neither the
2 
ability nor the desire to invest in such large risky projects". This
is the kind of reasoning that will be familiar in the oil industry 
half a century later. The end result of this development was that by 
1909 38.8% of all capital stock in mining and industry was foreign 
owned. This was to be the highest degree of foreign ownership ever 
attained in Norwegian industry.
The attempts to curb this sharp increase in foreign ownership is 
closely related to the gaining of independence from Sweden in 1905 and 
the threat such a development represented to the weak Norwegian 
bourgeoisie. The question of a curb on foreign investment came to 
the fore in relation to the ownership of the waterfalls which were 
the basis for the electro-chemical and electro-metallurgic industries. 
The waterfalls were at the time bought both by Norwegian and foreign 
interests with a view of controlling the production of hydro-electric 
power. So in 1906 Stortinget enacted a temporary law (Concession-law) 
which prevented foreigners from owning any waterfalls or mines. In 
1909 this first and temporary law was extended to Norwegian capitalists, 
and also widened to include forests, which today (1977) are still under 
national control. In 1917 the Concession-law was further tightened up 
whereby any applicant for the purchase of any 'natural estate 1 had to 
agree to a number of conditions, the most important of which was that 
the natural resource in question was to be returned to the state after 
a number of years (normally 50-60 years). If the applicant was a 
foreign company the majority of members on the Board of that company's 
subsidiary in Norway had to be Norwegian citizens.
The result of these policies soon became clear. By 1919 the part 
of total capital stock owned by foreign interests had decreased to 
15.2%. This figure then increased again to 26.3% in 1930 as it turned 
out that the foreign firms were in a better situation to confront the 
world recession of the 1930s 0
326
The immediate post-war period saw a sharp drop in direct 
foreign investment as a percentage of capital stock. This was partly 
because the Norwegian state took over German-owned firms as war 
reparations, but also because Norway financed important parts of its 
investment programme in the period after 1945 externally. It is 
important to note that foreign direct investments were not at the 
time favoured as a means of financing the considerable investments 
taking place in Norway during this period. Seen in relation to the 
very strict system of direct controls in force in the Norwegian economy 
until 1952 (see Chapter 1, p.21), this is understandable from a politi- 
cal point of view. As a consequence, the portion of capital stock 
held by foreigners dropped in 1952 to 9.6%. This is not to say that 
the dependence on the outside world in any sense diminished during 
this period. As long as Norway relied on external sources of finance 
for its investment programme (and in particular as this was the case in a 
situation where the Norwegian currency was nonconvertible and where 
the US was the main source of finance and capital goods), then this 
dependence was maintained; albeit in a different form.
From 1956 there was an increase in foreign direct investment 
in the Norwegian economy. By now the Norwegian state was actively 
seeking to obtain foreign investments. A direct expression of this 
shift in policy was the appointment in 1959 of the former General 
Secretary of the UN, Trygve Lie, as a special Norwegian ambassador in 
charge of raising direct foreign investment for the Norwegian economy, 
which among other results led to the building of Esso's Slagentangen 
refinery in 1957. The timing of this shift coincided with a sudden 
collapse in the savings ratio in the Norwegian economy between 1957 and 
1958 when private indigenous savings decreased from Kr.3.1 bill, to
7
Kr.1.8 bill. Private foreign investment can thus partly be seen as a 
compensation for such a shortfall. But it must also be seen within a 
more directly political framework where a renewed allegiance to the 
West followed the 1956 events in Eastern Europe was most clearly 
expressed in the Norwegian state's willingness to allow in foreign 
private investment.
As a result of this development the importance of foreign industry 
again increased in the Norwegian economy, so that by 1963 17.4% of 
total capital stock in Norwegian industry was foreign owned with up 
to 48.1% in sectors like electro-technique.
APPENDIX F: SENSITIVITY TESTS
Results in percentage IRR (post-tax and with participation)
1965 
200m 700m
1969 Seen.2 
200m 700m
1969 Seen.3 
200m 700m
1969 Seen.4 
200m 700m
1972 Scen.l 
200m 700m
1974 Scen.l 
200m 700m
DEVELOPMENT COSTS:
+ 30%: New value ($m.) 
New IRR
- 30%: New value ($m.) 
New IRR
OPERATING COSTS:
-i- 30%: New value (c/bbl) 
New IRR
- 30%: New value (c/bbl) 
New IRR
PRICE TRENDS:
+ 2 percentage points: 
New value 
New IRR
- 2 percentage points: 
New value 
New IRR
EXPLORATION SUCCESS RATE:
+ 50%: New value 
New IRR
- 50%: New value 
New IRR
MIT PRODUCTION PROFILE:
New IRR
165 
6.1
89 
12.7
59 
7.6
32 
10.1
4 
12.8
0 
4.9
1:10 
11.5
1:30 
7.1
15.9
418 
9.0
165 
18.5
59 
10.5
32 
?
4 
15.5
0
7.6
1:10 
12.5
1:30 
10.8
27.0
218 
8.2
118 
16.1
- 72 
10.2
39 
12.7
6
15.7
2
7.5
1:6 
13.9
1:18 
9.8
20.2
504 
12.1
271 
19.2
72 
14.1
39 
  15.9
6 
19.1
2 
11.0
1:6 
15.9
1:18 
14.3
34.3
218 
9.1
118 
18.3
72 
11.4
39 
14.1
6 
17.2
2 
8.5
1:6 
14.6
1:18 
11.4
24.3
504 
12.3
271 
19.9
72 
14.4
39 
16.3
6 
19.4
2 
11.3
1:6 
16.0
1:18 
14.8
36.9
218 
8.6
118 
17.6
72 
10.9
39 
13.5
6 
16.5
2 
8.0
1:6 
13.9
1:18 
10.9
23.5
504 
11.7
271 
7
72 
13.7
39 
15.6
6
18.7
2 
10.7
1:6 
15.3
1:18 
14.2
35.5
247 
11.3
133 
20.9
98 
13.9
53 
17.1
8 
20.3
4 
10.8
1:3 
17.7
1:8 
13.1
28.1
527 
16.2
284 
24.1
98 
18.3
53 
20.6
8 
23.9
4 
15.0
1:3 
20.4
1:8 
18.4
45.4
390 
28.3
210 
48.4
195 
30.4
105 
33.1
8 
36.7
4 
27.0
1:5 
42.2
1:15 
29.0
72.1
1423 
19.2
767 
26.9
195 
21.6
105 
23.5
8 
26.9
4 
18.2
1:5 
24.9
1:15 
21.7
69.7
328
APPENDIX G
THE UK TERMS IN 1965
 4
The UK ratified the Geneva Convention in May 1964, and passed the 
Continental Shelf Act of 1964 which extended the already existing right 
of the Crown to grant licences to offshore areas. Then on 12 May 1964 
regulations were published which dealt with offshore oil and gas opera- 
tions. This led to a virtual scramble for concessions in the UK sector. 
The granting of licences in the autumn of 1964 had to be temporarily 
postponed due to the unexpectedly good response to the Minister 
of Power's invitation for licences. The chosen concession pattern 
was one where the private companies were given a virtually 'free rein 1 . 
This was despite the objective possibility that a state oil company 
could rapidly have been created in the UK. The expertise and the capital 
were there. While such a company was building up its own expertise it 
could, like almost all the majors, hire rigs to do the exploration 
drilling. This procedure was also feasible as a way of exploring the 
area of a country that itself did not have sufficient technical expert- 
ise to undertake exploration. In 1963 there was even a UK-based oil- 
drilling company that could have undertaken such a task (Keir and 
Cawden Arrow Drilling Limited). Simultaneously Brown Bros. £ Co (owned 
by a consortium of UK shipbuilders) was moving into the drilling field. 
Alternatively, instead of setting up a whole new corporation (which was 
suggested later in a formal way by a working party of the Labour 
Party (see Section 5.1) the UK could at the very least have given 
exclusive rights to Shell and/or BP, where it had an effective majority 
shareholding, to ensure that a maximum of the potential rent from the 
Continental Shelf would remain within the UK.
With a certain number of guarantees concerning thorough exploration 
of the North Sea, to avoid a Dutch situation where two majors had a 
monopoly on exploration, and where nothing was found until an element of 
competition was introduced between the companies, such an alternative strate 
could possibly have been pursued in the UK sector of the North Sea.
But to set up a strong state oil sector in 1965 there had to exist 
a political willingness to use public money for an undertaking that 
contained some element of risk. Furthermore the UK would probably also 
have had to pay a heavy international price for developing a strong 
state sector. Such a sector would have displaced a number of US oil 
companies from a very interesting area of exploration, a move that
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could easily have led to reprisals from American financiers and
2 investors. The UK would at the time have been very unprepared to
meet such a challenge in the light of its own weak economy.
But even so, the possibility of a major state involvement in the 
UK oil industry was indirectly expressed in the political disagreements 
over the state ! s role. Politicians are not likely to quarrel about 
something which is considered 'impossible 1 . Labour urged the 
Conservatives in September 1964 to withhold awarding the first con- 
cession until after the General Election that was to be fought in the 
autumn of the same year. The reason was that Labour wanted more state 
control over the activities. The suggestion put forward was that the 
state should keep control over some blocks, while other blocks should 
be auctioned to the highest bidders according to the Canadian 'chequer- 
board' system. But the Conservatives refused Labour's request and 
went ahead with the original plans that were to set the precedent for 
Norway. But despite Labour's election victory in 1964 and their former 
attitude, which one oil journal summed up as being: "the socialists
consider that the Tory government acted unduly favourably towards the
3 
companies", nothing was done to rewrite or renegotiate the existing
terms, which at least politically, if not legally, there could have been 
a mandate for doing. When the Labour Minister of Power was asked about 
nationalizating the oil in December 1964 -which showed that the issue 
was by no means dead - he avoided giving any clear answer. But on 
6 April 1965 he declared that the existing licences were legally binding
and that "it would not be in the public interest" to disturb the
4 
production licences already issued.
In the second round of licensing in 1965, the Labour government 
tried to change the relative weight between the state and the oil 
companies by favouring the nationalized industries, whose shares 
compared with the first round of concessions increased by 8%. As a 
consequence the total UK share of the new licences went up from 30% to 
37%, but the fundamentals of the old system remained. It was the 
inadequacies of this sytem that would make such a strain on the 
relationship between the UK and the companies in the mid 1970s and which 
also provided the basis for the Norwegian system.
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APPENDIX H
'GENERAL CONDITIONS OF PRODUCTION' AND THE CONCEPT'S
RELEVANCE TO OIL
The concept of 'general conditions of production' (GCP) as it exists 
in marxist literature is of little help in understanding state interven- 
tion in the field of oil. It is for this reason that we have developed 
our own concept of 'strategic good' (see p.278).
Marx concentrates the bulk of his discussion of GCP on commodities 
whose value it is difficult to realise on the market. In this category, 
which Marx explicitly labels 'general conditions of production', he 
primarily uses the example of roads and other means of transport which
according to him "facilitate circulation or even make it possible at
2 
all". The only other example he refers to is provision of goods which
"increase the force of production (such as irrigation works etc.).
Since oil is manifestly a commodity which together with the other 
basic inputs in the production process can readily be sold on the market 
and hence for which there are no problems of realisation, Marx's dis- 
cussion seems of limited value. Furthermore, Marx's prediction of what 
will happen to such 'general conditions of production' is widely at 
variance with the present trend of capitalist societies 
Marx stated that:
"The highest development of capital as capital exists when
the general conditions of the process of social production
are not paid out of deductions from the social revenue, ...
4 but rather out of capital as capital."
In other words, Marx expected that parallel to the development of 
capitalism there would be a development towards running the 'general 
conditions of production 1 according to capitalist criteria. If this 
observation is applied to Marx's definition of 'general conditions of 
production', then the tendency has been the absolute contrary. This is 
so in the case of oil. Furthermore the production of oil was never 
originally carried out by means of payments from social revenue, and Marx's 
discussion is therefore irrelevant to the problem at hand. Altvater's 
analysis of the problem is written within a methodological framework where 
the state is (incorrectly in our view) described as being by necessity 'non- 
capitalist'. He not only touches on the material characteristics of the 
commodity, but also looks at the inability of the system to supply such 
goods because of the low rate of profit to be earned in their production. The
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inability of private capitalists to supply certain goods Altvater 
claims is due on a general level to the tendency of the rate of profit
to fall. On a more specific level, the non-supply of a good can be
6due to four reasons:
(a) the investment may be too large, or
(b) the time before the profit can be realised too long for 
private capitalist to want to invest.
(c) There may be no immediate commodity-character of the commodity 
produced (R§D, academic qualifications, etc).
(d) The size of the market may be too small for the individual 
capitalist to invest and earn the average rate of profit. 
Factors (a) and (b) are results of the development of productive forces 
and in this way express a basic thought in marxian thinking. Factor 
(c) on the other hand is similar to the factor that Marx chooses to 
focus on in his treatment of the problem. But oil cannot, according 
to Altvater's scheme, be classified as a 'general condition of produc- 
tion 1 as it is a good which manifestly is being privately manufactured. 
This seems however to be a more fruitful approach than Marx's, which 
has some similarities with the orthodox theory of 'public goods' 
(both centre on difficulties of selling in the market), and which 
therefore is partly subject to our already stated misgivings about 
that concept (see Appendix D). But Altvater's approach will unfortunately 
not settle the issue because the definition of 'general conditions of 
production' as it stands is too broad. Clearly not any industry 
should be classified as supplying a 'general condition of production' 
because its profitability is too low.
We must therefore conclude that the concept of a 'general condition 
of production 1 in its present shape gives little insight as to why the 
state has so heavily intervened in the oil industry. This has two 
immediate consequences. First, it suggests that we are confronted 
with a new and challenging phenomenon as far as marxist thinking is 
concerned. Secondly, it represents a theoretical spur towards developing 
some new analytical tools for understanding the role of oil production 
within a capitalist society. This we have attempted to do in the shape 
of the concept 'strategic goods'.
3 This attitude permeates all his later writings, but is explicitly 
stated in Myrdal (1973), "Through the types of problems I came 
to deal with, I became an institutional economist, after having 
been in my youth one of the most ardent 'theoretical 1 economists" 
(p.11). His institutionalist methodology requires that "All the 
'non-economic 1 factors - political, social and economic structure, 
institutions and attitudes ... have to be included" (ibid, p.10).
4 His point of departure in analysing present-day power relations in
Norway has been to "put great emphasis on inter-institutional relations... 
Here we have taken advantage of the traditions of economics, political 
science, and sociology" Hernes (1978), p.57.
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was the building of semi-corporate structures in Norwegian political 
life. The best example was the yearly centrally-controlled wage 
negotiations between the Norwegian employers 1 association (NAF), 
the trade union organisation (LO) and the state. The immediate 
result of this was a period of relative macro-stability and economic 
growth, but at the expense of a tight political control from the top 
leading to passivity and depoliticization at the grass roots of the 
labour movement. In short, economic growth temporarily 'solved 1 the 
legitimacy problem.
48 Slagstad (1977), p.186. For him the key is to understand the 
simultaneous interrelationship between three 'subsystems': the 
'socio-cultural system', the 'economic system', and the 
'administrative-political' system.
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49 In 1970 Norway exported 18 million tons of raw materials and semi- 
processed goods, while it imported 25 million tons of the same. 
The relation between exports and imports of such goods was drastically 
different from other Western capitalist countries where the volume of 
these imports was normally many times the volume of exports (Svendsen, 
1974, p.29). Further, this pattern of trade was superimposed on an 
economy which was extremely 'open 1 . Almost 45 per cent of the GDP 
consisted of foreign trade. In 1971 imports constituted Kr. 34.4 bill, 
or 44.9% of a GNP of Kr. 76.6 bill. (SSB, Statistical Yearbook 1975). 
The dependence of the Norwegian economy on fluctuations in world 
markets, especially with respect to raw materials prices, has been a 
constant feature of Norwegian economic history throughout this century.
50 As late as 1970 only 87 firms employed more than 500 workers or less 
than 0.5% of all industrial and mining firms (SSB, Norsk Industri- 
statistikk, 1972, Table 16). It is clear that the Norwegian state was 
worried about this structural feature of the economy. In St.meld, no. 39 
(1969-69) the large number of small and medium-sized firms were 
regarded as a serious weakness for the international competitiveness 
of the Norwegian economy. It should be noted that both the 
industrial and geographical concentration of industry increased 
rapidly during the 1960s and early 1970s (Halvorsen (1977), p.46, and 
Str^m (undated), p.53). The weakness of the industrial sector waswell 
illustrated by the amount of external capital in the capital-structure 
of the average firm. In Norway 81% of all capital was'external' to the 
firm, the highest in Western Europe. If we look at new investment in 
the period 1962-66, the Norwegian figure increased to 87% (Innstilligen 
om obligasjons og allsjemarkedet, Norge, 1968). The corresponding 
figure for the UK was 40%. Such a capital structure tends to give 
considerable power to the financial institutions of a country. In 
the Norwegian case, because the state's role in the credit structure 
until recently has been relatively limited, this has given consider- 
able power to the private commercial banks. Industry's necessity to 
obtain outside private finance for investment has contributed to a 
closer integration between industrial and finance capital than in a 
number of other Western European countries.
51 Norway has thus been relying on a constant inflow of capital to 
finance investments, a further characteristic of a 'peripheral' 
country. As will be made clear in Appendix E, the form that this
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capital inflow took varied over time and was furthermore interspersed 
with attempts by the state to control its role in the Norwegian economy 
But despite such efforts, 32% of total assets in Norwegian mining and 
industry were owned by foreign capital by the late 1960s. This figure 
contrasts with 23% in the economy as a whole, quoted in Einarsen (1970), 
Seierstad in Strghn (undated), p.73, operates with the lower figure of 
22% for industry and mining and 16% for the economy as a whole. The 
relative inability of the Norwegian state to control this high degree 
of foreign ownership is well summarised in St.meld. no.39 (1967-68), 
which states: "There is probably little that can be done on Norway's 
part to meet this development (the increasing rate of foreign 
ownership - PN)".
52 Norway never went through a period of classical feudalism (possibly 
because the amount of extractible surplus was insufficient to support 
a land-owning class). It thus was a country where small and independ- 
ent farmers could become an important and relatively independent social 
class. This class played a significant political role from the 
beginning of the 19th century. It strongly supported the introduction 
of parliamentary democracy in the 1880s; according to Therborn (1977) 
"... to a significant extent, Norway owes her democracy to the 
independent petty bourgeoisie" (p.28). It was also intimately linked 
to the fight for national independence, which culminated in Norway's 
separation from Sweden in 1905. Again according to Therborn, 
"In Norway ... the establishment of democracy would almost certainly 
have been delayed for a considerable time had it not been for the 
unresolved conflict with Sweden" (p.22). This independence heralded 
the start of an industrialization process, a process that took place 
at a rapid pace and which in its rudimentary form was virtually 
completed 20 years later. Finally, as a concomitant of industrializa- 
tion, this period saw the birth of the Norwegian labour movement as a 
mass political force (even in the Labour Party had been formed as early 
as 1887). This movement has ever since maintained its strong ties with 
the primary industries and especially with the small farmers and the 
fishermen. These factors go some way towards explaining the anti- 
centralist and anti-bureaucratic political tradition which is a major 
characteristic of Norwegian political life, permeating Norwegian 
politics not only on the left but also in general. It further gives 
some insight as to why nationalism is such a powerful political force
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in Norway. The most recent expression of the strength of this 
sentiment was the 1972 referendum on entry to the EEC, where national- 
ist sentiments played a major role in the victory of the 'no 1 -vote.
The historical strength of the petty-bourgeois agrarian sectors 
has been mirrored in the relative weakness of the Norwegian bourgeoisie 
even if this class played an important part in the fight for independ- 
ence from Sweden. The only exception to this weakness has been the 
ship-owning class, but their direct influence on Norwegian society 
was partly mitigated by the international nature of their business. 
See Kleven (1965) and (1976) for the only available thorough analysis 
of the Norwegian bourgeoisie.
53 DNA has controlled the government almost continuously from 1945 and 
the party has in effect acted as political guarantor for the stability 
of the capitalist system in Norway. To borrow a phrase from Keul and 
Kjeldstadli (1973), DNA became the 'state-carrying 1 party in Norway, 
in much the same way as the Christian Democrats became the 'state- 
carrying' party of Italy.
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1 In most countries (outside the US) the right of landowners to 
reserve mineral rights to themselves was successfully opposed by 
other classes, and the rent from subsoil activities was in principle 
appropriated by the state - see e.g. the Mexican Constitutional 
Provisions after the Mexican Revolution.
2 Bye (1940), p.40.
3 Adelman (1972), p.6.
4 His theory of oil prices is well summarised in Adelman (1972), 
Introduction.
5 Adelroan (1972), p.8.
6 He predicted that "there will continue to be enough competition to 
make prices gravitate towards costs, however slowly", Adelman (1972), 
p.l.
7 Chalabi (1978), p.36.
8 Rafai (1974), p.46. PN emphasis.
9 Noreng (1978b), p.94.
10 ibid, p.102.
11 Rafai (1974), p.46.
12 Jacoby (1974), p.18.
13 Jacoby also adheres to this argument (ibid, p.21).
14 Blair (1978), p.27. PN emphasis.
15 ibid, p.28.
16 Frankel (1946), quoted by Penrose (1971), p.182. PN emphasis.
17 Stork (1975), p.134.
20 This view of the structure of the oil industry is well reflected in 
the statement attributed to R. Mabro in the Sunday Times, 25 April 
1976, "If it (OPEC - PN) did not exist, we would need to invent it". 
OPEC is here seen as necessary to keep up prices to protect the 
higher-cost oil-producers. A free market situation with oil prices 
approaching Saudi-Arabian production costs would be disastrous for 
all oil producers (including the Saudis) and would also have im- 
measurable political consequences in the Middle East.
341
21 While Adelman does not discount that the long-run average-cost curve 
of oil extraction may be downward-sioping, he claims that the marginal 
short-run cost curve for oil production, not only on a 'world-wide 1 
but also in the case of a single field, is upward-sioping which 
would tend to undermine the 'natural monopoly 1 argument. There are 
three reasons for this which Adelman puts forward. First, an in- 
crease in the demand for oil will lead to an increase in demand for 
oil tankers. This would mean that in the short run relatively 
inefficient high-cost 'moth-balled 1 tankers would be used to satisfy 
the increase in demand, hence increasing the marginal cost of pro- 
ducing one more barrel of oil. Second) output of a given field 
can only be expanded by new developments which are costly. There 
is therefore, according to Adelman, no such thing as a 'drilled-up' 
field where output can be expanded at very low cost. A third reason 
follows almost automatically from his conceptual framework. 
Assuming there is full capacity utilization, the only way to increase 
production is to look for new sources of oil. In a perfectly 
competitive world oil is explored according to its relative cost- 
advantage. It therefore follows that to increase production even 
in the short run, costs will increase. But this third reason does 
not seem to be valid in the world's oil industry. As an example, 
production is taking place in the North Sea despite the fact that 
there are vast unproduced reserves in the Middle East, so Adelman's 
hypothesis that exploitation will take place first in low-cost 
areas is empirically contradicted.
Concerning Adelman's two other objections to the notion of a 
'natural monopoly' in the oil industry, it is possible to have an 
increasing marginal cost curve in the short run, where marginal 
costs are still less than average long-run costs. Hence a situation 
of instability which in our schema 'necessitated' a high degree of 
monopolisation may well prevail.
On a more general level Adelman finally argues on almost a_ 
priori grounds that if the oil industry exhibited decreasing costs 
then "the industry would be a 'natural monopoly' and normal 
competitive rules would not hold" (Adelman, 1972, p.5). The thought 
that 'normal competitive rules' might not hold seems too absurd for 
him to contemplate; and hence the idea is virtually dismissed.
22 A challenge to the balance of payments argument for the US was 
presented in Chase Manhattan (1966).
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23 OPEC at its meeting in Vienna in November 1973 undertook four major 
studies, one of which was to establish with more certainty the 
relationship between the value of crude and production costs of 
alternative energy resources. Quoted in Kubbah (1974).
24 For Masserat the oil surplus consists of taxes both to the consumer 
and the producer countries plus excess profits to the companies. 
He shows that the final price to the consumer of different sources 
of energy tends to be equal pr. energy unit (Equivalent Coal Unit 
(CU) = 7000 kcal). The final price of oil to the consumer cannot 
go above the production costs of the marginal energy source on a 
world scale. This marginal source which will just earn an average 
rate of profit and which earns no oil surplus, is according to 
empirical data presented by Masserat (1979) US coal production. 
If the final price of oil to the consumer was below the cost of 
production of US coal, such production would not earn an average 
rate of profit and would go out of business. World demand for 
energy would as a consequence not be satisfied (especially given the 
long 'lag-times 1 for demand to change in response to a change in 
prices). Masserat's point can be well expressed by a simple diagram,
Market- 
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$/CU.103
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CU - coal unit 
1 CU = 1 kg coal contain- 
ing 7000 cal. 
1000 CU = 1000kg coal
1000 CU = 700kg crude oil
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25 Van Meurs (1971), p.26.
26 Mikesell (1970).
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27 In January 1974 OPEC decided to fix a differential premium of 6<f/bbl 
pr. degree API above 34° and a discount of 3^/bbl pr. degree below 34°
28 According to RafaS (1974), p.60, there was a sulphur penalty of 
3c/bbl for each 1% sulphur content in excess of the reference 
value of 1.6%.
29 Chevalier (1976), p.287.
30 Tanzer claims that because the AERA-rate includes long-run charters 
which on average have tended to have been more expensive than the 
available spot charters, there has historically been an overcharging 
on transport costs. This could have meant that subsidiaries of the 
majors were overstating their transport costs because these were 
invoiced according to AFRA-rates, ;
Furthermore, the way that AFRA's seemingly f neutral 1 rate is 
set can at least be questioned once the origin of the system is known. 
It was instituted at the request of Shell who on 1 April 1954 asked 
the then London Tanker Broker's Panel (also set up at the initiative 
of Shell, with one other company, in early 1951), for "a periodic 
assessment of an average tanker freight rate for a voyage from 
Curacao to a UK port..." Australian Board of Review (1962), 
pp.323-324.
31 Monopoly rent accrues to even the least efficient company in the 
industry - and therefore differs from technological rents which 
derive from the difference in efficiency between different companies.
32 But for an analysis of the oil industry at a world level both
Masserat and Chevalier include such taxes in their definition of rent.
33 .
Figure (i)
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Figure (i) shows a supply curve (S,) of oil from one geographic 
area such as the North Sea. The higher the price of oil, the more 
marginal fields will be worth while to explore (ceteris paribus) 
and the higher the output. The immediate amount of rent to be 
fought about by the nation state and the oil company is differ- 
ential rent = A. Its origin is twofold. As pointed out in the 
definition of oil rent, some large fields enjoy a cost advantage 
over the more marginal fields. Some fields also enjoy a quality 
differential in output in relation to other fields.
S, is drawn on the assumption that the oil companies get a 
pre-tax return of say 25%. If the oil companies only required a 
10% return on their capital, more investment would be made at 
price p, and a larger amount of oil would be produced (OQ2 as 
compared with OQ,). The total amount of rent would increase by 
B because the supply curve would then be S2 .
Finally, if the price for whatever reason increased from 
OP., to 0?2, then the total amount of oil rent (at a given output 
Q,) will increase by C (monopoly rent).
Note that it is theoretically possible to have an upward- 
sloping long run supply curve, even with a short run declining 
average cost curve (the assumption which is implied in our theoret- 
ical discussion on the 'natural monopoly 1 above).
This way of presenting oil rents has a lot in common with 
Marshall's notion of "producers' surplus triangle" (Marshall 
(1949), Appendix H), which has been defined by Blaug as "excess 
earnings obtained by low-cost firms over the earnings of the 
marginal firm in an economy". But the definition is not relevant 
for our purpose because it only includes differential rent. A 
further weakness is that the concept as presented graphically above 
is undiscounted while we require, as will be made clear later, a 
discounted definition of rent.
34 Quoted in Mikesell (1970), p.46.
35 Noreng (1979), Introduction.
36 Hotelling (1931).
37 An alternative way of putting the same point is that an equilibrium 
will occur when the present value of rents is the same in every 
time period, otherwise producers could shift production from a 
period with low present value to one of high present value. Rent
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in period t is here defined as R = R e where R is rent at r too
time 0 and d is the discount rate. The price of the non-renewable 
resource at any one time equals the marginal cost of production 
plus rent or: P = MC + Re . Once marginal cost, total original
stocks, a discount rate and a demand curve for the resource is known, 
then the rent and time span of exploitation can be computed by 
requiring two conditions to hold. First, total amount of production 
over time must equal the total stock of the resource available at 
time 0. Secondly, that by the time the source is exhausted, its 
price is so high that all demand has been choked off.
38 StrgSm (1974). A similar point is made by Pearce (1977), Introd. pp.16
39 Hotelling (1931), p.157.
40 Ulph (undated), p.10, shows that the outcome of a comparison relies 
on the elasticity of the demand function and on costs of extraction. 
But he concludes: "As a general rule, ... monopoly will tend to act 
as a force for conservation" (ibid, p.13).
41 On the question of intergenerational equity and its relationship to 
non-renewable resources, one can contrast two approaches. First, the 
utility-maximization approach that allows for the aggregation of 
utility over generations and time. This is the traditional neo- 
classical solution, and used by, among others, Heal and Dasgupta 
(1974). The second max-min. solution the problem simply says that 
there should be equal consumption over time, i.e. between different 
generations. (This idea comes from Rawles (1971), and has been 
increasingly used as an alternative to the utility-max. approach.) 
It implies no net savings if there is no technological change (and 
no population increase), and negative saving with technological 
change. However, this implies for example that poor nations 
(assuming the nation is the methodological 'building-block') will 
stay poor for ever, a blatantly absurd result that according to 
Koopman (1970), pp.563-94, should make us wary about the model itself. 
But for the nations that we are dealing with in our context, the 
min-max. criterion may seem a reasonable one.
42 If the raw material in question is absolutely necessary for the 
production of 'essential goods' this will affect the rate of 
exploration. This can be expressed by means of the elasticity of 
substitution. Solow (1974) and in less technical language (1975) 
comes to the result that as long as this elasticity is below one 
(but greater than zero, PN), then the use of non-renewable assets
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should be treated according to the rules that govern the optimal 
use of reproducible assets 0 According to such a view there is 
nothing 'special 1 about a non-renewable resource like oil, as long 
as oil can be substituted for other commodities.
Dasgupta and Heal (1974) have tried to face the question of 
uncertainty of technical progress within a Hotelling framework. 
They assume that the date at which technical progres will make the 
resource in question less absolutely 'necessary 1 for the production 
of a specific good (i.e. by changing the elasticity of substitution) 
will be determined by a stochastic process. They therefore try to 
take Solow's analysis one step further. This gives a determinate 
solution to the problem at hand, but in case the technical progress 
takes place towards the end of our time-horizon a crisis may take 
place as the society has run out of one source of energy, and no 
technological breakthrough has taken place. Can the state take 
such a chance? Heal and Dasgupta naturally enough do not give us 
an answer.
43 Stiglitz (1974) argues that the market for non-renewable commodities, 
if left to itself, is inherently unstable. Natural resources are 
viewed in the same light as other capital goods, which are affected 
by the absence of future and risk markets. The only difference is 
that the consequences of a market failure for natural resources is 
even graver than for other goods, due to the fact that the only 
return from holding them is the speculative gain, while capital 
goods yield a rental return.
This is due to the inability of economic actors to foresee the 
future, leading to a situation where, if prices initially are set ^ 
too high, to restore equilibrium in the market in the next period, 
prices have to move even further out of line in order to offset 
the lower value of the rentals. Alternatively the lack of 
future markets may lead to an output either lower or higher than 
the optimal.
Even in the short run there exists a possibility of instability 
if the expected rate of return on holding natural resources varies 
from the rate of return on capital in general. Stiglitz argues that 
to restore equilibrium extremely large changes in current prices 
may be necessary, making a successful market adjustment unlikely.
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44 Strain (1974), p.8.
45 While in traditional welfare theory the sector which benefits from 
a specific policy may compensate the losers (The Scitovsky/Kaldor 
criterion), in reality this compensation never takes place. This 
criterion is therefore politically irrelevant.
46 Pigou (1962), p.29.
47 In the US in the early 1970s the Pentagon was implicitly using a 
'shadow price 1 for its purchase of oil. National oil was to be 
preferred to imported oil as long as the national price was not 
more than one third higher than the price of the imported oil. The 
shadow price of one dollar's worth of imports was therefore $1.33. 
Stauffer (1972), quoted in Chevalier (1974), p.134.
48 Robinson and Morgan (1976b) state: "Some formidable difficulties 
stand in the way of successful intervention... First, it is an 
open question whether, at any given time, a government can even 
identify in which direction company programmes should be varied... 
Second there are imperfections in the political process" (pp.255-56).
49 This is an oversimplification to describe what in each individual 
case is a very complex process. Nore and Turner (1979) is partly 
an attempt to show how a marxist framework can be useful in 
analysing the problem at hand. In particular see the contributions 
by Clawson, Hein, First and Turner in that volume.
50 The Norwegian Committee was created in 1966 (Aftenposten, 10 March 
1966), two years after the creation of its British equivalent.
51 Ferguson.(1969), p.282.
52 Mikesell (1970), Chapter 2, has attempted to indicate within a 
bilateral monopoly case when the two actors will attempt to 
collude. The company will, if it is an integrated firm, choose a 
lower output associated with non-collusion if other subsidiaries 
within the firm can supply raw materials at a higher after-tax 
profit per unit. The nation-state will, on the other hand, not 
appropriate all the rent to itself if it is thereby going to 
preclude the company from making investments in the future.
53 The gravest problem in using a game-theoretic approach for our 
particular problem is that the battle for oil rent in the North 
Sea was originally not a zero-sum game (meaning that the total amount 
of rent to be bargained about was fixed and in particular independent 
of the relative shares of the two actors in question). There is a 
general consensus in the literature that such a solution generally 
has no determinate solutions.
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Particularly in the earlier period when the Norwegian govern- 
ment did not have any possibility of producing the oil itself, a 
solution to the rent bargaining that e.g. would have given all the 
rent to the Norwegian state would almost certainly have precipitated 
a gradual withdrawal of the companies from the Norwegian sector of the 
North Sea, and hence reduced the total amount of rent which was 
bargained about. The situation was a non-zero sum game. However, 
since the creation of an independent Norwegian capacity to produce 
oil (especially since the creation of Statoil in 1972), the 
situation has been more like a zero-sum game.
t
54 The game-theoretic approach assumes^ a'minimax strategy on behalf
is
of the two actors. This is only one of many possible ways that 
economic actors can be postulated to act, both in conditions of 
certainty as well as in periods of uncertainty. In conditions of 
certainty an actor can follow at least four other strategies: 
(i) maximin, choosing an outcome where the worst possible 
outcome is minimized. This is a rather pessimistic view of life 
but may correspond well to Norwegian state behaviour faced, for 
example, with large possible investments in the North Sea.
(ii) maximax, on the other hand, reflects an optimistic attitude 
by choosing the method that gives the highest profit, irrespective 
of potential losses.
(iii) minimax potential regret. Regret is defined as the loss of 
profit caused by not choosing the best method.
(iv) The actor in question can assume that all possible strategies 
he engages in may have an equal chance of occurrance, and he may 
just choose the one for which the expected return is the highest 
(The Laplace Rule).
So in conditions of certainty there is no reason to believe 
that for instance the oil companies or the state behave in the basic- 
ally conservative way ("make the best out of a worst situation")
that game-theory assumes lies at the foundation of its approach. 
This may be especially so for the oil companies, whose 'dynamic 1 
and 'offensive 1 pattern of behaviour is revealed by even a casual 
glance at their history.
55 Under conditions of uncertainty different individuals have different 
attitudes towards risk, and there is no reason to believe that one of 
these attitudes is dominant above all others. One important corollary
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of this kind of analysis is that until now we have assumed that any 
project which has exhibited the highest expected monetary value 
would be chosen. This conclusion may be overturned depending upon 
the actor f s attitude towards risk, that is whether he is a risk- 
averter or a gambler, or simply 'playing the average 1 . Using a 
decision-tree analysis as an example will clarify the point. Here 
a choice for instance between drilling an exploratory well in two 
different locations depends upon the expected monetary value of the 
two options when the probability of occurrence is taken account of!, 
The decision is then taken on the (implicit rule) that the decision- 
making body in question is 'playing the average'. But if this 
organisation is a risk-averter it may well choose a line of action 
where a project yielding a discounted monetary value of $lmill. 
occurring with a probability of 0.9, would be preferred to a project 
involving a discounted monetary value of $10mill. occurring with a 
probability of 0.1 even if the latter has the same expected present 
value.
56 Young (1975), Introduction to Part IV, p.303.
57 ibid.
58 Rent, "like any other price set in a commercial bargain, will tend 
to be set within a range limited by each bargainer's idea of the 
cost of doing without the other", Hartshorn (1967), p.324.
59 Penrose (19Yl) makes a much more explicit use of the bilateral 
monopoly framework than Hartshorn when she unambiguously states: 
"we are basically dealing with a problem of bilateral monopoly" 
(p.157).
60 Penrose (1971) elaborates the point when she states: "-The government 
would also be in an extremely strong position with respect to the 
established oil companies if it could run the industry without their 
help" (p.158).
61 Vernon (1973), p.35.
62 Penrose (1971). Note that the more widespread the ability of
producer states to hire technology at non-monopoly prices, the less 
such an advantage will be.
63 ibid.
64 Hartshorn (1967), p.357, relates this mode of thinking to the price 
of hiring technological services in the market. His Chapter XXI 
(1967) contains a detailed discussion of the different strategies 
open to an exporting country which wants to increase its control over 
the oil industry. See also footnote 33 below.
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65 According to an internal briefing paper of the World Bank, dated 
May 23, 1978: "On June 30, 1977 the Bank made its first large loan 
for oil and gas production" (p.2, PN emphasis). But because of the 
supposedly high risk involved, "So far no Bank financing of explora- 
tion is contemplated... For this reason [the high risk] it [oil explora- 
tion] has always been funded by private or public investors" (ibid). 
US foreign aid policy was also clear at this point. A ruling was 
established at a meeting of US State Department economic officers in 
Rio de Janeiro in 1942 that at no time would US economic aid be granted 
for future developments of state oil corporations. Similarly the 
Inter-American Development Bank also had a policy of refusing loans 
to government oil enterprises. 0'Connor (1963), p.98.
66 "The development of a network of reliable buyers is generally a
difficult, costly, time-consuming affair" Vernon (1973), pp.54-55. 
He could also have added that it is a process which at least histor- 
ically has been enmeshed in political difficulties. The importance 
of this characteristic of the industry was most clearly seen in Iran 
in 1953 when the attempt to nationalize BP's oil finally faltered on 
this structural characteristic of the industry when Mossadeq was 
unable to sell any oil on the world market.
67 "Regardless of the producing country's ability to produce oil
efficiently, the control of international distribution channels by 
the major oil companies can be used effectively to prevent the 
country from selling oil." Penrose (1971).
68 Iraq managed to write into its contracts in the late 1960s that
renegotiation of existing contracts depended on the development of 
concessions in the rest of the world.
69 But he repeatedly makes the point that no crude conspiracy is 
involved in this relationship. The companies and their home 
governments objectively need each other.
70 Evensen (1971), pp.10-11.
71 This amounts to an implicit criticism of Penrose (1971), who aims 
to separate the business aspects of the confrontation between 
companies and producer states while disregarding the political and 
military overtones of>the analysis when she writes: "Since I am not 
concerned with political controversies ... I shall treat the oil 
companies as privately owned concerns interested primarily in making 
profits" (p.152) (PN emphasis).
72 For an excellent summary, see Picciotto and Faundez (eds) (1979).
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73 Bronfenbrenner (1955) must take part of the blame for the prevelance 
of such a methodological approach. On the other hand his conclusion 
that confiscation can be successful in "shifting income to development 
investment from capitalist consumption, from transfer abroad, and 
from unproductive investment" (p.201), and his recommendation that in 
some circumstances'a country should pursue a policy of "neo-isolation" 
based on confiscation, was politically influential and explosive at 
the time.
74 See in particular Mikesell (1970) Chapter 1. A summary is found on 
pp.54-55, op.cit.
75 "In most cases shifts in bargaining power result in renegotiation of 
agreements. 1.' Smith and Wells (1975), p. 18.
76 Mikesell (1970). p.54.
77 Vernon (1973) states that "almost from the moment that the signatures 
have dried on the document, powerful forces go to work that quickly 
render the agreements obsolete in the eyes of the government" (p.54).
78 The statement "It is a near-invariant law of public finance that an 
increase in the supply of funds creates its own long-term demand" 
(ibid, p.58) can serve as a starting point for a critique of Vernon. 
We question on methodological grounds! such 'laws 1 which are 
supposed to hold for all social formations irrespective of political 
make-up of the ruling elite and class-composition within the country.
79 Mikesell (1970), p.54.
80 Vemon (1973), p.35.
81 Mikesell (1970), p.55.
82 "Stripped of all complicating variation and special circumstances, 
the essence of the matter can be stated in the simplest terms as 
follows. The proportion of its profit that a company will be willing 
to give up depends on its estimate of the cost of meeting the govern- 
ment's fiscal demands compared with the cost of resisting them, up 
to the point where the loss in either case makes the business 
unprofitable". Penrose (1971), p.153.
83 Chevalier (1974) describes the traditional theories of bargaining 
as being limited in their outlook and largely descriptive in their 
approach (p.12). Instead, Chevalier tries to develop a general 
bargaining theory, a task he only partly succeeds in accomplishing. 
His basic point is that the relative strength of the companies on the 
one hand and the oil producing states on the other depends upon two 
variables: first, the development of long-run marginal cost (LRMC)
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of extracting oil, secondly on political awareness. If LRMC is rising, 
there are no pressures on the intra-marginal firms to lower their 
prices since they all earn an intra-marginal differential rent. 
But with a falling LRMC, it is only the marginal firm that does not 
experience the downward pressure on prices. Consequently the pro- 
ducers are in a constantly precarious position, their situation as 
a whole is relatively weak, and they have to engage in oligopolistic 
behaviour just in order to survive.
He then goes on to interpret the history of the oil industry in 
this light. The turnaround in 1969/70, in particular, becomes readily 
explainable within Chevalier's framework as, according to him, this 
was the time at which the oil industry, mainly as a result of explor- 
ation in the North Sea and Alaska, was faced for the first time with 
an upward-sloping LRMC curve (p.16).
84 While Chevalier's theory is attractive, not least due to its 
relative simplicity, a number of fundamental criticisms can be made 
of it. The first criticism relates to the basic indeterminacy of the 
final price level. The LRMC constituted nothing but a small share of
final price both before and after 1970. So while Chevalier's theory 
may explain the development of bargaining strength with respect to 
the LMRC, it can say nothing about the other elements of final price. 
If these shifted in the opposite direction to the development of LRMC, 
e «g« by a change in the monopoly situation in industry, we have no 
possibility of predicting which way prices would move. Hence very 
little can definitely be said about the bargining strength to the 
extent that this is expressed in the final price level.
Secondly, Chevalier's analysis will only be of help to the 
Norwegian case study under a number of clearly defined circumstances. 
His theory says only something about the relative strength of the oil 
producers as a whole and the companies. We would have to assume that 
Norway would automatically follow the lead taken by the OPEC countries 
in setting OPEC's terms vis-a-vis the companies for Chevalier's 
thesis to carry weight. The very least that is required is an 
analysis to establish whether there are any other important influences 
that will bear on the Norwegian case study.
For these reasons Chevalier's approach cannot simply be 
'applied' to the Norwegian case. But its main importance has never- 
theless been its emphasis on the mutual interaction between 'object- 
ive' circumstances (the shape of the LRMC curve) and the political
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factors. There could have been no OPEC 'revolution 1 unless there 
had been at the same time a development of political consciousness.
85 Even if such changes are often seen as totally exogenous to the 
firms and the nation-states, this is not always the case. Cost 
conditions (which help to define rents) can be influenced by 
different state policies like depletion. A lengthening of the 
production profile may for instance increase operating costs per 
barrel.
86 21 February 1973.
87 Smith and Wells (1975), p.18.
88 ibid, p.23.
89 Ode11 (1975b), p.55.
90 Adelman (1975) suggests that retroactively increasing the taxation 
rate is one way of stopping further exploration in the North Sea, 
the rationality of which as a policy instrument he does not put in 
doubt. He simply states that "... someone will say this is morally 
reprehensible, but that is not my concern." (p.103).
91 The US Renegotiation Act, quoted in Kubbah (1974), p.77.
92 For a further analysis of the concept of 'ideology' see Mohun (1979)
93 This discussion is developed on the assumption that the taxation 
system in operation is unable to capture all the oil rents. For a 
full explanation of this assumption, see pp.
94 We must assume that the time distribution of costs and revenues 
does not change if the shortcomings of the undiscounted graphical 
approach are to be superseded.
95 But thinking about 'take 1 at the margin can be quite misleading, 
as the conclusions drawn depend upon the nature of the tax system. 
A sufficiently flexible tax system could ensure that the government 
was effectively guaranteed the total rent no matter how much the 
'take' was at the margin, while the companies were left with their 
'normal 1 profits. If on the other hand we are faced with a more 
rigid taxation system (the more realistic proposition that under- 
lies this discussion), then a higher 'take 1 at the margin might be 
an indication of a 'tougher 1 bargaining position (and the same 
conclusion would not hold).
96 Ode11 (1975b) explicitly places the strategies of the oil companies 
in the North Sea in the context of their overall global strategies.
354
97 In practice a government will use a combination of policy instruments. 
But the best way of analysing the problem at hand is first to 
examine one instrument at a time; pp.69-70 will discuss different policy 
'packages'.
98 Bidding can also take place with respect to other variables such as
deferred bonus bids, royalty bids, and work commitment bids, see Crommelin 
(1974). But normally the system relies on cash-bonus bids.
99 Dam (1976), p.174.
100 ibidc
101 From a sample of seven offshore oilfields in the Gulf of Mexico, 
where the bonus-bidding system has been perhaps further refined 
than anywhere else in the world, the lease bonus paid per barrel 
ranged from 'negligible 1 to 26 cents, with an average of 11 cents. 
This compared with a profit per barrel of between 32 cents and 118 
cents (average 90 cents), Weaver et al (1972), Table 1.
102 ibid, p.26.
103 PPS, August 1972, p.278.
104 This was certainly the case with the limited auction experiment in
connection with the 4th round of licences in the UK in 1972, which later 
was one of the reasons for setting up the Committee of Public Accounts 
to review thoroughly the British oil policy.
105 To do this, we first adopt the same framework as Van Meurs (1971), 
p.93, who assumes that $100 is invested at year 0 and then $20 is 
earned at the end of each year starting in year 3. This will give 
an NPV curve like a in Figure (i) with a corresponding internal 
rate of return of 13.6%.
Net
present 
value 
(NPV)
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\
interest rate
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According to Van Meurs (1971), a state which wants to appropriate 
its share of the oil rent can use the following policy instruments:
1. Initial cash-bonus/Bonus at discovery-date.
2. Fixed annual surface duty.
3. Increasing yearly surface-duties.
4. Fixed royalty.
5. Royalty on a sliding scale.
6. Profits tax (inclusive of all allowances).
7. State participation with or without a state oil corporation.
8. Progressive profits tax.
9. Resource rent tax.
106 ibid, p.95.
107 The NPV schedule in footnote 105 shifts to the left (schedule b) 
when there is state participation with a compensation rate lower 
than the IRR to be earned in the original project. A proper 
compensation rate yields schedule c.
108 It is possibly doubtful to assume that companies will invest in 
projects with a negative NPV.
109 Lovegrove (1975), p.91.
110 Under conditions of uncertainty, the time element of payment will 
again determine a policy's attractiveness to the company. But the 
distinction between ex ante, mixed and ex post discovery payments 
becomes of increasing importance as the probability of success of 
a wildcat strike diminishes. In particular, the lower the 
probability of success, the less will be the relative weight of" 
the post-discovery outlays. This is clearly seen in the case of 
state participation, the attractiveness of which as a policy 
diminishes once we allow for uncertainty. The reason is that 
while in the 'no-risk 1 case the company would receive a yearly 
'participation-credit 1 per year to pay for the company's initial 
outlays; if there is a chance that no find will be made there is an 
equal chance that an oil company will not receive such a credit. 
Uncertainty on the other hand has no qualitatively different 
influence on any 'taxation package 1 . Hence when allowing for 
uncertainty the tax solution appears marginally more favourable to 
the oil company than a participation solution. But this conclusion, 
taken from Van Meurs, has been built on a number of doubtful 
assumptions. Most importantly the argument presented in connection 
with state participation under uncertainty only relates to explora- 
tion activities and may therefore turn out to be relatively 
insignificant in financial terms. As the amount of post-discovery
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investment increases, then the relative disadvantage of state 
participation will diminish. Finally, if the state does not have 
to pay any exploration costs the problems raised here would not 
arise.
111 The combined influence of bonus payments, surface duties and royalties 
will normally not be larger than the sum of their individual parts as 
an increase in any of these variables will be 'softened 1 by the 
existence of a profit-taxation system. A similar conclusion can be 
drawn when we analyse the effect of a policy package under conditions 
of uncertainty. Van Meurs (1971) p.102.
112 Garnaut and Ross (1975), p.284.
113 See Kemp (1976), Conclusion.
114 The 1933 agreement between AIOC and Iran contained a clause that gave 
Iran 20% of AIOC's net profit. However, subsidiaries of AIOC only 
referred a minor part of their profit back to AIOC, with a subsequent 
tax loss to the Iranian state. For instance British Tankers Company 
announced a net profit of ElOmill. in one of the pre-war years of 
which only 2.4% was transferred back to AIOC. This intra-firm 
manipulation was easy to carry out because the Iranian state had no 
representatives on the decision-making board. Mikdashi (1966), p.113.
115 Tugendhat (1968), p.180.
116 Garnaut and Ross (1975), p.277.
117 ibid, p.280.
118 We are not here considering the case of 100% state participation wHich 
will be treated separately - see Chapter 8.
119 Wyller (1973) (1975) has been a particularly strong advocate of such 
a view in the Norwegian context, and has centred his analysis on the 
key role that Statoil has as a supplier of premises for the decision- 
making process within the Norwegian state.
120 The attempts by the Algerian state more closely to control the 
financial operations of SONATRACH led in 1970 to a confrontation 
between the two, the outcome of which, according to Made1in (1975), 
was that "the managers of the state enterprise prevailed over the 
controllers of national finances" (p.122).
121 Pertamina's financial manipulations, diversification and ensuing 
massive indebtedness of several billion dollars at one point 
threatened the whole state of Indonesia with economic collapse 
(Sunday Times, 9 November 1975).
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122 For a critical view of this relationship by a French Parliamentary
Committee see Rapport de la commission d'enque'te parlementaire (1975), 
p.228.
123 "In embarking on a policy of rapid exploitatipn from the very start 
... successive governments realized that in doing so less time was 
left for their own indigenous industry to make itself ready to seize 
opportunities." Sir Robert Marshall, Secretary, Department of 
Industry (CPA (1973), p.141).
124 One of the factors that was taken into account when the first round 
of licensing took place in the UK in 1964 was "(ii) The United 
Kingdom would gain substantially from the production of indigenous 
oil or gas, providing an addition and secure source of primary energy 
and benefitting our balance of payment". Quoted in CPA (1973), p.24.
125 There was in 1976 a difference of $52/tonne between the value of
crude and refined products like naphta; $232/tonne when compared with 
a basic petrochemical input like ethylene. Naphta sold from $140/tonne, 
ethylene $320/tonne (FT, 14 May 1976) compared with a price of crude 
of $88/tonne. Crude transformed to textiles gives a value added of 
up to sixty times the original value.
In the example of Britain the oil companies originally planned 
to refine and further process only 35% of the oil from the North 
Sea in the UK (FT, 28 April 1976). From their point of view this 
was perfectly rational. Their own profits might not be maximized 
by, for instance, bringing oil ashore in the Shetlands and then 
shipping it to Britain in order to re-ship it in processed form 
elsewhere, while from a British balance of payments point of view 
this might well have been the best strategy. Such a state of affairs 
is the perfect example of the almost inevitable incongruence between 
the interests of a nation state and that of a transnational firm. 
The original estimates by the North East Office were that £670-780 
million per year could be saved on the balance of payments if the 
planned exported volume of crude was refined in Britain. This 
situation was recently highlighted further by the $1 billion deal 
concluded between Northern Liquid Fuels international and Shell UK 
for the supply of natural gas to the US for further processing 
there (FT 8 April 1976).
126 The distinction between maximum output and maximum balance of pay- 
ment effect was particularly important in the period up until 1973 
(for a fuller discussion see Section 4.2, which deals with the
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British 1965 allocation). After 1973 the increase in rent for each 
barrel of oil has tended to 'swamp 1 the other effects. 
127 Mikesell (1970) Chapter 6 suggests that the confrontation between 
an international company and a raw-material producing state can be 
expressed by the general concept) Retained Value (R), which is defined as: 
R = T (recurring taxes paid to the government. For the oil industry
this would be royalties + profit tax + customs on imported
material + others)
+ N (non-recurring taxes. Area and initial exploration taxes) 
+ E (government foreign exchange profits. Especially in third
world countries where there are non-convertible currencies
and multiple exchange rates) 
+ W (wages and non-wage remuneration paid to employees. A
special point in question is how much money in wages, and
money in terms of profit is being transferred abroad without
the knowledge of the Central Bank of the producing country. 
+ D (domestic purchases of goods and services by the oil industry.
Found by the petroleum sectors internal monetary payments) 
What percentage R constitutes of value of the total output is then 
seen as a very rudimentary index of 'toughness* of a government 
vis-a-vis an international company. Superficially 'retained value* 
would seem to be exactly the kind of concept we are looking for as 
it includes both spinoffs and rents. But unfortunately this is not 
so. The weakness of Mikesell's concept becomes clear if it is 
scrutinized more closely. First > it talks in terms of gross values, 
i.e. all problems in connection with depreciation are disregarded,, 
A relatively high percentage R thus isn't necessarily a positive 
thing if all capital stock has already been depreciated. 
Secondly, marginal propensity to import out of wages paid nationally 
is disregarded, which on a priori grounds can be expected to be 
higher than the national average. Thirdly, the concept is nothing 
more than a sophisticated notion of 'government take 1 and is there- 
fore undiscounted, the shortcomings of which we have already 
discussed at length. Finally, it misses the point about differential 
rent. Therefore a cross-section analysis between countries will make 
little sense, as different margins may be involved. (But on the 
other hand the development within one country over time may be at 
least suggestive, providing that no new and e.g. high productivity 
mines yielding differential rent come into operation to wreck the
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'ceteris paribus 1 assumption.) Murray , in his more general 
criticism of Mikesell, emphasises the latter ! s disregard for what 
the state's income is used for, as well as his disregard for the 
basic forces which make transnational firms invest in third world 
countries.
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Footnotes 
Chapter 5
1 Newendorp (1975), p.45.
2 Layard (1975), Introduction p.32.
3 Adelman (1972), p.76.
4 Quoted by Prof. J.M. Chevalier in an interview with PN in July 
1976. The case in question emerged during his inquiries as to 
why Esso (France) earned such low rates of return during the early 
1970s. The companies' argument also presupposes that their own 
entry into high-cost areas is 'inevitable 1 . Often, but by no means 
always,\this is a decision taken for private reasons, partly because 
the companies are not allowed into certain low-cost areas like Iraq. 
Western demand could, however, possibly be satisfied from these 
low-cost sources if the social organisation of the industry were 
different.
5 In the early 1960s the degree of self-financing was above 90%,
while by 1972/73 the companies were on average covering 70% of their 
investment through equity. Anonsen (1976), p.l.
6 Mobil f s 1975 takeover of Marcor, a paper and mail-order conglomer- 
ate (Sunday Times, 25 April 1976, p.63) was especially singled out 
in US public opinion for attack. A view of the companies 1 diversifi- 
cation into mining is given in the Economist, 15 September 1978.
7 When C. Howard Hardest Jr., Chairman of Continental Oil, was
asked in 1975 by the Senate Anti-Trust Committee whether Continental's 
coal subsidiary, Consolidated Coal, which controls 10% of the US 
coal market, would try to underbid Continental Oil in seeking 
utility business, his answer was: "No sir, under no circumstances". 
Robert Sherill, 'Breaking up Big Oil 1 , New York Times, 3 October 
1976, p.98, quoted in Oppenheim (1976), p.55.
8 Why there are consortia in financing can be explained by one of
the more general insights of game-theory: the importance of attitude 
towards risk. The realization that a company's (or a state's) 
attitude towards risk basically depends upon two variables, financial 
position and pure 'subjectivist 1 factors, opens the way for an 
explanation of why companies actually take on concessions in 
consortia. This is to avoid the phenomenon called 'gambler's ruin 1 , 
where in order to avoid 'putting all their eggs in one basket' the 
companies spread their investment capital over a number of concessions,
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One immediate consequence of this is that the likelihood of effective 
competition between companies which cooperate within consortia is 
even less than before.
9 Lack of new acreage is not necessarily a permanent constraint. 
Because oil is not only found in structural traps but also in 
stratigraphic traps, there are not necessarily a given or finite 
number of promising structures in an area to be drilled.
10 See for example Robinson and Morgan (1976d): "All the NPV calculations 
shown in this paper use a 20% discount rate (after tax)... Since all 
our calculations are in current prices, the implied real discount 
rate is substantially less than 20%" (PN emphasis) (p.6).
Qt.prp. no.26 (1974/75) also adjusts the discount rate according 
to inflation: "The choice (of a 15% discounting factor PN) must 
to some extent be viewed in conjunction with the high rate of 
inflation we appear to be experiencing at the present time" (p.92, 
British translation).
11 For an overview see in particular Johansen (1967) (1978), and Layard
(1975) Introduction. We must however present a very minimal theoretical 
background to the problem. This is necessary for our subsequent 
quantification of the social rate of discount.
The social rate of discount is a very much more composite 
concept than the corresponding private rate. According to Johansen 
(1967) p.27, the full formulae for the definition of the social 
rate is:
P 1 = r + (-v) G i - ((-v) + (y - 1)) Vl 
The value therefore depends upon three broad sets of variables:
- the subjective rate at which the state is willing to trade 
consumption 'today' for consumption 'tomorrow', r.
- the increased marginal utility which results from the increased
consumption in the future that an extra investment will bring about,
(f = elasticity of marginal utility , G^ = rate of growth of total consumpt
- the rate of population growthy , and a value y to bring this 
population growth into the state's preference function.
It should be immediately clear that the value of P contains a 
large element of subjective evaluation. Any subsequent numerical 
assessment of the value of the social rate of discount will therefore 
be partly arbitrary.
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Note that even if we will use the social rate of discount as 
the appropriate discount-rate in our subsequent analysis, the former 
discussion about the characteristics of the private rate of discount 
has not been in vain. In particular the effects of the rate of 
inflation on the rate of discount will also be relevant for our 
present discussion.
12 Note that what is being said here does not conflict with what is 
being said about 'risk 1 below, p.89. Here we are 
talking about the variance of the expected present value of the 
field, while in Chapter 2 we are more interested in the mean of the 
expected present value.
13 Sen (1961) provides an analogous argument with respect to saving, 
whereby the individual's savings decision is influenced by the 
uncertainty associated with the expected outcome of that decision; 
an uncertainty that would cancel for a savings decision taken by 
society as a whole.
14 Note that we can (and do) make a distinction between politicians 1 
and the state's discount rates. Robinson and Morgan (1976b) may 
well argue that the politicians have a time horizon which stretches 
no longer than to the next election, and that the state's discount 
rate should be higher that the companies'. What we argue is that 
the state's discount rate will be lower because its planning horizon 
is much longer than the politicians'. For a further discussion of 
the difference between the 'state' and 'politicians', see Nore and 
Green (1977), Chapter 12.
15 We disregard as part of the oil rent what Cyert and March (1963) 
called 'organisational slack', which corresponds to the sum of 
payments made to members of the coalition in excess of what is 
required to maintain the organisation (p.36). Such a 'slack' was 
indeed a prominent feature of the majors in the 1950s and early 
1960s, partly as a response to the high profit rates being earned. 
But its quantitative importance has undoubtedly decreased since 
then, with the relative decline in profit rates.
16 See Clark and Laading (1973) for a similar broad classification.
17 In any area like the North Sea where new techniques are constantly 
tested, lead times and costs normally tend to increase sharply up 
to a point, after which costs may even sink. This phenomenon, often 
referred to as flattening out of the 'learning curve', is well
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described in Trimble (1976), pp.13-14.
18 The traditional way of measuring the concept of risk is well 
expressed in the following table taken from Canadian data: 
Type of prospect r required 
proven and developed: 10% 
considered proven, but not developed: 12-16% 
probable acreage 25-40%
Quoted in Van Meurs (1971), p.65.
19 Newendorp (1975), p.92.
20 Rut even given these shortcomings, using high discount rates or 
requiring high rates of return remain the most common way to 
describe risk in the oil industry. The main reason for this is 
probably that such a procedure can easily be compared with other 
well-known ways of measuring corporate performance.
21 Newendorp (1975), pp.60-61 0 Note that our concept of 'uncertainty 1 
is different from the kind of risk which is inherently impossible 
to insure against.
22 If the present value of a successful project is $100mill. and the 
success ratio of drilling is 0.20 while the dry hole cost is 
$2nd 11., then the EMV of such a project becomes: $100mill. 0.20 - 
(1.0-0.20) $2mill. = $18.4mill.
23 The investment appraisal of the major companies has historically 
tended to operate on the assumption that the probability of finding 
oil from a given area is fixed (computed by the company geologists), 
The EMV of an 'average 1 field is then computed, and then compared 
with other size fields. The important thing to note is that the 
size distribution of a field is normally not used as an independent 
variable. (Information given to author by Ms. Katherine Erdman, 
investment analyst for Esso (Canada), working in Alberta, in 
interview September 1978.)
24 For an alternative theoretical approach see Clark and Laading 
(1973). They assume that the success ratio of a find (P) is the 
unknown parameter (and consequently assume that reserves will be 
of a minimum size). In such a case, to follow Arps (1961) (quoted 
in Clark and Laading pp.48-49) we can still find a measure of EPV, 
if we can claim to locate three points on the distribution of P. 
This is because it can be shown that under a number of specific 
statistical assumptions a quantification of the highest, lowest and 
most likely probability of a find of minimum size in a particular
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area can lead to statements about what percentage chance there is 
that these three possibilities will come true. If as an example 
the lowest, most likely and highest probability of a find are set 
at 0.1, 0.33 and 0.25 respectively, there is then a corresponding
15 percentage chance that a no-risk $6 mill, project based 
on a minimum size find will have an EPV of $6 mill, x 
[p.l - R (1.0 - 0.1)i, a 70 percentage chance that it will 
be $6 mill, x Jp.l - R (1 - 0.33)] etc., where R is the ratio 
of the cost of a dry hole to the PV. This will then give 
a final weighted average for NPV given these uncertainties. 
In a completely analogous manner it can be assumed that the size of 
the reserves (instead of P) is the unknown parameter and we can find 
the expected value of a project if P is fixed. The only problem 
arises because total reserves are a function of at least three 
variables: productive area, thickness, and recovery factor. Thus 
we can no longer claim that 'there is a 15% chance for x to happen 1 , 
which was permissible only when one variable was brought into 
question at a time. Now the probability of making a find is a 
combination of the different probabilities of the structural 
variables. Again this will give us a final weighted average of
the worth of the prospect, following a calculation that is repeated
4 81 times. (4 basic variables with 3 choices of each = 3 .)
One possible alternative way of utilizing a limited range of
r
data, also chosen by Laading and Clark, is to enter the values into 
a large number of Monte Carlo simulations, which can then be 
presented in a cumulative histogram form, showing cumulative 
probability on one axis, NPV on the other, of the form shown below.
NPV
cumulative probability
25 Section 3.4.5 argues the opposite, namely that there 
are (modest) economies of scale in development costs.
26 Ot.prp. no.26 (1974-75). But note that the use of discounted cash- 
flow techniques were used in the Department of Industry from 1972 
onwards. Laading and Clark (1973) were the first example of oil
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economists who simulated a cash-flow analysis from the North Sea, 
but their example was restricted to one field only, and they did 
not include an analysis of participation.
27 To carry out a discounted evaluation would have required a
complicated assessment of the expected profitability of a field 
with a minute determination of the size and time distribution of 
costs and revenues. By using a zero discount rate no such 
complicated assessment needed to be made.
28 This model is based on a cash-flow model presented by G. Williams 
of Shell called 'Oil and gas technology offshore of the UK 1 to 
a North Sea seminar, Autumn 1972. The basic assumptions of his 
'average 1 North Sea field were listed in PPS, November 1972.
29 The underlying model used by the Norwegian Ministry of Finance 
their work with Ot.prp. no.26 (1974-75) which dealt with the 
question of the special tax in the Norwegian sector.
30 The underlying model of the work by Robinson and Morgan 
(1976a,b,c,d)
31 Model presented by Nelson, Mobil Oil, at the 1976 Offshore North 
Sea Conference in Stavanger during a paper entitled 'Depletion 
and profitability'.
32 Identical with Eckbo (1976), which also was the underlying model 
for the Beall (1976) thesis. Permission to quote from the model 
specifications was obtained by PN in letter from Eckbo 2 October 1978
33 The model which underpinned the work of Bjerkdahl (1975). Was 
made available to Norgen Handelsh^yskole (Norwegian School of 
Business and Economics) in January 1975 by courtesy of Statoil.
34 The only hint that a similar methodology ever has been considered 
is given in a British cost study, which states: "With the data 
which operators have provided on their estimates and making use 
of available assumptions about oil-flow rates and recoverable 
reserves, it is possible to recreate (PN emphasis) the basic 
project appraisals which companies would have been examining
before development starts." HMSQ (1976) I, p.107. None of the 
data referred to was ever made public, and the proposed methodology 
was not followed up in the study.
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35 According to Adelman, quoted in RafaE (1974), p.31, the size of 
the oil which passed through the world's (excluding the socialist 
countries) non-integrated crude market in the period 1957/67 was a 
mere 10% of total crude production.
36 But our production profile figures are reasonably close to
Lovegrove's (1975) figures, which postulate a 14-year production 
span for a 200m. field compared with our 18 years.
37 Laading and Clark (1973^1. p.41.
38 The magnometric survey undertaken in 1962 by Aero Service Filial
2 
of Sutton Industry which covered 375 000 km in the North Sea only
cost a total of $850,000. Cooper and Gaskell (1966), p.74.
39 Qt.prp. no.26 (1974/75), p.47
40 This is an average figure derived from Lovegrove (1975), pp.33-35.
41 Their number depends upon the technological specificity of the 
individual field like the productivity of the wells, which again 
depends upon factors like reservoir pressure. It is furthermore 
known that such pressure can be increased during the life of a 
field by 'secondary 1 , and 'tertiary' recovery methods. We thus 
have a potential trade-off of speed of extraction and further 
investment.
Furthermore the total reserves are no unambiguous concept. 
The number of platforms and wells necessary to develop a field also 
depends upon the area over which the reserves are spread. And this 
area depends upon the height of the oil-bearing strata, and the 
porosity of the rock giving the recovery factor.
42 Development costs, according to Hinde (1966), include among other 
elements "fixed platforms for the deviated production wells, the 
drilling of the required number of wells (which will depend on the 
contract gas volume)" (p.164, PN emphasis). Shell's submission to 
the Norwegian Parliamentary Committee of Industry assumes in the 
circumstances they specify that "doubling of the size of a field 
leads to a doubling of technical units" (Ot.prp. no. 26 (1974-75), 
Appendix, p.5).
43 An 18-well drilling platform was described as 'typical', quoted
by Martin (1974), figure 4« Apart from total reserves, the optimum 
number of platforms also depends upon the maximum number of wells 
per platform and the geological makeup of a field which determines 
the 'catchment 1 area of a platform. Our figure must therefore be 
seen as an 'average 1 .
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44 "... a number of these wells (production wells PN) may never be 
used because of technical problems arising during drilling, such 
as lost equipment down the well, caving in of the well walls, or 
the cracking of casing section." Lovegrove (1975), p.41.
45 Cazenove (1972), pp.42-47.
46 Lovegrove (1975), Table 17, p.60:
Item % %
Platform Structures 29.0)
Equipment 11.Ox
Wells 13.0) 73.0
Offshore Installation 15.0?
Miscellaneous 5.0)
Submarine Pipeline 15.0
Land Facilities (including a land pipeline) 7.0
Exploration 0.5 
Miscellaneous Costs, including administration,
land purchases, helicopter services, etc. 2.5
Financing Costs 2.0
100.0
47 According to footnote 46 above, platform costs constitute:
29% + 11% + 15% + 5% + 2% (platform costs share of miscellaneous 
costs and financing costs) = 63% of total development costs. 
Platform structure costs including installations in turn constitute
( ) % = 71% of total platform costs.
48 An assumption shared by Shell. See footnote 42 below.
49 Year % of total investment cost
1 4
2 44
3 27
4 11
5 . 8
6 6
50 While the rationale for the derivation of the figures was different 
from the one given by us, we see that development costs increase
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by a fixed $50mill. for each $100mill 0 increase in recoverable 
reserves with the exception of the increase from $300mill. to 
$500mill. reserves where the total increase was only $50mill. 
Figures from Robinson and Morgan (1976b), p.258.
51 See e.g. Cazenove (1972), p c 74, reproduced on p.384.
The substantial economies of scale arise because top production 
increases at a much slower rate than recoverable reserves.
52 OGJ, 8 January 1973, p.95.
53 "A doubling of reserves from 1 to 2 billion barrels will only 
marginally (sa godt som ikke) improve the internal rate of return 
... (because) there are few economic advantages in larger projects 
- a doubling of the size of a field results in a doubling of 
technical units (PN emphasis) and hence in investments in drilling 
and in operating costs (produkthandtering)." Ot.prp. no.26 (1974/75), 
Appendix, p.5.
54 Such costs have been estimated to constitute no less than 41% of yearly 
npp-rat-ingro<; > <;. Wood MacKenzie. Oil Report, October 1975, 2. section,p. 2.
55 Hinde (1966), p.164, even if he states that "slightly lower rates (in
(in operating costs) per therm are allowed for the higher flow rates" (ibid).
56 Cazenove (1972), p.112.
57 Surrey (1976).
58 Lovegrove (1975), p.93.
59 By listing operating costs which on a per barrel basis are roughly 
equivalent to the two-tier system adopted by other analysts, there 
would be no bias in undiscounted terms. But in discounted terms 
our method underestimates the profitability of the companies as 
with our choice of estimating operating costs companies have to pay 
a larger amount of the costs earlier. But this bias fits in with 
our overall methodology of choosing the most conservative or 
cautious figures when we make our assumptions.
60 One note of caution needs to be made at this point. While the 
broad outlines of the different participation agreements today 
are known, there are nevertheless some details from the still secret 
agreements where we have been forced to rely on deductions and 
reasonable assumptions in order to fully specify the participation 
agreements. Whenever we make such deductions we will state them 
explicitly. Furthermore, the Norwegian state oil corporation, 
Statoil, was not created in 1969, when the first participation 
agreements were made, so we are in the last analysis talking about
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participation as a means of taxation even if the different parti- 
cipation agreements were taken over by Statoil in connection with 
its creation in 1972.
61 This scenario corresponds to the participation agreement which 
covers the Heimdal field (Petroleum Production License No.036, 
block 25/4). Because it was originally thought that the Heimdal 
field was commercial, it was decided in February 1975 that Statoil 
was to exercise its participation option. This led to the publication 
St.prp. no. 104 (1974-75) which gives a number of details about 
this participation agreement.
62 This scenario corresponds to the participation agreement which
covers the Frigg field (Petroleum Production License No.024, block 
24/1). It was decided in February 1973 that Statoil was to exercise 
its participation option for the field, and St.prp. no.78 (1972-73) 
gave a number of details about the participation agreement.
63 It is nowhere mentioned that such an aggregation is to be discounted 
while exploration is going on. St.prp. no.104 (1974-75) states 
simply: "To repay Statoil f s proportional share of all expenditure 
incurred by the other companies in connection with the Heimdal 
field..." (p.10).
64 We have disregarded one stipulation in the Heimdal agreement, that 
the companies at any one time cannot take more than 50 percent of 
the output which is due to Statoil in order to cover Statoil ! s 
share of the exploration costs. (No such stipulation is made for 
the Frigg agreement,) The reason for this is twofold. In the first 
place it is not clearly stipulated whether the 50% requirement 
referred to the whole lifetime of the field or is valid on a per 
annum basis. Secondly and most importantly its quantitative 
importance is negligible. For the 400m. field Statoil would for 
the first year of production be entitled to $0.4 mill, worth of 
oil if no 50% stipulation holds, while if it did hold Statoil's 
share would have been $1.3 mill., a difference of $0.9 for a field 
with an expected net (undiscounted) worth of $1192 mill.
65 This interpretation of the Frigg agreement has been confirmed by 
Halvor Bjerke, Councillor at the Norwegian Ministry of Finance, 
in a letter to the author dated 24.7.78.
66 See Chapter 2, p.69.
67 This scenario was negotiated for agreements nos. 027-030, 032, 033, 
but to date no commercial find has been made on this acreage.
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Consequently there is no St.prp. like there is for the other two 
scenarios that could tell us in more detail about the agreement. 
Our information about this scenario stems mainly from scattered 
references in a number of White Papers. See for example St.meld. 
no.30 (1973-74), p.44 (E).
68 The net-profit agreements stipulate that the extra net-profit tax 
is to commence "after the company has covered the costs and 
investments it has spent in the area of the concession" (St.prp. 
no.78 (1972-73), p.16). No mention is anywhere made that this 
calculation is to be made in discounted terms.
69 For a further discussion of how especially the majors reacted to 
the evaluated the different participation scenarios in 1969, see 
Chapter 5.
70 The only commercial find made under this scenario is Statfjord
(Production Licence No.037, blocks 33/9, 33/12). For a summary of 
the conditions of the Statfjord agreements, see St.prp. no.114 
(1974-75). On the question of exploration costs it is unambiguously 
stated that: "The costs that were incurred before the field was 
declared commercial are paid, according to the participation agree- 
ment, fully by the other (non-Statoil - PN) companies". St.meld. 
no.21 (1976-77), p.33.
71 One possible way to correct the difficulty referred to in the text 
is to find the government 'take ! starting with the same present 
values in all different time periods and scenarios. But such a 
procedure goes against the historical nature of our investigation. 
It is not historically legitimate to ask what the tax-take would 
have been if there had been a change in the tax rate, for the simple 
reason that all other variables would not have remained unchanged. 
Indeed an increase in the tax rate was invariably in response to 
the changes in the other variables of our model, and consequently 
no simple ceteris paribus condition could hold. For example the 
taxation rules of 1974 were not constructed to handle fields of an 
expected present value of around $100 mill. (NPV of a 200 mill. 1965 
field), because of the diminished need for Norwegian output from 
such relatively small fields.
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Footnotes 
Chapter 4
1 As suggested by Wyller (1973), p. 16. Note that this argument is 
different from when Wyller argued that Norway perhaps should never 
have started the exploration for oil in the first place.
2 Denmark awarded (in 1963) exclusive rights of exploration and produc- 
tion of oil from the Danish Continental Shelf to Dansk Underground 
Consortium (DUG). The only condition attached to this licence was 
that it would be reconsidered if no production had started ten years 
after its signing. The leading member of the consortium was a Danish 
industrialist and ship-owner A,P. Mbller, who cooperated with three 
of the major international companies, of which Gulf was initially 
acting as operator. The reason for this organisational form is under- 
standable. The Danish bourgeoisie as a class is first much 
stronger than its Norwegian counterpart. In Denmark there had also 
been an overland search for oil going on from 1935, where one group 
had all the exclusive rights. This pattern was simply repeated when 
the question of offshire operations became an issue. Such a system 
was also implemented in other parts of the world at about the same 
time, e,g. in Grand Banks, USA, where an area equal in size to the 
North Sea was given to one Consortium.
3 Gulnes, interview (1976). The Oil Council was set up in 1965.
4 Used as an argument in St.meld, no.91 (1975-76), p.77.
5 For a critical evaluation of Danish oil policies, see Davis (1975).
6 Ot.prp. no.47 (1964-65), p.2.
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some caution because Cazenove only used undiscounted figures.
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tax variables was clearly 'swamped' by the increase in PV. The 
variable royalty rate should in theory have increased the 'take', 
but mainly contributed towards easing the profitability situation 
for the minor fields. This was because the higher royalty rates 
only came into operation for the very largest fields.
56 62.2% for the 200m. field and 55.8% for the 700m. field (author's 
estimates).
57 HMSO (1976), I, p.107.
58 This is only unambiguously so if we compare with the scenarios 3 
and 4 in 1969. But it should be remembered that scenario 2 with 
40% state participation was untypical for the 1969 allocations; 
most licences were granted under scenarios 3 and 4.
59 It is expected that the companies in the coming fourth round of 
concessions to be allocated in mid-November 1978 will have to 
accept a special clause that gives the state the right to control 
output from future finds. Such a clause would not have been 
necessary if the 1972 Royal Decree had proved to be satisfactory. 
The 1972 provisions have mainly been used to force the companies to 
reinject gas into Ekofisk instead of flaring it so as to maintain 
the pressure (and hence the long-run productivity of the field).
60 I. Ulveseth in the debate about St.meld, no. 95 (1969-70) and No. 76 
(1970-71), Stortinget, 14 June 1971.
61 Answer by Minister to question by K. Aasland, MP, in Stortinget, 
7 February 1973.
62 ibid.
63 Gulnes (1972a), p.97.
64 ibid.
65 Halvorsen (1967) was perhaps the first to systematically draw 
attention to what oil could mean for Norwegian industry.
66 T. Dyring, MP, Stortinget, 14 June 1971.
67 Gulnes (1972a), p. 97.
68 In some cases oil companies even have a direct ownership share in a 
spinoff industry. Gulf owns for example part of the major engineering 
firm Kellogg.
69 Statoil's existence was originally partly defended with reference 
to its 'industrial-political 1 aims. St.prp. no.113 (1971-72), p.10.
70 St.meld.no.76 (1970-71), p.20.
71 See St.meld, no.95 (1969-70), p.17. Hydro was very active in this 
respect.
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72 For a full list of these groups see St.meld, no.76 (1970-71), Appendix 
6.
73 A majority of the Norwegian merchant fleet had traditionally been 
financed in the international capital markets.
74 St.prp. no.113 (1971-72), p.10. It is possible to interpret the
state's purchase of additional Hydro shares to bring the total to
just over 50% as a step in a strategy to make-Hydro the state oil company
75 St.meld. no 0 76 (1970-71), p.20 0
76 Harbek, op 0 cit. (footnote 5) complained that the US interest in
the Norwegian sector of the North Sea was waning because there were 
very few private Norwegian oil companies left which were unattached 
to international companies and which could therefore become vehicles 
for new international entrants.
77 PPS, November 1972, p.429.
78 For example I.Ulveseth, MP,in Stortinget, 14 June 1971, cited Iran, 
Iraq, Indonesia, Italy and France as countries which had developed 
state oil corporations and rejected multinational control (sic).
79 According to the head of ERAP, there were three reasons why oil 
supplies to France could be threatened if France relied on the 
'majors*. This could happen if the French oil policies displeased 
the majors; if the majors 1 policies displeased the producer countries; 
or finally if French policies displeased the producer countries. The 
first two of these problems cease to be problems if a state oil 
corporation like ELF/ERAP were solely responsible for the production 
and distribution of oil in France,, The third factor could, according 
to the head of ELF/ERAP, be at least significantly reduced if a 
French state oil corporation followed a more far-sighted and unorthodox 
concession policy abroad. Made1in (1975), p.135.
80 ENI arranged for a barter deal with the USSR whereby Soviet crude 
was exchanged for Italian manufactured goods.
81 Made1in (1975), p.154. PN emphasis.
82 While in no sense a perfect division, this separation prevented the 
kind of difficulties experienced in the UK (1978) where BNOC was 
accused of being both a commercial and a regulatory entity.
83 St.prp. no.113 (1971-72), special appendix, p.20.
84 For an elaboration of this (dominant) view of state intervention in 
Western Europe see Holland (1975), pp.!20ff.
85 J. Syse MP in Stortinget, 14 June 1971.
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state intervention in the oil industry is striking. Patrick Jenkins, 
the Tory Shadow Secretary on Energy, described the plans for a 
British state oil corporation as "utter folly, pointless folly, 
damaging folly, and very, very expensive folly". FT Offshore 
Development Supplement, December 1976, p.29.
87 St.prp. no.113 (1971-72), p.10.
88 (1972a), p.97.
89 Debate in Stortinget, 14 June 1971.
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91 Debate in Stortinget, about the creation of Statoil, 13 June 1972.
92 The distribution of Statoil f s future profits between the state and 
the company has today (Summer 1978) still not been settled.
93 J. Syse MP in Stortinget, 14 June 1971.
94 Evensen (1971), p.13.
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Footnotes 
Chapter 7
1 Htfyres fraksjonsmerknad, Innst.S. no.275 (1973-74), p.12.
2 FT, 30 October 1974.
3 For a definition of 'produceable reserves', see St.meld, no.81 
(1974-75), p.78. According to the Oil Directorate these reserves 
consisted of around 260 mill, tons of oil (Oil Directorate, Annual
Report, 1973, p.79), 40 mill, tons NLG (ibid, p.15) and around 4009 3     
x 10 x Nm of gas (assuming 60% of the Frigg total), St.meld, no.77
(1973-74), p.4. At 1973 prices these reserves would be worth 
Kr. 35-40 bill, (author's estimate).
4 Spread over a production span of 15 years the value of reserves 
would on average give a year contribution to GDP of the order of 
Kr. 3 bill., compared with a GDP in 1973 of Kr. Ill bill.
5 Total expected state income would, according to T. Aakvaag, executive 
of Norsk Hydro, quoted in Petroleum Review, September 1973, p.336, 
reach a maximum of $3-400 mill. (Kr. 1.7 bill.) per year by the late 
1970s. Total state income in 1973 was Kr. 55.5 bill.
6 FT, 23 March 1973 attributed the delay in the granting of new 
concessions to Norway's relationship to the EEC.
7 H. Simmonet, Vice-President of the EEC Commission, assumed that 35% 
of the EEC's oil consumption in 1985 would be covered by North Sea 
production. Such a calculation could only be fulfilled if Norway 
drastically increased its planned production. FT (SNSI) (1974) op.cit. 
M. Van den Abeelee, Chef de Cabinet Adjoint to H. Simmonet, at a later 
date urged Norway more directly to maximize its output from the North 
Sea in return for favours given to Norway by the EEC. FT (SNSII) (1975), 
op.cit.
8 Guardian. 2 March 1973. According to PPS, March 1973, p.91, Norway 
used the large French interests in the North Sea as a bargaining 
leverage to overcome the (largely French) objections to Norway's free 
trade agreement with the EEC.
9 Within this perspective it becomes more understandable why Statoil 
was not given the exclusive rights to the Brent blocks. Such a policy 
might not have meant their immediate development in case of a find, 
while by giving the blocks to an international company this would 
de facto ensure their immediate exploitation if oil was found.
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10 Ellingsen (1976) gave Shell's subjective assessment of the situation 
in the North Sea from 1965 to 1975. This took the form of a plotted 
curve which rose in times of optimism and fell in times of pessimism. 
The shape of this curve was not made available to the press at the time. 
While we do not give much scientific credence to such an evaluation, 
it is nevertheless useful as secondary evidence in our investigations. 
The curve showed a continuous upward trend until the creation of Statoil 
in 1971. 'Nadir 1 was reached with the proposed 40% special tax in 
December 1974 while the actual conditions of the 1974 round raised 
Shell's optimism of the future to a considerable extent.
11 According to St.meld, no.81 (1974-75), p.19, "the majority of 
companies accepted this".
12 FT, 11 May 1973, wrote, "It is for this reason that some of the 
larger groups may prove tough bargainers."
13 St.meld, no.81 (1974-75), p.20.
14 This can explain why Shell decided that the deep-water blocks were 
not interesting from their point of view. SAGA, in a letter to 
the Ministry of Finance (Uttalelser til Finanskomiteen vedommende 
Ot.prp. 26 for 1974-75, Appendix to Innst.O. no.60 (1974-75) 
(hereafter Uttalelser (1974-75)), p.79) came to a broadly similar 
conclusion regarding the commercial prospects of the deep-water blocks.
15 St.roeld. no.81 (1974-75), p.20.
16 The need to include such a clause in the standard agreement casts 
some doubt on the state's former assertions that the companies would 
have been fully responsible for possible environmental accidents 
from the production of oil,
17 OGJ, 18 February 1974.
18 FT, 6 December 1974.
19 According to FT (ibid), "Some of the major US and French oil companies 
... can be expected to withdraw". Note that it was not suggested that 
all companies considered withdrawal, nor that any Norwegian company 
would withdraw.
20 Quoted in FT, 4 December 1974.
21 Under the headline: "OPEC-spirit in the North Sea', PE, January 1975, 
p.4, wrote in relation to the Norwegian package "The spirit of OPEC, 
which aims at ever increasing pre-barrel revenues and maximizing state 
participation has now firmly taken hold of the governments surrounding 
the North Sea."
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22 These were the State Attorney and the representatives of Statoil and 
the Ministry of Finance.
23 There were indications that representatives of private industry were 
less worried about the legal principle of "retroactivity" than part 
of the Norwegian civil service. A Vice-President in SAGA criticised 
a tax solution to the problem of expropriating oil rents because of 
the widely different conditions that existed in the Norwegian Shelf. 
He added that "A more logical approach would have been discussion 
on state participation in Ekofisk, similar to the Norpipe Solution". 
Evenson (1975).
24 See FT, 6 December 1974.
25 St.roeld. no.81 (1974-75), p.21.
26 Noroil, January 1975, p.5.
27 St.meld. no.81 (1974-75), p.21.
28 ibid.
29 The Economist, 27 March 1975.
30 Noroil, April 1975, p.9. Noroil, on the other hand described the 
actual costs of exploration drilling as "massive", and said that the 
4 wells the company would have committed itself to in the work 
programme would come to Kr. 200 million. Hence Noroil could under- 
stand that the taxation rules were important for an acceptance or 
not.
31 The 1965 Decree stipulated that oil and gas should be landed in
Norway if the national interest so required, while the more stringent 
1972 Decree explicitly required landing in Norway unless the state 
on application approved another point of landing.
32 According to the Daily Telegraph, 3 March 1973, Phillips and its
partners "have been gradually forced into giving way by nationalistic 
pressure that makes the Arabs almost look tame". FT, 16 February 1973, 
described the move as "yet another successful move towards greater 
direct participation in oil development".
33 Unanimous declaration by Parliamentary Committee on Industry,
quoted in a debate in Stortinget, 26 April 1973 (Stortingstidende, 
p.2806). According to the Ekofisk Commission this postponement would 
be "around two years" (ibid.).
34 As St.meld. no.51 (1972-73) pointed out: "To put conditions for the
development of the fields, which to an important extent changes the pre- 
conditions which underlay, the'production licences, presumably goes against 
the normal concept of the law (almenne rettsgrunnsetninger)", p.20.
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35 Arne Kielland, MP, Stortinget, 26 April 1973.
36 PPS, April 1973, p.148.
37 Chase Manhattan, controlled by the Rockefellers who also have a 
controlling interest in Exxon, was a member of the consortium that 
refused the loan if Norway got control over the pipeline, OGJ, 
12 March 1973, and Platts Oil News, 5 March 1973.
38 Guardian, 31 March 1973.
39 This report was written by Professor Sjur Braskhus for the North Sea 
Operators Committee, dated 13 December 1974 and sent to the relevant 
Norwegian Ministries on 2 January 1975.
40 Paragraph 97 of the Norwegian Constitution states, "No law shall 
be retroactive".
41 Uttalelser (1974-75), p.l.
42 ibid, p.37.
43 ibid, p.27.
44 Appendix 25, Innst.O. no.60 (1974-75), p.105.
45 Innst.O. no.60 (1974-75), p.79.
46 ibid, p.9.
47 ibid, p.75. According to the evidence submitted by SAGA (ibid, p.78), 
it is not even possible to see how a 10% acceptable rate of return 
would affect the 'acceptable area 1 of exploration*
48 ibid, p.64.
49 The five factors are: (i) increased capital costs, (ii) delays in 
start-up, (iii) less production than expected, (iv) a collapse in 
oil prices or market conditions, (v) a shortfall in financing. 
The company then stated that each of these factors might decrease the 
internal rate of return by 3-10%. ibid, p.73.
50 ibid, p.6.
51 In the period 1969-72 NTNF used a number of contracted firms (which 
were all independent of the oil companies) to shoot a total of 9800 
profile-kin north of 62°, while it continuously received all the 
seismic data from the companies. 1971 and 1972 saw the highest ever 
geological activity south of 62°N since the period just before the 
first allocation of blocks in the middle 1960s. 29400 profile km 
were shot in 1971 and 34400 km in 1972. St.meld. no.30 (1973-74), 
p.9. See also Footnote 17, Chapter 5.
52 Statens Oljedirektorat, Arsberetning (Annual Report) 1973, p.32. 
However, there were at the time still some limits to the ability of 
the Directorate to fully dominate the technical field of seismic
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surveys. Because of specific problems in conducting seismic surveys 
off the coast of Troms, the Directorate in 1973 had to seek special 
expertise from experts in Chevron, Mobil, Shell and Texaco. They 
were to aid the Directorate in technical questions, conduct tests of 
the field instruments and supervise the seismic shooting which was con- 
ducted by Geophysical Service International. Even if this particular 
set-up had no direct influence on the negotiations in 
connection with the third round (nor would the use of oil-company 
personnel necessarily influence the independence of the Directorate), 
it nevertheless served to clarify what kind of basic problems the 
Norwegian state was continuously faced with in having to rely on 
the international companies for technological advice.
53 The Oil Directorate makes safety assessments of the proposed
capital investment already at the design stage, Annual Report,op.cit. 
p.11.
54 Daily Telegraph, 19 December 1974.
55 St.meld. no.21 (1976-77), p.25. One year later the figure was 
244 (ibid).
56 "One has within the Directorate such expertise", Annual Report
op.cit. p.33. Note that from the mid 1970s onwards the production 
assessments of the Directorate have consistently been lower than
 
those of the companies. For one explanation of this, see pp.184-5.
57 Uttalelser (1974-75), p.60.
58 63 wildcats had been drilled giving 13 finds (St.meld, no.30 (1973-74), 
p.80). Dr. J. Birks, Director of BP Trading Co, gave a Norwegian 
success rate of one in eight with respect to commercial finds,
defined as a find which produces more than 30 000 bbls/d or 100m.
3 ft gas/d. He described the Norwegian success rate as "very
favourable compared with the usually quoted worldwide average of 
1:15", Birks (1973), p.4.
59 This is roughly in line with the assumed average cost of $4 mill, 
per exploration well used by Lovegrove (1975), p.29.
60 OGJ, 23 September 1974, p.139.
61 Barge-hire rates together with fabrication labour rates were the 
two cost elements in the North Sea singled out as being subject to 
excess demand during this period. HMSO (1976), I, p.36.
62 Lovegrove (1975), p.69.
63 ibid, p.69. (This figure is for a 200m. field but given our assump- 
tions about economies of scale this should not be important.)
64 Wood MacKenzie (WM), North Sea Report, 11 July 1974.
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65 The WM figure corresponds to a permanent development cost component 
of $161 mill, the Lovegrove figure to $136 mill.
66 An alternative way to find this fixed development cost component is 
to use a detailed breakdown of each component as we did in the 1965 
and 1969 calculations. Assuming that the cost of tanker-loading 
equipment remains the same ($4 mill, for each 100m. in recoverable 
reserves), a 100m. field will cost:
3 delineation wells @ $ 4.8 mill. = $14.4 mill. 
18 production wells @ $ 2.4 mill. = $43.2 mill. 
Total platform costs * = $88.0 mill.
Total costs $145.6 mill. 
With a subsequent total cost including the EKSBM, the total will be 
$149.6 mill., which is virtually equal to figures used in the text. 
* The 50 mill, barrel on field loading Auk-field had platform costs 
of £20 mill. ($44 mill.), McKay and McKay (1975), p.71.
67 This was the expected price for the pipeline from Forties. PPS^ 
April 1972, p.122.
68 Baxendell (1974), pp.2-3. This referred to a 36" pipeline in 500 ft. 
of water.
69 Lovegrove (1975), p.67.
70 Uttalelser (1974-75), p.63.
71 Brown (1975), pp.112-13.
72 OECD (1975b), Table 5-4.
73 A report from Wood MacKenzie, October 1973, gave total operating costs 
for Ekofisk's 3.8 billion barrels to be $876m., an average of 23{/bbl, 
(By 1975 this figure had increased to $1310m.). In contrast the > 
Statoil (1974) operating costs worked out at $1.53/bbl at the 1973 
prices, increasing to $2.30/bbl by 1975. Surrey (1976) employs a part 
fixed cost, part variable cost approach to allow for both tanker 
loading and pipeline. The idea is that average costs will decrease 
for the larger (pipeline) fields, compared with tanker-loading. Such 
a procedure gave an average $1.60 per barrel for a composite of the 
400m. and 700m. field (1976). Finally MacKay and MacKay (1975) 
expected operating costs in 1975 to average $1.00/bbl. (p.40).
74 MacKay and MacKay (1975), pp.46-47 and p.97.
75 Aronsen (1976), p.2.
76 Brown (1975), p.119.
77 This percentage was also used by Bjerkdahl (1974).
78 Until 1974 50% of all loans raised in the Norwegian sector had made 
use of export credits, St.meld, no.81 (1974-75), p.66.
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79 Wood MacKenzie assumed a rate of interest of 12% with 6 years repayment 
of loans (North Sea Report, January 1975, 2.section). NS (1974) however 
assumed a rate of interest of 10% with repayment over four years with 
two years' grace, while Statoil (1974) assumed a loan running over 
10 years with 10% rate of interest. WM reported in March 1975 that 
Agip had raised part of its capital for the development of Ekofisk 
at 10%%. (North Sea Report no.75, Section II, pp.60-61).
80 Parra used the same assumption in a similar calculation, quoted in 
PPS, November 1972, p.422.
81 Wood MacKenzie, Report, October 1975, p.51.
82 This is in line with Chevron's adjusted figures to point of distribution, 
submitted to the Norwegian Parliament in 1975 (Uttalelser (1974-75), 
p.60), and WM's figures of $11.25/bbl (North Sea Report January 1975, 
Section I), but lower than Esso's assumption of $12/bbl also given to 
the Norwegian Parliamentary Committee (Uttalelser (1974-75), p.19).
83 These calculations subsequently turned out to be very optimistic,
but in 1974 there was still no indication of the real cost explosion 
that was to come and which was to play havoc with expected profits 
of the North Sea. At the most one could ascribe the cost increases 
which had taken place since the end of 1973 to a sudden excess 
demand for all factors which related to oil production, as all 
companies and consumer-states in Western Europe made a determined 
bid for self-sufficiency and stepped up the search for oil. This 
interpretation of the cost rise clashes with the conclusion of the 
British cost study (HMSO, 1976), which ascribes the cost 
increase mainly to insufficient engineering planning.
84 It is important to note that the participation rate is therefore not 
related to reserves. St.meld, no.91 (1975-76), p.16.
85 ibid, p.16.
86 ibid, p.22.
87 Therefore the comment in a White Paper that a find the size of 
Ekofisk would give the state a participation share of around 70% 
(St.meld, no.81 (1974-75), p.21) at a time when Ekofisk reserves 
(lower estimates) in 1975 totalled 1010m. bbls (ibid, p.79) does 
not necessarily settle the issue. But just to be on the safe side 
we have also run a sensitivity test on the latter assumption. 
As we will see the difference it makes to our results is marginal 
(see footnote 94) ;
88 As long as losses are incurred these losses are carried forward, for >>
r^
a maximum period of 15 years. A maximum of one third of the ; ^
* «o
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accumulated losses can then be used to offset profit before corporation 
tax per year, hence this process of deduction will take place over 
three years of profit before corporation tax is greater than one-third 
of the accumulated loss. If not, it can stretch over more years. 
89. Net profits defined as: net income before corporation tax plus
distributed dividend (not deductable for special tax) = net income 
for tax assessment minus tax free allowance = 10% of all capital 
goods acquired during the preceding 15 years. When there are no 
taxable profits, this free income can be accumulated and carried 
forward, but the maximum tax-free allowance which in any year can be 
utilized must not exceed net income for tax assessment.
90 Wood MacKenzie, North Sea Report, no.61, 11 July 1974.
91 Ot.prp. no.26 (1974-75). [Note that we have already argued in
Chapter 3, p.83, why the high discount rates used e.g. by 
Robinson and Morgan (1976d)have been disregarded.]
93 Quoted in PE, December 1975. According to Wood MacKenzie (op-cit.) 
the post-tax IRR for the other Norwegian fields would be: Frigg, 
19%; Statfjord, 34%; Ekofisk (gas) 30%.
94 If we use an alternative participation scale (see p. 219and footnote 
87) which assumes a 55% participation rate for the 100m. field, and 
increases by 1.7% for each 100m. reserves reaching 70% for the 
1 bill, field, the difference in total state control over rent 
changes only marginally. For the 700m. field Statoil's PV decreases 
from $995o3mill. to $924.2mill. A similar trend is seen for the 
200m. field.
95 The situation today (1978) is different from 1974 as concerns the 
optimal rate of depletion for Norway. As a result of large external 
borrowing to maintain full employment during the recent international 
economic crisis and the continuation of this crisis; and the shortfall 
in production compared with the state's expectation in 1974, the
 
Norwegian state has now stepped up the granting of concessions. This 
partial change in policy underlines the importance of our historical 
methodology. The 1974 negotiations, especially about volume, can 
only be understood based on what was believed and known at the time.
96 Evensen (1973), p.57.
»
97 F.vensen might have engaged in a certain amount of historical self- 
justification. As we have shown, depletion policy was neither in 
operation in 1965, nor arguably in 1969, but at the most could be said 
to operate after 1971.
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98 The fact that he assumed fixed exchange rates makes no difference to 
his argument. Instead of pricing a good out of the world market by high 
labour costs, a shift in exchange rates will also have the same effect.
99 Seland (1973), p.9.
100 Mabro (1969) showed in particular how in a state like Libya where 
employment was virtually guaranteed by the state's income from oil, 
this had brought about a misallocation in the labour market. It was 
in particular difficult to induce nationals to take employment in irksome 
tasks like agriculture and construction. For a more theoretical treat- 
ment of the 'rentier state' in the third world, see First (1979), Part I.
101 Naustdalslid (1975b), p.33.
102 St.meld. no.25 (1973-74), p.8* E.
103 ibid, p.8.
104 ibid, p.97, Appendix.
105 ibid, p.98, Appendix.
106 See Brandzaeg (et al) (1975), especially pp.54-64.
107 "Any use of the revenues beyond this level would appear at the moment 
to lead to such extensive structural changes that it would be difficult 
to get it under the necessary public direction and control" (St.meld. 
no.25 (1973-74), p.18*). If we use this figure then the structural 
changes outlined above based on an injection of Kr. 10 bill, (see 
footnotes 102 and 103 above) would be correspondingly less.
108 ibid, p.6.* This was the higher estimate for income in 1981-82.
109 A largely similar argument was later put forward by 0ien (Ministry 
of Finance) when he supported a slow rate of oil production by 
implicitly referring to a classic portfolio choice between "oil in 
the sea and (the yield of - PN) international investments" (speech 
to Norske SosialgSkonomers H^stkonferanse, 1975, quoted in NI no.21, 
1975, p.16).
110 The area around Stavanger is a particularly clear example of the
direct effects of the oil activities and the pressures of centraliza- 
tion brought about in an area which has become part of the oil economy. 
For a micro-study of its effects on social work clients, see 
Stangeland and Nilsen (1976). For a more general analysis of the 
social consequences of the oil activity, see NOU, no.38, 1975 and 
NAVF (1978). The latter overview suggests that the negative social 
effects might have been less than initially feared.
111 Statement by official in the Norwegian Ministry of Environment, 
quoted in Guardian. 7 April 1976..
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112 Confidential source in the Ministry of Finance.
113 Norman (1974), (summed up in less technical language in Norman (1975)J
criticized a number of what he saw to be crucial assumptions of the calci 
tions. He claimed that the PRIM/MODIS macro-model used at the time 
by the Ministry assumed the elasticity of demand within the external 
sector to be zero and the elasticity of demand within the sheltered 
(including the public) sector to be infinite. Hence a 1% increase 
in disposable income would increase the demand for goods produced by 
the sheltered sector by one full per cent, and on the assumption 
that there is a fixed labour/output ratio, increase the labour force 
in that sector by one per cent. This increased demand for labour 
would be transferred from the external sector. The only mediating 
influence would be that if we take into account the decreased demand 
from the external sector for the goods in the sheltered sector, then 
the increase in the demand for labour would be less (around 0.83% 
according to the PRIM/MODIS calculations). Norman claimed that it 
was more reasonable to assume a demand elasticity less than infinity 
for the external sector, when taking into account phenomena like 
product differentiation. He furthermore assumed a positive demand 
elasticity in the sheltered sector because he found unreasonable the 
PRIM/MODIS assumption that the decrease in real income which would 
follow an increase in prices of the protected sector would lead to 
a decrease in the demand for internationally traded goods only. 
Finally he challenged the underlying fixed input/output coefficients. 
A change in these three assumptions would according to Norman tend 
to overestimate the structural changes which would follow an increase 
in oil production.
114 Screiner and Wilhelmsen (1974) denied that the crucial price and
income elasticities were necessarily equal to one or zero as Norman 
had assumed, and that PRIM/MODIS had been misrepresented. But of 
more principal interest was their answer to Norman's assumption 
about employment in the public sector which he had assumed was price- 
elastic. This meant that Norman's lower estimate for the need to 
transfer manpower mainly stemmed from a lower relative growth of the 
public sector. Screiner and Wilhelmsen pointed to the assumption 
used by the Ministry that different parts of the 'sheltered' sector 
had different employment elasticities. Employment would increase by 
18,000 man years for each Kr. 1 bill, spent by the public sector, 
compared with 5,000 man years for each Kr. 1 bill, spent by extra 
private consumption (St.meld. no.25 (1973-74), Section 4.3.2).
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Therefore Norman's assumption that the share of public expenditure was 
to remain constant as a percentage of GNP when oil revenues were expected 
to arrive were "a political declaration" according to Screiner and 
Wilhelmsen (p.125). In addition they objected to Norman's assumption that 
the demand for public services was independent of the relative price between 
the two main sectors. Thus, interestingly, it seemed as if one key to the 
technical aspects of the depletion debate were dependent upon the size of 
the public sector.
115 Debate in Stortinget, 6 June 1976. The opposition against this aspect of 
Norwegian oil policy must also be seen on the background of a general scep- 
ticism by the oil companies and the significant sectors of the Norwegian 
capitalist class towards the state's oil policy, and the general strength- 
ening of the state it implied.
116 The Times, 12 December 1974.
117 FT, 30 October 1974. (PN emphasis).
118 NI, no.24, 1975, p.12. The latter reason was an interesting, albeit
implicit, admission that the oil production in the North Sea was expected 
to generate enough cash flows to help the financing of future huge offshore 
investments; not exactly an indication that the profitability of the 
Norwegian investments was bad. SAGA also wanted to increase the rate of 
production in the North Sea. This standpoint seemed to have been inspired 
(as for Esso) by reference to the energy needs of the Western world and 
the commercial interdependency between the rest of the world and Norway 
(interview with Knud Endre Knudsen, M.D., SAGA, NI, no.10, 1974, p.10).
119 This factor, according to Adelman (1975), pointed in the direction of the
most rapid possible extraction of Norwegian resources. He wrote: "The chance 
is minimal that the price of oil will increase so much in the 1990s that it 
will pay to keep back oil production" (p.98). This point of view must 
clearly be seen in relation to and in conjunction with Adelman 1 s 
theoretical framework, which we have already criticized in Chapter 2.
120 Ode11 (1974a), pp.3-4.
121 Adelman (1975), p.102.
122 Ode11 (1974a), p.4.
123 Interview with the Director of Norges Industriforbund, in NI, no.16, 1975, 
p.29. But note that the organisation in principle claimed to be in favour 
of "a moderate rate of depletion" on the Norwegian Shelf (ibid, p.28), 
even if this was not defined in more detail.
124 This is the main argument in Qdell (1975a).
125 ibid, p.3. The validity of this argument depended crucially upon the
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expected production from the North Sea. If one believes, as Odell did, 
that the reserves of the North Sea are much higher than official estimates, 
then such an argument makes sense. If one on the other hand thought (as 
the Norwegian state clearly did at the time) that, while the resources were 
considerable, they were in no sense 'immense 1 , then his argument has much
less force.
126 This he only indirectly implied. See Ode11 (1974a), point 3, p.4.
127 St.meld, no.25 (1973-74), p.98, Appendix (E).
128 Noroil, May 1974, pp.29-31.
129 By early 1975 the Finnish shipyard Rauma-Repola was under contract to build 
9 H-3 rigs, NHSST, Oil Survey, 5-10 May 1975, p.17.
130 While it had been normal in the rig market to build in response to specific 
needs and requests made by the oil companies, the Norwegians built drilling 
rigs without being sure beforehand that they would be employed. In so 
doing, however, they often cooperated with an experienced (often American) 
drilling contractor.
131 Offshore Products § Services Guide, Norwegian Export Council, quoted in 
the Scotsman, 4 June 1976.
132 R.S. Platou a/s, Oslo shipbrokers, quoted in NHSST (op.cit.), 28 of these 
65 rigs were of H-3 construction.
133 Industriens Servicekontor (1975), quoted in Jenkin (1977), p.10, Appendix 
D. Of the total Kr.2.76 bill, worth of deliveries or orders of drilling 
rigs gained by Norwegian industry by mid-1975, only Kr. 400 mill, was 
destined for overseas markets.
134 St.meld, no.25 (1973-74), p.21a.
135 Scotsman, 4 June 1974.
136 Condeep is a Norwegian-constructed gravity structure destined for production. 
It represented the first alternative to production platforms made out of 
steel which until then had reigned supreme offshore. The advantage of gravity 
structures of the Condeep kind was especially clear in deeper waters, and the 
two first orders came in the autumn of 1973 from the UK sector. Mobil 
ordered one Condeep for its Beryl field to be placed in 384 feet of water, 
while Shell ordered another for the Brent field, to be placed in 460 feet.
137 Noroil, May 1975, p.67.
138 Industriens Servicekontor (op.cit.). Some caution should be exercised in 
the interpretation of this figure. The production of both platforms to 
Frigg which was at the time at least a 50% Norwegian field were classified 
as 'export 1 .
139 NH^ST, op.cit., p.44.
402
140 Bugge Supply Ships (BSS) which by 1976 planned to operate a total of 
23 ships, was owned by major firms like Fred Olsen, Vesteraalens 
Dampskipselskap, and Northern Offshores Ltd (ibid).
141 St.meld. no.25 (1973-74), p.23.
142 The total by May 1975; Noroil, May 1975, p.67.
143 Statssekretaer Engell Olsen, Ministry of Industry, NI, no.19, 
1975, p.25.
144 Industriens Servicekontor (op.cit.)
145 PE, October 1974, p.368.
146 Because of the late completion of Phillips 1 installations at Teeside, 
supply of NGL to Bamble has been delayed. There is today (1978) a 
legal battle going on between Phillips and the Norwegian firms operat- 
ing the Bamble plant (see below) about who is to carry the cost for 
the delay.
147 Innst.S. no.230 (1973-74), p.4.
148 All points from Prime Minister Lars Korvald, in Stortinget, 26 April 
1973.
149 The price of NGL is to adjust only 80% in relation to the change in 
an index figure which is fixed to changes in the crude prices, 
alternatively to the long-run supply price of naphta as a raw material 
in the petrochemical industry. St.prp. no.79 (1973-74), p.4.
150 Hydro had initially wanted to build a 250,000 tonne/year cracker
only in cooperation with the Norwegian firm Borregaard, but was also 
negotiating with ICI to build a similar structure on Teesside. SAGA 
wanted to build a 300,000 tonne/year polyfinil complex together with 
the Norwegian private firms Aker, Dyno, Elkem Spikerverket, Hafslund 
and Ardal 5 Sundal. PE, February 1974, p.69.
151 In constant 1973-Kr. St.meld. no.30 (1973-74), p.62.
152 Innst.S. no.333 (1973-74), and St.prp. no.79 (1973-74).
153 Cf. comments by the chairman of the Parliamentary Committee of 
Industry, in Stortinget, 26 April 1973.
154 Innst.S. no.381 (1973-74) explicitly said that Statoil's participation 
in future finds "will give the Norwegian state an effective means to 
secure that the state's intentions with respect to supplies to the 
offshore industry is being realised" (p.13).
155 Ministerial answer to I. Helle, MP, in Stortinget, 17 January 1973. It 
was thus clear that the Norwegian state naively thought that its own 
behaviour was going to have permanent repercussions on the rational 
behaviour of other countries, an attitude for which there was precious
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little rational basis. The justification for this policy resembles the 
UK's justification for its original terms in 1965 (see Chapter 4, p. 116), 
and the earlier Norwegian argument as to why the Norwegian state should n 
be directly involved as a productive entity in the oil industry.
156 Norwegian industry will supply between 60 and 70 per cent of the
total worth of the Statfjord B platform (Statoil's purchase manager 
DSstol at Offshore North Sea (ONS)), Stavanger, October 1976. 64 
per cent of the value of Statfjord A was produced by Norwegian 
firms (St.meld. no.21 (1976-77), p.46).
157 This crucial role of Statoil was recently shown in the creation of 
Norwegian Petroleum Consultants (NPC). NPC was set up in 1976 by 
the ten largest Norwegian engineering and supply firms to carry out 
multidisciplinary work on major integrated petroleum projects. 
NPC and Brown $ Root have jointly been awarded the main engineering 
contract for Statfjord B and the majority of the work will be done 
in Norway. As in the case of SAGA it was the Norwegian state (now 
in the shape of Statoil) which was instrumental in pushing for a 
cooperation of Norwegian firms to form NPC (Lavik, Interview, 1976). 
Statoil on at least one known occasion pressed for an offshore 
order to go to Norwegian suppliers for 'reasons of employment 1 
(Jenkins (1977), p.27). The yet clearest discrimination in favour of 
the Norwegian spin-off industry was made clear in the 1978 bidding 
for the deck of Statfjord B where only Norwegian firms were invited 
to submit a tender. For the industry's hostile reaction to this 
procedure see Noroil, editorial, October 1978, p,17 0
158 In St.meld. no.30 (1973-74), it was stated: "This (full integration - 
PN) is a prerequisite for the solution of the tasks that the govern- 
ment has entrusted to Statoil" (p.44).
159 But the final extent of the vertical integration had not yet been
determined. The decision that the state should also control retailing 
was not taken until the summer of 1975 when a separate marketing 
entity, Norol, based on the network of BP, was formed.
160 Its initial equity of Kr. 5 mill, was quickly enlarged first in May 
1973 to Kr.150 mill. A further Kr. 150 mill, were provided by the 
Storting in 1974. Sttjneld. no.30 (1973-74), p.21.
161 The first hole drilled by Statoil was spudded in 15/12 during the summer of 
1975. The company had by that time chartered a Norwegian drilling rig, 'Ross 
Drill', for five years. Esso played initially a key role as technical assistan
162 Quoted in St.meld. no.30 (1974-75), p.45. But the letter also pointed 
to the advantages of an active state company, namely that all the
404
found oil would go to the state and that the activities could more 
easily be subject to other Norwegian policy considerations in the field 
of industrial and resource policy.
163 Conservative MP Knudson complained that the 200,000 Norwegian share- 
holders who had invested Kr. 400 mill, in the so-called "peoples' 
oil companies" were given a chance to participate in the UK sector, 
but barred from Norwegian waters. Stortinget, 9 June 1975.
164 Interview in N^, no. 18, 1974, p. 18.
165 Innst.S. no.381 (1973-74), comments to Chapter 10.
166 Innst.S. no 0 402 (1974-75), p.8. But a conservative amendment to the\ 
Industrial Committee in 1974 that these blocks should be exploited
together with SAGA and Hydro was rejected in favour of a statement 
which gave more flexibility to Statoil.
167 This sentiment was echoed by Minister Leif Aune when he was asked to 
comment on the international commitments of SAGA and he answered: 
"There are neither any plans nor wishes from Statoil to be engaged in 
such projects" (Stortinget, 27 March 1974).
168 Johnsen interview, NI, op.cit.., pp.8-9.
169 NI_, no. 7, 1972,.p.16.
170 MPs Austreheim, Eika, Helland, Vigestad and Westermoen from these 
centre parties declared: "Given the phase in which Norwegian 
petroleum activity finds itself at the moment, Statoil in the 
opinion of these members should first concentrate on the exploration, 
production and pipeline transport of oil and gas." Innst.S. no.381 
(1973-74), p.7.
171 R.T. Larsen, Innst.S. no.381 (1973-74), p.18.
172 Motion put forward by the Conservative Party, Stortinget, 9 June 1975, 
but defeated against their own 28 votes.
173 Knud-Endre Knudsen, interviewed in NI, no.10, 1974, p.15.
174 Saganytt no.l, August 1974, p.2. See also interview with Endre 
Knudsen, op.cit., p.16.
175 NHSST, Oil Survey, 13-16 September 1977.
176 Johnsen, interview, op.cit.
2177 Hydro was prospecting for oil on a 10,000 km concession in Denver,
Colorado, together with Gulf Oil.
179 See Stork (1975), p.159, and First (1974), p.203.
180 See Sampson (1975), pp.212 and 215 for a somewhat less categorical 
interpretation of this event.
181 RafaS (1974), p.308.
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182 Stork (1975), p.175.
183 ibid, p.205.
184 ibid, p.
185 According to New York Times, 25 October 1974, quoted in Barraclough
(1975a), p.21.
186 "Saudi Arabia virtually imposed conditions (at the OPEC meeting - PN) 
that were closely in line with American desires." New York Times, 
20 March 1974.
187 This agreement was made public during the US Senate hearings (1975), 
US Senate (Part 7, p.254). According to Sampson (1975), "It was not 
surprising that the companies did not wish the Shah to know how his 
country's future income depended on a private rationing system controlle( 
by eight companies" (p.132).
188 27 March 1974, quoted in Stork (1975), p.139.
189 The agreement which in July 1969 was concluded between INOC and the 
Russians to develop the huge North Rumaila fields was undoubtedly 
such a threat. For a good summary of Iraq's oil policies during this 
period see Stork (1979).
190 Speech at a Financial Times North Sea oil conference in London, 
reproduced in full in Middle East Economic Survey (MEES), 22 
September 1972.
191 ibid.
192 Stork (1975), p.195.
193 St.meld. no.30 (1973-74), p.46 (E).
194 ibid.
195 St.meld. no.25 (1973-74), p.94 Appendix.
196 This attitude may have changed again in the autumn of 1976 when
there were strong forces within the Ministry of Finance which opposed 
the use of 'service contracts' because it complicated the taxation 
dealings with the companies.
197 St.meld. no.25 (1973-74) (E), p.16, Appendix E.
198 ibid. This conclusion is reinforced by examining the UK depletion 
rules announced by Minister Varley (Commons 6 December 1974). These 
are only valid for any finds made after 1 January 1976 and are extremely 
feeble. They allow for a maximum cut in production of 20%, after the 
field in question has been paid for.
199 Johnsen interview, op.cit., p.14.
200 St.meld. no.30 (1974-75), p.46.
201 FT, 30 October 1974.
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202 FT, 3 January 1974.
203 inst. S. no.275 (1973-74), p.10.
204 St.meld. no.25 (1973-74) (E), p.14.*
205 SV urged that no private company should be given any concessions on 
the Norwegian Shelf and that Statoil should have a monopoly over all 
new concessions. Old concessions should be renegotiated and the 
average Norwegian f take f per barrel should be comparable to those 
in the OPEC countries. SV furthermore wanted to decrease the planned 
output from Norwegian waters to 50 million tons per year, and as a 
step in this direction aimed to control directly the output of all 
existing fields. The main reason given for such a ceiling was that 
structural changes would be minimized with such a policy. Finally 
SV wanted a better parliamentary control over Statoil.
206 Innst. S, no.275 (1973-74), p.10.
207 St.meld. no.25 (1973-74) (E), p.13.*
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Footnotes 
Chapter 8
1 Ot.prp. no.26 (1974-75)(E), p.7.
2 St.meld. no.11 (1968-69), p.6.
3 One of the four major assumptions used by 'Project Independence" 
concerning future US energy production was that investments in the 
energy sector would realise a 10% rate of return. Federal Energy 
Administration (1974), p.78.
4 As shown in Chapter 6, p.185, the reference to 'conservation* ini
Norwegian law constituted no method of regulating output from a 
single field for macro-economic reasons.
5 There is however a micro-economic optimal level of inventories to , 
be held by the individual firm in oil production as in any other 
kind of production.
6 In 1965 total Phillips production of crude amounted to 17 million 
tons, while its total refinery output was 22 million tons. CGT 
(1976), p.91.
7 Total crude output of 199m. tons with a refinery run-through of 
78m. Ibid, p.32.
8 This view clashes directly with Odell's analysis of the inter- 
relationship between the wprld energy situation and the situation in 
the North Sea. He argues that the major companies' neglect of the 
North Sea acreage extended into the 1970s (Ode11 (1976), p.85), some- 
thing we cannot accept given the almost euphoric interest in 
Norwegian acreage from 1970 onwards, and the much tighter work 
programmes negotiated in the Norwegian third round.
9 Dillar Spriggs, Executive Vice-President of Baker Weeks £ Co Inc, 
declared to the US Senate Church Committee on Multinationals that
 
the oil companies had shifted their profits downstream between 1971 
and 1973 in anticipation of producer-state ownership. While profit 
margins per barrel of final products was 30 cents on average in 1971, 
this had been increased to 90 cents in the spring of 1973. (US 
Senate Hearings, 30 January 1974, pp.56-61, part 4). According to a 
Wood MacKenzie report on Shell, quoted in PE (May ]977), Shell's 
downstream profit was 10<f/bbl in 1971, nil in 1972, but shot up to 
69<f/bbl by 1976. The belief that the companies would not earn any 
money upstream has, however, turned out to be too pessimistic. 
See Nore (1979a).
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10 This was hinted at in Noroil, July 1975, p.14, and has also been 
confirmed to the author by a former employee of Statoil.
11 OPEC Bulletin, September/October 1969.
12 Especially in Algeria it was apparent that the aim of nationalization 
was intimately related to the country's development plans. According 
to Made1in (1975), "From 1969 onwards it was clear that Algeria was 
seeking complete 'recovery* of its sources of production, in order to 
obtain full possession of the proceeds from them, for the purpose of 
financing very large investments under the First Five Year Plan" 
(PN emphasis), p.154.. By the early 1970s oil constituted 16.0- 
16.5% of the Algerian GNP (Economist, 6 February 1971, p 0 62) 0 
"... concerning the (problem of - PN) prices, it was only by a process 
of nationalization that the Algerians could get control over the 
surplus so that it could serve the development of the country" 
Chevalier (1974), p.101. 
See Table 6.2 in Nore (1979a)". 
Net profit per barrel in cents, 1957-72
13
14
Government 'take' Company profit
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
78.1
75.7
76.5
70.8
70.0
70.9
75.1
75.2
76.4
77.0
79.7
82.8
83.9
86.0
126.4
134.0
77.1
60.3
58.4
56.5
54.3
53.1
56.3
43.2
41.8
41.1
36.9
39.9
35.6
33.0
33.5
28.0
* Relates to whole integrated operation
Source; 'Energy memo', First National City Bank. October 1969, 
January 1973, and January 1975. 
15 Jacoby (1974), p.248.
409
16 See Table 6.3 in Nore (1979).
Majors' return on net assets in Eastern hemisphere, 1957-71
1957
1957
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
18.6
15.0
13.8
13.9
13.2
13.1
14.1
11.1
11.2
11.5
10.7
11.7
11.1
11.2
12.9
Source: 'Energy memo 1 , First National City Bank, July 1975.
17 Issawi and Yeganeh (1962), p.112, computed that the companies' Middle 
Eastern rate of return (measured as net income over total net assets) 
averaged 67% in the period 1948-60. Kubbah (1974) assessed an average 
rate of 79.2% for 1970 based on data from the US Department of Commerce.
We accept that there were fluctuations in the companies 1 rate 
of return. For instance, in the aftermath of the Teheran agreement 
the companies experienced a significant increase in their profit 
margins which undoubtedly accelerated the producer-states 1 demand for 
a fuller control over their operations. A similar upturn followed 
the Arab-Israeli war of 1967. But our point is that these movements 
nevertheless were superimposed on a downward trend of profitability.
18 This concession made the oil industry one of the lowest taxed industries, 
especially in the US. Exxon paid an effective 11.2% of their net 
earnings to the US tax authorities in 1973 (US Senate Committee (1975), 
p.13). This policy was also used as a method by the US government 
to increase its aid in an indirect manner to the Arab countries in 
the 1950s (ibid, p.2, Introduction).
19 The companies just assumed that the future investment in the industry 
would be provided from retained earnings. Hence it followed almost 
automatically that the industry wanted higher prices (and hence higher 
profits) once it was expected that production costs would drastically 
increase. According to PPS, August 1971, higher prices were in- 
evitable. "The enormous quantities of oil needed'to satisfy demand 
in the 70s and 80s ... will have to be sought for and developed in 
more and more difficult places.... the rise in prices will have to be 
greater than the rise in costs, because of the need for larger 
earnings" (p.212).
410
20 Mr D.H. Barran, quoted in PPS, June 1968, p.202. His point carries 
additional weight given the high price elasticity on oil products.
21 Chandler (1974), p.4.
22 According to Edward Symonds, writing in First National City Bank's 
Energy Memo, January 1967, "... the intensity of competition between 
fuels will make it important for companies to consider getting a foot 
in more than one camp.... In the future, increasing attention may be 
paid to their (the companies 1 - PN) access to diverse types of 
energy.V
23 US total coal reserves are estimated to be in the order of 1 trillion 
six hundred billion tons or, in energy terms, equivalent to 12 times 
total proven worldwide oil reserves. Boumedienne (1974a), p.160.
24 ibid, p.163. See also Chevalier (1974), p.142.
25 Writing in Foreign Policy, Fall 1976, he stated, "Since 1971, the
United States has encouraged Middle East oil-producing states to raise 
the price of oil and keep it up" (p.24).
26 Chevalier (1974), pp.160-61.
27 Economist, 7 July 1973, under the title 'The phoney oil crisis',
voiced the suspicion that the US had only capitulated too readily to 
the OPEC demands for an increase in oil prices because such an increase 
would slow down the Japanese economy. Japanese exports were at the 
time outcompeting American goods and its economy would be more hurt 
by rises in the price of oil than that of any other nation.
28 There are however some notable exceptions. Oil workers were active 
in both the Soviet and Mexican nationalizations in 1917 and 1938. 
The action of the Iranian oil workers in 1978 in opposing the Shah 
were a follow-up to their militant actions under Mossadeq in the early 
1950s. See also Nore and Turner (1979), Introduction.
29 See Kontrast no.6, 1976 (62), pp.327-28, for the author's argument 
that it is not possible to relate Norwegian oil policies to any of 
the three leading general schools of modern state theory: the STAMOKAP 
(State Monopoly Capitalism), the STINKAP (State Interventionalist 
Capitalism)(also called the "Capital Logic" school), and finally the - 
"Althusserian" school. This argument was presented within the context 
of a general introduction by Kontrast's editorial committee on the 
subject of modern state theory. A similar disillusionment with the 
usefulness of general theories of the state is found in Gestenberger 
(1978), who also stresses the importance of the political and economic 
pecularities of each social formation.
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30 For a discussion along similar lines of the choices open to the
OPEC countries in the aftermath of the 1973/74 events, see Jabarti 
(1977).
31 St.meld, no.24 (1973;74), p.9+(E).
32 ibid.
33 ibid.
34 Such a thought, often described as state intervention on behalf of 
capital in general, owes much to the work of Poulantzas. See in 
particular his (1973), and 'The problems of the capitalist state 1 
reprinted in Blackburn (1972). But as opposed to Poulantzas we 
don't make this into a general theory of the capitalist state, but 
merely one that is representative of the Norwegian social formation. 
Other social formations, such as that of Australia, do not correspond 
to such a characteristic of the state. Here the state is very much 
under the influence of one fraction of capital: the raw material 
producers. See Richards (1976) for a confirmation of this point with 
respect to Australia.
35 Naustdalslid (1975) argues that there will be an increased contact 
between the (then) Ministry of Industry and Norwegian oil capital 
which will strengthen both of them. The loser will be the Ministry 
of Finance as the overall coordinator of the Norwegian economy (and 
hence as representative of 'capital in general').
36 For a summary of O'Connor's work see 0'Connor (1973), 
pp.5-13.
37 But if the Norwegian state's main aim in the period up to 1975 was 
to maximize its total rent to try to overcome a 'fiscal crisis', the 
state would presumably have sought to maximize its total production 
and not control output. This seeming paradox can be explained by the 
fact that an intensified rate of extraction would have meant a more 
than proportional increase in state expenditure due to the whole range 
of externalities which would result from an increased rate of produc- 
tion. Also at this time the structural consequences of oil production 
had still not shown themselves fully, so the reasons for an increased 
output put forward on p. 273 had not yet made themselves felt 
It was only later that these reasons 'swamped' the effects of the 
externalities referred to above.
38 Total taxes corresponded to 47% of GDP. Parliamentary Report no.l 
(1976-77), Table 1. Of OECD countries only Sweden had a higher 
percentage of taxes as a percentage of GDP.
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39 For such a perspective see Rowthorn (1977),
40 Holloway and Picciotto (1977) and (1978), Introduction, argue such a 
point. Their perspective is wider than Rowthorn f s because they 
include a restructuring of the political process as part of the 
total restructuring referred to in the text.
41 In 1976 the state acquired the majority shares of the construction 
firm H^yer-Ellefsen which was part of Norwegian Contractors. This 
followed a rescue operation for the ship-owner Hilmar Reksten. These 
shares were then sold to Norwegian private firms in 1977.
42 Minister of Industry Finn Lied referred explicitly to 'Konsesjonslovene 
during a debate about St.meld, no.95 (1969^70) and St.meld, no.76 (1970 
71) when he defended an increased role of the Norwegian state in the 
North Sea. Stortingstidende, p.3219.
43 Following the defeat at the Annual Conference in 1949 of the left 
wing of the Labour Party which wanted to extend and reinforce the 
autarctic tendencies of the post-war 'siege economy 1 , the majority 
of the party expressed no principled doubts about relying on foreign 
capital to provide capital inflows for investments. First, it was 
argued that foreign investment provided valuable jobs, which was seen 
as an absolute political priority and would also increase the total 
value of exports. This attitude was further reinforced by the know- 
ledge that the companies often controlled the whole vertical production 
process of an industry (as in aluminium). Consequently to insist on 
Norwegian control over only one part of a vertically integrated 
structure (while the companies controlled both the marketing and 
the raw-material end of the process) was seen as irrelevant. 
Finally, the Norwegian government's position in the after-war period 
could be seen as a virtually inevitable consequence of the liberal 
world-view of international economics which it had adhered to at 
Bretton Woods in 1944, see RgSd Larsen (1977).
44 A high degree of socialisation of production can also mean that the 
time before any profit can be realised is so long that private 
capitalists refuse to invest in the project. Infrastructure is an 
example of such a commodity. See also Altvater in Appendix H.
45 SSB (1976) 'Statistical Yearbook', p.58. The figure excludes all 
investment related to oil and gas production, but includes invest- 
ment in nationalised industries.
46 Extrapolated from Aronsen (1976), p. 2.
47 For a more detailed discussion of the concept of 'General Conditions 
of Production', see Appendix H e
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48 Foley (1976), p.64.
49 Barraclough (1975a), p.21.
50 Ford Foundation Report estimate, ibid, p.22.
51 A similar argument can be made with respect to the OPEC countries where 
there is also an 'objective 1 need to accumulate capital for the 
purposes of industrialization. But the exact form this 'need 1 takes 
depends, as in the Norwegian case, upon the political institutions, 
i.e. the specific state structure through which it is mediated. 
No thorough exposition can, of course, be made here about that 
process, but see especially contributions by Clawson, Hein, Turner in 
Nore § Turner (1979) for such a connection.
52 This trend has recently been accentuated, as Statoil now has started 
to participate in the financing of general exploration costs 0 On 
blocks 24/11 and 24/12, according to terms announced in October 1976, 
Statoil is to shoulder 7.5% of exploration costs even if no commercial 
find is made, a break with the basic state participation agreements 
negotiated as Scenario 1.
53 Anonsen (1976), p.2.
54 Estimate made by the Scottish merchant bankers Noble Grossart, quoted 
in Kirkby (1976).
55 Brown (1975), p.3.
56 Estimates by Chase Manhattan quoted in Anonsen (1976).
57 ibid.
58 Up to 1973 $80 bill, alone had been channelled through the Eurodollar 
market. Ramfors (1975), pp.116-121. There were also other financial 
institutions to draw on. The European Investment Bank, which in 
principle should earmark its lending for EEC countries, has in reality 
channelled large sums to the Norwegian sector. In the words of its 
director, even if Norway was not a member of the EEC, "we had no 
difficulties in accepting that it was of Community interest (to finance 
Norwegian oil developments - PN), since the oil was coming to the UK, 
the gas to Germany for distribution there and in the Netherlands, 
Belgium and France" 'Kirkby (1976).
59 Kirkby (1976), p.4.
60 Gulnes (1972a), p.5.
61 The only exception was the financing of the Ekofisk pipeline. But this 
was an unrepresentative example which primarily sprang from the 
Norwegian government's need to strike a 'tough 1 bargaining in view 
of considerable domestic opposition to the deal.
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62 Banks have in particular mistrusted the increasing control that the 
state has achieved over operations in the North Sea. Chase Manhattan 
Bank, for example, blocked an effective Norwegian control over the 
Ekofisk pipeline. See Section 7.3
63 L.G. Beckers et.al, Petroleum Department, First National City Bank, 
London, in Investors Chronicle, 5 September 1975.
64 Brown, Director of Noble Glossart (1973), p,120.
65 Kirkby (1976).
^  HV^VMM^Xv ' 
66 Smart and Saster (1973), p.3. Aas (1975), pp.22-23, gives an overview 
of how Statoil at the time was financing its capital requirements, 
part of which was simply borrowed from the state. Statoil has later 
gone directly to the international market in order to raise finance.
67 Longcroft (1975), p.51. This is part of a longer quote which also 
shows the potentially nationalistic attitudes of this sector. 
"A great deal of press comment has been directed towards castigating 
government participation as an expensive piece of political dogma 
which should be abandoned. The British government's role in this 
regard should be re-stated, their role should be to help establish a 
healthy and expanding independent British exploration industry. 
Certainly our government is the only possible means whereby the 
exploitation of our own oil reserves will not be dominated by foreign 
interests in the years to come.... Only through the British govern- 
ment becoming a participant can Britain remain independent of, and 
over the years, be less reliant upon the international oil industry 
through the establishment of a balanced oil industry" (ibid).
68 A development loan for Tricentrol to meet their share of the cost for 
the development of the Thistle field was concluded on 16 June 1976, and 
guaranteed by the UK state. See FT (NS76), op.cit, p.34.
69 Given the importance of the state's role in securing finance for 
projects in the North Sea, it is not surprising that there were 
attempts by the private sector to use the state in a manner that was 
congruent with the way that the state normally had been used by the 
private sector in the past, i.e. as a passive supporter of private 
capital accumulation. This idea was clearly present in an early UK 
suggestion that the state should supply the finance for projects in 
the North Sea, but only ask for a 'bankers return 1 on the sums 
provided. This idea was however never followed up. Its rejection 
can serve as an indication that the period had passed where such a 
direct and unambiguous support from the state to the private sector 
could be put forward and accepted.
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70 The data is kept by the Norwegian Oil Directorate, which is not allowed 
to make it public until five years have passed. This rule also applies 
to Statoil.
71 Goks^yr, Interview (1976).
72 For a good overview of the present decision-making procedures on the 
Norwegian Continental Shelf, see St.meld, no.21 (1976-77), which deals 
with the initial cost overshoots of Statfjord.
73 In this sense they differ from the 1969 agreements where no partici- 
pation on the Operating Committee was guaranteed until a commercial 
find was made.
74 The lower percentage is the stipulation under participation Scenario 
No.2, cf. St.prp. no.104 (1974-75), p.!0 0
75 This situation is broadly similar in the UK sector. According to 
SCNI (1974), p.xi, 51% state majority will not ensure complete state 
control on the Operating Committee; the minority partners maintain 
effective powers of veto.
76 In that case there was no meeting of the Policy Steering Committee 
between 5 January and 16 June 1976 (St.meld, no.21 (1976-77), p»64). 
So for almost half a year in the most crucial part of the development 
planning stage of a field, decisions were taken by other and less 
formal channels, which seems to have blocked the Ministry's (but not 
necessarily Statoil f s) access to vital information.
77 Despite Statoil f s 50% share in the concession, the Norwegian govern- 
ment almost had to resign in February of 1977, as a result of its own 
lack of information about cost escalation on Statfjord. Statoil and 
Mobil seem to have had a much better cooperation than the Ministry 
of Industry and Mobil. In view of the greater congruence of ration- 
ality between the two firms, this is hardly surprising.
78 Even in the case of block 34/10, the so-called 'golden block 1 , where 
Statoil has an 85% interest and where no foreign company holds any 
equity, Esso will still be providing 'technical assistance'. The 
terms of what amounts to a virtual 'service contract 1 are still secret.
79 Lavik, Interview (1976).
80 ibid.
81 For a forceful statement of this position see Tanzer (1979).
82 Lavik, Interview (1976).
83 Point made by Jon Bakken, Engineer, Statoil, in interview with PN.
84 The probability that the companies will have a technical role to play 
on the Norwegian Shelf in the foreseeable future is positively related 
to the speed of exploration of the Norwegian oil reserves and the
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technical complexity (especially deep-water) of exploration. The 
faster the Norwegians choose to develop the area north of 62°, and 
the deeper they go, the slimmer are their chances not only of supply- 
ing spinoffs (as recognized earlier), but also of gaining enough 
experience as operators so that Statoil on its own can undertake 
this task, and thus in a meaningful way replace the international compan:
85 Dr. Jesse Wyllie, Executive Vice-President of Gulf Oil, when asked 
to comment on the UK proposals for majority state participation, 
contrasted these with the Norwegian policy, which he described 
favourably in the following terms: "The Norwegians have not done 
anything like that. Their legislation has not suddenly changed the 
rules of the game. It is not retrospective" fBanker, December 
1974, p.1484).
86 For a treatment of different aspects of oil's relationship to
Norwegian foreign policy see 'Saeter (1975) and Brundtland (1975). 
Ausland (1978) is an interesting piece of work because the author 
worked in the US Embassy in Oslo from 1969 to 1974. The government's 
point of view was put forward by Evensen (1971) and Frydenlund (1975).
87 Quoted in Ausland (1978), p.45.
88 ibid, p.102.
89 ibid, p.34.
90 Such an assessment of course depends upon the future geographical
spread of world production, the size of new reserves and the political 
development in the key OPEC countries.
91 We will not go into any detail about Norway's relationship to IEA, 
partly because Norway did not join until 1975. But it must be said 
that IEA was perceived as a threat to a 'national 1 oil policy in general 
and to the question of the rate of depletion in particular when the 
agreement was first ratified by the Storting in April 1975. Ms. Berit 
As, leader of the Socialist Electoral Alliance (SV) criticised the 
IEA as the product "of an American move to create a new US dominated 
organisation similar to previously established organisations like the 
World Bank, the IMF and NATO"(FT, 1 May 1975). Former Prime Minister 
Per Borten (Centre Party) called for reassurance that Norway would 
itself have the right to define the Norwegian reserve production 
capacity for oil, in case of an emergency, as well as to define when 
an emergency had arisen. The interpretation that the creation of IEA 
was basically the West's 'answer' to OPEC is provided by Saeter 
(1975) and Ausland (1978), p.34, among many others.
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Footnotes 
Chapter 9 
Conclusion
1 It is in this context important to note that the strongest challenge 
to the companies came in the aftermath of the EEC referendum which 
momentarily weakened the last constraint referred to in the text.
2 No comprehensive analysis has as yet been undertaken concerning this 
trend in Norwegian capitalism, but even a casual glance strongly 
suggests the existence of such a trend. SAGA operated in 1974 in 
six countries: UK, Holland, Italy, Peru, Guatemala and Ireland, while 
Hydro saw an equal expansion as a producer in the US, Abu Dhabi 
and in Italy. The realisation by the international companies that 
their chance of obtaining concessions were proportional to the degree 
of participation by Norwegian firms in their operating consortia also 
helped to tie Norwegian firms closer to international capital. This 
tendency is also clearly seen in the engineering industry (cf. the 
creation of NPC and the many bilateral production agreements between 
Norwegian and foreign firms, e.g. Aker's cooperation with Brown £ Root, 
De Grooth Offshore Contractors, and Moran Bros.Inc. just to mention 
a few).
3 The official report from the blow-out blamed the Norwegian Oil and 
Gas Directorate for weak inspection routines. See NOU: 15 (1977), 
p.5.
4 The bad working conditions, the existence of virtual company unions, 
and low wages paid to non-Norwegian labour, has led to bitter conflict 
during the construction of several oilfields. In October 1978 Spanish 
workers carried out a successful four-week strike, mainly on the 
question of union recognition, against Mobil, and Brown and Root/Aker, 
the firms in charge of the construction of Statfjord A,
5 These failures have lately (1978) been accentuated by the sudden need 
by the Norwegian state to earn rent as fast as possible from the North 
Sea to cover its present balance of payments deficit and to increase 
industrial employment. The deficit has arisen because the oil has 
been produced at a slower rate than was initially expected, and because 
Norwegian policy-makers miscalculated the extent of the present world 
depression. Their economic strategy of borrowing abroad in order to 
maintain a high level of aggregate demand in Norway throughout what 
in 1975 they thought would be a short-lived international recession,
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ran into problems as the depression continued. A new phase of 
Norwegian oil policies has recently been introduced, whereby the 
granting of new concessions is tied to the applicant's willingness 
to create employment in Norway, whereby industrial firms like the 
Swedish Volvo and the German Veba (through Denimex) have been promised 
oil concessions in the North Sea on the condition that they form joint 
industrial ventures with the Norwegian state. It should be stressed 
that the reason such industrial investment is needed at least partly 
springs from the collapse of the traditional Norwegian export 
industries, which again is partly a result of the expected oil 
revenues' effect on unit costs in industry. This new trend has 
important long-term consequences for the way that the Norwegian state 
will be tied to international capital, and thus reduces its ability to 
pursue an independent oil policy.
6 Preface to Chevalier (1974), p.8. A similar self-satisfied statement 
was made by a Norwegian MP when he stated: "It is possible that the 
multinational companies have not been accustomed to a situation where 
the state wants a decisive influence. But Norwegian oil policy assumes 
this, and the companies had better abide by that." (Arvid Johansen, 
Stortinget, 6 June 1974).
7 Statoil's expected turnover will by 1980 reach Kr. 4.6 bill, if we c; ; 
cautiously assume a constant oil price in money terms (St.meld, no.21 
(1976-77), p.48. This will by then make it Norway's largest company. 
A couple of years later the state oil corporation should be earning a 
substantial profit, and by the mid ]980s probably become the most 
profitable single company in Norway. By 1976 Statoil with Kr.1.55 bill, 
also had the largest capitalisation base of any single Norwegian firm. 
St.meld, no.19 (1976-77).
8 Statoil's role cannot be isolated from other aspects of the state's 
oil (or industrial) policies. Statoil is merely the most dramatic 
expression of a trend that has accelerated and which has recently made 
itself felt in Norwegian society. This is the increased productive 
role of the Norwegian state. During 1975 the state increased its equity 
holdings in Norwegian industry by Kr. 2.3 billion. As a result, its 
share of total Norwegian industrial equity reached in 1975 between 
40% and 45%. The Ministry of Industry directly controlled 30% of 
this total compared with 15% in 1970 and 21% in 1974. (NI no.22, 1975, 
p. 5). A number of the state's important ownership shares are either
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directly or indirectly related to the Norwegian oil industry. The 
extraction, refining, reprocessing and retailing of oil products thus 
seems very much to be the 'tail that wags the dog' as regards a state 
productive role in the Norwegian economy. But there are also more 
indirect effects from oil in the state-owned sector. The Norwegian 
state bought in 1975 a controlling interest in Alcan Aluminium for 
Kr.600 mill. The ready availability of the finance for this transaction 
was clearly a reflection of the country's expected future oil income.
9 The most immediate expression of this trend is the huge increased in 
expected state revenue from oil. In Norway the income of the state, 
both from taxes and from Statoil, is expected to reach Kr. 16.1 bill, 
by 1982. fDet Reviderte Nasjonalbudsjettet, 1979) This is equivalent 
to 7% of GDP and 14% of total state income (1978 figures). This income 
will give the Norwegian state an increased political 'room for 
manoeuvre', a development which has already been seen in the facility 
the Norwegian state has had in borrowing internationally to overcome 
the world slump of 1974-77. But there are also domestic repercussions 
of this development. The state's ability both to guarantee accumulation 
as well as to enact measures that serve the legitimization of the 
political system is bound to increase with the state's accessibility 
to an increased share of the rent. The capitalist state's classic role 
as overall coordinator of economic activity and the entity that 
facilitates the process of accumulation in the private sector has also 
been strengthened in Norway as a result of the oil. The relative 
success of the Norwegian spinoff industries and the centralisation of 
private capital through the establishment of SAGA was mainly a result 
of state action.
10 For the only author who has tried to deal with this topic, see Noreng 
(1979).
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Footnotes 
Appendix A
1 Such an overview becomes a synthesis of one f s own historical under- 
standing of the oil industry. Because the data of this appendix is 
generally well known, the number of footnotes have been kept to a 
minimum. My overall view of the history of the industry has especially 
been influenced by Odell (1974b). Jacoby (1974), Evensen (1971), 
0*Connor (1955) and (1963), Chevalier (1974), Tanzer (1969), Penrose 
(1968). But whenever there is reference to the history of a particular 
geographic area or a particular problem we will make this clear in 
footnote form.
2 It should be noticed that Norway's historical relationship to the 
major companies in its capacity as a consumer country is not directly 
relevant for the purpose at hand and will therefore only be treated 
in passing.' All it may indicate, is something about the general level 
of influence that the international companies enjoyed in Norway in 
the period up to 1965.
3 One episode during this period brings out the strategic value of oil, 
which was to become of ever-increasing importance as time passed. 
Winston Churchill argued in Parliament in 1913, at the time the 
British Navy changed from coal to oil, in favour of the UK state's 
purchase of 51% of the shares of the Anglo-Persian Oil Corporation 
(later to become BP). He said, "We (the British - PN) must become 
owners, or at any rate the controllers, at the source of at least a 
proportion of the supply of natural oil we require"-(House of Commons, 
17 July 1913), quoted in Sampson (1975), p.55.
4 Two examples show collaboration or at least tacit 'accommodation' 
between imperial powers and institutions in their handling of oil 
issues. The Frontier Commission of the League of Nations which was 
arbitrating the conflict between Iraq and Turkey over Vilayet of 
Monsul in the 1930s refused to rule in favour of Iraq until the 
country concluded an oil agreement with IPC (which at the time 
consisted of Shell, BP, and Standard Oil of NY (now Exxon)),-quoted 
in Kubbah (1974), p.77. When the US companies tried to move into 
the Middle East after the First World War they met fierce opposition 
from the dominant UK interests in the area. Characteristically there 
were no attempts by the Americans to try to gain entrance by outbidding 
the British in terms offered to the Middle Eastern states (as happened
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later). Instead the main confrontation took place between the UK 
Foreign Office and the US State Department over the head of any 
producer state. There can be no better indication of the perceived 
irrelevance of the Third World nation state during this period.
5 For an overview of the history of the Mexican industry up to the 
early 1960s from a former Director General of PEMEX, see Bermtidez 
(1973). For a more critical assessment from a former World Bank 
economist, see Levy (1960).
6 O'Shaughnessy, H. (1976) provides a brief but extremely useful 
overview of all Latin American state oil corporations.
7 This was accomplished in the immediate post-war period when Exxon 
and Mobil joined the original partners of ARAMCO (Caltex and Socal) 
in a move which merged crude-short and crude-long companies.
8 Jacoby (1974), p.40. The seven companies referred to as 'The Seven 
Sisters 1 were: Esso (now Exxon), Shell, British Petroleum, Texaco, 
Gulf, Socal, Mobil. When the term 'major 1 is referred to, the French 
C.FoP. and US companies like Continental and Phillips are often 
included.
9 For a critical summary of the companies 1 behaviour during this period 
see UN European Commission Report (1954), "The price of oil in 
Western Europe". According to Penrose (1968) the report "caused 
considerable annoyance among the oil companies" (p.185). According 
to Hartshorn (1967), after this incident, the UN was "warned off oil" 
(p.286).
10 Jacoby (1974), Table 4.1, p.53.
11 Nelson (1963), pp. lOff, shows how concentration tends to decline 
in rapidly growing industries.
12 Blair (1978), having been associated with the drafting of the report, 
gives an 'inside 1 story of this particular incident. His Chapters 
2 and 3 are based primarily on material in that report (p.71).
13 Jacoby (1974), p.12.
14 There seems at a first glance to have been an important contrast 
between American international diplomacy, which directly and un- 
compromisingly supported the oil companies, and the stated action by 
the Federal Agencies which on a domestic level seemed to take a more 
critical attitude. But in view of the final outcome of the anti-trust 
case, this difference may turn out to be much less of a contradiction,
15 Jacoby (1974), p.248 (figures with respect to non-US, non-communist 
countries).
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16 ibid., p.211.
17 Due to the large percentage of energy needs satisfied by hydro- 
electric power, Norwegian demand was very much concentrated in 
relatively unusual items like heavy fuel oil and diesel.
18 For a short overview of Esso-Norge's history, see Norsk Esso (1974).
19 See for example the interpretation by Odell (1976), p.36. It was 
clearly in the interests of the companies that the State adopted the 
argument of 'security of supply'. This policy not only led to 
international expansion and supportive State diplomacy internation- 
ally, but also resulted in extremely profitable protective policies 
for their home operations.
20 For a summary of the Venezuelan case study see: Tugwell (1975) 
or Hein (1979). The latter concentrates more on the role of the 
labour unions in the history of the Venezuelan oil industry.
21 Evensen (1971), p.60.
22 ibid, pp.31 and 61.
23 US Senate Committee (1975), Introduction, p.2.
24 According to Szulz (1975) the six major US oil companies paid in 1973 
a total of $642 mill, in US taxes compared with their total net 
profits of $6.7 bill., a rate of taxation of 8.2% on gross profits 
(pp.67-68). The depletion allowance was during this period estimated 
to cost the US tax-payer $3.5 bill. p.a. in lost tax revenues, 
Barraclough (1975a), p.22. For a further critical view of what the 
US tax system in the oil industry has meant for the allocation of 
resources, see Adelman (1964).
25 An attitude put forward by Qdell (1975b), p.13.
26 For an introduction to the Iranian case study, involving a comprehen- 
sive bibliography, see Clawson (1979).
27 Johnsen (1968), p.13.
28 Nirumand (1967), p.34
29 Johnsen (1968), p.22.
30 ibid, p.25.
31 Kemit Roosevelt, CIA's head of station in Teheran during this period, 
admitted later that CIA had engineered Mossadeq's downfall. See: 
Julien (1968), p.315; Stocking (1970), p.156; Tanzer (1969), p.325; 
and Sampson (1975), p.127, for a confirmation of CIA's involvement.
32 According to one Vice-President of Standard Oil (New Jersey) the 
nationalization laws gave the consortium rights over Iranian oil
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which "were in no way inferior to real property rights". Quoted 
in Johnsen (1968), p.37. One should nevertheless note that the 
1954 terms were more favourable to Iran than those in operation 
before 1951.
33 In 1947 Western Europe had a refining capacity of 10.9 mill, tons 
with a total consumption of 37.1 mill, tons of refined products. 
By 1954 the area was self-sufficient in refined products. Quoted in 
Johnsen (1968), Chapter III.
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Footnotes 
Appendix B
1 Bye (1940), p.103. One should note that a number of neo-classical 
writers including Walras would agree with this statement.
2 For a clear summary of Marx's theory of rent, see Ball (1976). 
Marx's own views are set out in Marx (1969), Vol.2 Part VI and 
Marx (1969), Vol.2 Part 3. For a critical survey of marxist work 
undertaken in the field of rent, see Edel (1975).
3 Desai (1974), Chapter II.
4 Murray (1977) has stated, "In this essay I want to re-assert the 
importance of Marx's value theory for rent analysis and in doing so, 
to relate the issue of rent to the more general debate on value" 
(p.101).
5 It was a letter from Dr. P. Clawson, New School of Social Research, 
New York, that first alerted the author to this aspect of Marx's 
thinking. See also Clawson (1979), Part I.
6 Bye (1940), p.101.
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Footnotes 
Appendix C
1 Hulsey (1964), p.19.
2 Newendorp (1975), p.23.
3 Tanzer (1969) claims that the change in the investment criteria meant 
that the companies encouraged a 'quick kill mentality 1 . He gives an 
example whereby a company according to a discounted investment criter- 
ion would prefer a once and for all income of $40 mill, in year 1 to 
$15 mill, in perpetuity (Chapter 1). While his point is generally 
correct, his specific example makes no sense unless the chosen 
discount rate is revealed.
4 See for example a number of Norwegian White Papers connected to the 
oil industry, perhaps the clearest example being Ot.prp. no.26 (1974- 
75), Appendix I. Note that this does not contradict what was said 
earlier about the use of undiscounted figures which are being used 
alongside the IRR criteria.
5 See for example the reports from Wood MacKenzie stockbrokers in
Edinburgh, an example of which is reproduced in Petroleum Economist, 
December 1975.
6 Hulsey (1964), pp.23-24. This point tends to support Tanzer's 
argument presented in footnote 3 above.
7 Newendorp (1975), p.550.
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Footnotes 
Appendix D
* This appendix is based on a paper given to a conference organised 
at PNL by the London and South East Branch of the APTE in February 
1977 with the title "The role of the state in orthodox economic 
theory". The title of the conference was "The state and the economy".
1 Peacock and Wiseman (1961), p.12.
2 Johansen (1971), p.12.
3 Peacock and Wiseman (1961), p.12.
4 Samuelson (1973), p.160.
5 Peston (1972), p.12.
6 Davis (1975) is the only writer who has attempted to employ the
framework of externalities in the North Sea to analyse the situation 
for oil-producing states.
7 Peston (1972), p.14.
8 Robbins (1947), p.20.
9 Samuel son (1973), p.156.
10 Quoted in Bartlett (1973), p.9.
11 For a non-technical exposition see K. Arrow, 'Values and Collective 
Decision-making!, in Laslett and Runciman (1963).
12 Musgrave (1959), p.132.
13 See Buchanan and Tullock (1962).
14 Bartlett (1973), p.14.
15 For an analogous argument related to profit maximization see T,
Scitovsky in American Economic Association's Readings in Price Theory, 
1954.
16 For a pure description of this development see Gough (1973).
17 McCullock, p.298.
18 Wealth of Nations, Book IV, Chapter IX,
19 No writings of A. Wagner have been translated into English.
R. Goldscheid's 'A Sociological Approach to Problems of Public 
Finance' is found in Musgrave and Peacock (1958).
20 See J. Haines (1977), The Politics of Power CLondon; Jonathan Cape), 
Chapter 3.
21 Solo (1975), p.100.
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Footnotes 
Appendix E
1 The key references for this overview are Einarsen (1970) and 
Stonehill (1965).
2 Einarsen (1970), p.164.
3 SSB (1965), p.137.
4 From SSB: Credit Market Statistics and Census of Establishments, 
1963, quoted in Einarsen (1970), p.170.
Appendix G
1 PPS, May 1963, p.192.
2 See Oil on troubled water (1976), p.3, which makes a similar point
3 OGI, September 1964, pp.71-73.
4 IPR, May 1965, p.192.
5 The figure rose from 3% to 11%, CPA (1973), p.
6 IPR, September 1965, p.442,
Appendix H
1 Marx (1973), p.526.
2 ibid, p.530.
3 ibid, p.531.
4 ibid, p.532.
5 Altvater (1973). For an overview of his general thinking and 
its relevance to Norway, see the interview with him in Kontrast 
no.3-4, 1978, pp.82-89.
6 Altvater (1973), p.105.
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